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Abstract 
In contrast to theories which explain social reforms in terms of the 
{X>wer of individuals, structuralism focuses upon the role of the state in 
capitalist society. 'lbe state · is seen as plrIX>sive-rational, acting 
economically, to ensure the continued accumulation of capital, and/or 
IX>litically, to ensure the hegem:my of the bourgeiosie. According to this 
view all IX>wer resides within social stuctures, outside of the influence 
of working people, even as a class. '!bus state intervention in musing is 
presented as a deliberate strategy to incorIX>rate and thereby defuse 
working class pressure, with the intention of cementing existing economic 
relations. Recent roodifications to this radical perspective have suggested 
that classes do have {X>wer, and that {X>litical and ideological struggle 
can be constituted relatively autol1OIOOusly from economic relations. 
'lbe recent growth of state suPIX>rt for musing associations provides an 
opportunity to reevaluate these differing views of state intervention. Is 
state suPIX>rt for musing associations best explained in economic, 
political or ideological terms? 'lhe economic basis of musing association 
provision is not substantially different from local authority provision. 
Provision through associations is not cheaper than provision through 
local authorities, and both rely upon the private sector for muse 
building. In addition, there has been no discernable working class 
pressure for alternative tenure forms in this country since the 
comnencement of the municipal programne. Rather, an anlaysis of political 
debates on legislation relevant to musing associations demonstrates that 
supIX>rt is dependent upon the ideological attitudes of central government 
towards the relative desirability of private or plblic sector pcovision. 
'lbis has led to sharp party political differences in the tasks that 
associations have been encouraged to perform. These policy shifts have 
encouraged the association novement to develop a wide diversity of 
organisational forms which renders central government control of the 
novement problematical, and leads to wide variations in the relationship 
between local authorities and musing associations. '!he association 
novement thus has no clearly defined role, which leads it to muse people 
who are, on many social indicators, mid-way between owners and plblic 
tenants. 
'!bese findings suggest that an economically functionalist view of 
state intervention is incapable of explaining recent support for the 
housing association novernent. Rather, the p>licy seems nore consistent 
with a relative autonomy view of state intervention in which p>licies can 
plrsue p:>litical and ideological strategies. Until government p:>licies are 
related to crucial issues of mUSing production and consumption, and are 
as plrposive-rational as radical writers would have us believe, 
associations are likely to suffer considerable uncertainty as a result of 
ad hoc policy formation which leaves them in search of a distictive role. 
This work is dedicated to my father, 
who died from lung cancer less than 
one year ago. It is difficult for me 
to imagine a more debilitating and 
humiliating way to die. 
Acknowledgements 
In the course of nearly three years of research I have received the 
assistance of so many people that I soon realised that my acknowledgements 
might run into several pages. 'll1e decision was where to draw the line. I 
have decided that I should Irention those who have either devoted a 
significant aIOOunt of time to my work, or have been unusually generous in 
granting Ire access to information. 
Within my study boroughs I found the housing associations very willing 
to assist me. 'll1e following associations allowed Ire to discuss their work 
with them: Brent People's, Ccmnunity, Family, Guiness, New Islington and 
Hackney, Paddington Churches, St. Marylebone, Samuel Lewis, Sutton, Tennant, 
and World of People. I am especially grateful to Ms Petch at Catmunity 
Housing Association, Ms Elliott at samuel Lewis, and Me Daly at World of 
People Housing Trust. It was through these people that I was given 
permission to undertake an inspection of a sample of the tenant files of 
their housing associations. Both of the local authorities were also very 
helpful, and I would like to thank Janet Prendiville at westminster, and 
Ian Stuart at Islington. 
'Ine Housing Corporation was also helpful. I am grateful for the 
assistance of Ken Bartlett (Chief Officer of the Programme Division) and 
Jeff Wilton (Chief Officer of the Registration Division). I am glad that 
Richard Best, Director of the National Federation of Housing Associations, 
found the time to talk to Ire, and am grateful to Nigel King (their 
Information Officer) for allowing me to browse through their library. 
I would like to express my thanks to the Research Coomittee in the 
Faculty of Social Sciences at the Open University for supporting my work, 
and in particular for providing the money for a special tabulation of 1981 
Census data from the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. The 
Academic Computing Services staff saw Ire through many a trying rooment 
whilst I prepared my bibliography with the aid of the OUGOS progr~ and 
the thesis itself using meAL. Steve Daniels deserves particular credit 
here. 
Finally, there are my joint supervisors Linda McDowell and Chr is 
Hamnett. Linda McDowell provided valuable comments on advanced drafts of 
the thesis. Particular thanks go to Chris Hamnett, who took an active 
interest in my work from start to finish. Had he rot done so, and thereby 
given me an opportunity to discuss and develop my ideas, the thesis would 
almost certainly have taken longer to write. 
INDEX 
Page 
Chapter One: IN'rRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Thesis Cbjective 1 
1.2 The Increasing Significance of 
Housing Associations 6 
1.3 The legislative Background 8 
1.4 Structure of 'lhesis 9 
1.5 Conclusions 12 
Chapter Two: 'lHEX)RI£S OF STATE INTERVENfION IN HOUSING 13 
2.1 Introduction 13 
2.2 Theor ies of State Intervention 14 
2.3 State Intervention in Housing 25 
2.4 Central-Local Relations 38 
2.5 Conclusions 50 
Chapter Three: CEN'I'RAI., OOVERNMEN'!' SUPIQRT FOR 
ffJUSING ASSOCIATIONS 52 
3.1 Introduction 52 
3.2 Accumulation Explanations of State SupfX>rt for 
Housing Associations 62 
3.2.1 Building Iooustry Profitability 62 
3.2.2 The Reproduction of Labour Power 64 
3.3.3 Public Expenditure 66 
3.3 Organisational Explanations of State Support 
for Housing Associations 71 
3.4 The Changing Political aOO Ideological Basis of 
State Support for Housing Associations 75 
3.4.1 From Cost Rent to Rehabilitation 75 
3.4.2 The Role of Housing Co-operatives 96 
3.4.3 The Conservative Return to the 
Private Sector 100 
3.4.4 State Expenditure on Housing Associations 107 
3.5 Conclusions 110 
Chapter Four: INTRODUCTION '10 CASE STUDY OOROUGHS 113 
4.1 The Need for Empir ical Data 113 
4.2 The Selection of Study Areas 115 
Chapter Five: 'lHE roLICY 'IOOIS- 'lHE HOUSING OORroRATION 
AND HOUSING ASSOCIA'l'IONS 123 
5.1 Introduction 123 
5.2 The Housing Corporation: 
Power and Accountability 124 
5.3 Housing Allocation and the Role of 
Housing Associations 133 
5.4 Housing Association Allocation and 
Organisation 143 
5.4.1 Housing Association Constitutions 143 
Page 
5.4.2 Housing Associations in 
Islington and Westminster 148 
5.5 Conclusions 153 
Chapter Six: '!HE IMPACt OF lOCAL AlJI'HORITIES 00 
roLICY IMPLEMENl'A'l'ION 156 
6.1 Introduction 156 
6.2 The Range of Local Authority Attitudes TOwards 
Housing Associations 157 
6.3 Local Authority Expenditure Within the Greater 
London Area 163 
6.4 The Policies of Islington and Westminster 
TOwards Housing Associations 168 
6.4.1 Introduction l68 
6.4.2 Housing Need and Expenditure 170 
6.4.3 Housing Policy [X)cwrents 174 
6.4.4 Conclusions 183 
6.5 Conclusions 184 
Chapter Seven: ASSOCIATION TENANl'S: 
SOCONDARY STATISTICAL SOURCES 189 
7.1 Introduction 189 
7.2 Analysis of Income Levels 195 
7.3 SOcial Class and SOcio Economic Group 199 
7.4 Analysis of Household Characteristics 203 
7.5 Conclusions 209 
Chapter Eight: ASSOClA'rION TENANTS: 
PRIMARY STATISTICAL SOURCES 212 
8.1 Introduction 212 
8.2 Inspection of 'I'enant Files 214 
8.2.1 Participating Associations and Methodology 214 
8.2.2 Findings 217 
8.2.3 Conclusions 226 
8.3 SOcio-Economic Group of Association Tenants 227 
8.3.1 Purpose of Special Tabulation 227 
B.3.2 FWings 228 
8.3.3 Conclusions 240 
8.4 Conclusions 240 
Chapter Nine: cncLUSIONS 242 
9.1 The Nature of State Housing Policy Formation 242 
9.2 Tenure Neutral Housing Policy 248 
9.3 The Future for Housing Associations 252 
Appendix 1: Housing Associations in the Study Boroughs. 254 
Appendix 2: Analysis of H.S.I.P. Docwrents. 256 
Afpendix 3: Association Units Provided Through GLC Funding. 25~ 
Afpendix 4: Policy Docwrents of the Study Boroughs. 260 
Afpendix 5: Household Canposi tion in Study Boroughs. 262 
Page 
Afpendix 6: Results of Inspection of Tenant Files. 264 
Af.pendix 7: Socio-Economic Profile, by Tenure, in 
Kensington and Chelsea (198l). 270 
Appendix 8: Grouped Socio-Economic Profile, by 'l-enure, 
in England and Wales (1981). 272 
Bibliography 274 
LIS'l" OF TABLES 
No. 'l'itle Page 
1.1 Housing associations registered with the Housing 
Corporation (Great Britain, 1975-83). 7 
3.1 Housing association completions since the second 
world war (England). 54 
3.2 Public expenditure on the municipal programne and 
on housing associations (capital expenditure, 
£In cash prices). 68 
3.3 Housing association activity: rehabilitation as a 
percentage of total tenders and completions. 96 
3.4 Public expenditure on the municipal programne and 
.00 housing associations (£In cash pr ices) • 107 
3.5 Central and local expenditure on housing associations 
(£In cash pc ices) • 109 
4.1 canparison of tenure profile of wooon and England and 
Wales (1981). 116 
4.2 Factors considered in selecting shortlist for 
study ooroughs. 117 
4.3 Shortlisted study ooroughs: differences in 
age of head of household (1978). 118 
4.4 Shortlisted study ooroughs: differences in 
household type (1978). 119 
4.5 Shortlisted study ooroughs: differences in 
family type (1978). 119 
4.6 Shortlisted study ooroughs: differences in 
socio-economic group of head of household (1978). 120 
4.7 Shortlisted study boroughs: differences in 
emp10YJrent status of head of household (1978). J.20 
5.1 'l'otal approvals by type by unit for the 
years 1964 to 1983. 138 
5.2 Tenurial characteristics of total approvals for 
the years 1964 to 1983. 139 
5.3 Fair rent completions for the year 1982/83, by 
type by region. 146 
5.4 Allocation priorities of associations in 
study ooroughs. 149 
6.1 Percentage of households in each tenure 
(England and Wales). 163 
6.2 Percentage oouseholds by tenure by oorough 
(GI£ area). 165 
Page 
6.3 HSIP payrrents 1981-82 (GLC area) (£OOOs). 167 
6.4 Housing need in Islington and Westminster (1983). 170 
6.5 H.S.I.P. payrrents for Islington and Westminster 
(1982-83). 172 
6.6 Total expenditure on associations in the study 
boroughs, 1983/84 (excluding GLC expenditure) (£OOOs). 174 
7.1 Sample sizes in secondary sources. 194 
7.2 Household head income characteristics (1968). 196 
7.3 Household head income characteristics (1978). 197 
7.4 Household head income characteristics (1978). 198 
7.5 Social class of household head (1970). 199 
7.6 Socio-economic group of household head (1976). 200 
7.7 Socio-economic group of household head (1978). 201 
7.8 Household type (1978). 204 
7.9 Household type (1978). 205 
7.10 Household type (1981). · 206 
7.11 Dwelling size (1981). 207 
7.12 Household size (1981). 208 
7.13 Density of occupation (1981). 209 
8.1 Percentage of files supplying given information. 218 
8.2 Route to accOOl'OOClation. 218 
8.3 Comparison of allocation policies and tenant profiles 
of surveyed associations (by rank). 219 
8.4 Nominating agency. 220 
8.5 Date tenancy corrmenced (by association). 221 
8.6 Date tenancy ccmnenced (by borough). 221 
8.7 Household size (percentage). 222 
8.8 Age distr ibution (percentage). 222 
8.9 Age of household head (percentage). 223 
8.10 Sex of head of oousehold (percentage). 224 
8.11 Previous tenure. 225 
8.12 Elnploynent status. 225 
8.13 Der ivation of grouped socio-economic groups. 229 
8.14 Socio-economic profile, by tenure, in Islington (1981). 233 
8.15 Socia-economic profile, by tenure, in Westminster (1981). 234 
8.16 Compar ison of tenants of housing associations, and 
total population of Islington and Westminster (1981). 235 
8.17 COOlpar ison of socio-economic profile of different 
tenures in the combined London boroughs of Islington 
Page 
and westminster. 236 
FIGURE 
4.1 Location of study boroughs, and association stock. 122 
1. INTRODUcrION 
1.1 Thesis Objectives 
In 1961 a Conservative Government introduced legislation extending the 
scope of housing association activity, by creating an exchequer fum to 
proIOOte the provision of additional rented accornnodation. Only two decades 
have passed since then, yet the current Conservative Government is 
encouraging association tenants to . buy their properties. 'Ibis dramatic 
reversal of attitude by the Conservative Party in the Comnons has left 
Conservative Peers defending the ootion that the provision of rented 
accomnodation . is the principal p.1rpose of housing associations. 'Ibis 
di vergence of atti tudes between the Party in the Cornnons .~ the Lords has 
led the Lords to repeatedly reject clauses in government legislation 
relating to oousing associations. Conservative Peers have joined an 
alliance of Opposition Peers, and have struck out several~ clauses of the 
Housing and Building Control Bill which would have had the effect of 
extending the right to buy to charitable associations. Whilst the 
Conservative Party has a majority of nearly 150 in the Commons, the Lords 
has repeatedly rejected government legislation with majorities 
approaching 100. 
The troubled history of the Housing and Building Control Bill 
illustrates the existence of a variety of attitudes towards the role of 
housing associations, and raises crucial questions about the nature of 
state support for the IOOvement. First, why did the Conservative Government 
increase its support for associations in 1961? Was it to ensure the 
provision of housing for particular groups of people, or were associations 
perceived to have same organisational advantage over local authorities? 
Was provision by associations intended to compensate for the decline of 
privately rented accornnodation, or to provide a competitor to local 
authority housing departments? Secondly, if the Conservative Government 
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encouraged associations to provide rented accomnodation in 1961, why has 
the current Conservative Government switched its emphasis to encouraging 
ownership? Thirdly, what has been the reaction of the Labour Party to 
these initiatives, and why have Conservative Peers opposed Conservative 
Ministers on the recent legislation? This thesis seeks to answer these 
questions, and in doing so, to provide a re-evaluation of the rationale of 
state housing policy in general, through an examination of state policies 
towards housing associations. 
In order to understand why these changes in association activity have 
been proJOOted, it is necessary first to reconsider the reasons for the 
introduction of state subsidies in 1919. '!here are several conpeting 
explanations available. State housing can be seen as a politically neutral 
attempt to improve the living conditions of the working class. 
Alternatively, the provision of state housing can be perceived as an 
attempt to protect the operation of the capitalist system of production by 
granting material concessions to an organised working class. Another 
explanation is that state activity is primarily influenced by political 
forces rather than economic requirements. '!his would suggest that the 
reason for the introduction of state housing was mainly the ideological 
attitudes that it pronulgated. '!he last two explanations are similar, but 
vary in the ~rtance attatched to economic requirements and political 
and ideological pressures. The former holds suwort of the economic system 
to be the primary function of state activity, whilst the latter suggests 
that securing political hegemony is the primary function of the state. 
The recent growth of housing association provision, and the wealth of 
contemporary legislation and political debate on the JOOvement allows a re-
evaluation of theor ies of state housing policy. To date JOOst academic 
studies have been primarily concerned with the introduction of subsidised 
state housing in the early twentieth century. Duncan (1981) has pointed 
out that many of these studies adopt an economically functionalist model 
of the state. '!his approach suggests that all state policy is determined 
by the need to proJOOte capital accurmJlation, and that the state 
manipulates social policy, and social classes, to achieve this end. 
Alternatively, writers such as Byrne and Darner (1980) incorporate a theory 
of the relative autonomy of the state, and argue that legislation reflects 
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the balance of class forces. This suggests that short term economic goals 
may become subordinate to the need to protect political stability. Support 
for accumulation remains the long term goal of the state, but the autonomy 
of politics and economics permits the state to adopt political strategies 
to secure the long term domination of private accumulation processes. 
Until recently, few authors have considered the ideological and political 
significance of housing policy. Swenarton (1981) has described the 
introduction of municipal subsidies as an ideological strategy intended 
to proroote the concept of the benign welfare state, capable of fulfilling 
the aspirations of the working class. In this approach, the dissemination 
of ideological attitudes supportive of the existing economic or social 
structure becomes the primary p,lrpose of state intervention, at times 
relegating economic policies to a secondary role. Ball (1983) and English 
(1982b) characterise current Conservative thinking towards council 
housing as ideological. In spite of the increasing sofbistication of 
analysis of state intervention in housing, in 1983 the National Federation 
of Housing Associations (1983, p.G) suggested that 
"The Housing Association f.k>vement is 'political' in that its 
work affects the comnunity at large and is greatly influenced by 
government policy. But it has no Party Political affiliations. 
Its positive aims have appealed to those across the spectrum of 
British politics- and to those with little or no interest in 
political issues. Indeed, the f.k>vement has been dependent upon 
its cross-party support for its remarkable growth over the last 
decade." 
This oversimplifies the nature of Party political support for the 
association IOOvement. Such oversirrplification is hardly surprising, for 
the National Federation would not wish to expose political differences 
that do exist for fear of prejudicing future political support for the 
movement. This thesis will examine state policies towards housing 
associations in order to advance the debate on the rationale of state 
intervention. '!be analysis will be undertaken on several levels. First, the 
policies of central government and their underlying political rationale 
will be considered. On the one hand, central government support for the 
association IOOvement may be seen to have functional objectives, such as 
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increasing building industry profitability, securing the reproduction of 
essential labour power, or facilitating better ' control of public 
expenditure on housing. Alternatively, support for associations may result 
from perceived inadequacies in the performance of local authority housing 
departments- an organisational approach. Another possibility is that 
associations were perceived as representing non government housing 
provision, and by conpeting with local authorities in the supply of rented 
accommodation, were intended to provide alternatives to municipal housing 
activity. 
Secondly, the structure of the housing association Irovement and the 
objectives of a sample of individual associations will be examined, in 
order to outline the differences between associations and local authority 
housing departments. 'Ibis will suggest the extent to which associations 
are intending to, or are able to, fulfill tasks which local authorities 
have traditionally performed. If housing associations are not intended to 
replace municipal activity, how can we categorise their relationship with 
local authorities? Thirdly, local authority attitudes to housing 
associations and the different relationships between local authorities 
and housing associations will be considered. 'llle extent to which this 
relationship varies between areas, and as a result of local political 
control, will suggest the extent to which central government is capable of 
dictating the activities of housing associations. Finally, the tenant 
composition of housing associations will be examined. Over the last 
decade, various studies have attenpted to determine the social composition 
of housing association tenants. Most of these studies rely upon small 
sample sizes, or were undertaken by a body with a vested interest in their 
findings. In order to rectify this, an inspection of the tenant files of a 
sample of housing associations will be undertaken, and a special 
tabulation of socio-economic data from the 1981 Census is used. In order 
to provide detailed examples the relationships between associations and 
two inner London Boroughs will be explored. 
It will be argued that variation exists at all levels. Government 
policies have changed over time, reflecting changing ideological attitudes 
towards the legitimate extent of state intervention. In the 1960s 
associations were prorroted by a Conservative Government as a private 
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sector solution to the decline in the supply of privately rented 
accommodation, in order to reduce the need for municipalisation policies. 
The following Labour Government preferred rehabilitation to new provision, 
and encouraged associations to house poorer privately rented tenants by 
undertaking rehabilitation from 1967. Labour legislation in 1974 
reinforced this approach. Furthermore, the powers of the Housing 
Corporation to supervise housing associations were increased, and an 
increase in subsidies made available to associations made the rovement 
appear rore like a part of the p.lblic sector. Dunleavy (1980, p.52-3) 
defines p.lblic sector provision through the notion of 'collective 
consumption'. 'Ibis definition illustrates the corrplex nature of 
association provision. Under the 1961 and 1964 Housing Acts association 
provision could be regarded as a part of the private sector, for economic 
renting was allocated according to ability to pay, and no contribution 
from taxation was made to the rovement (subsidies only being granted 
through authorised arrangements at that stage). Under the 1974 Housing Act 
increasingly large subsidies allowed associations to allocate according 
to need rather than ability to pay, rendering association provision rore 
like rrunicipal provision, and hence a part of the p.lblic sector [1] • 
When re-elected in 1979, the Conservative Government showed less 
enthusiasm for associations, and included them in the legislation which 
applied the right to buy to local author i ties. 'Ibe apparently smooth 
development of legislation relating to housing associations thus hides a 
significant Party Political division. Associations have evolved very 
different constitutions and practices, partly as a result of these 
changes. Such is the extent of variation between associations that it is 
difficult to infer their management practices without ~ertaking a 
direct survey of their tenants. Local authorities also vary in their 
attitudes towards associations. Some offer very little support, whilst a 
few spend the vast majority of their Housing Strategy and Investment 
Programne allocation on associations. The quantity of nominations required 
[1] The corrplex nature of association provlslon means that ambiguities 
still exist however, for Dunleavy suggests that 'collective' 
provision is a conponent of a definition of state provision. Is 
provision by over 2,000 associations which are not directly 
accountable to an elected body 'collective'? 
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by local authorities in return for this assistance also varies 
considerably. Given the extent of all of this variability, the concept of 
central government p..1rsuing economically functionalist goals is 
untenable. Rather, it will be argued that central government policies 
towards housing associations reflect ideological attitudes towards 
property ownership and control (the equity created by association 
schemes), and the legitimate role of local authority activity (the extent 
to which associations compete with or assist local authority provision). 
1.2 The Increasing Significance of Housing Associations 
The recent growth of the association roovernent has been dramatic, and 
represents the beginning of a significant change in tenure structure in 
this oountry. '!he future rourse of the developnent of the housing 
association roovement will have tmportant ~lications for the scale and 
role of nunicipal provision. During the nineteenth century legislation 
first regulated the private provision of housing, and later permitted 
local authorities to provide unsubsidised housing. Even by 1914, however, 
p..1blic provision of rented housing was negligible; some 90% of all 
accorrmodation was privately rented. Central government subsidies were 
introduced in 1919, and from this date accomnodation rented from a local 
authority grew in nllltbers. Although the 1919 Housing Act permitted the 
granting of subsidies to housing associations, until recently they played 
only a small part in the provision of housing. Nearly all accorrmodation 
produced with the aid of government subsidies was provided by local 
authorities. This position changed in the mid 1960s, and by "1982/83 roore 
than half net capital p.lblic housing expenditure was channelled through 
housing associations" (Arden, 1983, para.5, p.vii). From 1945 to 1963 
housing associations rorrpleted an average of just over 2,600 units per 
annum. Between 1964 and 1982 four times as many uni ts were corrpleted; an 
average of nearly 11,000 units per annum. In 1962 there were 891 
associations registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act. 
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By 1972 there were 3,709 [2J • The Housing Corporation began registration 
in 1974. By 1983 2,771 associations were registered with it (see table 1.1). 
These changes have been the direct consequence of an increase in 
central government support for the rrovement. In 1982-83 associations 
received £680m from central government (and a further £110m through local 
authorities). 'Ibis represents 56% of the total arrount spent on state 
housing (£1410m) [3] • Only six years earlier association expenditure 
conprised only 25%. We are witnessing the growth of a new tenure. Yet in 
1978 the National Federation of Housing Associations (1978a, p.iv) 
suggested that "there are few achievements of Housing Associations that, 
in a perfect world, could not have been acconplished by local authorities" . . 
This thesis is concerned with examining the reasons why successive 
governments have contributed to the growth of housing associations rather 
than changing the nature of rrunicipal provision. 
~LE 1.1 Housing associations registered with the 
Housing Corporation (Great Britain, 1975-83). 
Year Nl.D1lber 
1975 28 
1976 1,561 
1977 2,344 
1978 2,635 
1979 2,765 
1980 2,941 
1981 3,068 
1982 3,020 
1983 2,721 
Source: Interview with Chief Development Officer of 
the Housing Corporation (December, 1983). 
Note: Figures are as at March 31st each year. 
------------------
, 
[2] National Building Agency (1974, p.7). Sane of these associations had 
oot umertaken any activity; this helps to explain the relatively 
small nlJl'lt)er of associations registered with the Housing Corporation. 
[3] This does oot include tax relief on rrortgage interest payments by 
owner occupiers (see section 3.2.3, chapter 3). 
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1.3 The Legislative Backgrourrl 
Goverrunent support for housing associations began in 1866, when the 
Labouring Classes Dwelling Houses Act permitted the granting of loans to 
housing associations. When subsidies were introduced for state housing in 
the 1919 Housing, Town Planning etc Act, local authorities were permitted 
to pass them on to housing associations. '!his system became known as 
"authorised arrangements" between a local authority and an association. 
'!he 1957 Housing Act defined a housing association as a society, body of 
trustees or a corrpany established for the p.lrpose of providing or 
improving housing, and which does oot trade for profit, or whose rules 
prohibit the issue of capital with a dividerrl exceeding a rate of interest 
specified by the Treasury. Despite this defining legislation, the 
relationship between local authorities and housing associations was oot 
altered until the Conservative Government passed the 1961 Housing Act. 
'!his introduced two important changes. First, an exchequer furxl of £25m was 
established for the granting of loans to housing associations which 
provided accomnodation at economic rents. Secondly, the system whereby 
subsidies could be passed to associations by a local author i ty was 
extended to permit authorised arrangements between the Minister and an 
association, thereby allowing the possibility that local authorities could 
be excluded from this process. 
The Conservative Goverrunent followed this initiative with the 1964 
Housing Act which created the Housing Corporation to oversee and promote 
the activity of housing associations. The Act also permitted associations 
with restricted meni:>ership (co-ownerships) to receive government 
assistance. In 1967 the Labour Housing Subsidies Act strengthened the 
scope for associations to urxlertake rehabilitation work by including 
acquisition costs in subsidy calculations. The next legislation to affect 
housing associations was the Conservative 1972 Housing Finance Act. '!his 
created the centralised 'new build subsidy', distributed by the Housing 
Corporation. '!he Act . also applied fair rents and rent allowances to 
housing associations (other than oo-ownerships). Fair rents are an 
economic rent which asswnes that there is 00 greater demand for any given 
property than there is a supply of that type of property. These rents are 
8 
registered by a government appointed rent officer, and rent setting was 
thus taken out of the control of housing associations. Rent allowances are 
a rreans tested subsidy towards the consumption cost of housing, and their 
application to housing associations automatically granted subsidies to 
many of their poorer tenants. 
In 1974 the Labour Housing Act created the register of housing 
associations at the Housing Corporation, and thenceforth only registered 
housing associations were permitted to receive financial assistance from 
the governrrent [4] • 'lhe Act also changed the subsidy system, introducing 
the 'housing association grant', the system in operation today. 
The Conservative 1980 Housing Act brought many changes to the 
activities of housing associations. ~st significantly, it granted the 
'right to buy' to the tenants of non-charitable housing associations. The 
Act also applied controls to the auditing of association accounts by the 
Housing Corporation, the payment of lOOney to comnittee members of 
associations, and the {Xlblishing of their allocation priorities. Finally, 
the current Conservative Governrrent introduced the 1982 Housing and 
Building Control Bill which sought to apply the right to buy to the 
tenants of charitable housing associations. 'lhis clause was defeated in 
the House of Lords and remains uninplerrented [5] • 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter two discusses different theories of the function of state 
intervention in general, and intervention in housing in particular. It 
considers functional theory and its modification by concepts of relative 
autonomy and working class pressure. Central-local governrrent 
relationships are considered as a factor which questions the viability of 
central functionalist policy. 
[4] Sehedu1e 5 of the 1975 Housing Rents and Subsidies Act created a new 
section 17(5) in the 1974 Act which permitted local authorities to 
lend money to unregistered self-build associations. 
[5] 'lhe Bill has been reintroduced by the Conservative Governrrent with a 
clause which will give these tenants the money to {Xlrchase 
alternative accomnodation; see WeImar, 1984. 
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Studies of the introduction of state subsidies are considered, and then 
contrasted with organisational approaches (which posit rore complex 
relationships between different parts of the state apparatus) • 
Contemporary neo-Marxist literature is considered, this suggesting that 
political pressures at the local level are significant influences upon 
local policy making, and may lead to constraints upon the forll1llation of 
central government policy. 
This discussion suggests that a focus upon central economic objectives 
is inadequate, and that an analysis of politics (and ideology) and the 
interaction between different levels of government is necessary in order 
to obtain a full understanding of the feasible objectives of central 
government policies. The remainder of the thesis sets out to use the 
example of state support for housing associations to further consider this 
debate. 
Chapter three comnences by outlining the rationale of state support for 
associations in the nineteenth century in order to provide a background 
for subsequent discussion. '!be focus then IOOves forward to the twentieth 
century. Economically functionalist explanations are outlined and 
criticised. Organisational explanations are outlined and criticised. It is 
argued that an alternative explanation is required, and political debates 
and legislative measures relevant to housing associations since 1961 are 
critically analysed in order to provide a political and ideological 
explanation. 
Chapter four introduces the case study boroughs of Islington and 
Westminster. The reasons for considering association activities in 
specific areas are explained, and the process whereby the study boroughs 
were selected is described. 
Chapter five considers the constitution and evolution of the functions 
of the Housing Corporation, and the growth of the housing association 
IOOvement. It is argued that the different attitudes of the main political 
Parties are reflected in the changing duties of the Corporation, and the 
ambivalent attitude of sucoesive governments to the association movement 
has resulted in a surprising degree of central financial control. '!be 
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variety of tasks being undertaken by associations in the study boroughs is 
discussed, and it is concluded that changes in goverrunent policies over 
time have led to the existence of wide variations in the constitutions and 
practices of individual associations. It is therefore difficult to predict 
the allocational practices of associations. The implications of this for 
the functional theory of the reproduction of labour power are outlined. 
Chapter six theoretically analyses the possible range of relationships 
between a housing association and a local authority. It is argued that 
local authorities may perceive associations as having 00 role, as 
supplementing, corcplementing or replacing nunicipal activity. '!be case 
study boroughs will be discussed as an illustration of manifestations of 
these relationships. It is concluded that local authorities can influence 
association activity to an extent that is inconpatible with centrally 
functionalist policies. 
Chapter seven reviews existing research on the tenant profile of 
housing associations, and conpares their tenant structure with that of 
local authority housing. Existing research suggests that association 
tenants are drawn from higher socio-economic groups than local authority 
tenants. Conpared to the total population, housing association tenants are 
biased towards lower socio-economic groups than one would expect on a 
proportionate basis. Conparing associations with the total population, 
their households are smaller and younger than one would expect. Although 
suggesting that associations perform a reasonably distinct role, these 
sources of data suffer from several problems. First, the JOOst recent direct 
survey of association tenants was carr ied out six years ago. Secondly, the 
sample sizes in the surveys are very small. '!birdly, some of the surveys 
only studied specific types of associations, and thus lose generality. 
Despite increasing government support for housing associations, very 
little reliable information on their tenants has been collected. 
Chapter eight provides reliable data on the tenant profile of housing 
associations in inner London in two ways. First, by a direct survey of the 
tenant files of a sanple of associations operating in Islington and 
Westminster. Secondly, by a special tabulation of data from the 1981 Census 
showing the socio-economic group of association tenants in the study 
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boroughs. The files on association tenants suggests that associations are 
housing a distinctive ' group of people; generally smaller and younger 
households than one would expect on a proportionate basis. It is clear 
from the way in which the data is collected that it is not possible for 
associations to rronitor their allocational performance on the basis of 
tenant files. The special tabulation of Census data suggests that 
association tenants are generally drawn from higher socio-economic groups 
than local author i ty tenants. Despi te this relati ve difference, in 
absolute terms, association tenants are closest to nunicipal tenants. This 
suggests that housing associations complement the role of local 
author i ties. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Chapter nine concludes that it is necessary to focus upon policy 
formulation and implementation in order to fully understand the nature of 
state intervention. Housing policy formation in this country is largely a 
process of ad hoc reaction to economic or political circumstances. Changes 
in the nature of housing production and consunption require well developed 
strategies, rather than ideological commitments to existing tenure forms. 
Successive governments have vacillated between support of p.1blic and 
pri vate sector solutions to housing needs. Housing associations house 
people who are socio-economically between owners and p.1blic renters, yet 
this is not the result of a p.1rposive-rational strategy. Rather, it is the 
resul t of the fact that the association rroverrent has also developed in an 
ad hoc manner, and is still in need of explicit testable objectives in 
terms of housing allocation, production and consl.JIl1?tion. Such explicit 
objectives will offer associations a role distinct from that of private 
sector and nunicipal housing. This is inportant if the rrovement is to 
secure a specific role in housing provision which is capable of 
withstanding the ideological predilictions of the main political Parties 
for previously existing tenure forms • 
• 
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2. 'IHEORIES OF STATE INTERVENTION IN HOUSING 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to understand why central government assistance to housing 
associations increased dramatically in the 1960s it is necessary first to 
provide a theoretical explanation of state intervention in general, and 
intervention in housing in particular. This will be undertaken in terms of 
the contemporary neo-Marxist debate on the nature of state intervention, 
for this approach has been widely applied to explain the introduction of 
municipal housing at the beginning of the century, and Swenarton (1981) 
has recently discovered information in Parliamentary debates 00 the 
introduction of state subsidies which explicitly acknowledge the 
political objectives behind government policies. The precise objectives of 
individual policies is a matter of some debate. It is possible to argue, as 
Swenarton does, that state intervention is intended to serve political and 
ideological ends, but most neo-Marxist work stresses the economic 
functions of state intervention (such as the reproduction of labour power 
through housing). This thesis is primarily concerned with evaluating the 
relative merits of these approaches through an analysis of contemporary 
state support for housing associations. Other approaches are considered 
(see sections 2.3 and 2.4 below, and section 3.3, chapter 3), but these do 
not seem to offer such explanatory power. Public housing policies have 
traditionally been implemented by local authorities under legislation 
enacted by Parliament. Central government support for housing associations 
has begun to change this relationship. It is impossible to explain this 
change in the form and nature of public housing intervention without 
providing a theoretical context for these activities. This entails a 
theory of the central state urrler capitalism, and a study of central-local 
government relationships. As Jessop (1982, p.223) puts it, "concern with 
the exact institutional forms of political representation and state 
intervention is crucial". 
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This chapter begins with a brief survey of theories of central state 
intervention, followed by an explanation of housing intervention in these 
terms. Finally, the complexity of central-local government relationships 
will be considered. Subsequent chapters will evaluate the extent to which 
these theories provide an adequate umerstanding of the attitude of 
central and local government towards housing associations, a subject 
rarely considered in existing studies of state intervention in housing. 
2.2 Theories of State Intervention 
Gough (1979, chapter 1) contrasts two explanations of state activity: 
functionalist and pluralist. Gough (p.8) describes functionalism as 
follows: 
"Functionalist theories of the welfare state objectify all 
processes within society and see policy developnents as a 
passi ve response to these social or oon-social forces. There is 
no room here for humans as active, initiating groups helping to 
shape their own history." 
Pluralistic theories, on the other hand, concentrate exclusively upon 
individuals, both in the formation of policies (people of influence) and 
the ferception of problems. 'n1ere is 00 synthesising theory of state 
activity. ·The task then is to develop a theory which is capable of 
incorporating the structural economic constraints of capitalism, and the 
dynamic forces present in the relations between social classes. As Gough 
(1979, p.lO) fXJts it: 
"existing theories of the welfare state are fatally weakened by 
their insistence on either the objective or the subjective 
element in understanding human history in general and welfare 
developnents in particular. Consequently, neither can adequately 
grasp their interrelation in the historical process." 
The debate within contemporary Marxism also revolves arouoo the / 
question of the significance of structure/economy and 
individual/politics. Sauooers (1982, p.48) provides a useful sumnary. 
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Theories vary in the importance attatched to the political and the 
economic. At one extreme, 'instrumentalism,leconomism' suggests that state 
activity is determined by economic requirements. lhe 'relative autonomy' 
approach suggests that there is an autonomy between political and economic 
forces. State activity responds to both pressures. Political pressures 
represent classes and therefore economic interests, so the autonomy is not 
complete. At the other extreme, 'state derivationism' suggests that 
politics and economics are completely autonomous. 
In order to address this debate it is necessary to consider what is 
meant by economic and political forces. Economically functionalist 
theories focus upon the primacy of 'accUl'llllation'. Gough (1979, p.lS) 
defines accUltUllation through the Marxist notion of 'exploitation': 
"Exploi tation refers to the process whereby... the dominant 
class, extracts surplus labour from ••• the subordinate class. 
That is, the total labour of the latter class produces a social 
product, part, and only part, of which is returned to, or 
retained by, that class in the form of conswnption goods." 
The perpetuation of capitalist relations depends on the extraction of 
surplus value. As Gough (1979, p.25) puts it: 
"The surplus product or, in its capitalist form, surplus value 
provides the wherewithal for extra neans of production ••• It is 
thus the sine qua ron for the renewed accumulation of capital." 
Cockburn (1977, p.5ln) suggests that state intervention is designed to 
promote the extraction of surplus value, and analyses state intervention 
as assistance to capitalist production, and assistance to capitalist 
reproduction. The forner may be direct, as in the case of contracts with 
the private sector for the provision of 'public' goods (such as housing), 
or ind irect, as in the case of social pol icies implerrented in order to 
maintain the value of labour power. Of the reproduction of labour power, 
Gough (1979, p.2l) says that 
"the value of labour power rust suffice, rot only to 'produce' 
the worker, but also to reproduce the next generation of 
workers, the future working class." 
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The demands for skilled labour mean that this is an ever JOOre demanding 
task. According to Cockburn (1977, p.54) the reproduction of labour power 
"goes on mainly outside the firm. It occurs on the whole by 
giving people wages so that they can do it for themselves ••• But 
capital needs labour that is skilled and appropriate to the job 
••• The state therefore takes steps, on behalf of the capitalist 
class collectively, to do the job of extended reproduction: to 
plan for and provide education, housing, health arrl social 
services for the country as a whole. II 
As an aspect of state policy, the focus upon housing is thus the 
extended reproduction of labour power. Since this awroach defines 
assistance to accl.DlUlation as the primary task of state intervention, it 
is clear that state assisted housing provision rust be urrlertaken in a way 
which does not fundamentally threaten private profitability. This is done 
by relying on private sector institutions for the i.nplementation of 
policy- private building companies and private financing agencies- whilst 
public agencies are responsible only for organising the housing programme. 
According to Cockburn, reproduction also involves ideological 
indoctrination of the benefits of capitalist social relations, and 
repression through the state apparatus, such as the judiciary. 
O'Connor (1973) develops a typology of state expenditure which reflects 
a similar functional ist view of the state. SOCial investment is (p.7) 
expenditure which "consists of projects and services that increase the 
productivity of a given amount of laborpower arrl, other factors being 
equal, increase the rate of profit". This is divided into r;:hysical capital 
(for exanple, infrastructure) and human capital (for exanple, research and 
developnent). SOCial consUJTption is expenditure which (p.7) lowers "the 
reproduction costs of labor and, other factors being equal, increase the 
rate of profit" (housing is an often cited example, but see Pickvance, 
1980, discussed below in section 3.2.2, chapter 3). SOCial expenses is (p.7) 
expenditure "required to maintain social harmony- to fulfill the state's 
'legitimization' function" (including the state repressive awaratus, such 
as the judiciary). 
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Jessop (1977) describes the main political functions of the state as 
being either: a means of securing social cohesion (in the work of 
Poulantzas); an instrument of class rule (Miliband); or the facilitator of 
the domination of the bourgeoisie (neo-Gramsci). Miliband explains the 
class bias of the state as resulting from three factors: first, the 
personnel of the state are drawn from the capitalist class; secondly, the 
capitalist class can exercise power through its control of economic 
resources; thirdly, there are structural constraints by virtue of being 
located in the capitalist mode of production. Most of the other approaches 
adopt various forms of functionalism, in which abstract necessities of 
state activity are in some way pre-given and pre-determine state policy. 
These theories are rovel, within Marxism, in that they argue that the 
political activity of the state is rot directly pre-determined by economic 
necessities (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978, p.3). To what extent is the 
nature of housing intervention shaped by political needs (working class 
pressure or ideological attitudes towards tenures) or economic needs (the 
need to promote accunulation)? In order to address this question it is 
necessary to establish how functionalist theory can be adapted to 
incorporate the rotion of the autonomy of social relations. In 1977 Clarke 
raised this question: 
"The crucial problem for Marxists is that of theor ising the 
institutional separation of the state from capitalist 
enterprises, the p:>litical separation of the state from the 
capitalist class, the differentiation and fragmentation of 
social classes, the representati ve relations between classes 
and p:>litical parties, and the limits of state intervention, 
without losing the fundamental Marxist premise of the capital 
relation as principle of the unity of the social formation." 
(p.3) 
Clarke concluded, analysing the work of Poulantzas, that no 
satisfactory solution to this problem had been fourrl. According to 
Saurrlers (1983, p.100) this is still the main area of controversy within 
Marxismw and Poulantzas argues that 
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"The problem still remains, how to find the specificity and the 
autonomy without falling into the absolute autonomy of 
politics." 
It is necessary to consider this issue, for it marks an attempt to 
incorporate economic and political analysis within one overall theory. 
Before discussing the work of Poulantzas, it is worth considering the 
drift away from economism explained by l-buffe (1979) • '!he Second 
International regarded revolution as an inevitable consequence of 
economic tendencies: increasing industrial concentration, overproduction 
and proletarianisation. As Mouffe (1979, p.174) observes, since the 
collapse of capitalism "was seen as merely the result of the play of 
economic forces, the latter were considered all the elements necessary to 
explain the historical process. As a consequence, political and 
ideological factors sinply became epiphenomena". It was in response to the 
inability of this approach to explain specific historical events (notably 
the Russian revolution), that Grarnsci wrote his Prison Notebooks. The key 
concept employed is that of 'hegemony', and Mouffe (1979, p.195) defines a 
class as being hegemonic "when it has managed to articulate to its 
discourse the overwhelming majority of ideological elements 
characteristic of a given social formation". 'lhis approach correctly 
recognises that the state cannot mechanistically and unproblematically 
implement policies which promote the interests of the capitalist class as 
a whole. Different fractions of capital benefit from different types of 
government assistance, and policies which explicitly damage the interests 
of the working class may lead to political protest. '!he state seeks to 
avoid such conflicts because they raise the issue of the distribution of 
power within society. The work of Gramsci thus develops the concept of the 
relative autonomy of the political and the ideological from the economic, 
and the argument that there is no necessary correspondence between social 
groups in the political and ideological field and classes in the economic. 
Grarnsci thus provides the basis of a theory which recognises (relatively 
indepeOOent) economic and political influences on state activity. '!he 
state therefore has the dual role of ensuring conditions favourable for 
the I::x:>urgeoisie in general (specifically for the accunulation of capital), 
whilst responding to and accomnodating political demands. Poulantzas also 
utilises these concepts by combining structural elements and a theory of 
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relative autonomy. Poulantzas argues that the distinguishing feature of 
capitalist society is that economic processes have such internal 
discipline that the state does not need to intervene in them. As Jessop 
(1982, p.161) puts it 
"the political region is able to monopolise and 
constitutionalise the use of coercion and to specialise for the 
first time in the global political function of maintaining 
cohesion rather than being directly irrplicated in the 
organisation of the labour process and the appropriation of 
surplus-labour. n 
Similarly Clarke (1977,p.9) says 
"The economic level is thus the technical realm of production, 
and the political and ideological levels are the social realm 
which establishes the social conditions of material 
reproduction. " 
This then is the autonomy of the political and the economic. Political 
domination is achieved juridicially and politically ~ treating people as 
individual subjects with individual rights (the 'isolation effect'). 
Poulantzas denies any rigid class correspondence. In similar fashion, 
ideology is seen as an area of conflict. A particular dominant ideology is 
not a simple creation of the dominant class, it contains elements of the 
conf licting ideo log ies of all classes. This is necessary if ideology is to 
achieve the political task of unifying disparate social classes. 
Hall, Lumley and McLennan (1978, p.65n) note the debt that Poulantzas 
owes to Gramsci in his forrrulation of the concept of ideology, and they 
argue (p.53) that for Gramsci 
"Ideology is principally regarded as the 'cement' which holds 
together the structure (in which economic class struggle takes 
place) and the realm of the conplex superstructures. Yet whether 
and to what extent ideologies succeed in performing this role is 
never pre-g i ven. " 
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Poulantzas thus presents a set of ideologies, each corresponding to 
specific class interests. These sets of ideas are constantly competing 
with each other (Clarke, Connell and McDonough, 1978). Where does this 
leave the function of the state? As Clarke (1977, p.13) {Xlts it 
"The state is not defined with reference either to the 
'economic' level or to the dominant class ••• the state continues 
• to be a class state because the social formation whose unity it 
maintains is a social formation in which a particular class is 
dominant." 
Here Poulantzas lapses back into the structuralist argument that the 
nature of the state apparatus, and its relation to the dominant class, 
determines the outcome of its policies. Domination is thus seen as a 
structural {tlenomenon. As Poulantzas {Xlts it when discussing ideology 
(1968, p.209) 
"the ideological (i.e. a given ideology) is constituted as a 
regional instance within the unity of the structure1 and this 
structure has the domination of a given class as its effect in 
the field of the class struggle. '!be dominant ideology, by 
assuring the practical insertion of agents in the social 
structure, aims at the maintenance (the cohesion) of this 
structure, and this means aOOve all class domination and 
exploitation. " 
References to 'structure' and 'effect' clearly signify the use of 
structural fuoctionalism. To ensure hegeJOOny, the state nust be relatively 
autonorrous from all classes; it merely re-presents the power of the 
dominant class. For (Poulantzas, 1967, p.67), 
"if in general the politically dominant ideology in a formation 
is that of the politically dominant class, this is not because 
it can be identified with some political will of the class-
subject as if ideologies were 'political' nlJltDer-plates social 
classes wore on their backs1 it is because the dominance of this 
ideology is related to the set of objective (X)-()rdinates which 
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result in a given political domination, a given class State, and 
a given dominant ideology." 
Poulantzas offers little on the way in which the functional 
requirements of this structure can be reconciled with his assertions on 
the oonflict between classes in and through the state. Harloe (1978, 
p.593), in his discussion of the 1977 Consultative Document on Housing 
Policy, suggests that 
"a tightly functional, economistic analysis of the relation 
between the State and capital accumulation relates awkwardly, if 
at all, to a theory of society which emphasises the bqportance 
of economic, political and ideological factors and of 
oontradictory, class-based processes and to a theory of the 
State which envisages it as 'managing', more or less effectively, 
this oorrplex si tuation to achieve the dual goal of 
accumulation/legitimation." 
Rather than lapse into a structural-functionalist explanation, 
contenporary neo-Marxist analysis nust seek to define the relationship 
between the economic and political objectives of state intervention. As 
Clarke, Connell and McDonough (1978, p.12l-2) point out 
"the 'primacy' of the economic in Marxist theory must be thought 
in a more persistent and active way than its reduction to the 
'matr ix' of structures by Poulantzas \liQuId seem to allow. The 
difficulty of thinking (sic) ideology adequately is the task of 
holding this extended oonception of the economic without 
allowing further analysis to lapse back into vulgar economism 
in which ideology and politics are treated as mere reflective 
epiphenomena. " 
Clarke (1977, p.23) ~ts it forthrightly: 
"The juxtaposition of a structural theory and a class theory of 
the state in Poulantzas's \liQrk is 00 doubt the basis of its 
appeal to Marxists. The concept of 'conjuncture', which marks the 
junction between the two, is also the most anDiguous ooncept in 
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Poulantzas's work." 
Saunders (1983, p.SO) also points to the difficulty of reconciling 
relative autonomy and economic determination: 
"Poulantzas insists that the role of the capitalist state rust 
be to maintain the interests of the dominant class in the long 
run, even at the expense of short term concessions ••. however, he 
also insists that the state is a condensation of political class 
struggles and that its policies at anyone time will reflect the 
balance of power between the classes. The problem which he fails 
to address is how the varying fortunes of class struggle 
inevitably result in state policies which are consistent with 
the interests of the dominant fraction of capital." 
In an attempt to solve this difficulty, Holloway and Picciotto (1978, 
p.6) insist that Poulantzas' over politicisation nust be tenpered, and the 
focus reoriented to economic processes: 
"By severing his study of the political from the analysis of the 
contradictions of accumulation, that is to say of the relations 
of capitalist exploitation, he cuts himself off from the 
principal source of change in capitalist soc ie ty- the 
development of those contradictions, powered by the 
revolutionary struggle of the working class." 
This approach suggests that economic relations determine social 
relations and that therefore social relations do not constitute a separate 
sphere of study. Such a view must be rejected for it ignores the political 
power of social classes, and the ability of classes to articulate 
political demands upon the state. Saunders (1983, p.Sl) suggests that the 
solution is a move away from Marxist analysis: 
"If we reject the principle of economism, then we are left with 
the principle of non-correspondence - that is, an historically 
contingent relation between economics and politics in which the 
one cannot be deduced from the other. Acceptance of this 
principle points us ;Nay from Marx and towards the political 
sociology of Max Weber." 
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This is a good example of the tendency of some writers who (Mouffe, 
1979, p.200) "by identifying economism with the thesis of the 
determination in the last instance by the economy, and by proposing the 
total autonomy of ideolog ical practices as a solution call into 
question the basic tenets of historical materialism". 'Ibis is not a 
necessary response to the theoretical problems of neo-Marxism. What is 
needed is a definition of the link between economics and politics, not a 
reduction of the significance of social relations, or of the historical 
materialist approach altogether. Jessop (1982, p.187) is rore sympathetic 
towards Poulantzas than many other writers, stressing that structuralist 
analysis is rruch IOOre prevalent in his earlier work, and that 
"if one interprets Poulantzas sympathetically, the 
inconsistencies in his account of hegemony appear 
presentational rather than fuooamental. But this interpretation 
clearly depends on rejecting the structuralist problematic in 
favour of form-determined and class theoretical analyses." 
What is needed is not a rejection of Marxist analysis, rather a 
reorientation in which (Jessop, 1981, p.191) 
"state power is a form-determined condensation of class 
relations and rust be investigated in terms of the complex 
interaction between the so-called 'institutional materiality' of 
the state apparatus (its form) and the balance of forces 
involved in political action as the overdetermining level of 
class struggle (social relations)." 
This clearly represents an attempt to come to terms with the notion of 
relative autonomy, for Jessop rightly claims (p.221) 
"a Marxist analysis of the state in capitalist societies will be 
considered adequate to the extent that ••• it establishes the 
relations between the political and the economic features of 
society without reducing one to the other or treating them as 
totally independent and autonoIOOus." 
Despite considerable theoretical criticism from Marxists, the ability 
of relative autonomy approaches to embrace political as well as economic 
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forces means that the concept of different levels of state activity is 
permeating ruch recent work. Holloway and Picciotto (1978, p.9) observe the 
fact that Poulantzas' 'framework' has been widely adopted. This framework 
permits an analysis of the 'political' or 'ideological' independently of an 
analysis of accumulation processes. Indeed the ideological aspects of 
state intervention are receiving much more attention recently: notions of 
citizenship being used to explain the form of the state (Duncan and 
Goodwin, 1982, see section 2.3 belowh and ideolOgical explanations of 
state policies (Swenarton, 1981, p.195). 
To advance the neo-Marxist ar:proach to theorising the role of the 
state, such analysis must explain how particular ideological or political 
strategies relate to economic processes. SWenarton (1981) has rightly 
criticised an economically functionalist view of state intervention in 
housing by stressing the ideological aspects of policy, but to suggest 
that suWOrt for state housing following the second ~rld War was 
ideological is insufficient, for all policies fit into a theoretical 
framework of ideas not necessarily shared by all groups in society. To be 
more explicit, and to go some way in meeting Jessop's requirements, it is 
better to suggest that housing policy at this stage did not directly meet 
any economic criteria. Rather, it was an atterrpt to convince the working 
class that capitalism was capable of ensuring that their needs were met. 
Working class pressure demanded a political response, and the response 
sought social oohesion (and acceptance of the status quo) even at the 
expense of certain economic interests, such as those of private landlords. 
It is the contention of this thesis that particular policies may not 
irrprove owortunities for accumulation, yet do foster a faith in the 
tenets of capitalism. 'Ibis then is their 'economic' rationale. This 
divergence between the ideological battle over ideas and the economic 
requirements of capitalism is an area seldom addressed by Marxists when 
discussing specific policies. '!he following section will extend and 
develop the application of these theories to state intervention in 
housing. 
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2.3 State Intervention in Housing 
Private sector housing provision is considered natural by all 
political Parties, and the state will only intervene if the private sector 
fails to provide adequate housing. The Labour Government's 1965 Comnand 
Paper, The Housing Progranme 1965 to 1970, stated (para.15) 
"once the country has overcome its huge social problem of 
sltmrlom and obsolescence, and met the need of the great cities 
for rrore houses let at rooderate rents, the progranme of 
subsidised council housing should decrease." 
In 1977, the Housing policy Consultative Document was produced under 
the Labour Government. Paragraph 7.03 stated that "owning one's own home is 
a basic and natural desire". In 1979 the then Conservative Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine M.P. said [1] : 
"Too many of our people are forced to accept the restrictions of 
tenancy." 
The Social Democratic Party (1983, p.l) asserted that owner occupation 
"is desirable in itself". From at least 1965 the main political parties 
have explicitly recognised the primacy of owner occupation. Reluctance to 
provide state housing is based upon the fear that state activity might 
threaten the economic basis of private provision, and the possibility that 
state provision will become expected as a right by the working class and 
become the subject of political demands. Murie (1982, p.49) suggests the 
economic and ideolog ical functions of owner occupation are closely linked: 
-----
"(),mer occupation provides the rrost likely mechanism for 
ensuring that the consumption of housing is governed by market 
processes. In this sense increased owner occupation is rot 
sinq;>ly an end in itself but is a means of achieving other goals 
concerned with p.lblic expenditure, market processes, incentives, 
choices and self-help." 
[1] Hansard, VolLDne 967, col.409. 
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Once central government considers state intervention desirable it may 
take several forms. Regulation of private provision leaves private 
production relations virtually unchanged. Subsidisation oe private 
provision alters the balance of competition in favour of certain 
privileged sectors. Direct provision is normally the last resort for it 
acknowledges a conplete failure within the private sector (and 
politically can be a difficult step to conpletely reverse). 
Nineteenth century housing legislation was essentially permissive, 
rather than mandatory, and focused upon poor conditions and overcrowding. 
The working class did not develop local organisations until late in the 
nineteenth century, and was slow to raise housing conditions as an issue. 
Until this occured, reform was only urged by certain sections of the 
middle class. Because of the lack of organised protest by the working 
class, the middle class was able to suggest liberal reforms which did rot 
fundamentally alter economic relations (production for profit being 
regulated to meet social needs). In this way the causes of bad housing 
(poverty and housing production) were igrored, and legislation 
concentrated upon the effects (multi-occupation and insanitary 
cond i tions) • 
This approach was comnon, and led to the regulation of private 
provision. Various permissive health and overcrowding statutes were passed 
from the middle of the nineteenth century~ the 1848 Public Health Act was 
passed six years after Chadwick published his Report on the Sanitary 
Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain. This Act permitted 
sani tary reform by local Boards of Health. The 1855 Nuisances Rerooval Act 
created the row faIOOus };tlrase 'unfit for human habitation', and placed a 
duty on local authorities to ensure the adequate provision of privies, and 
the regulation of overcrowding. The 1866 Sanitary Act, introduced 
following Dr. Snow's statistical work, gave the vestries fuller powers to 
inspect and register overcrowded tenements. 
At about the same time the J;tlilanthropic housing ROvement, which 
originated in the l840s, began to receive state support. In 1866 the 
Labouring Classes Dwelling Houses Act enpowered the Public Works Loan 
Corrmissioners to lend ROney to the housing trusts. The trusts sought to 
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provide housing for the working classes whilst securing a return on 
capital sufficient to maintain their funds and thus their future activity. 
Tradition has it that only five per cent interest was sought (though the 
success of Peabody is in large part a result of it operating at a return of 
less than five per cent). The m::x'lel schemes of these trusts were intended 
to demonstrate the profitability of investment in housing for the working 
classes. Miller (1979, p.6) describes this 'five per cent J;tlilanthropy' as 
"a typically British corrbination of altruism and sound economics". Such 
state intervention was not perceived as a threat to private initiative, 
quite the reverse. 
The permissive sanitary legislation passed by the state was seldom 
implemented. Liberal reformers usually criticised the organisational 
structure of the administration for this failure. Gauldie (1974, p.80) 
notes that the progenitor of the 1866 Sanitary Act, 
"John Snow... believed that the failure of the Act to produce 
sanitary reform on a national scale was due to the inefficient 
working of local government." 
This approach was partly correct. '!bus the 1866 Sanitary Act was, 
according to Gauldie (1974, p.139), a failure because of 
"inadequacies in the administrative system which became 
increasingly obvious after 1866." 
FurtherlOOre, Wohl (1977, p.275) notes that 
"inertia, timidity, extreme localisny and determination to keep 
the rates down still dominated local thinking down to the First 
World War." 
This approach reifies the organisational structure of government 
however. It suggests that the only obstacle to reform was administrative, 
without attempting to explain why particular organisational practices 
were adopted. FurtherlOOre, it ignores the significance of local political 
resistance to the implementation of permissive legislation. It is possible 
to argue that local authorities were entrusted to implement housing policy 
in order to divert what little housing protest there was away from central 
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government (see Cockburn, 1977) • What is certain is that the 
administrative structure selected by central government is of political 
signif icance. 
First, the legislation sought to prohibit the consequences of poverty 
(for example, controlling multi-occupation) without addressing the causes 
(the high oost of property and the low wages of the casually errployed, 
which necessitated the subdivision of dwellings). Much of the legislation 
offered little help to the working class, many of whom were displaced by 
municipal clearance programmes without suitable cheap alternative 
accomnodation being forthcoming. Wohl (1977, p.l39) notes that 
"the inability of Iililanthropic capitalism to provide 
inexpensi ve accomnodation in central London, resulted in the 
labouring classes suffering considerably from the housing 
legislation and the municipal activities of the mid-Victorian 
years." 
Many of the new inspectors and health officers appointed under the 
legislation realised this. Gauldie (1974, p.254) notes "the unwillingness 
of medical officers to close houses when the occupants could only turn to 
worse conditions". Strict enforcement of the legislation would have 
worsened the plight of the poor. As Stedman Jones (1976, p.189) put it 
"If sanitary legislation had been effectively enforced 
throughout London in the 1860s and 1870s, the cr isis in the 
1880s would have been much IOOre severe than it actually was." 
Secondly, such a focus on the efficiency of government ignores the 
distribution of political power. Gold, Lo and Wright (1975, p.46) observe 
"The internal structures of the state, as well as the concrete 
state policies shaped within those structures, are the objects 
of class struggle." 
A purely organisational focus is over simplistic and inadequate. 
Alternatives are suggested by Dickens (1978) who applies an economically 
functionalist view of state intervention to an analysis of government 
housing policy in the first three decades of the twentieth century, Byrne 
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(1982) who utilises the work of Foster (1979), and adopts a relative 
autonomy Marxist approach, and Yelling (1982) who propourrls a Weberian 
argument. Dickens (1978) provides an excellent example of the application 
of economically functionalist theory to an explanation of state housing 
policy. Typical of his approach is his assertion that, at the turn of the 
century, "government housing-policy was in effect capital's housing 
policy" (p.393). Dickens (1978, p.339) bases his analysis upon three main 
hypotheses: 
(i) the state has never adopted any course of action which will 
damage dominant economic interests, 
(ii) economic necessity prevails over political processes, and 
(iii) the state can anticipate the demands of the working class, and 
prepare policies intended to defuse working class protest, 
without sacrificing its comnitment to dominant economic 
interests. 
The latter hypothesis is an explicit rejection of the ootion of the 
relative autonomy of politics from economics. Using this approach, Dickens 
is able to suggest that rent control was introduced in 1915 in an atterrpt 
to secure the continued production of armaments, and was oot a concession 
to a politically powerful working class [2] • several criticisms can be 
made of this approach (Byrne and Darner, 1980). First, whilst it is 
tautologous to suggest that the state will oot deliberately take action 
which threatens the material interests of groups which provide its power, 
it is possible that political pressure can force the state to support 
policies which damage dominant interests in the short run. Secondly, 
whilst finance capital would like to determine the pace of housing policy, 
there is 00 guarantee that the demands of the working class can be 
effectively contained. Indeed, if central government is as omniscient and 
omnipresent as Dickens suggests, and can predict future causes of 
political unrest, one wanders why any policy which supports the interests 
of the working class has ever been in'plernented. Byrne and Darner (1980, 
p.65) suggest that it is always political necessity which leads the state 
[2] See Goodwin (1980) for an approach which stresses both political and 
economic influences behind state intervention. 
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to grant material concessions to the working class, and that "state action 
on behalf of the working class only comes about as a result of working-
class organisation and pressure". Whilst support for accLnllulation is a 
structural constraint, the way in which this is manifested in state 
policies is dependent upon the constellation of social forces. As Duncan 
(1981, p.235) puts it 
"the notion that the capitalist state is forced to intervene in 
social reproduction, including housing, so as to facilitate the 
reproduction of capital itself can be seen as a logical 
necessity given the structure of the capitalist mode of 
production ••• But nothing can be deduced from such 
abstraction about the form, extent and nature of state 
intervention in anyone society." 
The outcome is contingent upon social relations, at both central and 
local government level. Iooeed, Dickens (1978, p.359) is forced to concede, 
contrary to the main thrust of his argtunent, that the state is "far from 
being a monolithic and conflict-free organisation". If this is the case, 
one wonders how the adoption of preeIT1?tory anti-working-class policies 
can be guaranteed. Furthermore, if the working class is unable to mount 
effective political pressure, how is it that Dickens (1978, p.350) is able 
to claim that "rent control, once introduced, was politically i..n'q?ossible 
to abandon". Bryne and Darner (1980, p.66) accuse Dickens of adopting a 
"non-Marxist, sub-Castellian, neo-functionalist theory of the state". 
Dickens does however offer us an insight that he has ooticed cracks in the 
functionalist edifice he has constructed. 
Byrne (1982, fig.l) focusses upon political forces in order to explain 
state intervention in housing. In the mid-nineteenth century the working 
class was unorganised and unrepresented; bourgeois reform was thus 
unlikely to change the established distribution of power. Clearance and 
street inprovement schemes, desired by the middle class to disperse pools 
of casually €IT1?loyed labour in order to avert social disorder, met with 
considerable 'success' (see WOhl, 1971, and Stedman Jones, 1976, p.180). 
Legislation to inprove the sanitary conditions of the working class met 
resistance from the urban bourgeoisie which was at least the equal of the 
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strength of the reform IOOvement. 
Byrne (1982, fig.l) posits a class conflict/relative autonomy model of 
the state when he suggests that it was the rise of 'radical reformist 
labour ism' which first gave substance to the needs of the working class. 
This was heavily influenced by the desire of some industr ialists to 
improve the living conditions of their labour force. The vestries, then 
responsible for the tmplementation of the permissive sanitary legislation 
passed by government, were unwilling to act because of a oonflict of 
interests; the vestr ies were dominated by the property owning urban 
bourgeiosie (Wehl, 1977, p.18). This inertia oould only be challenged by an 
organised working class. Class conflict could divert state policies-away 
from direct support for accumulation. Foster (1979) follows a similar line 
of argument in a critical evaluation of the work undertaken by Castells on 
the reproduction of labour power. He concludes 
"the state has to be seen as indeed responding- consciously, 
deliberately though not without oonflict- to the needs of the 
most dominant and advanced sections of capital." 
(p.112, enphasis added) 
In oontrast to these interpretations of events, Yelling (1982) divorces 
his analysis from any oonsideration of economic processes. Yelling (1982, 
p.301) argues that "clearance ••. was .~. largely promoted as a genuine 
measure of social reform". Indeed, around this time the 'reform movement' 
was particularly active. The l880s proved remarkably fruitful in terms of 
research into the conditions of the poor, especially in London. Mearns 
published The Bitter Cry of OUtcast London in 1883. This suggested that 
Christian missions would achieve nothing until the problem of inadequate 
housing had been solved. Charles Booth published The Life and Labour of 
the People of London from 1887. Booth divided his analysis of the casual 
{XX)r between the dangerous and the feckless, and argued that most fell 
into the latter category. The casual poor were now to be oonsidered a 
SOCial problem rather than a danger. The Royal Comnission on the Housing 
of the Working Classes in London reported in 1884 and linked IOOral 
degradation to living conditions. 
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The views of Dickens, Byrne and Yelling present contrasting 
interpretations of events. Dickens argues that all policy can be explained 
in terms of support for dominant economic interests. Byrne focusses upon 
the accumulation process in explaining social policy, and argues that only 
an organised working class can alter government priorities. Yelling, on 
the other hand, focuses upon the work of social reformers, implicitly 
suggesting that political analysis can be conpletely separated from 
economic analysis (he offers remarkably little on the political debates 
surrourrling the enactment, rather than the irrplementation, of the 
legislation) • 
Whilst Dickens can be criticised for crediting central government with 
IOOre power and foresight than it actually has, Yelling neglects the 
IX>litical implications of the nature of nineteenth century housing 
reforms. Investigation into the nature of these 'social reforms' lends 
further support to the approach of Byrne. Stedman Jones (1976, p.296-7) 
highlights the arrbivalence of t:x>urgeois reformers towards the {X>Or, 
manifest in their reasons for wishing to improve the living conditions of 
the {X>Or: 
"The social cr isis of London in the mid-1880s engendered a major 
re-orientation of middle class attitudes towards the casual 
poor. In conjunction with growing anxiety aOOut the decline of 
Britain's industrial supremacy, apprehensions aOOut the 
depo~lation of the countryside and uncertainty at:x>ut the 
future IX>litical role of the working class, fear of the casual 
residuum played a significant part in provoking ' the 
intellectual assaults which began to be lOOunted against laissez 
faire t:x>th from the right and the left in the l880s." 
Thus there was a coincidence of IX>litical (working class/casual 
reSiduum) and economic (industrial) needs for action, and the first 
manifestation of this was the 1888 Local Government Act which displaced 
the vestries from power, and created the London County Council. '!his 
highlights the artificiality of treating 'reform' as an abstract ootion, 
separate from its IX>litical and economic context. 
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In addition to local government reform, the pressures for change led to 
a strengthening of housing legislation. The 1868 Torrens Act had permitted 
municipal demolition, but specifically excluded municipal house building. 
Stedman Jones (1976, p.188) describes it as "purely destructive, creating 
more overcrowding than it removed". The 1875 Cross Act gave municipalities 
the power to replace demolished houses and appointed a centralised housing 
authority in London; the Metropolitan Board of WOrks. '!be compensation 
clauses, and the difficulty of building on cleared land without economic 
loss (Stedman Jones, 1976, p.200n) meant that replacement was seldom 
uooertaken (if they atterrpted this at all, public txxUes relied upon 
housing trusts; see Swenarton, 1981, p.28). In contrast, the 1885 and 1890 
Housing of the WOrking Classes Act extinguished the requirement that 
municipal housebuilding be a replacement activity. The 1885 Act 
consolidated previous legislation and made irrplementation less onerous on 
municipalities (with longer loan repayment periods and lower compensation 
payments). '!he 1890 Act was oot radically different, but local government 
reform in 1888 further eased inplementation. 
Very little was achieved umer these Acts however; local political 
opposition (from property owners for exarrple) far outweighed the active 
political strength of the working class itself, and some o~ the reformers 
displayed an alarmingly arrbivalent attitude toward state intervention 
(see Stedman Jones 1976), enphasising social control more than the 
benefits to the working class, and regarding state intervention as a 
regrettable necessity. 
Despite the fact that Yelling (1982, p.302) refers to a "spirit of 
genuine reform", two statements that he makes lends further support to a 
framework focusing upon class conflict and ideology. First, when 
discussing the proposals of the London County Council to add to the total 
housing stock through its use of the 1890 Act, he ootes (p.298-9) that the 
"proposals were fiercely opposed by all the Council's officials who 
believed that the Council should oot compete with private developers in 
the provision of additional dwellings". Clearly, such an ideological 
attitude has its roots in interpretations of the legitimate extent of 
state intervention and the sanctity of the private market (and 
acclJlllllation in general). Duncan and Goodwin (1982a) argue that 'reform' is 
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a political concept; its implementation depends on the existence of 
political power to override short term capitalist economic interests (see, 
for example, their case study of Oldham). 
Secondly, Yelling (1982, p.300) notes that the compensation paid to the 
owners of land coIlp.llsorily purchased for clearance was not substantially 
reduced until the passing of the 1919 Housing, Town Planning etc Act. Once 
again the full economic and ideological inplications of restrictive 
compensation clauses are not addressed by Yelling (3) • Irrleed, Yelling 
(p.30l) suggests that the Marxist viewpoint "has some comnerrlable points". 
Like Dickens, Yelling himself sows the seeds for a critique of his 
position. 
There are serious flaws in the functionalist awroach of Dickens, and 
the Weberian approach of Yelling. A relative autonomy perspective holds 
the mst explanatory power, and this can be deIronstrated through an 
analysis of the introduction of nunicipal house provision. '!be final 
impetus to the inposi tion of a duty upon local author i ties to provide 
subsidised working class housing occured during the first WOrld War and 
was the result of the working class taking direct action in support of its 
own interests in an organised fashion (see Byrne and Darner, 1980). '!be 
first WOrld War caused the supply of new privately rented accomnodation to 
dry up. The need for labour for munitions factories greatly increased the 
pressure upon the housing stock in certaL'l areas. Some unscrupulous 
landlords seized upon this opportunity to raise rents. In Glasgow many 
workers threatened to cease work unless their housing plight was eased. 
According to Byrne and Darner (1980, p.68) 
"it was the critical nature of the contradictions at the local 
level in Glasgow which eventually resulted in the explosion of 
1915." 
(3) ~ee McDougall (1979), who pays this issue the attention it deserves 
l.n . a discussion of the 1909 Housing, Town Planning etc Act and 
Finance Bill. See also Ball (1983, chapter 7) on land-use planning and 
speculative housebuilding. 
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It was indeed because the working class became roore powerful than the 
urban bourgeoisie in certain areas that the political (legitimation) 
function became pararoount. Ball (1983, p.210) also focusses upon the newly 
fouoo power of the working class: 
"By the end of the nineteenth century the working class had both 
the power and the means to influence urban policies and 
politics, especially since the enfranchisement of a substantial 
proportion of the working class had changed the nature of local 
politics." 
This suggests that the primary ooncern of central goverrurent was to 
secure hegeroony by granting powers to local authorities to provide housing 
which would ~e the working class. The oost of the housing programne 
was oonsiderable, but it was serving a political need. As Lloyd George said 
of the proposed housing programne in 1919 
"Even if it oost a huoored million pc>unjs what was that oonpared 
to the stability of the State?" (Quoted by Swenarton, 1981, p.78) 
'nlus the 1919 Housing, Town Planning etc Act placed a duty upoo local 
authorities to provide housing for the needs of the local population, and 
provided subsidies for this purpose. 
It is iIrportant to stress that subsidised provision was the COI'Cplex 
response to the interaction of the economic (the need to reproduce the 
labour force), political (to incorporate locally organised labour in the 
years preceeding the formation of the national Labour Party) and 
ideological (an attempt to oonvince disgruntled workers that capitalism 
was capable of satisfying their needs). These are all themes manifest in 
the nineteenth century, but the experience of war aOO the increasing 
politicisation of the working class proved an irresistab1e catalyst. The 
political need for for action was overwhelming, in view of local labour 
disputes aOO the growth of organised labour. As Swenarton (1981, p.195) 
observes 
"it is clear that both the rootive for, aOO the primary 
determinant of, state intervention in 1918-19 carne from the 
political aOO ideological levels rather than the eoonomic." 
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This approach confirms the relative autonomy model of state 
intervention. The economic interests of private landlords were sacrificed 
(through rent control in 1915), and vast sums of money were spent on state 
housing in order to maintain hegemony. 
The acceptance of the role of guarantor of decent housing has placed a 
political burden upon the state which has remained to this day. Indeed, 
housing has become a major Party political issue, with manifesto 
comnitments designed to attract electoral support. Nevertheless, 
contradictions remain. There is a delicate balance to be struck between 
the need to reproduce the labour force and placate working class protest, 
and the risk that in so doing the state may make its political and 
distributional effects too visible (Habermas, 19761 Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1977, p.971 Pickvance, 1978, p.28). '1llus state housing provision 
also has ideological risks, for it challenges private property relations, 
distribution according to ability to pay and the 'neutral' image of the 
state. 
As a result of the ideological prediliction for private sector 
solutions, the state responds to social stability by elevating the 
importance of its economic function and reverting to private sector 
solutions to human needs (see for exaItFle Harloe, 1981). '1llis serves to 
support private sector accumulation and (if successful) avoids the short 
term prospects of a crisis of legitimation. '1lle history of state 
intervention in housing reflects these tensions, with programnes being cut 
or increased because of macro economic circumstances, the relati ve 
strength of organised labour and the ideological predilictions of the 
government [4] • Short (1982, p.3) notes that 
"because the main political parties ••• carry ideological 
baggage from previous times, memor ies of the past and an 
intellectual articulation of their position relative to other 
parties, they can be relatively autonomous of the interests of 
any one specific group." 
[4] Merrett, 1979, provides a useful discussion of the first two factors1 
see Barnett, 1969, for a discussion which focusses upon ideology. 
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Their ideological predi1ictions influence the precise nature of 
specific interventions, constrained by the influence of capital and 
labour. Housing policy in the 1920s provides a good example of the 
operation of these forces. Social stability following demobilisation 
decreased the political desirability of the public housing programme. As 
early as 1921 cheaper designs for public housing had been introduced and 
by the end of the 1920s government support for the building society 
movement was manifest [5] • So great had the need for action been 
percei ved in the previous decade that an open ended subsidy had been 
introduced; this was soon rectified in the different political and 
economic climate of the 1920s. 
In the years preceding the second World War, the ertphasis in housing 
intervention shifted to slum clearance by local authorities, and 
encouragement of building societies in the private sector. After the 
second WOrld War history repeated itself. '!be Labour Government was 
elected on a tide of patriotic collectivism, of which public housing 
provision was one part. By the 1950s however, the Conservative Party's 
electoral pledge to preside over a construction rate of 300,000 houses in 
one year reflected a Jrore even balance between private and public 
provision. 
The period is interesting, for it reflects both the 'natural' tendency 
for governments to revert to private provision of housing in times of 
social stability, and the political institutionalisation of housing (with 
Conservative housing conmitments during general elections in the early 
1950s and 1960s, and a Labour conmitment in the late 1960s). 
(5) Ball (1983, p.40) suggests that this has been overstated in an 
interesting conment: "The take-off of owner occupation in the mid-
1920s was helped for a few years by generous building subsidies 
introduced by the Chamberlain Act of 1923. But this effect was 
fortuitous as they were a response to Conservative doctrinal 
aversion to council housing rather than specifically to support the 
growth of owner occupation." One would have thought that an aversion 
to municipal provision would have had little choice but to favour 
owner occupation at that time. Ball ascr ibes the main cause of the 
growth of a"mer occupation to wider economic forces (falling 
building costs, a pool of unenployed building labour and the 
availability of personal savings from those in enployment). 
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The reality of housing programnes is thus that class pressure can 
influence policy, and that short term economic interests may be sacrificed 
in order to meet political expedient. In the case of the 1915 Glasgow rent 
strikes, the political need to show that the state could control 
capitalism to the benefit of the working class, in other words the need to 
'legitimate' the role of the capitalist state, became paraJOOunt. This 
tension between economic and political functions is always present, though 
seldom so dramatic. The outcorre is dependent upon the political and 
economic climate prevailing at the tirre. As Ball (1983, p.17) puts it, "it 
is oot possible to ascribe invariant functions to housing tenures". 
Indeed, the nature of state support for particular tenures may undergo 
dramatic changes over time, as the strength of social classes and the 
economic climate vary. Forrest (1984, p.12) provides an excellent example 
of a relative autonomy perspective when explaining the right to buy 
policies of the current Conservative Government: 
"Whilst the collectivised welfare state reflected roth the 
strength of organised labour and the necessity of its 
reproduction, the errergence of the individualised welfare state 
reflects the weakening and fragmentation of trade unionism and 
the need to reproduce and extend consunption power". 
The next section applies this 'relative autonomy' theory of political 
action to the local state, and its interaction with central government. 
2.4 Central-Local Relations 
It has been shown that the contemporary Marxist debate on the role of 
the central state has led to the forlllllation of political theories 
utilising the concept of the relative autonomy of 'levels' and the argument 
that class protest can influence government policy. Such theories are used 
to examine the formation of central government policy at the national 
level. Governrrent subsidies towards housing provision have traditionally 
been granted to local authorities. Local authorities might oot be 
COnstrained by the same economic and political forces as central 
government. This section seeks to examine the applicability of the 
relative autonomy model of state intervention to local governrrent1 to 
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local policy formulation, and central government responses to local 
authorities. 
Despite local administration of public housing, until Cockburn wrote 
The Local State (1977) there had been little atterrpt at making local 
government the object of Marxist theoretical analysis. Cockburn's work is 
paradoxical, for it raises the issue of the local state as an object of 
study, yet fails to apply any special or specific analysis to it. Typical 
of this tendency is her conment (1977, p.2) that 
"Local councils don't spring from ancient rights of self 
government but are, and under capitalism always have been, an 
aspect of government which is in turn part of the state." 
'Itlis can be taken as tautologous if it is seen as sirrply an attenpt to 
describe a part of the organisational structure of the modern state. It 
tells us nothing about how local government works, its relationship to 
central government, nor (if the ties between centre and periphery are as 
strong as is suggested), why there is local government at all in Britain. 
Cockburn adopts a functional theory of the state, in which the economic 
function is ooly mediated I:rj the need to maintain legitimation, and 
applies it without roodification to local government. Criticisms of such an 
approach focus upon the use of such strict functionalism (Byrne 1982; 
Duncan and Goodwin 1982a, 1982b; Pickvance 1980; Sauroers 1982a) and the 
assertion that this is a necessary feature of all government bodies (Byrne 
and Darner 1980; Duncan 1981; Duncan and Goodwin 1982a, 1982b; Flynn 1978). 
It is not only subsequent Marxist work that can be used to criticise this 
approach, but a good deal of organisational studies both before and after 
(Griffith 1966; SAU.S. 1979). Indeed, the two traditions are occasionally 
called upon simultaneously (Flynn 1978). 
Organisational approaches have focused upon the conplex relationships 
between and within government bodies. Although such a focus upon 
administrative structure does little to explain the political processes 
behind policy formation, any deroonstration of the corrplexity of 
organisational relationships casts doubt on the validity of 'unitary' 
Views of policy formation, and it is probable that subsequent political 
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analysis was rootivated by the desire to explain these administrative 
variations within an overall theoretical context (see Sauooers 1982a). 
A good example of this tradition is provided by Griffith (1966) who 
argued that the relationships between central departments and their local 
counterparts varied considerably in terms of the aroount of local 
discretion permitted. Much of this work argues that local flexibility is 
in some way a product of inter organisational relationships. Bristol 
University (1979) argues, for example, that flexibility occurs for four 
reasons: first, as a deliberate concession to local autonom~n secondly, 
because of political difficulties in the central resolution of policies; 
thirdly, because of problems in defining standards of performance 
applicable to all situations; fourthly, because of the inherent limit to 
the ability of central government to re<]ulate all tasks. '!bis approach 
runs the risk of inplying that organisational structure is a pre-given 
object, am does mt derive from any wider economic or political 
requirements (e.g. the desire for greater predictability in certain key 
areas of policy; see Sauooers 1982a). 
Another inportant strand of organisational approaches is the analysis 
of the coaplex relationships within government bodies. The C.P.R.S. (1977) 
has described central government as a "federation of departments" in which 
the different professions are unlikely to achieve a consensus on policy 
priorities. Similar arguments can be propourrled in the case of local 
government. If local government personnel have different ideologies from 
central government personnel then a crude central-stinulus/local-response 
model is inappropriate. 
These theories are extremely useful in exposing the coaplexity of 
organisational relationships. '!beir weakness lies in their failure to 
adequately explain row or why these sets of relationships have come to 
exist. '!he only 'theory' that they possess is one concerned with analysing 
efficiency, in terms of the process of policy formation and the obstacles 
to the inplementation of (central) policies. '!bus individual actors, or 
groups of actors, can be seen as plrsuing conflicting objectives, am a 
good deal of their time is spent discussing local government officials as 
one such group. 
40 
In contrast, Cockburn (1977) provides a theoretical framework for 
analysing state policy formation, yet fails to ascribe any distinctive 
features to local government as an aspect of this. Her theoretical 
approach suggests that local state is central state, and the faults of 
organisational approaches are completely reversed; the economic function 
is seen as determining the policy of both central and local government, 
with no political differences between the two. 
Both Cockburn and JOOst organisational theorists make the error of 
failing to produce a theory which utilises concepts of human agency and 
structural constraint simultaneously (Lukes, 1977, p.29). Flynn (1978) goes 
some way towards solving this problem. First (p.9) he criticises the 
structuralist and instrumentalist view that all state policy, including 
local government policy, is deterministically supportive of capital. He 
thus posits a relative autonomy at both centre and periphery. 'Ibis is an 
intx>rtant step forward in the developnent of Marxist theory and is 
receiving widespread support recently, as will be shown below. Flynn 
(1978) also utilises some strands of organisational theory to argue that 
local government posseses different characteristics from central 
government; although dependent on central government for finance, it is 
highly professionalised, bureaucratic, and depends on a nultitude of 
private sector agencies for the realisation of its policies. It is thus 
thrust firmly into the realm of local politics. Flynn concludes 
"the empirical task still remains that of analysing how 
administrative routines, politico-bureaucratic structures and 
inter-organisational relations, interact and affect state 
policy." (p.12) 
Although a considerable improvement on earlier theories, Flynn's view 
of the nature of the state is relatively urrleveloped, and still leaves 
some questions unanswered: local government is the creation of central 
government, and questions of how the current distribution of powers has 
come to exist, and the reasons for the extent of bureaucratisation are rot 
raised. 
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Saunders (1982a) attempts to provide a theoretical basis for 
explaining the current distr ibution of powers between local government 
and central government. He argues that support of accumulation is the 
primary task of central government, and thus policies which crucially 
impinge upon this function are centrally determined. Policies related to, 
for example, consumption, are locally controlled because they are not 
crucial to the government's economic programnes. However, Saunders 
describes local government as being subject to pluralistic pressures, 
without explaining why this should be. The implication is always that the 
policies that central government has conferred upon local government are 
relatively 'safe' in the sphere of pluralistic politics (in other words, 
that it is a 'plot' of central government). However, past conflicts between 
central and local government suggest that if this is a plot, it is a very 
imperfect one. The resistance of Clay Cross to the 1972 Housing Finance 
Act represented a severe ideological attack upon the policies of the 
government of the day. The indications are that Saunders' 'ideal type' is 
too simplistic. 
Another line of criticism of the functionalist lOOdel of state 
intervention which inevitably leads to a discussion of central-local 
relationshi~ is provided by Duncan (1981, p.235) who suggests that it is 
tautologous to argue that the capitalist state exists to support 
capitali~ and that an analysis of the relationships between classes is 
crucial to an urrlerstanding of how this is transformed into policy in 
practice. 
Duncan and Goodwin (l982a, p.l72) use this argument to explain the 
existence of local government. Seizing upon one of the influences behind 
state intervention outlined in section 2.2, they argue that local 
deJOOCracy was a tactic to accomnodate working class pressure. It may have 
been functional then (it may equally have been forced upon the ruling 
class), but that is not to say that there are not rore functional forms of 
administration available now. 
Duncan and Goodwin thus eqtlasise the political function of government 
(legitimation through citizenship). This not only caused the creation of 
local goverrunent, but has rendered it susceptible to demands for the 
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delivery of welfare rights. Like Dearlove (1979), they regard the relative 
autonomy of local government as a problem for central government. This is 
particularly the case in times of economic recession, when the central 
state does perceive the economic function as paramount. '!hey observe 
(1982b, p.93) 
"The question which becomes forced on dominant classes is how to 
respond to, and hopefully accornnodate or relOOve, the 
implications of local electoral politics." 
This is an approach also adopted by Byrne and Darner (1980, p.69) who, as 
suggested above, argue that state housing intervention was a response to 
certain local conflicts between the urban l:x>urgeoisie and the working 
class. Of this period they argue that 
"the differences between practice at central and local levels 
is the direct outcome of the relative strength and 
representation locally of (i) the 'urban oourgeoisie' and the 
industrial bourgeoisie, and (ii) an organised working class 
informed by Marxist analysis." 
Byrne (1982, p.66n) subsequently applies this approach to a case study 
of Gateshead- in much the same way that Duncan and Goodwin study Oldham 
(1982a, p.17ln) and Sheffield (forthcoming). '!hese studies oonclude that 
the local state is oot relatively autooooous to the extent that its 
support of capital is directly mediated by the oonflict between labour and 
bourgeoisie at the local level. This seems a particularly useful approach, 
for it permits an analysis of economic oonstraints at the central and 
local level (the need to prolOOte accumulation/local sectoral business 
interests) and an analysis of political pressures (class representation 
nationally and locally) • This developnent, with its emphasis on 
form/structure and 'social relations', seems to be the type of analysis 
that Jessop (1982, p.19l) suggested was necessary in order to IOOve the 
Marxist debate forward. 
Considering their different approaches to the study of the local state, 
it is perhaps surprising that Byrne (1982, p.75) should reach similar 
conclusions to Cockburn (1977, ch.l) regarding current trends in local 
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government reorganisation and rationalisation; both hold it to be an 
attempt to make the local state IOOre functional for capital. The 
difference is that Cockburn's theoretical analysis would suggest this as 
inevitable- indeed, it would lead one to question why the local state 
should ever have been given independence from central government in the 
first place. Byrne (and for that matter Duncan and Goodwin) perceive it as 
a response to a change in the balance of class forces: local government was 
a necessity to secure political legitimatio~ but now it is IOOre trouble 
than it is worth. The relative strength of organised labour in certain 
localities has necessitated a switching of functions away from local 
government, as a part of a 'rationalisation' of the p.lblic sector as a 
whole which favours the application of corporate business methods (and the 
integration of local government into this process). The relative weakness 
of organised labour as a whole has permitted this strategy to succeed. The 
current Conservative Government clearly regards the Metropolitan County 
Councils as a hindrance to the successful iIrplementation of central 
government policies, and this is reflected in proposals for their 
abolition. 
Thus the economic function is row dominating the political fuoction 
(legitimation). This is also a product of social relations; the current 
ideological domination of industrial capital over the working class is a 
product of the current recession and state policy intended to further 
weaken the working class 50 as to indirectly facilitate the restructuring 
of industry in an attempt to revive capitalist production [6] • As Jessop 
(1982, p.235) notes, "it is inportant to recall the argument advanced by 
Joachim Hirsch that the state responds to the political repercussions of 
crisis and not to the economic crisis (or crises) as such". 
Housing intervention can be used as an illustration of central-local 
relations. If p.lblic housing programmes resulted from the central state 
perceving a particular conbination of economic and political necessity 
outweighing the ideological risks, why was the responsibility for 
--------------------
[6] Although the aroount of government rooney spent on owner occupation 
through income tax relief is criticised by some sections of 
industrial capital. 
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implementing the programne given to local authorities, aM not retained by 
a government appointed body? Indeed, local authorities have always been 
allowed considerable flexibility over the implementation of housing 
programnes, especially in relation to allocation (see McKay aM Cox, 1979, 
for exapnle p.149). If the reproduction of labour power, and the housing of 
politically threatening groups was one functional objective of state 
housing, local discretion rendered its achievement problematical. 
Part of the explanation is that subsidised housing was an ideological 
strategy as nuch as a functional necessity, aM that local authorities 
were perceived as the institution roost capable of fulfilling this 
ideological requirement. Another reason for relying upon local authorities 
relates to the use of local electoral politics as a device for 
legitimation, apparently granting equal political (and social) rights to 
the local po~lation (the ootion of 'citizenship'). Indeed, the use of 
local authorities to provide ~blic housing occured just 31 years after 
the reform of local government. Emerging local labour organisations 
strengthened the legitimation function of locally elected government and 
helped to institutionalise protest before the national Labour Party had 
formed. However, although having such advantages to the state, there really 
was little alternative available. Byrne and Darner (1980) have suggested 
that the working class had become roore powerful than the urban bourgeoisie 
in some areas. '!be view that the 1919 Act represented centrally inspired 
incorporation credits central government with more autonomy (and 
foresight) than it had. Rather, local political pressure aM the 
perception of the need for ~ediate action forced the government's hand. 
Duncan aM Goodwin (1982a, p.169) argue that the legislative developnents 
at the turn of the century were 
"a question of ruling groups being forced to respond to changing 
social relations and the social and physical forms so produced. 
This response was always partial and internally contradictory. 
Its functionality was never assured." 
Having said this, some of the inplications of the legislation were 
beneficial to the government; marked intervention was only likely where 
working class strength was greatest. Central government could pass 
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national legislation yet remain relatively distant from responsibility 
for its direct implementation. 'Ibis may have helped to avoid the 
articulation of national political pressure for public housing by locally 
based working class organisations (on the basis of 'comparative' need). 
Several events since 1919 have suggested that reliance upon local 
authorities may present serious difficulties to central government. 
Working class consciousness has been raised through locally elected 
bodies on several occasions since 1919. This has allowed class 
consciousness to replace the intended notion of citizenship. '!be use of 
the poor law by the guardians in Poplar in the 1920s provides an early 
example. With working class control of the board of guardians, equality 
before the law was transformed into a progressive redistribution through 
poor law relief. The national guidelines for implementing the legislation 
were ignored, and the administration of this local service was used as a 
platform for articulating political demands for rates equalisation and a 
less onerous system for assesing eligibility (see Brankon, 1979, for a 
detailed discussion of these events). In the case of housing 
administration, perhaps the Il'Ost fcuoous example of a 'breakdown' of 
traditional central-local relations is that of the resistance of the 
councillors of Clay Cross to the implementation of the Housing Finance Act 
1972. In this case the Labour Party offered support to the recalcitrant 
councillors, and the issue was united at central and local government 
levels. Despite the subsequent withdrawal of support by the Labour Party, 
the incident served to make housing administration a political rather than 
a bureaucratic issue (see Skinner and Langdon, 1974). 
Byrne (1982, p.75) and Duncan and Goodwin (1982a, p.167) perceive the 
possibility of direct working class control of locally elected bodies as a 
threat to the ideological domination of the notion of citizenship. As 
Byrne (1982, p.75) puts it, local electoral demxracy was a viable tactic 
for legitimation and incorporation whilst instrumental rule by the 
bourgeoisie was possible, but direct working class rule at the local level 
provides an unacceptable obstacle to central government. 'Ibis is what 
Jessop (1982, p.232-233) terrcs "the contradiction between the bureaucratic 
preconditions for the formal untiy of the state system and the substantive 
efficacy of policies oriented to accumulation". 'Ibis then is the 'problem' 
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of local government, and Duncan and Goodwin (1982a, p.170) suggest two 
possible responses by central government. One 
n is to attenpt to restructure it in order both to transcend 
class relations with bureaucratic relations of the 'state form', 
and to remove important social transactions from the domain of 
electoral local politics. Another response is to maintain 
hierarchical and bureaucratic work processes within state 
services and institutions." 
These conclusions are shared by many writers (for example, Byrne 1982 
and Dear love 1979). Furthermore, the outcome of the few direct 
confrontations between central and local government verify these 
propositions. '!he poor law boards of guardians were replaced by a 
government appointed body. '!he councillors of Clay Cross were replaced by 
a housing comnissioner, and the bouOOaries of the local authority 
subsequently redrawn. 
Jessop (1982, p.233) argues that the result of this tension 
"can be seen in the expansion of quasi-non-governmental 
organisations (or 'quangos') charged with substantive suFPQrt 
and facilitation of economic and social activities and/or with 
imperative or concertative direction of these activities and 
given much greater freedom of manoeuvre than the ministries and 
departments which remain formally within the bureaucratic chain 
of comnand." 
However, in recent years local authorities have rarely had their powers 
removed by legislative decree. A more detailed discussion of the life of 
the 1972 Housing Finance Act provides reasons for this. The 1972 Act did 
indeed usurp the role of elected councillors by appointing Rent Scrutiny 
Boards to fix the level of m.,micipal rents. '!his provoked a critical 
response from Labour Councillors who feared a progressive erosion of their 
powers (see Sklair, 1975, p.285). However, the way in which power was to be 
withdrawn from the elected bodies also threatened the status of local 
authority enployed housing professionals. As Flynn, T (1981, p.121) 
observes 
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"Many professions operating in local government have an 
ideology of technical rationality and neutrality." 
Attempting to relocate rent setting from local professionals to 
government appointed bodies is thus likely to provoke a defensive reaction 
by local authority professionals. Their arguments are likely to be along 
the lines of their suitabilty for the technical task, but it will serve to 
highlight central government's involvement in the administrative changes. 
If this occurs it prejudices the atterrpt to 'transcend class relations' 
with bureaucratic relations, as the central state remains the visible 
political agent of control. 
It would seem that political expedient has seen the growth of local 
authority powers to such an extent that it oow places a limit on the power 
of central government. This limit is political and ideological, for local 
government is a constitutional product of central government, and as such 
could be directly modified by central government (see Duncan and Goodwin, 
1982a, p.173 for the government's reluctance to disenfranchise over the 
issue of the administration of the poor law by the working class in the 
1920s) • 
More subtle changes in central-local relationships are probable, and do 
not confront the local power base so directly. Examples are the gradual 
removal of functions from local government; the reorganisation of local 
government into larger and more politically conservative areas (as with 
Clay Cross, when it became a part of North East Derbyshire District 
Council) ; and greater control over local administration through 
expenditure processes (both project specific, as in the case of Housing 
Strategy and Investment Programnes, and general, as in the current 
proposals to limit the ability of local authorities to raise rates). 
Indeed, housing administration provides some excellent exartples of 
these strategies. '!be Housing Strategy and Investment Programne is 
presented as politically neutral; a COIt1?rehensive awroach to planning 
housing investment (in the 1977 Green Paper). Lansley (1979, pp.204-205) 
however, regards it as a method of extending central priorities into local 
decision making. Wright (Ch.6, Wright (ed), 1980) sees the Public 
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Expenditure Survey Comnittee system as a method of centralising power 
within central government (in favour of the Treasury). The H.s.I.P. system 
is vertically integrated into the P.E.S.C. system. Furtherrore, Ginsburg 
(1979, p.155) argues that the system of the defecit financing of local 
author i ty Housing Revenue Accounts has similar roti vat ions. 
These arglDllents clearly coincide with those of Duncan and Goodwin 
(1982a, p.170). However, since the conflict surrouming the Housing Finance 
Act 1972, direct usurpation of local authority housing powers has only 
occurred over the centrally imposed 'right to b..Jy'. 'Ihe 1980 Housing Act 
permits the Secretary of State for the Environment to take over the sales 
policy of a local authority which is considered to be obstructing 
inplernentation of the Act. On December 7th, 1981 Norwich City Council 
appealed to the High Court against the decision of the then Secretary of 
State, Michael Heseltine M.P., to take over these duties. This appeal was 
lost 00 DecenDer 18th, and on February 9th, 1982 the Court of AR;>eal upheld 
this decision. It is significant that the 1980 Act reserves the right to 
take over defaulting councils in respect of sales policy ooly. In this it 
is less severe than the 1972 Housing Finance Act, which ~inted a 
governmental body to set rents and also reserved the right to ~int a 
housing comnissioner in defaulting councils. 
Established institutional frameworks have thus developed a certain 
inertia, which central government is loath to challenge. Paris (1978) 
illustrates this nicely in his study of house improvement in Birming~ 
Paris perceives the primary functions of the state as being economic and 
ideological, and argues that the Labour Party supported rehabilitation 
because it permitted a reduction in plblic expenditure (in line with their 
macro economic policy) and because it had the ideological aweal of being 
more socially sensitive. The Conservative Party supported rehabilitation 
because it provided rore scope for private profit, and had the ideological 
aweal of favouring market solutions to housing improvement. 'lhese 
packages of ideas were necessary in order to redirect economic processes 
whilst maintaining legitimation (Paris, 1978, p.126) and to deflect the 
opposition of local government. In Birming~ local Labour Councillors 
were reluctant to challenge the policy of the Labour Party in Government, 
and Conservative Councillors were happy to accept a policy which they 
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bel ieved would reduce council expenditure. Both were therefore quite 
prepared to present the policy as 'technical' and 'rational'. This study 
confirms the reluctance of central government to overtly direct local 
government housing intervention, and its preference for JOOre subtle 
ideological tactics which incorporate local government officials. In other 
contexts central control has been more crudely achieved: Urban Developnent 
Corporations override electoral control in the name of economic 
regeneration, and the less severe Enterprise Zone rrerely reduces the 
powers of the relevant local authority. This conplex pattern of 
interrelationships serves to confirm the validity of the assertion of 
Pickvance (1978, p.26-7) that the major weakness of economically 
functionalist theory is that 
.. it depicts the state as a monolithic agent, free to intervene 
in the appropriate manner, and with adequate resources of money 
and legitimacy. Against this I would argue that the state is not 
monolithic but divided horizontally into Ministries and other 
agencies, and vertically into central and local levels; is not a 
free agent able to meet the needs of monopoly interests but has 
to reflect all forces in the class struggle (fractions of 
capital; capital and labour); does not have unrestricted 
resources at its disposal; and does not have limitless resources 
of legitimacy." 
2.5 Conclusions 
There has clearly been a shift away from the application of theories of 
economic functionalism to explanations of central government and local 
government policies in contenporary neo-Marxist literature. Most of the 
literature reviewed in this chapter starts by analysing the political and 
ideological aspects of state policy and then atterrq:>ts to explain their 
basis in economic relations. Class conflict at the local level is often 
cited as the reason for policy initiatives and changes in the 
administrative structure. In the words of Jessop (1982, p.223) 
"to treat the state as a real (as oWOsed to formal, legal) 
subject with a pre-given unity is to exclude from view political 
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struggles within and between state apparatuses as well as the 
effects of its institutional structure on the constitution and 
conduct of political struggles beyond the state." 
The work of Gramsci (and Poulantzas) seems particularly relevant, for 
it errq:;tlasises that political and ideological processes are rot class 
determined, but contain conflicting elements from all classes and class 
fractions. Yet most studies of struggle over the tasks and organisation of 
the administrative structure focus upon political struggle to the virtual 
exclusion of ideological conflict, and deal with events which occurred 
several decades ago. SWenarton (1981, p.195) is correct when he asserts 
that "we nust give rather more attention to political and ideological 
factors than recent theoretical writings have suggested". '!be growth of 
the housing association movement raises questions about the political 
motivations of its supporters, and the creation of the Housing Corporation 
in 1964 changed the relationship between central government and the local 
administration of housing. '!he following chapters will explore the 
validity of the relative autonomy perspective outlined above through a 
study of the nature of political support for the housing association 
movement, and the activities of housing associations in practice. 
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3. CENTRAL OOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HCXJSING ASSOCIATIOOS 
3.1 Introduction 
Housing associations have been eligible for government assistance 
since the middle of the nineteenth century. In the 1960s however, the 
nature of this support changed, and from 1974 increasingly large sums of 
government lOOney have been allocated to housing associations. Yet 
throughout all of this, there has been virtually no theoretical analysis 
of the role that housing associations play in the provision of housing 
accomnodation by academics or government departments. 
Why have successive governments increased their support of the rousing 
association JOOvement? This is the key question which this chapter 
addresses. A var iety of theoretical approaches to this task will be 
employed. First, a theoretical explanation in functional and 
organisational terms will be UI"rlertaken. Subsequently an analysis of 
political debates on the association movement will be UI"rlertaken. The main 
sources used will be Hansard (second reading debates and standing 
comnittees on legislation), White Papers and Circulars. This will 
facilitate an examination of the political and ideological basis of state 
support for the IOOvement. This chapter will conclude by evaluating the 
relative merits of these approaches. It will be argued that an analysis of 
ideology holds the JOOst explanatory power. 
As table 3.1 shows, recent government support has led to a dramatic 
increase in the output of accomnodation from associations. Since 1944 a 
total of 253,508 units have been completed by housing associations. Only 
18.8% of these were completed in the 19 years to 1963. The remaining 81.2% 
have been completed since 1964. Housing association provision has clearly 
grown in importance from the mid-1960s. It is important to first consider 
the nature of state support before these changes. State support for 
hOUSing associations predates subsidies to local authority house 
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provision, yet much Marxist analysis of housing ignores this and starts 
with a discussion of the 1919 Housing Act. An examination of the rationale 
of state assistance to associations before this period might throw light 
on the reasons for their recent revival by central government. 
In the nineteenth century housing provision was largely unsubsidised. 
The main providers of housing intended specifically for the poorer classes 
were the model housing trusts. 'l'he first trust formed was the Metropolitan 
Association for the Improvement of the JMellings of the Irrlustrious 
Classes, fourrled in 1842. At its inaugural meeting it was described as an 
association "for the plrpose of providing the labouring man with an 
increase of the comforts and conveniences of life, with full compensation 
to the capitalist" (Quoted by Tarn, 1973, p.22). 
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TABLE 3.1 Housing association completions since the second 
world war (England). 
Year Completions 
1945-60 42,720 
1961 1,564 
1962 1,550 
1963 1,925 
1964 2,846 
1965 3,620 
1966 4,097 
1967 4,521 
1968 5,538 
1969 7,095 
1970 8,176 
1971 10,168 
1972 6,904 
1973 8,340 
1974 9,264 
1975 13,652 
1976 14,436 
1977 24,193 
1978 20,572 
1979 16,275 
1980 18,946 
1981 16,661 
1982 10,445 
1945-63 47,759 
1964-82 205,749 
, 
Source: Department of the Environment, Housing and Construction 
Statistics, 1972-83. 
The Society for Improving the Condition of the Labouring Classes was 
established in 1844, and rapidly developed a programne which catered for 
special needs (including the housing of widows). The Peabody Donation Fum 
was founded in 1862, with an enptasis on housing the poor of London. '!be 
'model' schemes of these trusts \oIere intended to derronstrate that it was 
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possible to solve the problem of insanitary housing by providing housing 
of good quality to rent that working people could afford, whilst earning a 
moderate return on investment. Merrett (1979, p.15) notes that: 
"The model dwellings associations intended to delOOnstrate in an 
exenplary manner that wage earners could re provided with 
dwellings containing a regular water supply, adequate sewage 
disposal and proper ventilation at a rent they could afford 
without overcrowding, and that simultaneously the investor in 
such dwellings could earn a modest return on his capital." 
These trusts generally sought a return of 4-5%, a low return at that 
time [1] , but sufficient to perpetuate the trusts activities. '!bey 
clearly played an ~rtant function in prolOOting social stability in the 
eyes of the goverrunent. As wahl (1977, p.50) p..1ts it 
"The connection between the home and social control is awarent 
in Shaftesbury's writings, and he believed that if overcrowding 
were permitted to continue, the husband would lose his 
'authority' and the wife her 'genial influence', and that that 
would p..1t an end to all hope of iJrprovernent in society." 
Shaftesbury supported the activity of the trusts (appropriately enough 
in a panltillet entitled The Mischief of State Aid). '!be trusts applied 
str ict rules to their tenancies (Stedman Jones, 1976, p.187 calls this 
"paternalistic vigilance"). The social control function was never IOOre 
manifest than in the work of Octavia Hill (see ~l, 1977). Hill 
proaulgated a relief that, given a minimum level of housing provision, the 
occupants could be trained in the responsibilities of housekeeping. 
Stedman Jones (1971, p.193) describes Hill's work as a scheme where 
"poor and overcrowded courts were taken over, and the tenants 
were 'trained' in p,mctuality, thrift, and respectability through 
----------
[1] Industrial investment could yield a much higher return. Henry Roberts 
addressed the Royal Institute of Br i tish Architects in 1862 and 
explained that (Tarn, 1973, p.43) "with care, a return of three and a 
half or four percent could be obtained ••• Nevertheless, he aanitted 
that housing societies could not hope to attract comnercial 
investment, because a return of that sort was not a good investment 
by the standards of the day". 
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the medium of the landlord or the lady rent collector." 
As Tarn (1973, p.l34) comnents, the "problem of the {XX>r was seen to be 
moral and educational". 
The 1866 Labouring Classes Dwelling Houses Act permitted the granting 
of loans to housing trusts, to encourage private provision for the working 
classes. This has been interpreted as an attempt to limit the extension of 
state intervention. As Gauldie (1974, p.221) fX,lts it, the trusts "led 
people and parliament to believe that private enterprise, efficiently 
controlled, could deal with the problems of unsanitary housing, 
homelessness, and overcrowing, and perhaps held up the progress to state 
controlled housing for decades by encouraging this ill-fourrled belief." 
In truth, predominant laissez-faire attitudes meant that state 
intervention was likely to consciously avoid state subsidisation and 
provision. As WOhl (1977, p.92) pointed out, at that time both Liberals and 
Conservatives were ideologically opposed to state intervention: 
"it would be wrong to suggest that any clear distinction can be 
drawn between the rank and file of the two parties in their 
ideological attitudes towards laissez-faire and paternalism." 
It took a change in the organisation of the working class, and 
different attitudes toward state intervention, both fX,lblic and in the 
government itself, tefore subsidies were introduced. This rot ooly 
provided the necessary encouragement to government bodies deemed 
responsible for the provision of housing, but allowed provision to te 
directed towards the {XX>rest. The philanthropic trusts had been incapable 
of helping the neediest (see Stedman Jones, 1971, p.184-5; Merrett, 1979). 
For example, Tarn (1973, p.18) argues that the high rents of the dwellings 
of the Society for the Improvement of the Condition of the Labouring 
Classes "was an example of their social policy to provide the test 
accomnodation at the least rent compatible with their desire to make a 
limited profit ••• the rents were rot small by 'comparison with those then 
prevailing for a slum tenement, and this limited the value of the building 
to one particular social class, the artizan". Iooeed, there is ample 
evidence that these trusts sought to house the labour aristocracy, relying 
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on the 'filtering' concept for an improvement in the conditions of the 
poorest. Water low, chairman of the Improved Industrial Dwellings COmpany 
(wahl, 1977, p.150), "defended his policy of self-contained and therefore 
not inexpensive flats before the Royal Commission in 1884: 'it would not 
have been right to build down to the lowest class', he argued ••• Instead 
the company had 'rather tried to build for the best class, and by lifting 
them up to leave more room for the second and third (class) who are below 
them". 
The implications of the failure to house the poorest are significant. 
Gauldie (1974, p.235) puts it succinctly: 
"'!he fact that these patently admirable, financially 
respectable, able and determined business men wor king on the 
best comnercial principles, should fail, had great influence on 
the future of government housing policy." 
The failure was not just in terms of the dwelling companies inability 
to house the poorest. Stedman Jones (1971, p.197) notes that by 1873 only 
27,000 persons were housed by the m:x3el dwelling corrpanies in London; 
insufficient to house six months pofUlation increase. '!be Charity 
Organisation Society in 1881 also confirms the statistical insignificance 
of voluntary housing: 
"The amount of remedial work in the direction of housing the 
labouring poor in London performed by philanthropic or 
associated conmercial enterprise, useful as it undoubtedly is, 
continues ••• relatively insignificant and wholly inadequate in 
proportion to the needs of the pofUlation, nor is there reason 
to expect a large developnent in this direction in the future." 
(Quoted by wahl, 1971, p.40) 
In similar fashion Merrett (1979, p.19) notes that by 1914 the companies 
had provided less than 100,000 rooms in London; insufficient to house two 
years pofUlation increase. 
The background to the passing of the 1919 Housing, Town Planning etc 
Act has been discussed in the last chapter. Significantly, the 1919 Act 
granted subsidies to local authorities, and also allowed them to pass the 
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subsidies on to housing trusts urrler agreements between themselves and 
specific trusts. Local authorities were selected to undertake the building 
programme because of the urgency of the perceived situation (see section 
2.2). Their administrative experience gained during the first World War 
gave them a measure of respectability, and the national local government 
system suggested that they were capable of initiating schemes across the 
whole country simultaneously. 
Thus section 18 (1) of the 1919 Act stated 
"A local authority ••• may promote the formation or extension of 
or ••• assist a public utility society whose objects include the 
erection, ~rovernent or management of houses for the working 
classes." 
Section 18 (3) stated that 
"Any expenses incurred by a local authority under the 
provisions of this part of this section ••• shall be defrayed in 
the same manner as the expenses of the local author i ty. " 
Between 1919 and 1961 legislation did oot significantly alter the 
position of housing associations. Barclay (1976, p.17) comnents that after 
"1924 a large number of societies, associations and trusts registered 
urrler the Provident Societies Act came into being". Whilst there may have 
been a growth in the formation of associations at this time, Barclay does 
not offer an explanation. The nearest looustr ial and Provident Societies 
Act to 1924 was the 1894 Act. 'Ibe 1923 Housing Act did, however, offer 
direct Exchequer assistance to associations for the first time, although 
only for a very limited period [2] • Section 26 of the 1935 Housing Act [3] 
defined 'housing association' for the first time as: 
"any society, body of trustees or company established for the 
purpose of, or amongst whose objects or };X)Wers are included 
those of, constructing, improving or managing, or facilitating 
[2] By section 1 (1) (a) the work had to be completed by October 1st 1925. 
[3] Section 30 allowed the Minister to recognise and suwort a "central 
association or other txXJy". 'Ibis was used to proroote the National 
Federation of Housing Associations (N.F.H.A.). 
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or encouraging the construction or improvement of, houses for 
the \\Qrking classes, being a society, company or I::x:xly of 
trustees who do not trade for profit or whose constitution or 
rules prohibit the issue of any capital with interest or 
dividend exceeding the rate for the time being prescribed by the 
Treasury, whether with or without differentiation as between 
share and loan capital." 
This definition clearly has its antecedents in the I;hilanthropic 
societies of the nineteenth century (with its emphasis on limited 
dividends) • The 1936 Housing Act made the procedure whereby local 
authorities entered into agreements with housing associations for the 
provision and improvement of accommodation compulsory if financial 
assistance was to be given to an association. section 94 used the I;hrase 
'authorised arrangements' to describe such agreements. Financial 
assistance was to be paid to associations, through the local authority, as 
if the houses had been provided by the local authority itself (section 94 
subsection 3). The type of activity encouraged by section 94 (1) 
concentrated overwhelmingly upon the housing of the 'working classes'. 
Baker (1976, p.148-9) notes that 
"The underlying aim was to use the local authorities as agents 
for the central government in ensuring that the p..1blic furx:ls 
paid over to associations were properly used. Unfortunately, 
some rot only declined to use rate JOOney to supplement the 
Exchequer subsidy, which was understandable enough in many 
circumstances, but used the powers entrusted to them to block 
payment by the Exchequer." 
The system whereby housing associations could only receive government 
subsidies through the mediator of a local authority was rot altered until 
1961. Housing associations re-entered the mainstream of housing 
legislation in 1957, when the Housing Act provided a new definition. 
Section 189 (now amended by schedule 18 para.6 of the 1974 Housing Act) 
stated that 
"'housing association' means a society, body of trustees or 
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company established for the p.lrpose of, or amongst whose objects 
or powers are included those of, providing, constructing, 
improving or managing or facilitating or encouraging the 
construction or improvement of, houses or hostels as defined by 
section 129 (1) of the Housing Act 1974, being a society, body of 
trustees or company who do not trade for profit or whose rules 
prohibit the issue of any capital with interest or dividend 
exceeding the rate for the time being prescribed by the 
Treasury. " 
This definition differs from that in 1935 in that it does rot 
specifically designate the task of associations to be to cater for the 
working classes [4] • This may have been intended to accomnodate the types 
of activities later introduced by the 1961 Housing Act (see section 3.4, 
chapter 3) • In the event, the 1961 and 1964 'Acts defined eligible 
associations as 'housing societies', and created definitional confusion 
for over a decade (see M'Kenzie-Hall, 1971, p.35). The 1957 Act maintained 
the system of authorised arrangements between an association and a local 
authority "for the purpose of enabling the association to improve houses 
or buildings" on land owned by the local authority (section 129). To this 
end local authorities were empowered to make grants or loans to hoUSing 
associations (section 119) for the provision (section 120) or 
rehabilitation (section 121) of acconmodation. '!be Act suggested very 
little that was new. As Stack (1968, p.48) p.lt it 
"The 1957 Housing Act consolidated earlier legislation and 
incorporated provisions relating to housing associations which 
were essentially the same as those obtaining in the inter-war 
years." 
Local authorities had been empowered to advance lOOney to housing 
associations since the passing of the 1919 Act. Very little money was 
advanced to associations by local authorities however. In 1961 
associations completed only 1564 units (in England). '1here are at least 
two reasons why local authorities did rot provide much assistance to 
-----------------
[ 4] Section 1 and schedule 1 of the 1949 Housing Act rerooved the 
requirement that provision should be for the working classes. 
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associations. First, many local authorities, particularly those which had 
been active under earlier, less favourable legislation, did not want to do 
anything which limited their role in the provision of housing. Local 
authority professionals were concerned to establish a tradition of 
municipal housing provision. Secondly, the 1919 Act limited the loss a 
local authority could incur on any housing scheme to the product of a 
penny rate. 'Ihese virtually limitless subsidies meant that there was 
little financial incentive for local authorities to utilise housing 
associations. Although the magnitude of municipal subsidies varied over 
time, the relationship between local authorities and housing associations 
did not radically change until central government supported associations 
directly in 1961. Borrowing money in order to support associations could 
have prejudiced the programne of a local authority. Stack (1968, p.32) 
observes that 
"a local authority may not be inclined to increase the size of 
their outstanding loan debt for the sake of helping a housing 
association and perhaps jeopardise some future project of their 
own." 
Local authorities therefore had been primarily responsible for 
producing state supported housing for 42 years when the then Conservative 
Government passed the 1961 Housing Act. This Act created an exchequer fund 
of £25m for use by (cost rent) housing societies [5] , and permitted 
authorised arrangements between a housing association and the Minister of 
Housing. This represented a radical departure from previous practice, and 
began a process of decreasing local authority influence over the activity 
of housing associations. 'file remainder of this chapter will consider the 
different theoretical approaches to explaining why this, and subsequent, 
support of housing associations occurred. 
[5] In England and Wales by section 7(3). In Scotland a further £3 
million was allocated by section 11 (4) of the 1962 Housing (Sootland) 
Act. 
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3.2 AccLDnulation Explanations of State Support for Housing Associations 
One way of explaining state support for housing associations outlined 
in chapter 2 is to suggest that the policy p.1rsued specific economic 
goals. Much contemporary neo-Marxist analysis of state intervention in 
housing argues that the policies are functionally required by 'capitalism'. 
These approaches posit two fundamental requirements of state activity. The 
first task is to secure the conditions favourable for capital accLDnulation 
(either through direct contracts with the private sector, or by securing 
general conditions favourable for accLDnulation). In housing these tasks 
are fulfilled by contracting out state housing to private building firms, 
financing housing on the open market, and securing an adequate supply of 
healthy labour for industry (reproduction of labour {X)Wer for 
accLDnulation). '!be second task is to secure legitimation, and social 
stability. In housing this is achieved by ensuring the adequate 
reproduction of 'essential' labour {X)Wer (reproduction of labour power for 
social stability). 'Ibis section will assess the applicability of these 
functional theories of state intervention in explaining state support for 
the housing association movement. 
First, the likely profits generated in related construction industries 
will be considered. Secondly, the reduction in the costs of reproducing 
labour power will be considered. Finally, the effect of the transition to 
association provision on the level and predictability of p.1blic 
expenditure will be considered. 
3.2.1 Building Industry Profitability 
It is difficult to see how association new building can be in the 
economic interests of 'capital'. In 1980 there were 2,685 housing 
associations in England and Wales, but only 353 housing authorities [6] • 
This fragmentation of association tendering is reinforced by the project 
[6] See Brion and Legg (1977, p.32). Coo'paring the size distribution of 
local authority and housing association housing departments they 
conment that "the differences are so great that we cannot even use 
the same scale for the diagrams", associations departments being much 
smaller (see the figure on p.33). 
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specific nature of the housing association grant, whereas local 
authorities can pool their rents and subsidies. There can be little doubt 
that, if the intention of state policy is to provide public housing with 
the least inconvenience to large capital [7] , securing greater 
accLDnulation [8] , the local authority sector is currently the JOOst 
functional. Irxleed, Short and Ramsden (1974, p.lO) and Short (1982, p.191-2) 
argue that associations are inherently inefficient, duplicating each 
others work and suffering diseconomies of scale [9] • 
Association rehabilitation raises slightly different questions. 
Rehabilitation lends itself to the organisational structure of the 
association JOOvementi it requires smaller programnes of work, often in 
phases. This may provide stability for small building firms, which are the 
most wlnerable to economic fluctuations. Local authorities can and do 
urxlertake some rehabilitation work however, and there can be little 
economic justification for preferring associations. Housing association 
activity is unlikely to generate profits in the private sector 
significantly larger than those generated by nunicipal activity. An 
explanation of state support in terms of accLDnulation is therefore 
inappropriate. 
[7] According to Dunleavy (1981, p.15-16) the cxmstruction industry is 
dominated by a small numbe.r of large firms. In 1968, the largest 
building and civil engineering firm accounted for 21% of employment 
for the type of firm, and 26% of gross output. Ball (1983, p.S7) 
confirms this: "Big capital dominates the industry and generally such 
firms produce JOOre than 300 dwellings per year", and "47 percent of 
the market in 1978 was taken by 89 firms providing JOOre than 250 
dwellings" • 
[8] Ball (1983, p.83) confirms the fact that large building firms make 
greater profits when he asserts that "their ability to take a long-
term view enables them to raise their development profit above the 
norm" • 
[9] An argument disputed by the National Federation of Housing 
Associations, who argue (1983, p.ll) that "there is 00 optimum size 
for housing associations" and "the global nl.D'l'ber of housing 
associations is an irrelevant consideration", as long as each 
association is operating efficiently. Irxleed, in 1977 the N.F.H.A. 
argued (1977, p.23) that "housing associations, on an average basis, 
move quite speedily on the developnent side for both new-building and 
rehabilitation" • 
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3.2.2 '.Ihe Reproduction of Labour Power 
Pickvance (1980) discusses the notion that social housing is intended 
to reproduce labour power. In order to verify such a thesis he argues that 
three questions must be addressed. First, one must decide which groups of 
labour are JOOst functional for capital and therefore require specif ic 
assistance. Secondly, the inadequacy of the private sector to meet the 
needs of this group must be demonstrated. Thirdly, one must demonstrate 
that social housing reduces the cost of housing and improves the use value 
of housing for the ocupational groups specified. A fourth question must be 
addressed if this argument is to be extended to housing associations; that 
housing associations perform this function better than local authorities 
(for the innovation is not justifiable if associations are merely as 
suitable as local authorities). 
Pickvance (1980, p.42) correctly recognises that only the third 
question has been adequately addressed. He regards the identification of 
functional groups as particularly problematical. This is ~rtant if the 
function of allocation practices is to reproduce specific types of labour 
power. There are several reasons why, even should such groups be capable of 
identification, associations are unlikely to house them JOOre efficiently 
than local authorities. First, local authorities comnonly nominate 50-75% 
of association tenants. Were municipal inefficiency in targetting priority 
groups the reason for supporting the housing association JOOvement this 
practice would be positively discouraged. In fact, it was a Government 
White Paper (Fair Deal for Housing, para.78) which suggested this as 
standard practice. Secondly, it has been argued that one advantage of 
associations is their flexible allocation policies (see C.HA.C., 1971, 
para.2.4). This militates against a functional allocation policy which 
seeks to reproduce specific types of labour power nationally. It could be 
argued that associations merely have flexibility in selecting from 
amongst a growing pool of 'welfare' applicants. '!be trend towards 
marginalisation in the council sector has been widely recognised (see, for 
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example, English, 1982a; Ball, 1982 [10] ). Gray (1976b) has suggested that 
the allocation system operated by local authorities is intended to 
stigrnatise occupancy of a council dwell ing, in order to obscure the 
reasons for the shortage of public housing and to foster preferences for 
market provided housing. Gray describes these as primarily ideological 
rather than economic strategies. The current Conservative Government is 
also emphasising the charitable elements of association activity however, 
suggesting that associations should now only house the poorest [11] • The 
crucial issue is whether it was necessary to support associations to 
further this aim. This raises two important questions. First, what was it 
about association provision that leads Gray (1976b, p.82) to suggest that 
association provision was a IOOre ideologically acceptable form housing 
provision than council housing in the eyes of the Conservative Government? 
Are the allocational procedures of housing associations likely to result 
in different ideological responses? Secondly, if housing association 
provision was preferred in the 1960s and early 1970s, why is the current 
Conservative Government, through the right to buy and marg ina 1 isation, 
treating housing associations much like local authorities? Why increase 
support for a tenure in 1961 only to begin a process of marginalisation of 
its tenants some twenty years later? 
Pickvance concludes (1980, p.46) 
"explanations of state intervention in terms of improvements in 
the reproduction of labour power need to explain why and how the 
particular means concerned, i.e. the state, came to intervene, as 
well as the purported reason for its intervention, since there 
are alternative means (the private market, philanthropy, 
companies) and the state itself is incapable of carrying out all 
[lOj Murie (1982, p.49) has roted that the Conservative Party is currently 
defining the role of local authority provision as being "largely 
concerned with meeting the needs of a residual population who cannot 
fend for themselves in the owner-occupied market and cannot obtain 
adequate housing in the privately rented sector"; specifically for 
"the elderly, the poor and certain groups with special needs". 
[11] See John Stanley M.P. (Conservative Minister for Housing), Standing 
Comnittee F, 1982 Housing and Building Control Bill, co1.305, who 
argued that "it has become apparent that at least some existing 
tenants of charitable housing associations are rot in necessitous 
circumstances". 'Ibis argument is developed in section 5.3, chapter 5. 
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the demands placed on it. n 
It has been suggested that the main reason for switching from indirect 
provision through trusts to direct provision through municipalities in 
1919 was a legitimation crisis caused by working class agitation over 
housing conditions. It is difficult to ascribe such a functional 
requirement in 1961. Iooeed, the early cost rent associations catered for 
middle income tenants; a group hardly in need of state assistance in 
reproducing its labour power. It can be argued that the current tendency 
towards a polarisation of association activity, between middle income 
purchaser (utilising the right to buy and other means of gaining 
ownership) and residual poor can be explained in part as a response to the 
failure of earlier attempts to promote a new unsubsidised tenure. 'Ibis 
having failed, the Conservative Government is prepared to subject 
associations to the same policies as are being applied to local authority 
provision. Quite who this could be functional for is hard to imagine, for 
the result is the creation of a new tenure which is merely duplicating the 
work of local authorities (in a way to be more accurately defined later, 
when the allocation policies and tenant structure of associations are 
considered). It would seem that there is also difficulty in addressing the 
fourth component of an adequate theory of the reproduction of labour power 
through housing association provision. 
3.2.3 Public Expenditure 
Another functionalist argtment suggests that housing associations have 
been supported in order to facilitate a reduction in p.lblic expeooiture on 
housing, or have provided a framework which will facilitate such a move in 
the future. Initially, cost rent and co-ownership associations received 00 
subsidy. From 1961 to 1972 the attitude of governments closely reflected 
those of their nineteenth century predecessors. Associatons were intended 
to demonstrate a viable area for private investment in rented 
housing. [12] Since 1974 however, housing associations have become 
increasingly subsidised. In 1981/82 associations received £636m from 
central government (through the Housing Corporation). 'lbe 1979 Carmittee 
[12] See section 3.4 for detailed support for this assertion. 
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of Public Accounts [13] stated that unit costs and subsidies were similar 
in municipal and association sectors. Hatch and Mocroft (1979, p.400) argue 
that the products of local authorities and housing associations have 
become similar to the point where "cost differences have mostly 
disappeared". Furthermore, central government reduced local authority 
housing expenditure from £2914m (1981 prices) in 1975/76 to £1422m in 
1981/82. During the same period it increased allocations to the Housing 
Corporation from£307m to £556m. 
These figures suggest that far from permitting a reduction in state 
expenditure 00 housing, support for the association movement has led 
governments to spend more on housing than they might otherwise have. '!his 
is oot to deny that increased central control over housing expenditure may 
be a long term objective behind suRX>rt of the association movement. '!he 
Housing Corporation is oon-elected, and central government may have 
expected to meet less political opposition to financial cutbacks from the 
Corporation than it would from local authorities. '!his argument has 
several weaknesses however. First, the government seems to be having 
little difficulty reducing local authority housing expenditure directly. 
This does oot inval idate the argument if this reduction has actually been 
facilitated by increased support for housing associations. Table 3.2 shows 
the total expenditure on municipal and association housing from 1976- 77 to 
1982-83. 
------------------
[13] ~ndix V of the report is a statement 00 the comparative costs of 
local authority and housing association provision, prepared by the 
Accounting Officer of the Department of the Environment. ~ilst 
stressing the difficulty of comparing like with like, the appendix 
concludes (para.10) "that there are 00 marked differences between the 
sectors in the costs of providing or managing accomnodation". Precise 
figures for costs are given as; management (para.6), £163 per local 
authority dwelling per year and, £160 per housing association 
dwelling per year (1977-78); provision (para.4), £15,500 per local 
authority dwelling and £13,500 per housing association dwelling 
(1978) • 
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TABLE 3.2 Public expenditure on the municipal programme 
and on housing associations (capital expenditure, em cash prices) • 
Year 76-77 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 
Municipal expenditure 
on municipal 
I programme 1860 1758 1736 1944 1717 1416 1410 
TOtal experxHture 
on associations 469 513 508 586 665 634 790 
Total expend iture 
on 'publ ic' housing 2329 2271 2244 2530 2382 2050 2200 
- ---
Percentage of 
76-77 expenditure 100 97.5 96.4 108.6 102.3 88.0 94.5 
Source: Treasury (1982 and 1983). Derived from table 2.7. 
Using 1976-77 as a base, there is a remarkable consistency in total 
housing expenditure, varying from a high of 109 to a low of 88. Iooeed, the 
expenditure in 1982-83 is only 5.5% below the level spent six years 
previously. It can be argued that expenditure on associations is rrerely a 
redirection of expenditure, without altering overall levels. 'l1le 
presentation of figures in cash terms obscures the effect of inflation, 
however. Using the index of general prices in Economic Trends (14] , the 
, 
real value of the 1982-83 allocation is only 73.9% of the 1976-77 
allocation. 'lbere has therefore been a considerable reduction in total 
housing expenditure in real terms, despite increased cash allocations to 
the Housing Corporation. looeed, in 1981 the Labour Party (1981, p.58) 
observed that 
"lhere is no evidence that the growth of housing associations 
----------
[14] January 1984, table 42. Inflation figures are given for calendar 
years, so the est~te is slightly inaccurate compared to the figures 
in table 3.~ The accumulated inflation rate over the years presented 
in the table is 27.8%, making the real value of the 1982-83 allocation 
only E172lm. 
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over the last few years has meant more investment in p.lblic 
housing than would otherwise have been made". 
Secondly, successive years of government support for the association 
movement has facilitated the creation of a political lobby in their 
favour. 'Ibis was demonstrated in resistance to a reduction in their 
subsidies in the late 1970s. This political lobby is based in the House of 
Lords, and was manifest in their rejection, in April 1983, of the 
governments attempt to awly the right to buy to the tenants of charitable 
, 
housing associations (clause 2) in the 1982 Housing and Building Control 
Bill. 
In the Lords Comnittee Debate, only five speakers were in favour of 
clause 2, whilst thirteen spoke against it [15] • '!be clause aroused 
oWQsition from all sides of the House. '!be variety of opponents was 
remarked upon by several speakers. For example, Lord Strathcona and Mount 
Royal (Conservative) (co1.814) observed "I think that it would be fair to 
say that Clause 2 has not so far flushed out very many friends in this 
house". Lord Be11win (Conservative), in his sumning up in favour of the 
clause (co1.847), was forced to acknowledge that oWQsition "has come not 
only from noble Lords oWQsite, but also from some of my noble friends". 
The clause was defeated by 182 votes to 96. In 1983 the Conservati ve 
Government introduced an amended version of the Bill. '!he new Bill 
included provision for a right to buy where the landlord only holds a long 
lease. Lords oWQsition to the right to buy being aw1ied to housing 
associations was manifest again, when an amendment was proposed to exclude 
this new right where the landlord is a charity. Baroness Nicol 
(Labour) [16] reflected on the fate of the previous version of the Bill: 
"We decided last year in a very well argued case on all sides of 
[15] Baroness Birk (Labour) (Hansard Lords, Volume 441, co1.8l4) argued 
that the whole concept of voluntary work would be jeopardised if the 
efforts of contributors merely resulted in the creation of private 
rights. Lord Hanworth (Social DeJoocrat) (col.827) suggested that 
retrospective legislation was a bad thing (the clause attempting to 
apply the right to buy to associations which had received housing 
association grant in the past). Baroness Denington (Labour) (col.842) 
observed that the country could not stand another source of decl ine 
in the availability of rented property. 
[16] Hansard Lords, Volume 448, co1.1l68. 
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the House that charities needed to be protected for very good 
reasons. '!hey are the one method we have of ensuring a long-term 
supply of rente] housing." 
Lord Evans of Claughton (Liberal) (col.1170) summed up the attitude of 
the House towards charities in general, and housing associations in 
particular: 
"If one permits the lessee of charitable freehold land the right 
to buy, then one is in fact going against the very p.lrpose for 
which the char i ties may have been set utr to help the less well 
off and those in need." 
The amendment was carried by 157 votes to 77. It is clear that the House 
of Lords is rot oR?Qsed to the right to buy per se, but its application to 
charitable associations. '!he new Bill offers tenants of associations 
deprived of the right to buy because of the exclusion of charities the 
money to p.lrchase al ternati ve acconmodation on the open mar keto Lord 
Bellwin (Conservative), introducing this .. right to exchange" [17] , 
stressed that it would create vacancies in association accoamod at ion, 
offer ing middle income tenants the right to buy and poor people the 
prospects of rented accomnodation. '!his clause was accepted by the Lords 
without division [18] • '!he Conservative Government is row paying 
considerable attention to the likely reaction of the House of Lords to its 
legislative proposals on housing associations, for, as roted by Brown, [19] 
at present "the upper chamber is the only place where the Government is 
likely to be defeated". It would appear that central government has rot 
created a rrore malleable tool of housing policy. 
Another factor which suggests that control of expenditure is rot the 
main determinant of p.lblic housing policies is the fact that support for 
owner occupation does rot involve savings to the exchequer, yet it has 
[17] Hansard Lords, Volume 449, col.19S. 
[18] '!he Times, seizing upon the willingness of the House of Lords to 
overturn legislation on this subject, urged the House to reject this 
clause on the rrorning of the debate; see Noble Tripwire, '!he Times, 
March 6th 1984, p.lS. It was also oR?Qsed by WOlmar (1984). 
[19] House of Lords Poses a Defeating Paradox for Labour, '!he Guardian, 
March 19th 1984, p.2. 
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been shown to receive all party agreement (see section 2.2, chapter 2). As 
Ball (1983, p.339-40) puts it: 
"'!he roost significant and well-known fiscal policy towards 
owner occupation is tax relief on mortgage interest payments. By 
1981 the Treasury estimated that this relief cost £2,OOOm in 
lost tax revenue, which was equivalent to all the central and 
local government housing subsidies to council housing, housing 
associations, new towns, rent rebates and rent allowances p.lt 
together." 
'!he argument of English (1982b, p.188) is relevant here. Discussing 
Conservative preference for owner occupation, and their reluctance to stem 
the scale of income tax relief paid out, he notes 
"'l11e implication rrust be that an even greater priority is placed 
on the alleged advantages of owner occupation than on limiting 
the cost of housing to the exchequer." 
'!his also suggests that a reduction of public expenditure is not the 
rationale for individual housing policies. 
3.3 Organisational Explanations of State Support for Housing Associations 
Another theoretical approach to explaining policy formulation is 
provided by organisational theory. Organisational explanations of the 
growth of government support of the association roovement are dependent 
upon the question of the space standards and design of Jtl.lnicipal 
housebuilding (management practices are discussed roore fully in the 
following section, and in chapter 5). '!be importance of housing standards 
was recognised from the inception of the p.lblic housing programne. 
As section 2.2 indicated, the rrunicipal prograrrme was initiated as a 
result of a legittmation crisis over the issue of the quality and cost of 
working class housing. It was therefore politically necessary that public 
housing standards \1iere high. '!be design standards of the garden city 
roovement \1iere adopted. As Swenarton (1981, p.187) observed 
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"It was crucial for the ideological function of the housing 
programme that the houses be indisputably better than working 
class houses of the past." 
Conversely, the ideological importance of declining public housing 
standards is illustrated by Merrett (1979, p.57). When discussing Circular 
1238/32 he observes 
"Many of the estates builtin the 1930s were to become the 
ghettos of the 1960s, in strong contrast to the housing approved 
urrler the full Wheatley subsidy." 
A reduction of public housing starrlards relative to other tenures 
reduces the desirability of this form of accomnodation. Do these arglmlents 
have any relevance during the period of Conservative suWOrt for the 
housing association movement? Dunleavy (1981) analyses the significance 
of structural factors in influencing the adoption of high rise housing by 
local authorities in the late 1950s and 1960s. He argues that the 
construction industry influenced local authority attitudes, and that local 
authorities in turn persuaded central government to include suwort of 
high rise in its comnitment to system building. Dunleavy (1981, p.355) is 
in 00 doubt about the ideological implications of the experimentation with 
high rise housing. 
"most significantly of all, the high-rise housing boom cast a 
sizeable blight on the public image of post-war council housing. 
The policy lent itself to an analysis in terms of the inherent 
inefficiency, bureaucratic indifference, and unresponsiveness 
of state intervention compared with market provision." 
Dunleavy (1980, p.l23) describes this as 'rationality defecit'. IDeal 
authorities were urrler pressure from the building industry to utilise 
system building, which was favoured by central government, to build high. 
In a period of ever increasing population projections this seemed to make 
statistical sense, but created a product disliked by tenants, and hence 
threw into question the very system which produced such an output. 
OUnleavy argues (1981, p.355) that this favoured private housing, but it is 
possible that the ideological damage done to council housing favoured all 
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other forms of provision which did not produce such an output, including 
housing association provision [20] • Iooeed, Milton Wilkinson am Thurman 
(1981, p.133) implicitly uompare the design of association accommodation 
favourably with that of owner occupied housing [21] • 
Certainly, the creation of the Housing Corporation in 1964 coincided 
with central government's onslaught on the basis of high rise building 
(the housing cost yardstick penalised high building in 1963, and Circular 
35/67 altered subsidies in a way which favoured low rise). In 1970 Dennis 
wrote his critical appraisal of 1960s comprehensive redevelopment 
policies in Suooerland. He concluded (1970, p.363) 
"Instead of roonolithic policies of clearance ••• the problem at 
the present time in Surrler land seems to call for responses as 
heterogeneous as the problems." 
The reaction against comprehensi ve redevelopnent am municipal high 
rise building in the ,years before the 1974 Housing Act (which redirected 
housing association provision towards rehabilitation) was indeed strong. 
Kirby (1981) suggests that an organisational focus is the only feasible 
explanation of state support for housing associations. He utilises the 
work of Dunleavy to argue that there is no feasible political or 
ideological explanation of the growth of the Housing Corporation. 
Rejecting any political explanation, Kirby argues that associations house 
'the politically weakest and economically roost marginal groups [22] • 
Furtherroore, associations rely upon small building firms, unlikely to 
generate large profits, so there can be no economic objective behind their 
[20] This is a historically specific assertion. Ball, writing in 1983 
(p.139), conpares nunicipal housing quality favourably with owner 
occupied housing: "the finish on council projects is often to a 
higher standard. Better quality facing bricks are used, am far roore 
expense is incurred on laOOscaping and shrubbery". 
[21) Explaining why exchange professionals are reluctant to combine 
developnents for owner occupation with association projects they 
note that ·the architectural quality of many housing association 
developnents makes them visually prominent aoo further E!mJ;tlasises 
their incongruity in an area where consistency of style am 
uniformity of tenure are held in great esteem". 
(22) He provides no direct evidence for this assertion. See chapters 7 and 
8 for empirical data on the tenants of housing associations. 
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promotion. Kirby (1981, p.1299) therefore turns to organisational 
explanation: 
"Housing Associations, locally based organisations with the 
potential for close involvement in local housing needs, were 
encouraged by the state as a direct result of the weakness of 
local authority housing policies in the postwar period." 
This approach ~lies a politically neutral rational (central) state 
reacting to inefficiency in local government. 'Ihere are obvious flaws in 
this awroach. First, as indicated above, central and local government are 
not completely autonomous from each other. Although the initial enthusiasm 
for high rise carne from local authorities, central government subsidies 
specifically encouraged the construction of high rise housing. Central 
government can itself use past m..micipal performance as an argument for or 
against continued suWOrt of municipal house building (despite the fact 
that central government is largely responsible for the general nature of 
local authority activity). This provides an excellent example of the use 
of ideology, where central government significantly influences and then 
interprets as autonomous and umesirable, local authority activity. 
Although Kirby (1981, p.1297) identifies ideology as a potential 
explanation of housing policy, he fails to consider its awlication to 
housing associations. It is therefore wrong to argue that central 
government policy is merely reacting to local administration practices, 
and that there is no political or ideological motivation behind central 
government policy. Irrleed, the analysis of p.Iblic housing standards by 
Merrett (1979) and Swenarton (1981) imply that attraction and 
stigrnatisation may have been deliberate policies of central government. 
Kemeny (1981, p.76) suggests that a 
"furrlarnental prerequisite for the maximum expansion of the 
home-ownership sector is that the alternatives to it be as 
limited and as unattractive as possible." 
Secondly, this analysis fails to explain why alternatives to m..micipal 
provision are sought when it is equally plausible to reform (by advice or 
legislation) the practice of local authorities. 
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Kirby's analysis is therefore over simplistic [23] • Whilst he is 
correctly sceptical of the validity of functional theories in explaining 
state support for housing associations, he totally ignores the 
significance of politics and ideology. There can be no 'rational' or 
'neutral' choice between municipal and association provision. As Kemeny 
(1981, p.63) puts it, "current tenure preferences are the product and not 
the cause of tenure systems". 
3.4 '!he Changing Political and Ideological Basis of Support for Housing 
Associations 
So far only explanations of state housing policy which focus upon the 
economic intentions and consequences of policies, and the organisational 
implementation of policies have been considered. Both of these 
explanations to some extent seek to understand policy initiatives in terms 
of their effects, and as the consequences of earlier policies. Little 
analysis of contemporary policy focuses upon the role of ideology and 
politics in shaping central government initiatives. The remainder of this 
chapter re-evaluates policies towards housing associations since 1961, and 
argues that the actions of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party can 
best be understood in ideological terms, and that it is only in these terms 
that some semblance of consistency and contrast can be seen in their 
respective approaches. 
3.4.1 Fran Cost Rent to Rehabilitation 
When the 1961 Housing Act established an exchequer furd of £25m for use 
by housing associations, local authorities had been receiving subsidies 
and under a duty to provide for the housing needs of their area for nearly 
half a century. What caused the government to dramatically increase its 
support for the housing association movement? Henry Brooke M.P. 
(Conservative Minister for Housing), introducing the 1961 Housing Bill 
(Second Reading Debate, col.969) asserted that associations were intended 
---_._--
[23] His theoretical rejection of alternative explanations in favour of 
an organisational focus (p.1297) occupies fourteen lines of text. 
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to be "mid-way between local authorities and private enterprise". 'Ibis 
concern with distinctions of tenure and ownership goes a long way in 
explaining Party attitudes towards the housing association JOOvement. 
Associations are privately administered, yet subject to government control 
through an unelected body. In the 1960s they received very little subsidy, 
yet from the 1970s the scale of subsidies has greatly increased. 
Associations can be perceived as being public sector institutions because 
they receive subsidies, or private sector institutions because they are 
privately run. It is precisely because of this ambiguous status that 
successive governments have been able to crlapt the movement to meet their 
own needs. 
The late 1950s marked a period of Conservative administration which 
errq;:tlasised oon-government solutions to the housing needs of the 
population. In the words of Barnett (1969, p.71): 
"'!he free market was the paper tiger of the 1957 Rent Act 
debates." 
Barnett (1969, p.72) regards this as a primarily ideological position; 
for "the government revealed 00 clear conception of the free mar ket, other 
than as a tag for its assortment of policy intentions". This was reflected 
in a reliance upon the private sector for new provision, and the belief 
that local authorities should only house "people who otherwise would oot 
be able to house themselves" (Henry Brooke M.P., 200 Reading Debate, 1961 
Housing Bill, col.969). Local authorities have traditionally had 
considerable iOOependence in determining their allocation policies, so 
central government could only indirectly ensure that local authorities 
housed the 'residual' needy. '!he JOOst direct means available was a 
reduction of subsidies to local author i ties and a reduction in the housing 
standards that they were permitted to provide. This made local authority 
aCcommodation less attractive. FurtherJOOre, Barnett (1969, p.43) observed 
"this withdrawal by the government would be possible only if the 
existing stock was brought up to and maintained in a good 
standard of repair." 
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One policy which sought to compensate for the withdrawal of support for 
local authority activity was that of seeking to revive the privately 
rented sector. The problem of private renting was perceived as one of 
insufficient supply caused by the low rental income permitted by 
legislation. Thus the 1957 Rent Act decontrolled many properties, and 
permitted large rent increases on properties remaining controlled. In 
order to fully curtail the attractiveness of nnmicipalisation, older 
privately owned property needed private investment to prevent its 
{ilysical decay. Thus the 1961 Housing Act introduced improvement grants. 
Whilst being administered by local authorities, and involving same public 
subsidisation, they only covered a part of the total costs of works and 
thus encouraged individual investment in housing. This accorded with the 
Conservative desire to promote non-government solutions to housing 
problems. Crucially, in a period of anti-collectivism, the asset remained 
private. 
Even by 1961 it was clear that the 1957 Act was not fulfilling its 
objectives: the supply of privately rented housing in Lomon was, if 
anything, reducing further (see, for example, McKay and Cox, 1979, p.126-7). 
Nevitt's analysis (1966) of property taxation and mortgage interest relief 
leads her to conclude (p.50) that "tenants who can move from rented 
accommodation to owner-occupation have a very strong economic incentive 
for doing so". As a result "the decontrol of rents is rather paradoxically 
the time at which we can expect the sale of dwellings to owner-occupiers 
rather than during the per iod of rent control" (p.116-7). Once rent levels 
start to rise, the taxation position of tenants renders purchase an 
economical roove long before economic rents are reached. '!be 1957 Act 
failed to stimulate new provision, and led to the sale of nuch existing 
privately rented property. In order to absorb pressures for an increase in 
public provision of rented property, subsidies to local authorities were 
concentrated in areas of housing stress. 
Finally, the 1961 Housing Act created an exchequer fum of £25m for 
making loans to housing associations. '!be 1961 White Paper, Housing in 
England and Wales, para.14, introduced the ooncept of what has become known 
as 'new style' housing associations to oomplement the traditional 
{ililanthropic housing trusts. 
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lithe Government ••• believe that there are people who would 
prefer to rent rather than buy a house and who would willingly 
pay an economic rent, if they could find what they wanted. n 
This comnent is crucial. First, it allowed non-profit - housing 
associations to be ron-charitable (i.e. not cater for the poor) and still 
be eligible for government loans. Secondly, the intention was clearly to 
increase the stock of privately rented property. 'lbirdly, no subsidy was 
involved, and the scheme was intended to demonstrate the viability of 
investing in private renting. consistent with the government's view that 
the problems of private renting were supply led. Henry Brooke M.P. 
confirmed this attitude in the second reading debate on the 1961 Housing 
Bill (cols.969-970), when he suggested that by the time the advances reach 
the £25m limit 
"I hope that the scheme will have done its work in defining the 
existence of a real demand for houses to let at ron-subsidised 
rents and that by then other agencies will be able to take over 
the meeting of itn. 
Clearly these cost rent associations were intended to supplement and 
stimulate pr i vate entrepreneurs cater ing for middle income tenants, and 
were unlike the traditional Iililanthropic associations which could house 
poor tenants because of charitable finance (and charity law) and tax 
exemption. '!he intention of the legislation was that the new style 
societies would provide accomnodation for mobile middle income earners 
who otherwise, because of the decline of privately rented acoommodation, 
would have been forced to apply for council housing. '!he pulanthropic 
associations would continue to house poorer people. '!his distinction 
between the two often became confused, particularly in the case of housing 
for the elderly. Circular 12/62 (Housing Associations in England and 
Wales) suggested (para.12) that such schemes may be appropriate for roth 
fXlilanthropic and new-style unsubsidised associations. Stack (1968, p.42) 
sums up a general confusion of role experienced by many associations at 
the time, when discussing provision for the elderly: 
nIt is rot clear under present circumstances whether providing 
housing for the elderly by musing associations should be 
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regarded as a social service (receiving financial support from 
the comnunity at large), or as basically an economic operation 
which meets the needs of a certain group of consumers who are 
able to pay the pr ice asked." 
The new exchequer fuoo did not involve local authorities in the process 
of assisting associations, and the old system of authorised arrangements 
between a local authority and an association was exteooed to permit 
authorised arrangements between the Minister of Housing and an 
association. '!his excluded local authorities from the process of 
supporting housing associations. Dame Evelyn Sharp (then Permanent 
secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Goyernment) said of the 
association IOOvement in 1961, "the essence of what we are creating is a 
movement independent of Government" [24] • Since the Conservative 
Government was promoting associations as private institutions same 
distancing of the movement from local authorities was clearly considered 
necessary. Since the scheme was intended to attract private finance, it may 
have been necessary to strengthen their private sector, entrepreneurial 
image. 
It is oot surprising therefore that some Labour MPs became suspicious 
of the Conservative Government's attitude toward the municipal programme 
implicit in these policy changes. Michael Stewart M.P. (Labour) (Standing 
COOmittee 0, 1961 Housing Bill, cols.32-33) comnented 
"It is an important principle that when anything is provided 
wholly or substantially from public fuoos, the management of 
that thing ••• ought to be in the haOOs of elected persoos." 
If this is an oblique defence of local authority housing provision 
against the use of housing associations, Michael Stewart M.P. was IOOre 
explici t in the second reading debate (Hansard, Second Reading Debate, 
1961 Housing Bill, col.990): 
"I still believe that the best judge of need is the elected 
[24] Quoted by Joyce Butler M.P., Standing Comnittee E, 1963 Housing Bill, 
col.ll. 
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local authority, which has a range of information about the 
conditions in its area that is not open to any private body, 
however diligent and public-spirited. 1I 
Clearly, some MPls appreciated the possibility that these new style 
associations, although apparently catering for people quite distinct from 
council tenants, could come to pose a threat to local authority activity. 
Charles Loughlin M.P. (Labour) (Standing Cornnittee D, 1961 Housing Bill, 
col. 50 ) observed, 
lilt may be that the intention is to redesign the part taken in 
the general housing of the people by local authorities and to 
put the enptasis on associations of one kim or another as 
distinct from local authorities. 1I 
This line of argument was so widespread amongst OppoSition MPls that 
the Conservative Minister for Housing (Brooke) responded (Standing 
Conmittee D, 1961 Housing Bill, col.116) "I am rot introducing a Bill 
designed to cut down local authority building". 
The Conservative Government reinforced these policy iniatives in 1964. 
The £25m exchequer fum was rapidly allocated, and to maintain roomentum 
new proposals were considered necessary. Circular 41/64 provides evidence 
of this: 
"The existence of a lively dernarx1 for new houses at cost rents 
has been clearly demonstrated by the success of the pilot scheme 
provided for in section 7 of the Housing Act 1961. £25 million 
was set aside umer that section to be used for advances to 
hoUSing associations providing houses to let at cost rents and 
for co-ownership. With the help and advice of the National 
Federation of Housing SOCieties, all this lOOney has been firmly 
committed." (Para.6) 
Paragraph 7 concludes that the new Housing Corporation should assume 
responsibility for continuing this form of provision. The Central Housing 
Advisory Conmittee (1971, para.3.4) also roted the success of the 1961 
experiment, and observed that the lOOl'ley made available under the pilot 
scheme of 1961 "was rapidly taken up and was very nearly all conmitted by 
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the end of 1963". The White Paper Housing (0nrxl.20S0, para.37) stated that: 
"The Government propose to establish a Housing Corporation with 
the function of stimulating the development of housing 
societies which will provide and manage rented houses, or houses 
on a co-operative basis. The aim will be to secure the formation 
of strongly organised societies operating (with paid staff) in 
the main centres of population, each capable of undertaking a 
ser~es of building schemes and managing a substantial munber of 
dwell ings. " 
The 1964 Act created the Housing Corporation to oversee the activity of 
housing associations. Section 1 (1) of the Act defined the function of the 
Corporation as being to 
"prolOOte and assist the development of housing societies, to 
facilitate the proper exercise and performance of the functions 
of such societies, and to publicise, in the case of societies 
providing houses for their own members 00 less than in the case 
of those providing homes for letting, the aims and principles of 
such societies." 
Sir Keith JOseph M.P. (Conservative Minister for Housing and Local 
Government), explaining the Bill, comnented (Standing Comnittee E, 1963 
Housing Bill, co1.36): 
"the Housing Corporation is intended to provide positive 
evangelical drive and guidance behind a considerable expansion 
of the housing society movement." 
In effect this merely institutionalised the system of lending money to 
associations without involving local authorities. '!he Corporation is an 
example of a quasi-autonOlOOus 'governmental body' (see Doig, 1979). A 
central department exerts administrative control over its operations, but 
a Minister is oot normally held accountable for its actions. Thus, rather 
than an exchequer fUM being allocated directly from the Ministry, a 
relatively independent body was to take over the duty. It is ~rth 
pointing out that, at this stage, very few regulations over the activity of 
the Housing Corporation and its evaluation of housing associations were 
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forthcoming. 'Ibis has the appearance of ad hoc policy formation, 
displacing the influence of local author ities at the expense of the 
creation of a body with few sanctions over and little knowledge of housing 
associations (the 'register' was created by the Labour Government some ten 
years later). Harold Lever M.P. (Labour) (Standing Comnittee E, 1963 
Housing Bill, co1.48) accused the government of "producing the legislation 
first and thinking afterwards". The reason for this roove was once again 
the desire to distance associations from the traditional organs of 
government. 
One innovation was the new definition of a housing 'society' in section 
1 (7), and implicit in section 1 (1) above. 'Ibis created the co-ownership 
association, where the tenants would ultimately acquire an equity holding 
in their property. 'Ibis nove was an attempt to reinforce the 'private 
sector' nature of the government experiment by attracting building society 
finance. In 1962 Waddilove (1962, p.144) had argued that the "possibility 
of raising capital from private sources for housing associations in the 
forseeable future seems hardly worth considering". '!be 1964 Act attempted 
to change this; as the White Paper, Housing (1963, para.39) put it, "the 
expectation is that the greater part of the money required by the hoUSing 
societies will come from the building societies and other private 
sources". In addition to hoping to involve building society finance by 
creating housing with a significant equity holding, this roove may have 
already reflected the decreasing desirability of cost renting in a period 
of rising interest rates. M'Kenzie-Hall (1971, p.36) observes that this put 
cost rent "out of the reach of roost of the medium wage-earners". Co-
ownership was thus a desirable alternative, creating individual ownership 
at little extra cost. 
This roove was therefore considered necessary because, despite continued 
protestations about the deroonstrative nature of the project for private 
enterprise, private finance had not been forthcoming. Sir Keith Joseph M.P. 
(Conservative Minister for Housing and Local Government) summarised the 
arguments in StaOOing Comnittee E (1963 Housing Bill, col.307), when he 
stated that "private enterprise is not fully responding to the need" for 
privately rented accomnodation, and (col.308) that he hoped that by the 
sensible deployment of the Act "private enterprise can return to this 
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market with their badly needed initiative, management and money". [25] 
The 1963 White Paper, Housing (para.33) established likely tenants 
consistent with the private sector image of the policy: 
"Post-war housing has almost all been either for owner 
occupation or for letting by p.1blic authorities. Hardly any 
provision has been made for those- the younger salaried people 
and high wage-earners -who may not yet be able to buy a house on 
the ordinary mortgage terms, or who may prefer to rent, although 
neither wanting nor needing a council house." 
The objective was new provision to supplement the higher end of the 
privately rented market. 'Ibis was emphasised by Frederick Corfield M.P., 
Parliamentary Secretary to Sir Keith Joseph (the Minister for Housing and 
Local Government) (Standing COOmittee E, 1963 Housing Bill, 001.251) when 
he "envisaged ••• that the main function of the Corporation, and Weed of 
the housing societies, will be to build new houses and rot to take over old 
ones for conversion". '!be enq;tlasis on new property and the middle income 
tenant was repeated by Sir Keith Joseph M.P. in the second reading debate 
(Standing Comnittee E, 1963 Housing Bill, 001.485) 1 
"'I'here are ••• those who, while they are quite ready to pay more 
than a subsidised price, are not quite able to manage to buy a 
new house of their own, but who want the advantages of a new 
house." 
'!he Labour Party remained suspicious of a roove which threatened to 
create a quasi-private sector competitor to local authority hoUSing 
departments. These new style societies threatened to attract middle income 
earners away from council housing, resulting in a social polarisation 
between tenures, where the wealthy buy or rent from a society, and the poor 
rent from a local authority. Furtherroore, the possibility of subsidies, 
rather than loans, being granted to societies by central government 
[25] 'Ibis situation was unchanged in 1971, when C.H.A.C. (Housing 
Associations, para.3.28) roted: "The expectations of an increasing 
investment in housing societies by building societies and other 
private sources have rot been realised." 
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threatened to usurp the role of local authorities. Frank Allaun M.P. 
(Labour) (Standing Cornnittee E, 1963 Housing Bill, co1.28) questioned 
whether goverrunent lOOney should be given to such quasi-private bodies: 
"we are providing in the Corporation a sort of godfather to 
associations which are, or may be, creating private rights. My 
query is whether it is right to spend p..1blic money and effort on 
this sort of enterprise." 
This attitude probably reflected a view shared by many Labour local 
councils that assistance, if it is to be given, should be given to 
traditional associations which, because of their charitable status are 
obliged to house poor tenants, not co-ownership associations creating 
private rights. 
Irxleed, the first indications of a significant policy change towards 
the role of rousing associations occurred in 1967 when the Labour 
Government passed the Housing Subsidies Act. This Act was mainly ooncerned 
with financial arrangements for local authorities, however, section 12 
strengthened the role of associations in rehabilitating older property ~ 
including the oost of acquiring properties in subsidy calculations. 
Significantly, the Labour Government did not apply this provision to local 
authorities until section 18 (2) (b) of the 1969 Housing Act gave them 
similar subsidy arrangements [26] • Clearly the Labour Party was 
considering the desirability of rehabilitation, and the use of 
associations for this p..1rpose. FurtherlOOre, such work would be roore suited 
to the traditional associations, rather than the new style associations 
providing new building. Any policy which encouraged the type of work 
urxIertaken ~ traditional associations would have been welcomed by the 
Labour Party, in view of its hostiltiy to new style oost renting for middle 
income earners. '!he 1969 Act also created the system of general 
improvement areas, and many local author i ties were eager to use housing 
associations in these areas. '!be encouragement given to Shelter in 
[26] Section 21 continued the powers granted by section 12 of the 1967 
Act. 
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Liverpool is a well known example (see Plumridge, 1970) [27] • 
In 1971 the Central Housing Advisory Comnittee p,lblished Housing 
Associations. [28] The report clearly reinforced the view of traditional 
associations as catering for special needs (para.2.4) and more generally, 
"setting out to provide accomnodation for the sort of people who would 
become council tenants" (para 1.4). New style associations are described 
(para.1.4) as setting out "to rreet a demand for rented accoomodation by 
those who are able to pay what it costs, such as younger salaried people 
and the higher wage-earners". More specifically, cost renting is described 
(para.3.l) as providing a substitute for the entrepreneurial landlord, 
accomnodating tenants who do "not need or could not expect help from 
p,lblic fuoos", such as the employed and roobile, and certain groups 
marginally failing to meet the requirements for access to a mortgage. Co-
ownership is perceived (para.4.3) as a financial alternative to 
conventional ownership for "better paid skilled workers, lower management 
grades, young professional people and small traders". 
The report stresses the flexibility of traditional associations to 
meet various housing needs (para.2.4). This is hardly surprising in view of 
earlier criticisms of local authority inflexibility made by the Central 
Housing Advisory Comnittee (Council Housing, Purposes, Procedures and 
Priorities, 1969). 
[27] See also Shelter (1972), which makes it clear that the Liverpool 
Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project p,lshed its work beyond the 
scope of the legislation. This may have influenced the nature of the 
tmprovement legislation subsequently tmplemented. 
[28] Table 3 on p.21 reveals the distribution of local authority 
assistance to associations in 1970 as follows: for new building 
f6.326m, for acquisition f16.l44m, and for tmprovement f3.68lIn. This 
iooicates that many local authorities were using associations as an 
alternative means of securing 'municipalisation' (acquisition 
comprising the largest share of their assistance). It could be argued 
that local authorities hoped that central government finance would 
be used for the rehabilitation (for this conprised the smallest share 
of local authority assistance). Another interesting observation in 
the report (para.3.41) is the declining viability of CX)st rent 
associations, relying as it does implicitly upon arguments outlined 
by Nevitt (1966). 
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In 1971 the Conservative Government produced the White Paper Fair Deal 
For Housing which suggested changes to the financial position of 
associations which crucially affected their relationships with local 
authorities. One influence was a recoamendation in the White Paper that 
where local authorities provided financial sUH?Qrt for housing 
associations they should retain nomination rights for at least 50% of the 
dwellings provided (para.78). Nominations were not a wholly new idea. '!he 
appendix to circular 58/54 [29] was a standard form of agreement between a 
housing association and a local author ity. Paragraph 3 of the ~ndix 
states 
"In selecting tenants the Association shall, so far as the 
objects of the Association allow, give effect to anyoomination 
of suitable persons made by the Council in relation thereto." 
Although Circular 73/67 [30] says of nominations (para.5) 
"While it is inportant to ensure that the benefit of subsidy 
goes to those who need it ••• For the authority to nominate 
tenants for all vacancies can destroy the whole point of an 
independent association." 
Stack noted in 1968 (p.38) that 
"By now the assumption that the authorised arrangements involve 
some share in tenancy nominations has become part of the 
conventional wisdom relating to the partnership between local 
authorities and housing associations." 
This 'conventional wisdom' related only to author ised arrangements 
urxler which subsidy was transferred to an association through a local 
authority. It did not apply to any scheme supported by the Housing 
Corporation at that stage, for no subsidy was involved in this process. The 
formal application of nominations to schemes involving local authority 
assistance and Corporation finance represented a dramatic contrast with 
earlier Conservative policies which had introduced central financing of 
[29] Housing Repair and Rents Act 1954: Section 33 
[30] Subsidies for Housing Associations 
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new style associations catering for middle income tenants. Allowing local 
authority nominations reintroduced local government influence. If local 
authorities were to nominate tenants then presumably they would be 
selected from aJOOngst their waiting list applicants. It could be argued 
that the Conservative Government was seeking to encourage local 
authorities to assist traditional associations (the only type to house 
people akin to council tenants according to C.HAC.). 
Another influence upon local authority attitudes to associations was 
the compulsory application of fair rents and rent allowances to 
traditional but not new style associations [31] , making their position 
consistent with the privately rented sector (where they had first been 
applied in 1965). It further reduced the role of local authorities in 
supporting associations as local authorities had previously had some 
influence 00 the rents charged by associations; see C.HAC. (1971, 
para.2.13). It also brought associations in line with proposals for local 
authorities. It could be argued that by providing more consistency in the 
practice of all renting tenures the Conservative Party was preparing the 
grouOO for later policy changes towards the role of associations and local 
authorities. 
The 1972 Housing Finance Act centralised subsidy arrangements and 
created the 'new build subsidy', and any shortfall in rents could be made 
up through this mechanism. At this time the subsidies were relatively 
small. However, fair rents and rent allowances were very significant to 
local authorities contemplating assisting an association. 'Ibis was because 
assistance in placing a poor tenant in association accomnodation meant 
that the tenant would automatically receive a subsidy through the 
allowance system (which did not yet apply to all of the privately rented 
sector, aDl was difficult for tenants to obtain if their landlord was 
uncooperative). Furthermore, if the local authority offered information 
and advice to an association, the Corporation might be tempted to allocate 
some of its new build subsidy to the association. If the authority also 
[31] Section 81(1) and 104(1) achieve this. In particular, section 104(1) 
defines housing association for the p.lrposes of the 1972 Act as 
excluding associations with restricted membership. 
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secured oomination rights by contributing to the project, this clearly 
represented a means of expanding 'publicly controlled' provision at 
relatively little cost to the authority. 
At the same time the Labour Party confirmed its preference for 
rehabilitation (as manifest in section 12 of the 1967 Act). In the second 
reading debate on the 1971 Housing Finance Bill (Standing Coomittee E, 
co1.62) Anthony Crosland M.P. (Labour) supported assistance to housing 
associations which were "improving and rehabilitating older property 
which otherwise would disappear out of the reach of low income families". 
This sudden change of attitude [32] was based on the desire to use 
associations as an alternative to m.micipalisation (which had been ruled 
out because of cost and political sensitivity in 1963). Anthony Crosland 
M.P. confirms this in the second reading debate on the 1974 Housing Bill 
(col.48), when he asserts that associations "also have a role in the 
extension of social ownership of rented accomnodation". Short (1982, p.190) 
comnents of this period that 
"In the hastily constructed 1974 Housing Act, initially pronpted 
by the electoral promise to repeal the controversial 1972 
Housing Finance Act, the Labour government endorsed the 
increased emphasis on housing associations. This action may seem 
strange, given Labour's historic comnitment to local authority 
housing, but it is even stranger when we consider that many 
reports and studies had shown housing associations to be 
inefficient, some to be corrupt, and in general they provided 00 
real basis for an attack on inner-city housing problems." 
This comnent displays little unjerstanding of the subtleties of the 
situation. By using associations JOOre to rehabilitate than provide new 
building the Labour Party may have perceived several advantages. First, it 
would exert p.lblic influence, however imperfectly, over inprovements to 
the privately rented stock. To this end Labour members wanted a register 
[32] Contrast this with the suggestion of Anthony Crosland M.P. (Labour) 
(1977, p.7) that local authorities "should accept a wider and 
ultimate responsibility for the total housing situation in their 
localities" • 
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of approved associations in order to exert more control. For example, John 
Horam M.P. (Labour), (Standing Comnitte E, 1971 Housing Finance Bill, 
co1.3813) said, 
"we should like a register of housing associations to be 
established by the Housing Corporation, which is the only 
appropriate statutory body to do this, in order that only 
housing associations which have the best of motives am are 
being run the proper way receive Government subsidies." 
secondly, rehabilitation might help to ensure that associations began 
to house poorer tenants generally. The Milner Holland Report was plblished 
in 1965, am AR;>endix 5 indicated the relative I,X>verty of controlled 
tenants. Rehabilitation work acquiring privately rented property might 
assist some of these tenants. To the Labour Party this might legitimate 
existing subsidies allocated through the Corporation, and could even be 
used to justify an increase in subsidies. Finally, it would achieve this 
using a Conservative creation, which might serve to further legitimate the 
'public' improvement of privately rented property [33] • 
During 1973 Conservative 1,X>1icy also signalled a switch away from 
association newbuilding towards association rehabilitation in areas of 
housing stress. 'Ibis may be because associations retained an image of 
private sector iniative, and because they were subject to fewer pressures 
from the local electorate. They were thus a more responsive tool for the 
implementation of central housing policy, being subject only to control 
from a government appointed body. Further, the types of unsubsidised 
associations encouraged by the Conservatives in the 1960s were well geared 
to oousing 'deserving' tenants; a task to some extent performed by local 
[33] In contrast, Ball (1983, p.363) describes renovation as "a cheap way 
of pltting off a housing crisis". It has already been shown that 
oousing associations receive subsidies similar to those given to 
local authorities, so the cheapness of the exercise may be 
questioned. As usual, the distinction made by Ball is really between 
local authority provision and owner occuption (the latter may induce 
do-it-yourself work to cut the costs, and does oot create a 'public' 
asset) • 
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authorities in the 1950s [34] but which the Conservatives clearly thought 
unsuitable for them in the 1970s. This would further residualise the role 
of local authorities. 
Thus the crucial differences between the attitudes of the two Parties 
were based upon different perceptions of the desired allocation 
priorities of associations and the relationships between associations and 
government [35] • '!he growing dissatisfaction with the oomprehensive 
redevelopment practiced by many local authorities in the late 1960s led 
both Conservative and Labour to increase their support for housing 
associations [36] , though for fundamentally different ideological 
reasons; the Conservatives as an attack on municipal provision in general, 
and Labour as a rrore flexible tool for extending public ownership (see 
also section 3.3 on this point). 
This convergence of proposals is reflected in the Conservative White 
Paper of 1973 (Widening the Oloice: '!he Next Steps in Housing, para.37), 
which clearly parallels Crossland's oomnents on the 1971 Bill: 
"'!he Government ••• believes that additional help towards the 
acquisition and ~rovement or conversion of older dwellings by 
housing associations is necessary to enable them to make a 
greater contribution towards solving the problems of older 
housing, especially in areas of housing stress." 
This is a new attitude towards solving the problems of the declining 
privately rented sector, and is explicitly stated in paragraph S(c). 
"The Government will expand the role of the voluntary housing 
[34] See Gray 1979, in fek:!rrett, p.201, where it is argued that "the income 
characteristics of local authority tenants have urrlergone drastic 
changes, from being biased away from the lowest income groups in the 
mid 1950s to strongly emphasise this very group twenty years later". 
[35] See chapter 5, where this is developed. 
[36] The Liberal Party also responded in this way. Its first 1974 election 
manifesto, O!ange the Face of Britain, expressed policy oomnitrnents 
to ooncentrate "on housing associations wherever possible, rather 
than on wholesale demolition", and to give "greater financial 
encouragement and responsibility to Tenants' Co-operatives and 
Housing Associations" (The Times Guide to the House of Comnons, 1974, 
p.322) • 
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movement as a provider of rented housing, particularly where the 
decline of the private rented sector has created severe 
problems ... 
Clearly, this approach to ~roving decaying privately rented property 
is far removed from earlier Conservative policies, which sought to provide 
new building to supplement the privately rented sector and encourage new 
forms of ownership. As such, this marked a convergence of Conservative and 
Labour policies towards associations. Iooeed, the Conservative Housing and 
Planning Bill 1974 was virtually indistinguishable from the later Labour 
Housing Bill and Act of the same year (this explains why the Labour 
OWOsition only forced a division on an amerdnent to the Conservative 
Bill, am rot on the Bill itself; see Second Reading Debate, 1974 Housing 
and Planning Bill, col.1173). 
The 1974 Act placed a duty upon the Housing Corporation to maintain a 
register of approved housing associations. Only registered associations 
were to be eligible for central subsidies. This allowed the Corporation to 
exert roore direct influence over association practices. '!be subsidy system 
was changed by the Act, with the 'housing association grant' replacing the 
new build subsidy, switching the emphasis from new building to the 
conmencement of a project. The Act created the system of housing action 
areas, with housing association grant being roore forthcoming in these 
areas (Circular 170/74, para.34). 
Both legislative proposals included the establishment of rousing 
action areas, increased support for associations therein, and the creation 
of the 'register of rousing associations' at the Housing Corporation. 
Despite these obvious similarities between the Conservative Bill and the 
Labour Act, Conservative ofPQsition to some elements of Labour policy 
became manifest. This is a reversal of the position of the two Parties on 
the 1961 and 1964 Acts, where the Labour Opposition was hostile to the 
nature of Conservative support for the association roovement. '!be current 
Prime Minister, then Secretary of State for Education and Science, 
Margaret Thatcher M.P. observed (second Reading Debate, 1974 Housing Bill, 
001.64) 
"In his speech on the previous Bill from this Dispatch Box the 
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right hon. Gentleman [Crosland) appeared to see the Housing 
Corporation as a great public enterprise housing authority, and 
we naturally fear that he will use it for that fA..lrpose." 
Considering the similarities between the two sets of policies, this 
accusation is, at first sight, somewhat surprising. Conservative 
apprehension appears to have related to a fear of the way in which the 
Labour Government might interpret the very flexible legislation [37) ; a 
belief that increasingly large subsidies were going to be permitted by the 
Labour Government, and that these would be directed towards poorer 
tenants, tenants nore suited to council housing than the target groups of 
the newer associations. Both of these tendencies would threaten the 
Conservative's ideological anti-municipal use of housing associations. 
This view is supported by Harloe, Issacharoff and Minns (1974, p.78) 
writing in the same year. The Conservative controlled Greater London 
Council supported associations for precisely the reasons that the 
Conservative Party did: 
"The GLe's interest in housing associations arose from its 
concern to increase the part played by private enterprise and 
other ron-council institutions in the housing market." 
Thus assistance to associations was consistent with Conservative 
support of private institutions. This helps to explain why the 
Conservative Bill included a clause permitting the Secretary of State for 
the Environment to direct a local authority to sell land owned within a 
housing action area to a specified housing association (clause 41), and 
[37] Both Bills contained provisions allowing the Housing Corporation to 
subscr ibe to shares in subsidiary companies. Once in the hands of the 
Labour Government, the Conservative ~sition realised tx>w 
different its implementation could be. Cecil Parkinson M.P. 
(Conservative) (Starxling Comnittee B, 1974 Housing Bill, col.83) said 
"we are creating a body to which we shall make available about £750 
million. One could do quite a lot with that if one fA.Jt one's mind to 
it. One could buy a large number of major companies in the building 
industry and still rot make a dent in that sum". 
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why the Labour Act omitted this clause [38] • 
Clause 41(4) of the Conservative 1974 Housing and Planning Bill stated: 
"A local authority shall comply with any direction given to them 
by the Secretary of State requir ing them to dispose of any 
housing land-
(a) to a housing association which is specified as 
mentioned in subsection (3) above, or 
(b) where no housing association is so specified, to a 
registered housing association named by the Secretary of 
State or to the Housing Corporation, 
and any such direction may specify a period within which the 
disposal is to take place." 
Clause 41(3) reinforced this: 
"Except with the consent of the Secretary of State, a local 
authority may not dispose of any housing land unless the 
disposal is to a registered housing association which, under 
section 34 (5) above, is specified in relation to the rousing 
action area concerned for the purposes of this Part of this 
Act." 
Since the Conservative Party percieved associations as quasi-private, 
they wanted local authorities to be subordinate to them, and clause 41, if 
used often, would have achieved this. Although the Conservative ORx>sition 
did not force a division on the Labour Bill in the second reading debate, 
Sir Peter Emery M.P. (Conservative) proposed an amendment to the Labour 
Bill in Standing Comnittee (B, 1974 Housing Bill, col.208) which would have 
had the effect of reintroducing the Conservati ve clause. In response 
Gerald Kaufman M.P. (Labour) (col.209) made the position perfectly clear: 
"I found attractive all features of the contribution of the hone 
l1\eItber for Honi ton (Mr. Emery) , except his support for the 
[38] 'Ibis issue is discussed further in section 5.3, chapter 5. 'Ibese 
ideological attitudes towards the proper role of local authorities 
have considerable ~lications for the types of housing association 
activity desired. 
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amendment; which I am afraid I cannot accept for reasons, I am 
glad at last to be able to say, of ideology." 
Gerald Kaufman M.P. (Labour) later urrlerlines the difference of 
principle involved (Standing Cornnittee B, 1974 Housing Bill, co1.210): 
"'!he effect of the ron. Gentleman's amendment would be to 
restore some, if not all, of the provisions of the Housing and 
Planning Bill, which sought to give a IOOre favoured role to 
registered housing associations in housing action areas than we 
think appropriate and those our new Bill provides for." 
Geoffrey Finsberg M.P. (Conservative) (col.231) demonstrates the 
hostility to municipal activity implicit in the Conservative proposals by 
suggesting that 
"A future Conservative Government may decide to legislate to 
corcpel local authorities to dispose of all properties that they 
have acquired, other than properties they have built themselves, 
to housing associations or to a new housing corporation." 
'Ibis is a clear example of what Raynsford (1980, p.14) describes as "an 
ideological preference for private or 'voluntary' rather than State 
initiative". Clearly, the Labour Party realised the threat to local 
authority activity implicit in the Conservative proposal and Kaufman's 
comnents reflect this. Any Labour policy which brought associations IOOre 
into the realm of government controlled l::xxlies coapromised the 
ideological stance of the Conservative Party. Fur the rlOOre, it left 
practically no truly private sector solution to the problems of the still 
diminishing privately rented sector. 
Anthony Crossland M.P. (Labour Secretary of State for the Environment) 
reflected Labour'S aspirations for a ilewfourrl public sector orientation 
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for housing associations in May 1974 [39] : 
"'ll1ere is ••• an important role for voluntary housing. First in 
br ing ing new resources to bear on the worst areas of housing 
stress by the acquisition and tmprovernent of existing property 
Second, there is a desperate need for additional 
accommodation for renting at prices which the less well off, in 
particular, can afford ••• 'll1ird, there is a need for specialist 
hous ing. II 
Having satisfied itself that associations could be transformed into 
'quasi-p,Iblic sector' bodies the Labour Government increased allocations 
to the Housing Corporation. In 1975/76 it allocated £307m (1981 prices). By 
1979/80 [40] this had steadily increased to £41lm. '!his increase in 
allocations was dramatically reflected in association conpletions. From 
1945 to 1963 associations completed an average of 2,653 dwellings per 
annum (see table 3.1). During the period from 1964 to 1973 this had risen 
to 6,131 per annum. Following the 1974 Act the rate of completions nearly 
trebled to 16,340 per annum from 1974 to 1979. FurtherIOOre, the switch to 
rehabilitation was dramatic (see table 3.3). In 1974/75 rehabilitation 
tenders aroounted to only 0.1% of total association tenders. By 1978/79, 
when the Labour Government fell, rehabilitation comprised 51% of tenders. 
'll1e election of a Conservative Government changed this trend little. By 
[39] In his address to the Annual General Meeting of the National 
Federation of Housing Associations. see Voluntary Housing, volume 6 
no.2 (1974), p.8-9. 'Itle quotation is from N.F.H.A. (l978a, p.2). Not all 
Labour M.P.s shared this optimism. Frank Allaun M.P. (Labour) (1974) 
makes several criticisms of associations, including their lack of 
accountability, despite the provisions of the Labour Housing Act of 
the same year. 
[40] The Labour Government fell in May 1979. Tender figures for 1978/79 
reflect their last full year in power, and expectations of 
allocations to be made in the following year. It is reasonable to 
asswne that expenditure during 1979/80 is also representative of the 
Labour Government, as the financial year had already begun before the 
general election, and much of the expenditure of the rest of 1979/80 
was conmitted under the Labour Government. 
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1982/83 rehabilitation tenders had stabilised at around 50% [41] • 
~LE 3.3 Housing association activity: rehabilitation 
as a percentage of total tenders and completions. 
Tenders Completions Government 
Year 
73/74 0.0 0.0 Conservative 
74/75 0.1 13.8 Labour 
75/76 3.1 6.2 Labour 
76/77 20.7 12.0 Labour 
77/78 44.5 23.8 Labour 
78/79 50.9 45.4 Labour 
79/80 54.0 38.1 Conservative 
80/81 58.4 38.5 Conservative 
81/82 50.5 41.7 Conservative 
82/83 51.5 56.7 Conservative 
Source: Annual Report of the Housing Corporation 1982/83. 
Der i ved from Append ix II, Table 4. 
3.4.2 '!be Role of Housing Co-operatives 
, 
. 
These differing views of the legitimate role of association activity, 
and the relationship between associations and local authorities are 
reflected in interpretations of the role of housing co-operatives. '!be 
---------
[41] Although in 1983 the N.F.H.A. observed (1983, p.10) that "Recently the 
balance of the Movement's programme through the Housing Corporation 
has shifted slightly away from property acquiSition and 
rehabilitation". Table 3.3 certainly questions the assertion of Ball 
(1983, p.363) that urban "rebuilding has been associated with oouncil 
housing, the switch to a policy of renovation principally with owner 
occupation". Indeed, his book corrpletely ignores the work of housing 
associations. 'l11eir work should not be uroerestimated. Jones (1980b, 
p.9) observes that "although associations owned less than eight per 
cent of all BAA dwellings, they had completed over one third of all 
BAA improvements". 
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Final Report of the WOrking Party on Housing Co-operatives (1975) defined 
a housing co-operative (para.l.15) as a housing society where a departing 
member receives nothing more than the value at par of his shareholding in 
the society. It goes on (para.1.22) to suggest that co-operatives represent 
"a highly desirable departure from traditionally remote and 
depersonalised forms of housing management". [42] 
Clearly this is also open to differing interpretations. '!he 
Conservative anti-rnunicipal reaction to this has been to suggest that the 
tenants of oouncil estates should take over responsibility for the 
management and routine maintenance of their estates, possibly saving the 
exchequer money [43] • As Circular 8/76 (para.8) p.lts it 
"Particularly at a time when it is important to use managerial 
and financial resources more efficiently, and not increase rate 
or subsidy oosts unduly, the introduction of oo-operative 
schemes oould be a means of bringing cdditional personal 
resources into housing. However, in present circll'llStances local 
authorities should go ahead only if they are satisfied that they 
can do so without incurring an overall cddition to financial, 
manpower or other resource oosts." 
This would have the effect of reducing the responsibilities of local 
authorities, and the idea of deliberately creating housing where the 
tenants have no financial share was opposed by the Conservatives. Indeed, 
[42] Paragraph 1.15 describes three situations; where a departing member 
(i) receives nothing more than the value at par of his shareholding 
in the society, (ii) receives part or all of the aroount of the 
mortgage that he has redeemed, (iii) receives part or all of the gain 
in the value of the dwelling he has occupied. According to the 
Working Party, only the first oonstitutes a housing co-operative, the 
others being varieties of oo-ownership. It is ironic that local 
authorities should oonsider turning to oontemporary housing 
association practices for guidance on co-operatives oonsidering 
their indebtedness to the movement for the 'restrictive' management 
practices oonplained of. See Gallagher (1982, p.14o-l) who notes that 
"the first government advice to the new local authority landlords in 
the 1920s was based at the exper iences and ideas of Fhilanthropic 
housing management." 
[43] See Michael Heseltine M.P. (Conservative), second Reading Debate, 1980 
HOUSing Bill, 001.1454: "Sane tenants will want to ••• take full 
responsibility for their own management by setting up a management 
co-operative, and I encourage this where possible". 
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Conservative suspicion of housing eo-operatives dates back to at least 
1964, when their legislation introducing 'co-owner ships' described them as 
leo-operatives' [44] '!be Conservative Party refused to plblicly 
acknowledge the furxiamental distinction between co-operatives and eo-
ownerships until the plblication of the WOrking Party Report on c0-
operatives in 1975. At first sight this is somewhat surprising. Hadley and 
Hatch (1981, p.96), in their critique of centralised state administration, 
praise the efforts of housing co-operatives. 
"Most accommodation provided by housing associations conforms 
closely to the standards set for local author i ties and is 
managed in a conventional way. However, within the voluntary 
field a number of housing co-operatives have come into 
existence, and the flexibility of some housing associations has 
enabled them to make a special contr ibution in accommodating 
groups with unorthodox needs." 
If the Conservative Party wished to reduce central controls and 
increase local freedom [45] , one would have expected stronger slJRX)rt for 
the concept of housing co-operatives. Such support was oot forthcoming 
because of the Party's commitment to tenures with tenant equity, which is 
inconsistent with the concept of co-operatives as it has developed in the 
Uni ted Kingdom. 
'!he Conservative attitude towards co-operatives has been seen as an 
attack upon runicipal provision by Labour, who instead suggested that new 
associations be established with the objective of co-operative management 
50 that all potential tenants are aware of the issues involved and are 
free to demonstrate their willingness to participate in collective 
management. 
{44] Joyce Butler M.P. (Labour) was quick to spot the significance of this 
loose definition, and in 1963 (Staooing Committee E, 1963 Housing 
Bill, col.8) remarked that co-ownership is "a rather coy expression 
derived, presumably, to avoid talking about co-operative housing". 
[45] See Heseltine, 1979, Why We Must CUrb the Bureaucrats, Suooay Times, 
Decenber 19th, page 16. 
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Co-operatives were statutorily defined for the first time in SChedule 1 
(para.9) of the 1975 Housing Rents and Subsidies Act as being "a society, 
company or body of trustees for the time being approved by the Secretary 
of State for the purposes of this paragraph". [46] This totally circular 
definition was strengthened in 1980 by section 2 (3) of the Housing 
Act. [47] 
As with rrost debates on the role of housing associations in this 
country, the debate on co-operatives focused mainly upon tenurial 
distinctions, rather than management practices (or production). Ball 
(1983, p.352) comnents that 
"With virtually no exception since the end of the First World 
War the politics of housng in Britain have been based on housing 
tenure and the relative roles that each tenure should play." 
Christiansen (1982) has produced a scale of increasing participation 
by tenants: starting with regulation by the landlord, participation 
increases through consultation and persuasion, to a working partnership 
with tenants having voting rights, then constrained self-government, and 
finally full co-operative with comnon ownership and control. In 
Christiansen's four case studies only one situation approximates to that 
of a full co-operative. Bearing in mind the Conservative rationale for 
local authority sponsored co-operatives, it is significant that it is the 
only case where the association was initiated by active individuals, and 
not a local authority. Furtherrrore, Ash (1982b, p.138) is reduced to noting 
the existence of tenant associations with voting rights as an example of 
participation in association management. This only reaches the mid-point 
of Christiansen'S scale, and Ash herself (1982b, p.138) observes that 
voting rights are not a sufficient criteria for assessing the scale of 
participation. Clearly co-operatives represent an innovative departure 
from traditional management styles and an activity distinct from common 
[46] Where a co-operative undertakes duties normally undertaken by the 
local authority it can receive exchequer subsidy through the local 
authority; Schedule 1, para.9 (6). 
[47] Section 2(3) defined co-owner ships, and clearly distinguished them 
from co-operatives, along the lines suggested by the 1975 Working 
Party. 
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municipal practice. rrhere are few examples of successful co-operatives 
however. Housing Corporation circular 3/78 [48] (para.2l) recognises 
inadequacies in the extent of tenant participation and suggests methods 
for increasing participation, such as the formation of tenant 
associations, the appointment of tenant representatives on boards of 
management, consultation with tenants on matters such as design and 
management, and the delegation of management to tenants. In any event, even 
successful co-operatives cannot hope to achieve the level of tenant 
involvement experienced in countries with a tradition of producer and 
consumer co-operatives (see Savill (1982); in Sweden the tenants are even 
involved in the rent setting process). 
3.4.3 ~ Cooservative Return to the Private Sector 
When the Conservatives were re-elected in 1979 they displayed a marked 
decline in enthusiasm for their quasi-private creation (49] • It could be 
argued that this reflected their suspicion of the types of people being 
housed as a result of rehabilitation work, and the increased subsidies 
allocated by the previous Labour Government. '!beir first musing 
legislation, the 1980 Housing Act, merely applied new controls to housing 
associations, and turned back to the pc! vately rented sector proper for 
the solution to its own ills. Michael Heseltine M.P. (Conservative) 
introduced the Bill (Second Reading Debate, cols.1444-5) as an atteJTPt "to 
reverse the trend of ever increasing dominance of the State over the life 
of the individual". 
rrhere is ample evidence to suggest that the new Conservative Government 
was ready to finish with their experiment with rented housing. Margaret 
Thatcher, Conservative Prime Minister, expressed the IOOOd of the Party in 
[48] In the Public Eye. 
[49] The attitude of the Liberal Party remained consistently in support of 
the JOOvement. 'lbeir 1979 election manifesto, 'lbe Real Fight is for 
Britain, stated that "Housing co-operatives and snaller locally-
based musing associations, which should be run deloocratically, 
should be encouraged" ('lbe Times Guide to the House of Comnons, 1979, 
p.3l8) • 
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the debate on the Queen's Speech [50] thus: 
"We will give to every council tenant the right to purchase his 
own home at a substantial discount on the market price ••• This 
will be a giant stride towards making a reality of Anthony 
Eden's dream of a property owning democracy." 
Michael Heseltine M.P. (Conservative Secretary of State for the 
Environment) extended the argt.nnent to a more general antipathy towards 
leasehold [51] : 
"TOo many of our people are forced to accept the restrictions of 
tenancy. We are determined to give them the freedom and 
opportunity of freeholders." 
Indeed, such is the vigour with which this aim is to be pursued that 
Michael Heseltine M.P. saw the policy as "no less than a framework for a 
social revolution" [52] • T.1is appears to be lOOre of a moral than an 
economic policy in the eyes of the Conservative Government. As Forrest 
(1984, p.47) puts it, recent Conservative policy on c:x:>uncil house sales 
"reflects an ideology of state provision which is concerned with rewards 
for individuals rather than for social groups" (emphasis added). People 
who opt for individual solutions to their housing needs are accordingly to 
be rewarded. 
The controls on associations iJntx>sed by the 1980 Housing Act related to 
the auditing of accounts by the Corporation (s124); the payment of lOOney 
to ex>nmittee menDers of associations (s126); and the publishing of 
association allocation priorities (s42). Furthermore, the Act created the 
Grant Redenption Fund, by which housing association grant would ultimately 
be repaid (s131). 
The return to support of the private sector proper involved reducing 
the period between rent reviews by the rent officer (s60); the creation of 
the system of protected shorthold tenancies (s52); and the revival of the 
------------------
[50] Hansard, VollJlle 967, col.80. 
[51] Hansard, Volume 967, col.409. 
[52] Hansard, Volume 967, col.411. 
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concept that approved new construction should be exempt from the 
application of the Rent Acts (s56, assured tenancies). 
The 1980 Act also applied the right to buy provisions to non-charitable 
housing associations. It would seem that the Conservative Government was 
determined to treat the Housing Corporation as a public housing authority 
itself. As Wyn Roberts M.P. (Conservative Uooer Secretary of State for 
Wales) put it (Standing Comnittee F, 1980 Housing Bill, co1.2356): 
liThe Government have started from the proposition that every 
public sector tenant should be able to benefit from the right to 
buy his house." 
Selling off property to the wealthier tenants of associations 
reinforces the residual welfare role of associations. Further, recent 
experiments with association building for sale suggest that private 
financing institutions may be JOOre willing to invest in association 
activity than in nunicipal activity. [53] This is because of the 
ambiguities over the public-private status of association activity. 
Associations were promoted as an unsubsidised form of private renting in 
the 1960s, aM despite increasing subsidies and government influence, the 
Conservative Party still perceive the residue of a similar role. This is 
manifest in their proJOOtion of build for sale, and their teooency to 
allocate specific portions of advances to the Housing Corporation to 
schemes which will result in ownership. It could be argued that building 
societies have at last begun to respond to these Conservative attitudes. 
They realised that this political support would mean that privatisation of 
association assets would cause less political difficulty than would 
similar enterprises urxiertaken by local authorities. Clearly a 
polarisation of association activity is intended; JOOst being privatised 
[53] Filkin aM McMorran (1979) describe an example where Merseyside 
Improved Houses provided a 'packaged service' for investing 
institutions, where all preparatory work towards acquisition and 
rehabilitation was urxiertaken by the association, aM JOOrtgage lOOney 
was successfully obtained from building societies. Smith (1982) 
provides a SlIIIDary of the response of associations to improvement for 
sale. Improvement for sale is now regularly incorporated into the 
Afproved Developnent Programne, urxier the heading 'other tenures' 
(see section 5.2, chapter 5). 
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for the wealthy tenant, the remainder having its charitable status 
strictly enforced. 
The Conservative Housing and Building Control Bill 1982 attempted to 
apply the right to buy to the tenants of charitable housing associations. 
Edward Graham M.P. (Labour) asked why charitable associations were to have 
the right to buy imposed upon them when the 1980 Act had specifically 
excluded them (Starrling Conmittee F, 1982 Housing and Building Control 
Bill, co1.159). John Stanley M.P. (Conservative Minister of Housing) 
replied pragmatically (ools.159-160): 
"When we were debating the Bill in 1980, it was evident that to 
exterrl the right to buy, even to certain tenants of charitable 
housing associations, would require some arnerXinent of 
charitable law. It has been necessary to consider that and to 
bring forward those proposals. Irrleed, subsection (2) [of clause 
2] gives the amendment of charitable law that is necessary to 
give effect to the provisions of the Bill. '!bat is the reason. 
There had to be some amendment of charitable law to enable the 
right to buy to be extended in that way." 
This response suggests that the Conservative Government do not 
perceive any distinction between charitable and non charitable 
associations. As John Stanley M.P. IXlt it earlier: 
"Whether an association has charitable status or not depeoos 
largely on its historical evolution. When considering other 
aspects of legislation affecting the tenants of housing 
associations, we were clear in our minds ••• that there should be 
no basic distinction in law between the rights of housing 
association tenants as tenants whether they were in char i table 
associations or not." (col.158) 
This reinforces the view that the Conservative Government now regards 
all housing associations as quasi-IXlblic, and wishes to privatise the 
sector as far as possible, in accordance with its early aspirations for 
new style housing associations. John Stanley M.P. expressed the Party's 
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attitude [54] : 
lilt has been argued that the right to buy should not be extended 
to the dwellings of charitable housing associations because 
they are somehow in the private rather than the p.lblic sector. 
But that is completely at variance with the views of the Labour 
Party when in Government about the scope of the p.lblic sector. 
Statistically, and in all our policies, we and our predecessors 
in Government have firmly regarded the housing associations as 
an arm of public sector housing." (col.156) 
Clearly, the current Conservative Government does regard oousing 
associations as public sector. This differs from the attitude of previous 
Conservative Governments. Reinforcing the changing basis of political 
support for the IOOvement, it is significant that Edward Graham M.P. 
(Labour) (col.149) defends the autonomy of associations from centrally 
~sed policies (a reversal of previous Labour attitudes) in a manner 
similar to which the autonomy of local authorities is defended: 
liThe Minister has postulated the classic 'Whitehall koows best' 
attitude. Regardless of the views of local people, which are 
shown through their elected representatives, they will be told 
what to do." 
The effect of applying the right to buy to charitable associations 
would be to strengthen the IOOvement's capacity to create private assets; as 
promulgated by the Conservative Party, and criticised by the Labour Party, 
in the 1960s. Michael \Velsh M.P. (Labour) (Standing Comnittee F, col.177) 
sums up these differences in political objectives well: 
"I see the association's p.lrpose as being to build oouses for 
the lower income groups and the IOOSt needy. Now I find out that I 
was wrong: housing associations are there to sell houses." 
[54] This is also the attitude of the Labour Party (1981, p.57): 
"Registered oousing associations are largely p.lblicly-funded; they 
are supervised by a p.lblic agency, the Housing Corporation; and as a 
result they are generally regarded today as part of the p.lblic sector 
in oousing". As suggested above, this is largely a result of Labour 
policies towards associations in the mid-1970s. 
104 
Allan Roberts M.P. (Labour) (col.195) puts it roore emphatically. 
"Soon the Government, through the legislation, will be turning 
housing associations such as MIH into second-class property 
developers and speculators." [55] 
As a result of the changing activities undertaken by housing 
associations and the changing relationship between government and the 
roovement (resulting mainly from the 1974 Act), the major political parties 
have undergone an almost complete exchange of attitudes towards housing 
associations. In the past Conservative Governments have defended their 
initiatives expanding the role of the association roovement from Labour 
Opposition. The current Conservative Government's legislation is a 
response to their hostlity towards the legislation of the 1974-79 Labour 
Government. These changes were mt proopted by political pressure on 
either Party (see section 3.5 below), they simply reflect their changing 
perception of the nature of housing association activity. 
In 1983 the Social Democratic Party (S.o.P.) p,lblished a paper entitled 
A Strategy for Housing. '!be docl.lllent supported the housing association 
movement, arguing that (p.7) 
II Housing associations should ... make a contribution to 
expansion in housing for rent fumed directly from p,lblic 
fums." 
The Party also recommends (p.ll) the creation of a new form of social 
housing "encouraging private investment in homes for rent at lOOderate 
prices". Housing associations should carry out roost of the developnent for 
this programne (p.12). A 'National Housing Bank' would be necessary to c0-
ordinate private investment (p.ll). Rent levels would be between fair 
rents and economic rents (p.l3), subsidised if they become too close to 
economic rents. To some extent this scheme is reminiscent of the 1961 cost 
[55] '!be association referred to is Merseyside Improved Houses. '!bis does 
indeed conflict with Labour policy as expressed by Bruce Douglas-
Mann M.P. in the secom reading debate 00 the 1980 Housing Bill 
(col.1492): "we need to bring the privately rented sector into social 
ownership through housing associations, local authority acquisitions, 
and so on". 
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rent scheme (which originally envisaged building society investment). One 
difference is that the use of private funds is intended to (p.14) "free 
housing associations from the burden of bureaucracy which arises from 
total dependence on public funding". The document does raise the quesion 
of the legitimate role of municipal housing however, arguing against 
municipalisation, which creates an "unresponsive bureaucracy" with a 
monopoly of rented housing (p.15). 
The 1983 election manifesto of the S.o.p./Liberal Alliance [56] adopted 
most of these policies and proposes (p.20) "attracting institutional 
investment in a new type of non-profit making rented housing to be managed 
by housing associations". '!his document also illustrates the criticism of 
local authorities which is implicit in most support for the housing 
association movement when it proposes (p.12) "providing new sources of 
rented oousing to compete with local councils" (enq::tlasis added) • 
Significantly, the Labour manifesto of 1983 [57] fails to mention housing 
associations at all, focussing largely upon a reversal of Conservative 
policies towards local authorities (p.23). '!his again demonstrates the 
ideological commitment of the political Parties to certain tenure forms; 
the s.o.P./Liberal Alliance displaying suspicion towards local authorities, 
and the Labour Party ignoring associations when municipalities come under 
threat. Indeed, in 1981 the Labour Party published A FUture for Public 
Housing, chapter 9 of which assessed the role of housing associations. '!be 
point is repeatedly made that there is little that associations can do 
that could not be done by local authorities, and the report offers no 
conclusion on what tasks associations should perform in the future. 
An analysis of political statements on the role of housing associations 
demonstrates the importance attatched to tenure form. '!he amount of 
support given to the association movement depends upon the extent to which 
association provision is perceived as replicating desirable tenure forms. 
'!he Conservative Party has thus encouraged associations to provide 
unsubsidised renting or outright ownership, whilst the Labour Party has 
encouraged associations to oouse needy private rented tenants. '!hese 
[56] WOrking Together for Britain. 
[57] '!he New Hope for Br i tain. 
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attitudes have led successive governments to slightly modify the nature of 
association activity to meet their image of desired tenure forms. No clear 
economic differences exist between association and municipal provision, 
and this issue is noticeably absent from debates on the advantages of 
association activity. 
3.4.4 State Expeooiture on Housing Associations 
The capacity of the association movement to withstand changes in the 
basis of government support is demonstrated by analysing public 
expenditure on housing. Allocations to the Corporation have steadily 
increased since 1974 (see table 3.4). 
TABLE 3.4 Public expenditure on the municipal programme 
and on housing associations (Em cash prices) • 
Year 76-77 77-78 ~8-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 
Municipal expenditure 
on rrunicipa1 
programme 1860 1758 1736 1944 1717 1416 
Municipal expenditure 
on associations 215 225 184 189 170 142 
Corporation expenditure 
on associations 254 288 324 397 495 492 
Total expenditure 
on associations 469 513 508 586 665 634 
Expenditure on 
associations 
as a percentage of 
expenditure on 
.municipal programme 25.2 29.2 29.3 30.1 38.7 44.8 
~ 
SOurce: Treasury (1982 and 1983). Derived from table 2.7. 
107 
82-83 
1410 
110 
680 
790 
56.0 
In 1976/77 the Housing Corporation was allocated £254m (cash prices). 
By 1982/83 this had risen to £680m. During this per iod, local author i ty 
expenditure on the municipal programme fell from £1860m to £1410m, in the 
face of severe financial constraints imposed by central government. 
Clearly, housing associations are continuing to receive favourable 
treatment from both major parties. The 1983 allocation to the Corporation 
(for 1984/85) was £687m [58] • carvel points out [59] that this 
represented a cut in real terms of 8%. This is still better than the 
relative poSition of local authorities, who suffered a cut of 13% [60] • 
The increased allocations provided by the current Conservative Government 
appear paradoxical in view of the controls applied to the movement in the 
1980 Housing Act. The only conceivable explanation is that even an 
imperfectly operating association movement fits the ideological image of 
non-state housing better than municipal housing does. The overall policy 
of supporting institutions having the appearance of being outside of the 
state apparently justifies granting millions of pounds to an association 
movement which still retains a semblance of its earlier fililanthropic 
image. 
This consistent growth in expenditure on associations is a reflection 
of the ability of successive goverrunents to interpret the role of the 
movement in ways which are consistent with their overall housing policies. 
As goverrunents succeed each other with their differing housing ideologies, 
rather than tmpose reductions in association activity, the nature of the 
movement allows a subtle redirection of its activity whilst financial 
support continues. 'lhe nunicipal programme appears less flexible, and 
elicits stronger partisan attitudes. This is revealed by considering the 
[58] See Housing Corporation, 1983b. 
[59] Housing Association Cut Back, The Guardian, November 25th 1983, p.6. 
[60] Similarly, in 1981 Matthews comnented of the 1981/82 allocation that 
the association "movement is pleased to have avoided any further 
cuts- particularly in view of what is happening to local 
authorities". The moratorium imposed on the COrporation in 1982 was a 
result of a projected overspend by associations. When lifted (after 
one m::mth), an additional allocation to the Corporation was made (see 
Carvel, 1982, Curb on Housing Association Schemes Lifted, The 
Guardian, Noveni:>er 1st, p.4). The extra £150 million allocated led to 
an unusually high level of oomnitments. As a consequence, the current 
reduction of 8% will have a disproportionate effect an new 
comnitments (see King, 1984). 
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trends in p..1b1ic expenditure between the period 1976-77 to 1978-79 (Labour 
Government) and 1979-80 to 1982-83 (Conservative Government). Over the 
three Labour years expenditure on the Jrunicipal prograrrme increased by 
4.5%. Over the three Conservative years it fell by 27.5%. Association 
expenditure fared very well under both governments, rising by 24.9% under 
Labour, and 34.8% under Conservative. 
Such an analysis of aggregate figures ignores the increasing 
centralisation of association expenditure. As table 3.5 shows, Corporation 
expenditure on associations as a percentage of municipal expenditure on 
associations rose from 118% to 618% between 1976-77 and 1982-83. 
~LE 3.5 Central and local expenditure on housing associations 
(Em cash prices) • 
Year 76-77 °77- 78 78-79179-80'80-81 '81-82 I 
82-83 
Municipal expenditure 
on associations 215 225 184 189 170 142 110 
Corporation expenditure 
on associations 254 288 324 397 495 492 680 
Corporation expenditure I 
I 
I 
as percentage of 
291.21346.5!618.2 municipal expenditure 118.1 112.9 176.1,210.1 
Source: Treasury (1982 and 1983). Derived from table 2.7. 
, 
, 
In addition, as Housing Association Grant has become more important, 
the current Conservative Government has exercised increased control over 
its application to projects. In 1982, £S2m of a total allocation of £556m 
was specifically allocated to schemes which would result in home ownership 
by the tenant (see Housing Group's Role, The Guardian, January 20th, 1982, 
p.2). Aggregate figures thus obscure the ways in which the Conservative 
Government is seeking to enforce that part of their aspirations for the 
association movement which still envisages the creation of private assets. 
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This factor goes a long way in explaining the Conservative Government's 
increasing support for associations, and the concomitant dramatic decline 
in their financing of municipal housebuilding. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Duncan and Ley (1982, p.45), in their critique of structural Marxism, 
argue that 
"TO collapse the range of social experience to the outworkings 
of deep economic structures is to present an impoverished view 
of the social, cultural, and political realms of life." 
As chapter 2 suggested, an analytical reduction of all state activity 
to the (short or long term) interests of fractions of capital has received 
widespread criticism recently. 5wenarton (1981) has argued that state 
subsidies were introduced as a result of an acute legitimation crisis; the 
need to deIOOnstrate the ability of the state to meet the needs of the 
working class. He goes on to argue that these political and ideological 
aspects of state activity have been largely ignored in the att.enpt to link 
everything to the economic realm. 
The previous sections suggest that functional theor ies are incapable 
of adequately explaining the growth of central government support for the 
housing association movement. Associations provide heavily 
subsidised [61] accomnodation for tenants, many of whom are oominated by 
local author i ties. If anything, the fragmented nature of the association 
movement renders them inefficient in comparison with local authorities 
(Short and Ramsden, 1974). Furthermore, there is no indication that the 
policy evolved as a response to political demands. In Scandinavia (Greve, 
1971) the housing association IOOvement evolved from building and other 
trade union co-operative organisations. '!here is no indication of mass 
based political demands for this type of housing organisation in Britain 
[61] 'Itle Comnittee of Public Accounts (1979, para.4) reveals that Housing 
Association Grant covers over 80% of the capital costs of association 
schemes. 
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in the early 1960s. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the ideas were 
wholly promulgated by central government. As Cullingworth (1979, p.l31) 
says, "the evidence suggests that there is little demand for alternative 
forms of tenure as such, but rather a series of perceived problems 
relating either to the management of or access to traditional tenures". 
Speaking of the 1961 Housing Act, the Department of the Environment (1971, 
para.4.4) corrmented that 
"the Act was intended to make co-ownership possible, but its 
wording could not be rore specific than this because there was 
virtually no background of existing experience and the 
consequences of the exper iments which the Government hoped to 
encourage could not be for seen. " 
Clearly the legislation of the early 1960s was an inspiration of 
central government (62] • Furtherrore, Miles (1984) argues that the types 
of association activity undertaken in the 1970s is almost exclusively the 
result of central government initiatives. 
The policy appears to be rore concerned with government perceptions of 
the relationship between central government and the providers of housing, 
the ideological preference for particular tenure forms, and the nature of 
tenant equity and control. The Conservative Party introduced support for 
associations in order to obviate the need for municipal action to 
compensate for the decline in the condition and quantity of the stock of 
privately rented accorrmodation. 
It is because associations had an ambiguous status, and thus served 
ideological ends, that the movement has received bi-partisan support. Both 
Labour and Conservative Governments have interpreted the relevant 
legislation in ways which reflect their ideological predilictions. Lord 
Somers provides a crucial insight into the nature of housing policy 
formation in the Comnons (Lords Corrmittee Debate, 1982 Housing and 
Building Control Bill, co1.834-835): 
(62] See also Joyce Butler M.P. (Labour), Standing Cannittee E, 1963 
Housing Bill, col.66, who argued that the idea of oousing co-
operatives should "have been publicised widely, because it takes time 
for these ideas to penetrate". 
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"'!he Government seem to have a habit of taking a principle which 
they feel is desirable in some cases- and in many cases it is-
and then assuming that it is desirable in all cases. '!hey have 
done so with the right to buy, or owner occupation. In many cases 
this is, no doubt, very desirable but in certain cases it is not 
desirable. '!his peculiarity is indulged in not only by this 
Conservative Government. It is comnon to all Governments which 
act according to party policy." 
Clearly, Party housing policies interpret existing legislation in terms 
of pre-existing political ideologies. As Short (1982, p.36) says of housing 
policy in general, "successive governments adopted and IOOdified previous 
legislation to their own ends". To this extent this appears to be another 
example of what Pickvance (1981) has described as the chameleon like 
interpretation and implementation of policy (see chapter 9). 
It is significant that the legislation gave government support to 
formerly privately run bodies. A good deal of the justification for this 
was couched in terms of the inadequacy of al ternati ve tenures. '!his 
referred primarily to inadequacies in mmicipal practice; both in terms of 
design (see Dunleavy 1981 and Kirby 1981) and management (see C.HA-C. 
1969). From the outset, the Conservatives hoped that associations could 
house middle income people in order to prevent them becoming council 
tenants (a replacement function). The Labour Party hoped that associations 
would house poorer people who could not be housed by a local authority (a 
complementary function). 
Is it reasonable to expect that housing associations could fulfill such 
roles? Although the rousing association register was created in 1974, 
associations are still relatively independent from central government, yet 
are reliant upon local authorities for information and assistance. Is the 
chain of conmand between central government and rousing associations 
sufficiently strong to permit the achievement of central government 
objectives? Can central government influence the nature of association 
management and allocation practices, or do local authorities possess more 
power in this respect? Chapters 5 and 6 will address these issues, and the 
implications for an analysis of central government policy formation. 
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4. INTRODUcrION '10 CASE STUDY BOrouGHS 
4.1 The Need for Empirical Data 
The previous chapter analysed the rationale behind state support for 
housing associations, and, relying upon an analysis of government 
publications and Parliamentary debates, provided evidence that the policy 
was ideological in character. Both of the main political Parties have 
propounded argtmlents in support of associations which depend upon 
distinctions of tenure. What the Parties assert, however, may ooly bear a 
loose relationship with the activities of housing associations in 
practice. In order to establish whether government objectives have been 
realised in practice it is necessary to examine the extent to which 
central government, and its appointed agency, the Housing Corporation, can 
influence association activity. It is important to clarify the 
relationships between these bodies implicit in government policies, and 
the extent to which associations are bodies which can be supervised in 
detail. It is also necessary to distinguish between general financial and 
administrative controls, and control over tenant selection by housing 
associations, for successive governments have expressed preferences on the 
types of people to be housed by associations. 
The legislation of 1974 provides the clearest evidence of Party 
preferences 00 the relationships between associations and local 
authorities, and the role of the Housing Corporation. Subsequent chapters 
will discuss these differences, and will examine the structure of the 
association IOOvement in order to assess the extent to which central 
policies are achievable. '!here are, in fact, three bodies which help to 
shape the outcome of central government support for housing associations. 
First, the associations themselves formulate development programmes and 
allocate properties to tenants. Secondly, the Housing Corporation acts as 
intermediary between the Department of the Environment and housing 
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associations. It is responsible for allocating finance to individual 
associations, and for supervising their activities. 'Ihirdly, local 
authorities may offer advice and assistance to associations. They can also 
offer financial support and nominate some of the tenants of association 
schemes. 
An analysis of the autonomy of these agents, and .their capacity to 
influence policy ~lementation is therefore necessary. If central 
government can ooly imperfectly control their activities, and if the 
outcome of their interaction is unpredictable, then central government 
cannot be certain that its policy of support for associations will produce 
an allocational outcome significantly different from that resulting from 
municipal activities. If there is uncertainty over the precise tasks 
performed by housing associations, and the possibility of a duplication of 
roles exists, then it becomes difficult to justify the expansion of this 
new tenure in functional terms. 
The allocational outcomes of association practices is of central 
importance, for it is through the housing of particular groups of people 
that functionalist theory might offer an explanation of the continued 
existence of state suWOrted housing [1] • It is therefore necessary to 
examine the power of the Housing Corporation to influence housing 
association activity, and in particular the groups of people housed (see 
chapter 5). Housing associations must be examined in order to to ascertain 
the predictability of their allocation practices and the groups of people 
housed by them (see chapters 5, 7 and 8). '!be relationship between local 
authorities and housing associations must be studied; if local authority 
practices, especially nominations, significantly influence housing 
association activity in a direction which central government cannot 
determine, then centrally inspired functionalist policies are untenable 
(see chapter 6). '!he local authority may itself be concerned with tenure 
distinctions. All of these chapters will utilise material drawn from the 
study ooroughs, so it is necessary first to explain the method by which the 
[1] The importance attatched to association allocation practices is 
revealed by the 1971 report of the Central Advisory Housing 
Comnittee, Housing Associations, para.l.4. See section 3.4, chapter 3. 
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areas were selected. 
4.2 The Selection of Study Areas 
There are currently over 2,700 registered housing associations in Great 
Britain. An analysis of the activity of each individual association would 
be beyond the scope of this work so a sampling frame is necessary. This 
section explains the basis upon which the selection of study boroughs was 
undertaken. 
Since the relationship between local author ities and housing 
associations is theoretically relevant, it is necessary to select study 
areas by local authority boundary, in order to permit an evaluation of the 
impact of local authority policies on housing association activity. 
Central government policy has been shown to be divided on Party lines so 
the boroughs should be selected in order to facilitate an examination of 
whether this political division is replicated at the local level. This can 
be done either by selecting two boroughs where political control has 
changed hands recently, or two boroughs where political control has been 
stable for a number of years. The former will permit a tenp:>ral comparison 
of policies and the latter a spatial comparison. This may reveal political 
differences in the relationship between local authorities and housing 
associations. These differences may influence housing association 
activity more than central government policy. 
In order to provide a rigorous basis for empirical analysis a large 
stock of housing association accomnodation is desirable. Furthermore, in 
1978 82% of tenants living in property which was p.1rchased by an 
association were previously privately renting that property, and 31% of 
all other association tenants were also previously in the privately rented 
sector [2] • This suggests that a large privately rented stock is also a 
necessary feature of the study areas, if the activities of associations 
studied are to be representative of the movement as a whole. A large 
association stock and privately rented stock indicates that the 
[2] Bird (ed) (1979, fig.C.2.4). 
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relationship between the local author ities and associations in these 
areas will be well developed, thus providing suitable material on inter-
organisational relationships. As table 4.1 shows, these factors suggest 
that the study boroughs should be in London. London has a large stock of 
housing association and privately rented accommodation, which will 
facilitate the analysis of the activity of housing associations. 
TABLE 4.1 Comparison of tenure profile of 
London and England and Wales (1981). 
Tenure Housing Privately 
Association Rented 
Area 
Greater London [1] 4.1 15.1 
England and Wales [2] 2.0 9.0 
Local 
Authority 
30.7 
28.8 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Greater London County Report 
Part 1. Derived from table 39. 
[2] 1981 Census, Housing and Households. Derived from 
table 2. 
Owner 
Occupied 
48.6 
58.1 
Table 4.2 shows the tenure profile of the eight London Boroughs with 
the largest proportion of housing association accommodation [3) • It also 
shows the results of the local elections in the boroughs in 1974, 1978 and 
, 
1982, and the size of the majority in 1982. Clearly it is not possible to 
analyse two boroughs where political control has recently changed hands. 
For boroughs with consistent political control preference is given to 
boroughs nearer the top of the list (with larger association stocks) and 
with larger majorities in the 1982 election. Conservative boroughs 
suitable for analysis were therefore Kensington and Chelsea and 
Westminster. Labour boroughs suitable for analysis were Islington, 
Southwark and Hackney. In the case of the Conservative boroughs, size of 
(3] The analysis was originally uooertaken using the 1978 National 
Dwelling and Household Survey. '!he results in the 1981 Census are 
presented since they are more accurate than the 1978 sample. 
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association stock and size of political majority are inversely related, 
suggesting no clear preference. In the case of the Labour ooroughs, 
Islington has the largest association stock and the largest majority in 
the 1982 election, suggesting that it should be one of the study ooroughs. 
~LE 4.2 Factors considered in selecting 
shortlist for study ooroughs. 
~litical control 1982 
1974 1978 1982 majority 
[1] [2] [3] [3] 
Borough 
Kensington & Chelsec: C C C 11 
Hamner smith L - - -
Westminster C C C 12 
Islington L L L 24 
Hackney L L L 19 
Lambeth L L - -
SOuthwark L L L 20 
Canrlen L L L 3 
Percentage household 
by tenure [4 ] 
Housing Privately 
association rented 
12.3 38.9 
9.9 30.6 
9.6 36.1 
8.3 17.4 
7.3 17.8 
6.7 22.0 
6.6 11.4 
6.2 29.1 
SOurce: [1] 1974 G.L.C. Annual Abstract. Derived from table 1.07. 
[2] The Times, May 6th, 1978, page 3, column c, Power Shift in 
Only Eight of 80 Councils Outside London. 
[3] The Times, May 8th, 1982, page 2, column d, How the Councils 
Fared. 
-
[4] 1981 Census, Greater London County Report Part 1. Derived from 
table 39. 
Islington was chosen as a study borough because of these factors, and 
because staff at the Open University were already undertaking research in 
the borough. '!his suggested that information would be readily available 
from the borough, as informal contacts with personnel in the housing 
department of the borough were already well developed. A visit to their 
housing department in 1982 confirmed this. '!he remaining choice was 
between Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster. Preliminary visits were 
made to the boroughs in 1982 in order to ascertain the co-operation 
offered by council officials. Both ooroughs seemed very willing to co-
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operate with the research, and this provided no basis for choice. 
Since the most relevant supply characteristics had already been 
considered (stock and political control), demand factors were examined in 
order to provide the basis for choice. The Conservative borough which had 
population characteristics closest to those in Islington would be chosen. 
This would permit the inference that differences in association 
activities between the two areas are caused by policy decisions (by the 
associations or the boroughs), and do not merely reflect differences in 
the population of the areas being studied. Tables 4.3 tc;> 4.7 analyse a 
range of population indicators, and show the absolute differences between 
the Conservative boroughs and Islington [4] • Whilst these are crude 
measures, any consistent difference would be accepted on the basis of 
insufficient al ternati ve theoretical reasons. 
TABLE 4.3 Shortlisted study boroughs; differences 
in age of head of household (1978). 
Male Female 
16-29 30-44 45-64 65+ 16-29 30-44 45-64 
Islington 11.5 20.0 27.2 11.2 4.9 4.6 5.2 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 14.9 22.1 19.5 8.0 9.3 7.0 6.4 
Westminster 12.3 19.0 23.6 11.3 5.9 5.1 6.2 
K&C - I 3.4 2.1 7.7 3.2 4.4 2.4 1.2 
W - I 0.8 1.0 3.6 0.1 1.0 0.5 1.0 
65+ 
15.4 
12.7 
16.6 Total 
2.7 27.1 
1.2 9.2 
Source: 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 88b. 
Table 4.3 shows that the age profile of the population of Westminster 
is closest to that in Islington. 
(4] This was done before the results of the 1981 Census were published. 
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TABLE 4.4 Shortlisted study boroughs; differences 
in household type (1978). 
, 
Lone 
Married parent 1 person 1 person 
couple family aged <60 aged 60+ 
Islington 51.9 9.6 14.2 16.2 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 38.1 6.6 17 .2 13.7 
Westminster 42.2 6.6 22.3 19.0 
K&C - I 13.8 3.0 3.0 2.5 
W - I 9.8 3.0 8.1 2.8 
Other 
8.0 
14.4 
9.9 Total 
6.4 28.7 
1.9 25.6 
Source: 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 65b. 
Table 4.4 shows that, although there is only a slight difference between 
Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea, Westminster has a profile of 
household types closest to that of Islington. 
TABLE 4.5 Shortlisted study boroughs; differences 
in family type (1978). 
Main Concealed 
1--
Married Lone One House- Single 
couple parent person hold person 
Islington 44.5 8.2 33.0 1.3 0.4 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 29.7 5.2 43.2 0.5 0.3 
Westminster 35.8 5.6 43.6 0.4 0.3 
K&C - I 14 .8 3.0 10.2 0.8 0.1 
W - I 8.7 2.6 10.6 0.9 0.1 
Single 
person 
not 
household 
12.6 
5.6 
14.3 Total 
7.0 35.9 
1.7 24.6 
Source: 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 100b. 
Table 4.5 indicates that, as regards family type, Westminster is once 
again closest to Islington. 
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~LE 4.6 Shortlisted study boroughs; / differences 
in socio-economic group of head of household (1978). 
I II IlIa IIIb IV Other 
Islington 12.1 33.8 23.4 18.2 8.7 3.9 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 30.3 38.6 11.4 12.9 3.7 3.1 
Westminster 24.6 37.5 12.9 14.2 5.8 4.9 Total 
K&C - I 18.2 4.8 12.0 5.3 5.0 0.8 46.1 
W - I 12.5 3.7 10.5 4.0 2.9 1.0 34.6 
Source: 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 97b. 
Note: [I] professional/employer/manager; [II] Other non-manual; 
[IlIa] Skilled manual; [IIIb] semi-skilled manual; 
[IV] Unskilled manual 
Table 4.6 shows that Westminster has a socio-economic profile which is 
closest to that in Islington, although both Conservative boroughs differ 
widely from the position in Islington. 
TABLE 4.7 Shortlisted study boroughs; differences 
in employment status of head of household (1978). 
Employed Unemployed Retired Housewife 
Islington 65.0 5.4 17.2 7.3 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 70.2 3.5 12.0 6.6 
Westminster 66.8 3.8 16.9 6.5 
K&C - I 5.2 1.9 5.2 0.7 
W - I 1.8 1.6 0.3 0.8 
Other 
5.1 , 
7.8 
6.1 Total 
2.7 15.7 
1.0 5.5 
Source: 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 91b. 
Table 4.7 indicates that the employment status of the population of· 
Westminster is closest to that of Islington. Whilst the relevance of the 
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variables selected to the activity of housing associations may vary [51 , 
the fact that Westminster is closer to Islington on all indicators led to 
this borough being selected as the second study borough. Figure 4.1 shows 
the location of the study boroughs in London (and the proportion of 
households renting from an association [61 ). 
---------
[51 See chapter 7, where this is developed. 
[6] Derived from the 1981 Census, and presented numerically in table 6.2, 
chapter 6). 
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5. '!HE POLICY 'IOOLS- THE HOUSING CORPORATlOO AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 analysed the varying basis of central government support for 
the association movement and concluded that support is largely based upon 
ideological attitudes towards tenure and control. Political debates are a 
poor indicator of policy outcomes however. '!he Housing Corporation, 
housing associations and local authorities are the tools selected to 
iIrplement central government policies. Chapter 2 suggested that 
functionalist theories posit a IOOI'lolithic view of the state, in which 
central government forltUlates policies which are iIrplemented 
unproblematically. If the agencies responsible for inplementing 
government policies towards housing associations have a significant 
degree of autonomy from central government, the outcome of central 
government policies is unlikely to satisfy pre-given functional 
requirements, and any theory which posits such a tight-link between policy 
outcome and structural requirements is invalidated (see Pickvance, 1978). 
Chapters 5 and 6 are primarily concerned with further exploring the 
period from 1961, and demonstrating that the iIrplementors of housing 
association policy do indeed possess significant autonomy. Chapter 5 
begins with a discussion of the Housing Corporation, the duties ascribed 
to it by successive goverrunents and its relationship to individual housing 
associations. '!be nature of 'accountability' will be addressed in terms of 
the control mechanisms possessed by central government over the Housing 
Corporation, and the controls the Housing Corporation has over housing 
associations. Subsequent sections will outline the allocational 
iIrplications of central government policies towards housing associations. 
The organisation of housing associations will then be examined, and their 
allocation policies contrasted with government policies. 
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This will provide evidence against the view that support of 
associations can feasibly have a functional requirement (e.g. the 
reproduction of specific types of lal::x>ur power), 'and that support is 
necessarily more general (and ideological). Chapter 6 will undertake a 
related analysis focusing upon local authority policies towards housing 
associations. 
5.2 The Housing Corporation: Power and Accountability 
The Housing Corporation was brought into existence by section 1(1) of 
the Conservative 1964 Housing Act. Schedule 1 paragraph 2 of that Act 
empowered the Minister of Housing to awoint the members of the 
Corporation. Johnson (1979, p.379) defines 'quangos' as 
"appointed p,lblic agencies established by statute or 
ministerial decision to perform executive tasks in place of 
central departments or elected local authorities." 
This definition clearly includes the Housing Corporation. A good deal 
of the political debate on the role of associations and the Corporation 
has revolved around the issue of accountability and democratic control, 
and Johnson himself cites the Corporation as an example of a quango 
(p.386) • 
That the Housing Corporation and boards of management of housing 
associations are oot elected is clear, but what precisely is the 
relationship between central government, the Corporation and housing 
associations? Is there an adequate hierarchical system of command which 
provides accountability through central government? Without it, any 
functionalist analysis of central policy formation is untenable. 
An examination of the relevant legislation provides the answer, and 
reveals significant changes since 1964. '!be 1964 Act gave central 
government both general and specific controls over the Housing 
Corporation. Section 1 (1) defined the general duties of the 
124 
Corporation [1] largely in terms of the promotion of specific types of 
association and activities to be urrlertaken by them. Any other activity 
undertaken by the Corporation thus became ultra vires. '!his is a 
constitutional control over the Housing Corporation. 
Section 1 (2) of the 1964 Act empowered the Minister or Secretary of 
State to give directions relating to the various powers of the 
Corporation. '!his power of direction is wide, and was extensively used to 
impose conditions on grants made by the Corporation. A third type of 
control is the requirement of Ministerial consent for several activities 
of the Corporation. For example, before the Corporation can direct an 
association on the disposal of its land, section 2 (3) required the consent 
of the Minister. A fourth type of control is that of providing information. 
'!he Corporation DUst sutmit audited accounts to the Conptroller and 
Auditor General, and p.1blish an annual r~port (section 10). 
These are all general controls and do oot relate to specific 
association management practices. '!he only significant powers the 
Corporation posseses over associations are in the distribution of loans, 
and the power to take over an association which is oot performing its 
duties (section 5). For the latter, Ministerial consent is required. 
Clearly the 1964 Act set up a very general framework. Indeed, details 
were consciously avoided. Sir Keith Joseph M.P. (Conservative Minister of 
Housing and Local Government) resisted Labour suggestions that the 
Housing Corporation should oversee the detailed practices of housing 
associations in the Standing Committee debate on the 1963 Housing Bill 
(Corrmittee E, col.42): 
"What I am resisting is the idea that the Corporation should 
seek to spell out in absolute form a complete code of 
management. " 
It was very much up to the Corporation on an ad hoc basis to decide what 
the "proper exercise and performance" [2] of an association was to be. '!he 
[1] See section 3.4, where the subsection is quoted. 
[2] Section 1 (1) 1964 Housing Act. 
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Labour Opposition reacted strongly to such vagueness. If the associations 
were only imperfectly accountable to the Corporation, was it merely a 
device to further reduce the influence of local authorities over the 
activity of housing associations? 
The next legislation to affect the Housing Corporation and 
associations was again Conservative; the 1972 Housing Finance Act. Section 
77 enpowered the Housing Corporation to make loans to traditional 
associations as well as to new style housing societies, and the grant 
system was centralised in the 'new build subsidy' (section 75). '!he only 
changes in the relationship between the government, the Corporation and 
associations were contained in sections 77 and 80. Both provisions 
bypassed the Housing Corporation and exerted central government control 
over associations directly. Section 77 extinguished agreements between 
local authorities and associations in so far as they related to rent 
levels in order to facilitate the transition to fair rents. Section 
80 (l) (a) eIIp)wered the Secretary of State to treat an association "as if 
it were for any specific };Urpose of this Act ••• the local authority". 
Both the 1964 and 1972 Acts reduced considerably electoral control over 
state supported housing provision. Imeed, this is a trend started by the 
Conservative Government in 1961. The Housing Act of that year created an 
exchequer fum of £25 mill ion for use by cost rent and co-ownership 
societies, and thereby supplemented local authority involvement with the 
associations through the traditional method of authorised arrangements. In 
so far as they related to rent levels, such agreements were illegal by 
1972. '!he 1964 Act created the Corporation but gave it little real power. 
The 1972 Act did not significantly increase the power of the Corporation, 
and exerted controls over associations directly. 'Ibis bypassing of the 
Housing Corporation only eight years after its creation paralleled the 
bypassing of lOCal authority rent setting for rrunicipal accomnodation 
some 53 years after they assumed this responsibility. It has already been 
argued that the Conservative Party wished to promote associations as 
'private' sector institutions at this time. '1he Party clearly felt that 
detailed bureaucratic control was inconsistent with this. What was being 
done was to extend state influence in housing activity through an 
unelected and largely uncontrolled body. When considered expedient, the 
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Conservative Government could simply bypass an unelected Housing 
Corporation. Labour M.P.s emphasised this lack of accountability. 
The first Labour legislation affecting these relationships was the 
1974 Housing Act, and this presents a marked contrast with earlier 
Conservative legislation. Section 1(1) of the Act created a new duty of 
the Housing Corporation, that of compiling a register of approved housing 
associations. Section 13 governs the operation of this register, and 
states the requirements that an association nust meet to be deemed 
suitable for registration. Section 15 gives the Corporation the power to 
strike associations off the register, and section 17 restricts the payment 
of certain loans and grants to registered associations. 
These provisions increased the power of central government generally, 
but mainly did so through the Corporation. FurtherlOOre, section 19 of the 
Act empowered the Corporation to conduct an inquiry into the affairs of a 
registered association that is also registered under the 1965 Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act. The Corporation may remove menbers from or 
appoint them to their boards of management (section 20), direct the 
transfer of its land (section 21) or financial assets (section 23), and 
petition for the winding up of any such association (section 22). Thus the 
control of the Housing Corporation over the housing association movement 
was greatly increased by the 1974 Ac~ In view of earlier Labour comments 
about accountability [3] , it is clear that the Labour Government decided 
that accountability could be secured through the Housing Corporation, 
without the direct intervention of the relevant government department. 
The power relationships contained in the Labour legislation clearly 
differ from those in the Conservative legislation. '!be Labour legislation 
opted for less direct intervention. A good example of this is Circular 
170/74, which instructed the Corporation on the types of projects which 
should receive favourable consideration when allocating the new 'housing 
[3] See Michael Stewart M.P. (Labour), Standing Committee 0, 1961 Housing 
Bill, cols.32-33 (quoted in section 3.4). 
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association grant' [4] • 
It can be argued that the Labour Housing Act of 1974 was very similar 
to the Conservative Housing and Planning Bill of the same year. The 
Conservative 1980 Housing Act reinforces the differences in approach 
however. Most of the provisions of the 1980 Act bypass the CorfX)ration 
once JOOre. Section 1 applied the right to buy to the tenants of non 
charitable housing associations. Section 44 required housing associations 
to {Xlblish their allocation priorities, and section 131 required each 
association to maintain a fum for repaying surplus rental income to the 
government (the 'Grant Redemption Fllrrl'). Very little of this Act relates 
to the operation of the Housing CorfX)ration. Imeed, section 123 actually 
weakens the powers of the Housing CorfX)ration by abolishing its power to 
control the disposal of land by unregistered associations. 
The Housing CorfX)ration now retains considerable influence over the 
professional standing of associations (through the register), and their 
financial practices (through the grant and audit). It also has the power 
to conduct inquiries into associations, and to appoint members to their 
boards of management (as at April 1st, 1982 there were 54 such awointees 
on 14 boards (5] ). 
Apart from Circular 170/74, there is very little guidance on the 
precise tasks that associations should urrlertake. Housing CorfX)ration 
circular 24/81 [6] (para.12) reasserts that "priority will be given to 
rehabilitation". Rather than introduce regulations to cover detailed 
tasks, the current Conservative Government has begun (7) to earmark 
specific fX)rtions of housing association grant to particular types of 
activity. In December 1982 the total allocation to the Housing CorfX)ration 
for 1983/84 was announced as £63Onk With projected receipts of £60m this 
[4] Suitable projects were defined as (para.34): those within a general 
improvement area or housing action area, those for special needs, 
those to meet local priority needs, those designed to maintain the 
stock of privately rented accommodation, those designed to prevent 
structural deterioration of housing in the area, and those instigated 
by the local authority for the area, or the Housing CorfX)ration. 
(5] Annual Report of the Housing CorfX)ration, 1982/83, p.34. 
[6] The Approved Developnent Programne. 
(7] See Housing Group's Role, The Guardian, January 20th, 1982, p.2. 
128 
made a gross allocation of £690~ The allocation was subdivided 
accordingly (Housing Corporation, 1982c): 
contracted expenditure £350m 
new tenders awroved £150m 
new fair rent and hostel projects £75m 
other tenures £93m 
major repairs £15m 
right to buy mortgages £6m 
mini-housing association grant Elm 
This system allows central government to dictate the general type of 
association activity. Once again however, the major 'influence' is 
tenurial, for such allocations can hardly influence the routine 
administration of housing association stock (allocation and management). 
Is it significant that of the total allocation of £6901'11, only £75m (10.9%) 
went to new (unterrlered) fair rent projects, whilst £93m (13.5%) went to 
'other tenures' (i.e. tenures resulting in a form of equity holding more 
akin to ownership than renting). It is clear that the scope for 
associations to pioneer new types of tenure on their own is limited 
somewhat by this procedure. 
The method of distributing the allocation to the regions of the Housing 
Corporation also reflects considerable central control, the Generalised 
Needs Irrlex (G.N.I.) being used. The GoN.I. is compiled by central government 
and is used in local authority rate support grant calculations. The 
Approved Development Programme was introduced in 1981 in order to render 
the G.N.I. more appropriate to the needs of housing associations. Housing 
Corporation circular 24/81 [8] sought (para.36) "to ensure that variations 
in housing need should be taken fully into account both at national and 
local level", and (para.16) roodified the G.N.I. to exclude factors oot 
relevant to housing, and to eJrt)hasise indicators of special needs. The 
National Federation of Housing Associations has objected to this system 
(1983, p.9), however: 
"The Federation would like to see more research as to how the 
----------------
[8] The Approved Developnent Programme. 
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Generalised Needs Index- which was devised with local 
authorities in mind- might be adapted for application to the 
particular contribution which associations can make." 
In addition to controls over capital allocations to the Housing 
Corporation, central government has also exerted considerable project cost 
control. Until recently both the Housing Corporation and the Department of 
the Environment scrutinised each project submitted by a housing 
association. '!he Comnittee of Public Accounts (1979, awendix II, para.4) 
comnented in 1979: 
"under present arrangements, the key decisions on individual 
grants are in fact taken by the Department- approval in 
principle of the original scheme (subject to certain 
exceptions), and the calculation of Housing Association Grant, 
as well as Revenue Defecit Grant. Under present legislation the 
delegations to the Housing Corporation cannot enbrace these 
functions. '!hus the Accounting Officer l'IUSt be in a position to 
satisfy himself that the public money involved is sufficiently 
safeguarded. That this leads to some degree of double-checking 
cannot be denied." 
The National Federation of Housing Associations has long criticised 
the extent of supervision. Typical of its position is the comnent (1978b, 
p.lO) that: 
"The funding authority- most notably the Housing Corporation-
is required to engage in far too rruch petty consideration of 
trivial aspects of each scheme." 
Milton Wilkinson and Thurman (1981, p.126) state that "duplication of 
scrutiny in the Department and in the Housing Corporation ••• should be cut 
out". The depth of financial control can indeed be surprising. Professor 
Hetzel notes one case (9] where "after holding plans urrler review for 
eight weeks, the Department of the Environment Regional Office recomnended 
[9] In an unpublished paper, c.1981, entitled Filling the Vacuum: A 
Perspective on English Housing Associations, p.19. 
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a reduction in the number of shelves in a cupboard from three to two for a 
total saving of £8". 
FurtherlOOre, methods of cost control can significantly constrain the 
types of units provided by housing associations. It has been suggested 
that the TOtal Indicative Cost system encourages associations to 
subdivide houses into as many dwellings as possible during rehabilitation, 
since cost limits are dependent, inter alia, upon the number of units 
provided. '!be cost of external works, for example, can be absorbed better 
through allowances for several units [10] • 
'Itle degree of financial control exercised reflects the ambivalence 
towards the lOOVernent expressed by both main Political Parties; the 
autonomy of the IOOvement is circumscribed in case its pioneering spirit 
presents central government with difficulties (be it financial or 
tenurial). Such controls, rather than encouraging flexibility [11] , tend 
"to reward conformity" [12] • '!hese procedures were streamlined under 
schedule 18 of the 1980 Housing Act. 'Itle Department of the Environment has 
now delegated cost control to the Housing Corporation [13] , but has 
simultaneously strengthened its supervision role [14] • 
'!be Conservative Party has long been suspicious of quangos. In 1978 
Philip Holland M.P. (Conservative) described the growth of quangos [15] as 
[10] Information gathered during conversation with the Chief Development 
Officer of the Housing Corporation, 21st December, 1983. 
[11] A feature of the IOOvernent praised by the Central Housing Advisory 
Comnittee in 1971 (para.2.4). 
[12] Hetzel, Ope cit., p.20. see also N.F.H.A., 1977, para.64 (iii), which 
asserted that such "scrutiny can lead to the imposition of 'standard 
practice' where diversity ought to prevail". 
[13] Formal notification of the utilisation of schedule 18 was contained 
in a memorandum from the Department to the Corporation dated March 
16th, 1981, entitled Housing Act 1980, Housing Corporation: Ag?roved 
Developnent Programne for England, MeIOOrancium of Authorisation, in 
para.14. 
[14] Ibid.1 para.8 and 9 require the Corporation to furnish information to 
the Department, and initiates a series of bi-monthly meetings for 
rnonitoring the performance of the Corporation. Para.16 permits the 
Secretary of State to make audit checks on the Corporation, and to 
this end para.17 requires the Corporation to give the Department 
access to information. 
[15] Hansard, Volume 995, col.283. They are accused of being "unelected and 
largely unrepresentative" in Holland and Fallon (1978, p.4). 
131 
lithe rapid spread of bureaucracy by the proliferation of 
unelected, unrepresentative bodies beyom the reach of 
Parliament and in many instances not accountable to anyone for 
the expenditure of large and growing sums of public money." 
Johnson (1979, p.380) observes that Conservative hostility to quangos 
derives from "anti-state critics of bureaucracy and of the continuing 
extension of plblic powers and services". Hollam am Fallon (1978), in a 
Conservative Party plblication, recomnended that the nUl'l'ber of quangos 
should be reduced, that bodies receiving more than half of their fuoos 
from the government should be made more directly accountable, and that the 
system of appointing the members of quangos should be revised. looeed, in 
1980 the Conservative Government abolished Oller 400 quangos [16] • 
Conservative support for the Housing Corporation awears paradoxical 
therefore until the Conservative conception of accountability is 
urrlerstood. Chapter three ooted that Labour MoP.s feared that the 
Corporation, in Conservative haoos, may have eroded the role of local 
authorities. '!be Conservative conception of accountability is indeed to 
central government. 'Ibis justifies the use of the Corporation, and helps to 
explain why their recent legislation has applied central controls over 
associations. Philip Holland M.P. (Conservative) made this clear in 
1978 [17] when he said: 
"what I am proposing are changes for the benefit of the House of 
Comnons and to restore power to the House of Comnons for the 
future." 
The 1974-79 Labour Government was satisfied that the Housing 
Corporation could sufficiently police the association movement. '!bis does 
oot awear to be the case with the current Conservative Government, which 
is increasing central controls. None of these controls are likely to 
enforce particular tenant allocation practices by associations however, as 
they concentrate on the internal financial performance of the Corporation 
and individual housing associations. McKay and Cox (1979, p.152) carment of 
[16] See Clark (1980), Abolition of 436 Quangos qy 1983 to Save £23~ in 
'!be Times, December 4th, p.2. 
[17] Hansard, VolLUne 995, co1.284. 
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municipal housing that, 
"In the crucial areas of management, access and allocation, 
central governments either have not wanted to or have lacked the 
political will to impose major changes in local practices. II 
No power given to the Corporation, or directly imposed by central 
government, suggests that the position is significantly different in the 
case of housing associations. Indeed, a reflection on the imperfect 
control exercised over the IOOvement is the comnent of Arden (1983, para.S, 
p.vi) that 
liThe nature of the housing association operation is such that 
either an abuse (even a serious abuse,) or an inefficiency (even 
a structural or corporate inefficiency,) can lie concealed, with 
no outward manifestation for a prolonged per iod. " 
5.3 Housing Allocation and the Role of Housing Associations 
In order to understand the extent to which the changing aims of 
goverrunent policies towards housing associations have (and can be) 
realised in practice it is necessary to first return to a discussion of 
the 1961 Act. 
The 1961 and 1964 Acts created a system of unsubsidised provision for 
middle income tenants. Clearly this role largely distinguished 
associations from the work of local authorities. '!be question of whether 
associations should provide for gro~s similar to those housed by local 
authorities was raised by Stack as early as 1968. Circular 12/62 stated 
that authorised arrangements should be used by local authorities "for the 
benefit of people whose needs would otherwise have had to be met by the 
authorities themselves" (para.3), suggesting a supplementary function. 
Cost renting through the Housing Corporation was seen as an alternative, 
non-rrunicipal function (para.7 and 12). Stack (1968, p.49) observed that 
"Many of the problems exper ienced by the Hanover Housing 
Association in its contacts with local authorities have arisen 
because it is not at all clear either from the legislation or 
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from official statements and Ministry circulars whether housing 
associations are supposed to be an alternative or a complement 
to local authorities." 
Since at least 1972 this distinction between traditional associations 
and Corporation sponsored associations has not been valid (for 
traditional associations can now receive funds through the Corporation). 
To the extent that some of the better-off council tenants might be drawn 
to association accomnodation as a result of the cost rent scheme, some 
overlap of roles may have existed. Early Labour suspicion of the IOOvement 
is partly based upon the fear that this process may at first have 
residualised and then replaced municipal provision. 
A clearer example of the different objectives envisaged by the main 
Political Parties is provided in 1974. In chapter 3 it was argued that the 
different attitudes implicit in these variations reflected ideological 
positions. It is now necessary to consider precisely what those positions 
were, and their implications for the relationship between association and 
municipal provision. '!his is a subject which is returned to in chapter 6, 
when the possible responses of local authorities to these central 
government policy changes is considered. It is an issue central to an 
understanding of the allocational role of housing associations. 
Early in 1974 the Conservative Government introduced the Housing and 
Planning Bill. Later in the same year a new Labour Government introduced a 
similar Housing Bill. '!he Labour Bill eventually became the 1974 Housing 
Act. The few differences between the two Bills reveals major differences 
in the attitude of the two parties to the role of associations and their 
relationship to local authorities. Clause 41(4) of the Conservative Bill 
would have permitted the secretary of State for the Environment to direct 
a local authority to sell land it owns in a housing action area to a 
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specified housing association [18] • 
Clearly the Conservative Party hoped that, to some extent, association 
activity would replace the activity of local authorities. 'Ibe Labour 
Government, whilst in large part adopting the Conservative Bill, was 
ideologically comnitted to the pre-eminence of local authorities in the 
provision of rented accomnodation, and the Labour Bill therefore excluded 
the Conservative clause 41. Irxleed, the Labour Government interpreted 
their new legislation in a way which presented a marked contrast with that 
of its Conservative predecessor. Circular 170/74 [19] (para.34) suggested 
priorities for housing association grant as including relieving housing 
stress; a task clearly similar to local authority work in housing action 
areas. 'Ibe Labour Government intended that this work should supplement 
local authority work (i.e. not compete with or replace it). Just as the 
legislation was open to interpretation by different governments, so this 
intention was open to interpretation by local authorities, as the next 
chapter shows. 'Ibe Circular (para.34) also suggested that associations 
. should rooet the needs of groups with special housing problems or needs; a 
task complementing local authority work, catering for people who are in 
housing need, but for whom local authorities have unsuitable stock or 
insufficient management experience (which by virtue of being tasks not 
normally undertaken by local authorities does not compete with 
traditional municipal activity). 
Bowing to the policies of the Party in power (20] , the Housing 
Corporation IXlblished a circular in 1975 (Corporation circular 1/75). 'Ihe 
circular (para.2) instructed associations to consider the 1969 C.H.A.C. 
report on council house allocation, thus suggesting functions 
[18] The Conservative White Paper (1973) 0nrrJ.5338, para.27 (c) also 
proposed "to empower local authorities to require landlords selling 
tenanted property within the area to offer first refusal of the sale 
of the property to an awroved housing association; or, if this was 
shown to be impracticable, to the local authority itself". 'Ibis 
confirms the Conservative preference for association activity over 
municipal activity. 
[19] 'Ihe Housing Act 1974: Housing Corporation and the Housing 
Associations. 
[20] As paragraph 2 of the circular states, the circular "is issued as a 
general guide to housing associations in the light of the 
Government's views on the role of the voluntary housing movement". 
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supplementary to local authorities. Paragraph 9 suggested that 
associations should also house groups with special needs who cannot be 
housed except by a housing association, thus suggesting a role 
complementary to that of local authorities. 
The Conservative Party originally used associations as a method of 
encouraging a private sector competitor to local authority housing 
departments, and if the Conservative Party wished to displace local 
authorities as the main providers of rented property, it may have been 
relatively disinterested in who associations housed, but roore concerned 
that associations, rather than local councils, should house them (see 
Harloe, Issacharoff and Minns, 1974, P. 78). Why should this be so? One 
likely reason has been referred to; that is, the ambiguities surrourxling 
the ~blic/private status of associations, and the possibilities this 
raises for subsequent privatisation. Another explanation may simply be the 
strength of anti-mmicipal/collectivism within the Conservative Party. 
Both explanations seem valid, for the Conservative Government awlied the 
right to buy to the tenants of non-charitable housing associations in 
1980, and attempted to awly it to charitable associations in 1982. 1he 
urxlerlying rationale for these moves is the desire to promote non-state 
solutions to housing problems, as part of a wider belief that non 
government provision of facilities is in some way morally and economically 
superior to state provision. 
As Hadley and Hatch (1981, p.159) point out, the Housing Corporation, in 
its prorootional role, encourages local initiatives and self help outside 
of bureaucratically dominated state institutions. SOCial democratic 
ideology should thus favour the housing association roovement [21) • 
Conservative ideology is more complex, for whilst favouring such rooves in 
principle, it is also oJ;pOsed to state expenditure by bodies which are 
only partially controlled by central government. The question becomes 
whether it is preferable for housing to be administered by bureaucratic 
local author i ties which can be controlled to some extent, or voluntary 
associations which can only be partially controlled. The clauses in the 
[21] See Social Deroocratic Party (1983, p.14). 
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1980 Housing Act [22] controlling housing associations, and continued 
increases in allocations to the Housing Corporation indicates that, under 
the Conservative Government, the outcome of this debate has favoured 
housing associations. 
The Labour Party presents a markedly different ideological position. In 
this case local authorities are to be the main providers of rented 
accomnodation. Associations should therefore focus upon complementary 
provision (which does not directly compete with traditional ITUnicipal 
target groups), such as special categories of need; and suWlementary 
provision, for people akin to council tenants, but in a subordinate role to 
local authorities (hence the omission of the Conservative clause 41 from 
their 1974 Bill). 
To meet the requirements of the Labour Party, associations would 
therefore house special needs groups (e.g. the elderly, Ii1ysically and 
mentally handicapped etc.), the poor, and some general needs groups. To 
meet the requirements of the Conservative Party, associations would have 
to house middle-income tenants as a step towards ownership, but as regards 
their rental function, recent Conservative policies do little to suggest 
particularly suitable groups. 
An analysis of the 1982/83 Annual Report of the Housing Corporation 
provides evidence of the extent to which the different tenurial 
aspirations of the main Parties are being met (see table 5.1). 
[22] section 124 on the auditing of accounts, 126 on payments to conmittee 
members, 42 on allocation policies, and 131 on the Grant Redemption 
F'Urx3. '!he Act also awlied the right to buy to the tenants of non-
charitable associations. 
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TABLE 5.1 TOtal approvals by type of unit for the 
years 1964 to 1983. 
Area Great Britain 
Scheme TOtal Percent 
New build fair rent 172,934 48.3 
Rehabilitation fair rent 129,210 36.1 
Co-ownership and cost rent 37,928 10.6 
Improvement for sale 6,207 1.7 
Leasehold schemes 
for the elderly 2,072 0.6 
Shared ownership 7,076 2.0 
Co-ownership 
(equity sharing) 809 0.2 
Community leasehold l32 * 
Self build 1,846 0.5 
Total 358,214 100.0 
SOurce: Annual Report of the Housing Corporation 1982/83, 
Appendix III, table 1. 
Note: * indicates less than 0.1%. 
These schemes can be divided into those which provide rented 
accomnodation similar to council accomnodation (fair rent (23] ), those 
which provide property at economic rents (cost rent) and those which ease 
access to ownership (the remainder). The 1980/81 Annual Report (Appendix 
II) gives the total cost rent stock as 1,395. Since 00 new cost rent 
properties have been built for several years, it is fair to assume that 
this figure is accurate today. 
---------
(23] See C.HAC. (1971), Housing Associations, para. 1.4, where traditional 
associations (which generally must charge fair rents), are described 
as setting out to house people similar to council tenants. 
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TABLE 5.2 Tenurial characteristics of total approvals for 
the years 1964 to 1983. 
Area Great Britain 
Total Percent 
Scheme 
Rented (similar to municipal) 302,144 84.3 
Rented (economic rent) 1,395 0.4 
Facilitating ownership 54,675 15.3 
Total 358,214 
SOurce: Annual Re{X>rt of the Housing Cor{X>ration 1982/83. 
Der i ved from Append ix II I, table 1. 
Table 5.2 shows that 15% of association provision is oriented towards 
the requirement of easing access to ownership. Nearly 85% of association 
provision is fair rented accomnodation, and the precise way in which it is 
similar to local authority provision will be considered i.it later chapters. 
Having oonsidered the tenur ial significance of housing association 
activity their allocation {X>licies must now be examined. It has already 
been hypothesised that securing the reproduction of labour power might be 
seen as one functional objective of government support for housing 
association activity. If this is a viable objective then associations J1IlSt 
have allocation policies which produce predictable outcomes geared to 
tasks defined by central government (see Picievance, 1980). If this is not 
the case then the validity of a functional approach to housing policy is 
once again ser iously questioned. 
The 1977 Green Paper (Housing Policy: A Consultative Document, 
para.9.26) suggested that because of the increased scale of association 
activity "informal methods of allocation which have been ~ate in the 
past may no longer be appropriate". Although the Labour Government did rot 
act upon this suggestion, section 42 of the Conservative Housing Act of 
1980 requires associations to publish their allocation priorities. How 
much significance can be attributed to this policy is open to 
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question (24) • '!he 1980 Act generally displayed a cautious attitude 
towards associations (see section 3.3, chapter 3), and this may be 
considered a constraint upon association activity. 'Ibe IOOve may have 
assisted local authorities in attempting to predict the likely 
allocational practices of individual housing associations, for it meant 
that each association had to publish a document on its allocation policy 
which local authorities could use in assessing which associations to 
support. 
The debates on the 1982 Housing and Building Control Bill go further in 
revealing Conservative IOOtivations. John Stanley M.P. (Conservative 
Minister for Housing) observed that some associations have not been strict 
enough in enforcing their charitable rules (StaOOing COOmittee F, 
cols.30S-6). John Stanley M.P. (co1.30S) stated "it has become awarent that 
at least some existing tenants of charitable housing associations are not 
in necessitous circll1\Stances". Indeed, the definition of needy has not 
been strict enough (col.30S), the income limitation to the average wage 
being oonsidered insufficiently low. Furthermore (co1.306), this test must 
constantly be reapplied to existing tenants to see whether they cease to 
be deserving of association accomnodation. John Stanley M.P. concluded 
(col.306) , 
"charitable housing associations and trusts will in future need 
to ensure that they operate their letting policies oonsistently 
with their charitable objects and the requirements of the law." 
'!he only exemption from this requirement is for tenants who are 
exercising the right to buy. '!hese are not to be considered ineligible for 
association acconmodation on the grourrls of income (else all tenants so 
applying would be evicted accordingly!). 'Ibis is reminiscent of what 
English (1982a) and Sumners (1981) characterise as the Conservative 
attitude towards nunicipal allocation. Sumners (1981, p.186) describes the 
[24) '!he Housing Corporation published a circular in 1978 entitled In The 
Public Eye. '!his circular suggested a var iety of ways of making 
housing associations IOOre accountable, and was welcomed (on p.2) by 
Reginald Freeson M.P. (Labour Minister for Housing and Construction). 
'!he circular notes, however, that the Labour Government "has already 
indicated that it will expect associations to publish their tenant 
selection p:>licies" (para.10). 
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ideological framework of the Conservatives as follows: 
"public expenditure is in itself a bad thing; as many people as 
possible should be encouraged to own their own homes and should 
be rewarded for owning them ••• ; the private rented sector 
should be prompted to prov ide for those who cannot buy; and 
public housing should only be for those who slip through this 
net." 
This can be contrasted with the Labour attitude as expressed by Anthony 
Crosland M.P. (1971, p.17): 
"council housing ••• was conceived of as essentially a social 
service for the poorer classes; and local authorities were 
restricted by statute to providing houses for 'the working 
classes'. But ••• the post-war Labour Government deliberately 
reJOOved this restr iction. We wanted council estates to be well 
balanced and socially mixed communities". 
'!be Labour Party (1981, p.15) confirms that a change of tenants is 
occuring: 
"'!he median household income of council tenants, for exanple, 
fell from 83 per cent of that of home buyers in 1953 to 58 per 
cent in 1978; the number of council tenant households with 
economically inactive heads rose from 25 per cent in 1968 to 35 
per cent in 1976, and apparently to about 40 per cent in 1977, 
and the proportion of all Supplementary Benefit claimants who 
are in the council sector rose from 49 to 59 per cent between 
1970 and 1979." 
Certainly, the increasing scale of rent arrears by association tenants 
suggests a parallel worsening of their financial position. During 1983 
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total rent arrears in the association sector rose by £6m [25] • 
John Cartwright M.P. (Social Democrat) [26] seems to be a little dated 
therefore, when he suggests competition between housing associations and 
local authorities: 
"what I want to see is a reduction of the virtual monopoly of 
local authorities in the rented sector which certainly exists 
in the major cities ••• Housing associations should provide more 
competition with local authorities in the provision of rented 
housing." 
This is an attitude dating from the mid-1970s [27] , before the 
majority of the Conservative Party came to regard associations in a 
similar light to local authority housing departments. 
To the extent that housing associations are oot part of local 
government, and engage in schemes for private ownership, the Conservative 
Government may still envisage a replacement role, but by and large it 
regards association stock merely as a more ideologically acceptable form 
of public ownership than municipal ownership. '!he Labour Party, on the 
other hand, still seeks to protect a distincti ve role for local 
. authorities, and has said oothing recently which conflicts with its 
earlier statements on association activity being supplementary and 
conplementary to nunicipal provision. 
[25] See Carvel, 1984, Scheme Raises Rent Arrears By £6m, in 'lbe Guardian, 
January 20th, p.2. It is suggested that the operation of the housing 
benefits scheme is partly responsible for the increase in rent 
arrears. Irdeed, Page and Ramsay (1984, p.3-4) suggest that it "is 
difficult to attribute the greater part of this [increase] to 
anything other than the introduction of the ••• scheme". Both articles 
point out that the increase represents only 57% of total arrears, so 
a more general deterioration in the financial poSition of the tenants 
is likely. 
(26] Housing and Building Control Bill 1982, Standing Comnittee F, col.203. 
[27] See, for exanple, the White Paper Better Homes: 'Ihe Next Priorities 
(1973, para.37) which asserts that "the trend towards a nunicipal 
roonopoly of rented accomnodation is unheal thy in itself". 
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The ideological basis of government support for housing associations 
implies distinctive patterns of association activity. For the Labour Party 
these activities include the housing of special needs groups and the poor, 
whilst the Conservative Party is seeking to privatise much of municipal 
and association acconmodation, and designate the remainder as welfare 
housing. '!hese policies are ad hoc responses to the evolution of the 
housing association movement, and the policies of previous governments of 
different political orientations. How well is the structure of the 
association movement geared to these tasks? '!be remainder of this chapter 
will demonstrate that central government cannot rely upon housing 
associations to fulfill these objectives. 
5.4 Housing Association Allocation and Organisation 
Section 5.4.1 will discuss the variation in the organisation and 
function of housing associations. Section 5.4.2 will then examine the 
specific characteristics of associations operating within the study 
boroughs. '!he findings will be briefly contrasted with the a1locational 
~lications of successive government policies. 
5.4.1 Housing Association Constitutions 
In the nineteenth century the only type of housing association was the 
{Xlilanthropic charitable trust. '!he first trust formed was the Peabody 
Trust (1862) and is fairly typical. In his letter establishing the fund, 
Peabody stated that 
"it is my wish that the sole qualification for participation in 
the benefits of the fund, shall be an ascertained and continued 
condition of life such as brings the individual within the 
description (in the ordinary sense of the word) of "the poor" of 
London; combined with moral character, and good conduct as a 
Inel'lber of society." (Quoted by Tarn, 1966, p.lO) 
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This brought the trusts within the operation of Charity Law and to 
retain the benefits this confers these trusts have had to focus upon 
housing the poor to this day. Many employ income limitations upon 
eligibility for housing for this purPose (the extent to which a focus is 
retained upon 'moral character' being more open to change). 
For nearly a century charitable housing associations operated on a 
relatively small scale, largely independent of government influence. '!be 
creation of exchequer furrls for the promotion of cost rent and co-
ownership associations in 1961 prompted the formation of a very different 
type of organisation. '!bese, almost by definition, catered for middle 
income tenants. From 1964 they have been able to have closed membership. 
With the creation of the Housing Corporation in 1964, and a JOOre generally 
available centralised grant in 1972, a new generation of associations 
developed to take oovantage of available furrls. In 1972 the grants were 
not conditional upon any specific activity being UJ"rlertaken (although the 
project needed approval, and the emphasis was clearly on new building). In 
contrast, Circular 170/74 suggested that only specific activities would 
receive Corporation support (such as rehabilitation and catering for 
special needs). Housing co-operatives were first defined in 1975 [28] • 
'!bese varying policies therefore encouraged the evolution of a variety 
of types of housing association: co-operative, open or closed member sh iP1 
catering for middle income earners or the poor; housing special or general 
needs. '!be evolutionary nature of the policies prevented the creation of 
associations with consistently specific functions however. A good 
illustration of the variability of housing association practices is 
provided in the division between new building and rehabilitation, and the 
ways in which associations with quite different constitutions can justify 
UJ"rlertaking rehabilitation. For example, many charitable trusts were eager 
to take up available grants and urrlertake rehabilitation work for the poor 
(often rehabilitating their own property (29) ). Non-charitable 
[28] 'lhe definition contained in schedule 1 para.9 of the 1975 Housing 
Rents and Subsidies Act was vague, and was strengthened by section 
2(3) of the 1980 Housing Act. 
[29] 'Ibis is ~t Samuel Lewis is currently doing in their Islington 
estate. 
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associations could promote owner-occupation at the same time as 
undertaking rehabilitation. Indeed, the geographical location of 
associations influences the balance between new build and rehabilitation, 
with new construction being difficult in inner city areas because of the 
general lack of housing land and high values of available land [30] • The 
Housing Corporation does not publish figures for rehabilitation and new 
building at this level of disaggregation. Its regional breakdown does lend 
some support to this assertion however (Appendix I table 2 of the 1982/83 
Annual Report). Table 5.3 is derived from this. In Great Britain the ratio 
of rehabilitation to new build conpletions for 1982-83 is 1.31. In 
Merseyside the ratio is 4.18 and in London and the Home Counties it is 1.44. 
The ratio is as low as 0.49 in the combined regions of the East Midlands 
and the West. Whilst this does suggest more rehabilitation work in the 
regions with the most built up area, the level of aggregation weakens the 
validity of this statistical support. 
[30] Milton Wilkinson and Thurman (1981) argue that because of the 
structure of subsidies (p.131) "wide var iations in land prices, which 
so profoundly affect the private sector, may apparently have only a 
tenuous connection with housing association developnent". 'll1e 
availability of developnent land in inner cities is regarded as a 
significant constraint however, being described (p.139) as Ita serious 
lack of land for housing association new build schemes". 
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~LE 5.3 Fair rent completions for the year 1982/83, by 
type by reg ion. 
Ratio of 
rehabili tat ion 
Activity New build Rehabilitation to new build 
Region 
London and the Home 
Counties 1,775 2,643 1.49 
West 1,193 762 0.64 
East Midlands 1,988 803 0.40 
West Midlands 1,122 1,131 1.01 
North East 2,001 2,620 1.31 
North West 1,238 2,042 1.65 
Mer seys ide 448 1,871 4.18 
Englw 9,765 11,872 1.22 
Scotland 1,034 1,081 1.05 
Wales 845 2J 302 2.72 
Great Britain 11,644 15,255 1.31 
SOurce: Annual Report of the Housing Corporation 1982/83. 
Der i ved from Append ix l, table 2. 
Another variation in the practice of associations is in the scope for 
special need projects undertaken, and indeed, the definition of special 
need. For some associations special need provision entails housing the 
elderly (a task which until recently local authorities did not 
specifically undertake), whilst for others it entails utilising 'referral 
agencies' such as Mol.N.D., ]).ge Concern and so on. A measure of this 
uncertainty is the increasing tendency of central government to allocate 
specific portions of the pool of available Housing Association Grant to 
special projects. In 1982/83 near ly 10% of the allocation to the Housing 
Corporation was specifically allocated to schemes resulting in ownership 
(see Housing Group's Role, in The Guardian, January 20th, 1982, p.2). 
146 
It is therefore difficult to infer the likely activity of an 
association from its title, or even year of formation. Indeed, the 
Directory of Registered Housing Associations (Housing Corporation, 1982) 
recognises this, for it codes the associations according to their main 
activities. '!be following categories are used: housing for letting; 
hostels; housing for letting and hostels; co-ownership and co-operative; 
almshouses; housing for disposal by way of sale or lease. Clearly these 
categories reveal little about the likely tenants of the associations. 
To some extent it is easier to distinguish tenurial distinctions within 
housing associations (disposal-letting, indicating tenant equity holding) 
than it is the types of people likely to be housed. Even this distinction 
is confused oowever, for the grouping of co-ownership and co-operative 
associations together is surprising given the quite different nature of 
tenant equity oolding in each. Only in the case of housing charities is 
allocation policy to some extent predictable, in the sense that tenants 
must be poor (but it has already been indicated that the Conservative 
Party consider some of their tenants to be insufficiently poor). 
Despite these wide variations in activity, all of these associations 
receive government assistance through the Housing Corporation. As section 
3.4.1 pointed out, such variation sits uneasily with theories of the 
reproduction of labour power. Irrleed, in the absence of predictability, any 
functional theory of state support for the IOOvement becomes untenable. It 
would seem that the only way to ascertain the allocation practices of the 
movement in ge~ral, and specific associations in particular, is to 
urxlertake detailed research. Once again, the Corporation has recognised 
this (in 1979) when it urxlertook such a survey (Bird and Palmer, Housing 
Association Tenants). '!he results of this survey will be discussed in 
chapter 7, but the general point to be made is the difficulty of predicting 
the behaviour of housing associations (the survey making little attempt to 
distinguish types of association, other than generalist-specialist). 'Ibis 
variation in the type and activity of associations means that central 
government objectives are un! ikely to be translated into corresponding 
outcomes. If allocational cr iter ia cannot effectively be set, then tight-
link functionalist theory is inappropriate, and other factors nust shape 
government policy. 
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5.4.2 Housing Associations in Islington and Westminster 
Whilst the previous section has examined variations in the 
organisation of housing associations, some empirical evidence supporting 
these arguments is necessary. Interviews were carried out with officers 
from eleven of the thirteen largest housing associations in the Loooon 
Boroughs of Islington and Westminster (Peabody refusing to participate, 
and the relevant officer of another being absent during the interview 
process). The following associations were interviewed: 
Brent People's Housing Association 
Community Housing Association 
Family Housing Association 
Guinness Housing Trust 
New Islington and Hackney Housing Association 
Paddington Churches Housing Association 
St. Marylebone Housing Association 
Samuel Lewis Housing Trust 
Sutton Housing Trust 
Tennant Housing Trust 
WOrld of People Housing Trust 
Detailed information was collected upon the allocation policies of the 
associations (see table 5.4). The roost mediately striking characteristic 
is the lack of priority given to selecting tenants. If central government 
considered the selection of tenants to be important, and desired that 
par ticular groups should be housed, one would expect support for housing 
associations which have predictable allocation practices based upon 
'rules' which are capable of evaluation by central government. If this is 
not the case, central government is pursuing a policy the outcome of which 
cannot be known in any detail. '!be evidence collected during interviews 
with officers from housing associations suggests that allocation 
decisions do vary considerably and, to an outside body, are largely 
unpredictable. Only three of the associations maintain an active waiting 
list (Guinness, Samuel Lewis and Sutton). Where allocation priorities t.'ere 
ranked, selection was ranked first only once, third by another association 
and fourth by another. Referrals, an indirect method of selecting special 
needs, fared a little better, being ranked secooo twice, third once and 
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fourth three times. If the policies of the associations are a fair 
indication of their practice (and chapter 8 will address this issue), 
housing associations choose very few of their tenants. Nominations are 
ranked first on two occasions, second on one occasion and third four times. 
The highest priority is given to decanting existing tenants in order to 
facilitate rehabilitation however, being ranked first no less than five 
times, and second once. 
~LE 5.4 Allocation priorities of associations in the 
study boroughs. 
Number of times ranked 
1st 200 3rd 4th 
Route to 
accoomodation 
Decant 5 1 0 
Nomination 2 1 4 
Referral 0 2 1 
Selection 1 0 1 
SOurce: Interviews with associations and allocation 
policy documents. 
0 
0 
3 
1 
1 
It seems clear that associations have limited freedom to choose their 
tenants [31] • Clearly, if associations themselves have imperfect control 
over the selection of their tenants, the idea that 'essential' labour power 
will be housed by them becomes untenable (the following chapter assesses 
the influence of local authority nominations). '!here are two fairly 
obvious reasons for this. First, since the White Paper Fair Deal for 
Housing (1971, para.78) local authorities which provide financial 
assistance to a housing association have been encouraged to nominate 
tenants for at least half of the net increase in tenancies resulting from 
the scheme. Secondly, in order to UJ"rlertake rehabilitation work 
------------
[31] Although this table may overstate the significance of decants 
nationally, for the high proportion ~f rehabilitation work uooertaken 
in inner London necessarily results in a large number of decants. 
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associations are purchasing properties with sitting tenants [32] ). Not 
only does the association thus have little control over the choice of 
these 'acquired tenants', but much of their subsequent work is devoted to 
decanting them to facilitate structural improvements. 
For those associations undertaking significant selection, there is 
considerable variation in their lettings policies. Brion and Legg (1977, 
p.32) observe that there are "great differences in 'management ethos' 
between one association and another". Milton Wilkinson and Thurman (1981, 
p.123) suggest that 
"'!be differences in size of housing associations were very 
marked. 'Ihese differences in size, especially in relation to the 
number of dwelling units managed, led to a corresponding 
variation in the number and skills of the staff employed 
directly, or engaged as consultants, by the associations." 
'!bis was also observed during interviews with association officers in 
the study boroughs, and contributes to their different management 
practices. An inspection of their policy docll1\ents reveals the following: 
Guinness maintains a chronological list, but eligibility 
restr ictions relate to income, weal th and housing need. Income 
must be below the national average, and savings below the 
equivalent of the average annual wage. 
St. Marylebone operates a five year residential qualification. 
Samuel Lewis has eligibility restrictions relating to income, 
wealth, an identifiable housing need (overcrowding, sharing, 
social reasons or tenancy problems). Furthermore, the awlicant , 
must have local connections (by virtue of employment, family or 
friends). Income of applicant must be below the national average 
(although family size is taken into consideration), and savings 
above £3,000 must be declared. 
Sutton does not currently operate a waiting list in Westminster, 
[32] According to Bird and Palmer (Housing Association Tenants, 1979, 
figure 3.1) 7% of association tenants are acquired tenants. 
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and is offering only short lets in Islington. Its general 
waiting list contains income and wealth eligibility criteria. 
Income must be below the national average. 
A five year residential qualification is hardly an example of 
"flexibility in access and allocation" [33] , but does serve to illustrate 
the variety of practices manifest in the movement. Furthermore, the extent 
of special needs provision varies considerably. All cater for the elderly 
to some extent, but other categories housed include ex-offenders, young 
imnigrants, the mentally handica~ and so on. New Islington and Hackney 
is a good example of an association enthusiastically catering for special 
needs. As at the end of June 1982 it had nine special need schemes under 
management, and a further nine being developed [34] • AWendix 1 indicates 
that of the 28 associations active in Islington, 18 cater for special need 
groups. Of the 27 associations active in Westminster, 21 cater for groups 
with special needs. Categories included vary from the needs of civil 
servants to the needs of 'rootless persons'. '!he awendix underestimates 
the extent of special need provision, for the register of associations 
prepared by the Housing Corporation in 1982, on which the awendix is 
based, suggests that New Islington and Hackney caters only for general 
needs and the needs of single parent families. '!he officers of the 
association, as already mentioned, indicated much wider provision. Further 
evidence of special need provision is provided by the National Federation 
of Housing Associations (1978, p.8) which states that 
"AWroximately 7% of housing association homes are for the 
{ilysically disabled/handicapped or are in schemes with extra 
'care'." 
In addition, one third of the members of the N.F.HA. cater exclusively 
for the elderly, and three quarters include some provision for the elderly 
(N.F.H.A., 1983, p.4). 
[33] 
[34] 
-------
N.F.H.A., 1977, para.50. 
Groups include ex-offenders, rehOl~ing children in care, ex-
alcoholics, housing the mentally 111 and catering for ethnic 
minorities. Information obtained during interview with officers of 
the association. 
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The associations also vary in their lettings procedure. SOme operate a 
hierarchical system staffed by qualified housing managers. Others operate 
an 'open' system with considerable input into the selection process from 
officers both qualified and unqualified in housing management (although 
the Trusts normally operate on the former lines, so too do many of the 
newer associations). Family Housing Association, for example, operates an 
informal allocation system. Each housing officer examines two or three 
cases and presents their need for rehousing to a meeting of all housing 
officers and the housing manager. An open 'competition' takes place, with 
the relative merits of each afPlicant, and their prospects for alternative 
rehousing being considered. The association does not consider its role to 
be to supplement the work of the local authority. Any applicant considered 
eligible for prompt rehousing by the local authority is referred to the 
borough. Only if the borough refuses to act is the ar:plicant considered 
for housing [35] • 
These variations mean that, as regards the selected tenants of housing 
associations, both the Housing Corporation and the local authorities 
usually have little indication of the likely outcome other than that 
provided in their fairly general policy documents (publication of which 
only became mandatory in 1980). Interviews carried out with the 
associations confirms a variety of policies and organisational structures 
(primary and secondary statistical analysis of tenant composition is 
contained in chapters 7 and 8). 
It has been suggested that the composition of the boards of management 
of an association may be reflected in its allocation policies [36] • In 
order to ascertain the var iation which this might lead to, the Housing 
Corporation registration files of the largest associations in the study 
boroughs were examined. This revealed var iety also in the composition of 
the boards of management of the associations. Many contain local 
[35] Source: attendance at allocation meeting of the association, 1983. 
[36] See Eustace Willis M.P. (Labour), 1963, quoted in section 7.1, chapter 
7, where this is considered further. 
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professionals (architects, estate agents and so on [37] ) and local 
'notables' (councillors, MP's, clergy and so on). Some associations have 
boards of management which differ markedly and comprise, for example, 
housewives, unemployed men and various non-professionals (a notable 
example being Holloway Tenant Co-operative [38] ). 
5.5 Conclusions 
The Housing Corporation has little control over the detailed 
management practices of individual associations. Most of its powers relate 
to the financial performance of associations. Significantly, the 1980 
Housing Act tmposed a duty upon associations to publish their allocation 
policies; a centrally tmposed duty which clearly reflects the view that 
the supervision of the Housing Corporation was, in this respect, 
inadequate. The current Conservative Government is increasingly ~sing 
obligations on individual associations directly, which confirms this view. 
The analysis of housing association organisation and policies confirms 
that there are many dimensions along which variation can occur, and it is 
difficult to imagine a classification of associations which would 
incorporate the diversity manifest in Islington and westminster and still 
have any meaning [39] • 
Central government advice on the allocation priorities of housing 
associations seems optimistic at best. Clearly there are ways in which 
central policies can influence association activities. The £25m fum 
created for use by cost-rent housing associations in 1961 was rapidly 
-----,---
[37] 
[38] 
[39] 
According to Arden (1983, para.74, p.xvi), in Greater Loooon, "62% of 
the ment>ers of management corrmittees are in professional 
occupations" • 
Arden (1983, para.74, p.xvi) confirms the tendency for co-operatives 
to have less professionals on their boards of management. 
categories are provided in voiuntary Housing, 1971 (Reference Sheet 
No.4). These are: (i) general family, (ii) old people's, (iii) 
industrial workers, (iv) self-build, (v) cost rent, (vi) co-operative 
and co-ownership, (vii) special purpose. This list suffers from three 
problems. First, its length indicates the diversity within the 
lOOVement, and lessens its usefulness. Secondly, grouping co-operative 
and co-ownership indicates a misconception of their roles. Thirdly, 
there can be considerable variation within these categories. . 
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exhausted. Table 3.2 (chapter 3) indicated the rapid increase in 
association rehabilitation following the 1974 Housing Act. '!be type of 
activity undertaken by associations can be influenced, and if it is 
possible to predict the likely allocational tmplications of these policy 
changes then central government can indeed influence the allocational 
practices of housing associations. It has already been suggested that the 
1974 Labour Government encouraged rehabilitation in an attempt to break 
the Irould of the middle income housing association tenant, and instead 
encourage associations to acquire poorer sitting tenants. 
'!be notion of central government striving to implement its own policies 
through the Housing Corporation is contradicted somewhat by central 
government support for local authority nominations. '!be developnent of a 
distinctive role for housing associations is jeopardised if most of their 
tenants are selected by local author i ties ( in Canrlen, for example, 
nominations range from 75% to 100%, whereas in Islington and Westminster 
nominations comprise 50%). 
Ministerial advice on the role of housing associations has 
consistently located them in terms of ownership and control as being 
either primarily state run or primarily privately run bodies. '!be reality 
is more complex. Housing associations are now firmly established in the 
middle ground between public and private enterprise; they still rely upon 
voluntary effort (with unelected and unpaid boards of management) yet 
receive central government grant and accept local authority nominations. 
In addition to their tenurial status remaining ambiguous, their allocation 
policies include elements favouring private ownership, such as co-
ownership and build for sale, where the economic basis of the projects 
goes a long way in determining the tenant coltp)si tion, and char i table 
provision where the tenants rust be poor. 
Whilst cost renting may have encouraged a fairly distinct role for 
housing associations, today the Irovement displays such a curious mixture 
of public and private initiative that any clear predetermined 
allocational role is hard to imagine. Both major political parties oow 
seem to regard associations as quasi-public sector bodies, and are willing 
to permit local authorities to significantly influence their activity 
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(through the associations need for local information, nominations and, to 
a lesser extent than hitherto, finance). 
Indeed, if the Housing Corporation was originally created as an 
institution to separate housing association activity from the realm of 
local government (as section 3.4, chapter 3 suggests), the movement has 
come full circle, for although local authorities provide much less finance 
than before its creation, they oow nominate more tenants than they have 
ever done before. It is unlikely that central government would have 
permitted this outcome if it desired to functionally dictate the precise 
nature of association activity. 
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6. THE IMPACT OF rDCAL AUI'HORITIES CN roLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
6.1 Intrcx:1uction 
Local authorities which enter into financial arrangements with housing 
associations for the provision of accomncx:1ation can reserve 'nomination' 
rights over the subsequent lettings. WKenzie-Hall (1971, p.llO) defines 
nominations thus: 
"'!be term 'nominations' is used where, as a condition of the loan 
agreement, vacancies must be offered to the local 
authority." [1] 
Since the p,lblication of the White Paper Fair Deal For Housing (1971, 
para.78) local authorities have been encouraged by central government to 
reserve nomination rights over at least 50% of the association's net 
increase in lettings. Local authorities are therefore in a position to 
significantly influence the nature of housing association activity, 
despite the recent decrease in the scale of their financial comnitment to 
the JOOvement (see table 3.4, chapter 3). This raises two questions central 
to a discussion of functionalist theory. First, if central government is 
pursuing functional objectives, why should it allow local authorities this 
means of influencing association activity? Secondly, are local authorities 
themselves likely to adopt the ideological attitudes of the main political 
parties; in other words, how will the relationships between local 
authorities and housing associations develop? 
'!bis chapter addresses the former question through a discussion of the 
latter. '!be variety of central government proclamations on the role of 
housing associations is reconsidered, and their inplications for local 
[1] N.F.H.A. (1977, para.10) suggests that local authorities now claim 
nomination rights even where they do not lend money. 
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authority activity outlined. The possible range of local authority 
responses is theoretically analysed. The expenditure programmes and stock 
characteristics of the thirty three London Boroughs are considered and a 
detailed analysis of the policies of the London Boroughs of Islington and 
westminster is undertaken. The chapter concludes by considering whether 
the extent of local discretion, and the ways in which it is used, is 
compatible with economically functionalist theory. 
6.2 The Range of Local Authority Attitudes Towards Housing Associations 
The desired relationship between local authorities and housing 
associations is a Party political issue. This was revealed IOOSt clearly in 
1974, in the debates surrounding the Conservative Housing and Planning 
Bill and the Labour Housing Bill. Clause 41 (4) of the Conservative Bill 
would have permitted the Secretary of State to direct a local authority to 
sell land that it owned within a housing action area to a specified 
housing association. This implied a preference for association activity 
over that of local authorities, and was strongly oWOsed by the Labour 
Party. The Labour Bill anitted the clause in order to reassert the primacy 
of local authorities in the provision of rented housing. Sir Peter Emery 
M.P. (Conservative) proposed an amendment to the Labour Bill restoring the 
Conservative clause. The exchange which this provoked between Sir Peter 
Emery M.P. and Gerald Kaufman M.P. (Staooing Comnittee B, 1974 Housing Bill, 
cols.208-211) clearly exposed the different ideological bases of their 
SUWOrt for the association IOOvement. Clause 41 (4) and Emery's amendment 
implied a dominant role for housing associations in the provision of 
rented accomnodation. Kaufman's response (co1.210) is unequivocal: 
"it is, above all, through local authority action that the worst 
housing areas can be saved from further FOysical decline and 
social misery, and then be permanently improved. It is the local 
authorities alone which have the capacity and the 
responsibility to tackle the major housing needs, and they will 
increasingly become the principal suppliers of rented 
accomnodation. " 
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The ideological difference is clearly whether local authorities or 
housing associations should have main responsibility for providing rented 
housing in the light of the decline the privately rented sector. '!be 
Conservative position is that associations should to some extent replace 
local authorities in the provision of rented accomnodation. '!be Labour 
position is quite different. As Kaufman (co1.211) put it 
"It is inawropriate ••• that a local authority, as an elected 
body with powers of compulsory purchase which successive 
Governments have thought it right authorities should have, 
should at the manent they exercise those powers be put urXler a 
statutory obligation to state to a voluntary body their 
proposals to dispose of property they are 50 acquir ing. " 
Since the Labour Government did oot envisage a replacement role for 
housing associations, it had to define a legitimate sphere of housing 
association activity suoordinate to local authority provision. Circular 
170/74 (issued urXler the Labour Government) did this. Paragraph 34 
suggests that associations should, inter alia, meet the needs of groups 
with special housing problems and needs and relieve housing stress in 
housing action areas. The former activity is, almost by definition, outside 
of the scope of local authority activity. Since it represents activities 
slightly different from those of a local author i ty (focussing upon 
different types of people in housing need), it can be described as 
complementary activity. The latter activity may be very similar to that of 
local authorities, but the relationship between local authorities and 
housing associations envisaged by the Labour Party suggests that such 
activity would be supplementary to local authority activity (i.e. oot 
dominant) • 
The range of relationships proposed by 
therefore suggests that local authorities 
associations as either: 
(i) replacing municipal provision 
(ii) supplementing municipal provision 
(iii) complementing municipal provision 
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successive governments 
should regard housing 
Local authorities are capable of formulating their own policies 
towards the role of housing associations. Chapter 2 discussed the nature 
of local pol i tical pressures and the influence this can have on local 
policy formulation. It was argued that these local pressures may lead 
local authorities to implement policies at variance with the wishes of 
central government. The study of housing associations provides an 
excellent example of these themes. For example, one possibility not 
mentioned by any recent government is that associations should be regarded 
as having no specific role. Since central government cannot precisely 
determine how Housing Strategy and Investment Prograrrmes are drawn up, and 
local authorities have their own political pressures and priorities, it is 
possible for a local authority to pursue a strategy which ignores 
associations. lmy given local authority is therefore free in principle to 
decide which of the four principal strategies it wishes to pursue. '!be 
relevant issue is the extent to which local policy will reflect the pro-
and anti-rrunicipal stances of central government, for if this occurs, 
delegation of responsibility through nominations becomes more 
uooerstandable. Central government may be able to rely upon local 
authorities to implement its objectives. 
If local authorities behave in a purposive-rational manner, and 
consciously pursue one of the four relationships outlined above, it is 
possible to develop a set of ideal-type relationships, and the types of 
association activities implied by them. The way in which a local authority 
perceives the function of housing associations would be reflected in its 
policies towards them, and towards its own housing provision. If a local 
authority considers that associations have no role then the authority 
itself nust house groups that are not catered for by the private sector. 
The local authority is therefore assuming full responsibility for 'public' 
housing. This can therefore be described as a pro-m . .micipal stance (with 
municipal activity pre-eminent). There could still be considerable 
differences in the extent to which local authorities perceive the private 
sector as failing to rreet the needs of the people of its area. 
If a local authority perceives associations as largely replacing its 
own provision this is clearly an anti-municipal stance (with association 
provision pre-eminent). Again some scope for variation exists1 the local 
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authority may offer financial support to associations and use its 
nomination rights to ensure that the groups suffer ing the roost acute 
housing problems, or capable of mounting the strongest political protest, 
are housed. On the other hand, the local author i ty may consider housing 
these groups to be its only legitimate function, and display a lack of 
interest in the allocation practices of associations (it may utilise 
nomination rights to clear its waiting list, or simply inform applicants 
that they should approach a housing association). 
Harloe, Issacharoff and Minns (1974, p.78) firmly place the Conservative 
Greater wndon Council (1967-1970) within this latter category: 
"the GLC's attitude towards the role of housing associations did 
not fit in with a broader planning policy of catering for 
different types of households. '!he GLC's interest in housing 
associations arose from its concern to increase the part played 
by private enterprise and other non-council institutions in the 
housing market. It was related to the other aspects of GLC 
housing pol icy such as the increase of mortgage fuoos for owner 
occupation and the reduction of the council house building 
programne. '!he GLC was not concerned with analysing what types 
of households would increasingly lose out as a result of such an 
emphasis in housing policy." 
This view is shared by Young and Kramer (1978, p.8l) who argue that 
Cutler, when Conservative chairman of the housing comnittee, p.lrsued 
policies intended "to repudiate the GLC's own building role in favour of 
the private sector and housing associations" [2] • 
'!he last chapter indicated that a local authority is in 00 position to 
rely upon a housing association to fulfill certain allocational 
objectives in the absence of nominations being taken up (even the policy 
documents p.lbl ished following the 1980 Housing Act are general and vague, 
and provide little guidance). Failure to consider the allocational 
[2] Swann (1975, p.ll6) states that the Royal Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea, and Brighton Borough also adopted this strategy. looeed, 
table 6.3 (below) reveals that in 1981-82, Kensington and Chelsea 
devoted nearly 70% of its H.S.I.P. money to support for associations. 
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practices of associations suggests that a local authority is more 
concerned with tenurial distinctions than who gets housed. If a local 
authority does not analyse association allocation practices, to the extent 
that the association selects its own tenants, the local authority cannot 
know the allocational outcome of its policy of support. '!he local 
authority cannot know whether groups in need are being housed by the 
association. '!his suggests that support for housing associations as a 
tenure overrides the requirement for full information on the 
implementation of policy. 
Perhaps the most complicated situation is that of a local authority 
which regards associations as complementary to its provision. If 
complementary means association activities somewhat different from local 
authority activity, but which have a private sector orientation, then one 
might expect an authority to assist associations which facilitate some 
form of ownership (such as co-ownership, build for sale or ster:ped 
purchase), or the private management of public stock (such as local 
authority estate co-operatives, relieving the local authority of some of 
its management responsibilities). In these cases the allocation policies 
of the associations are to some extent determined by the nature of the 
schemes. 
There can also be a public sector orientation to conplementary 
activity. This may involve a local authority promoting new co-operatives, 
or associations cater ing for categor ies of people in special need whom 
associations are better placed to house in the short run (because of the 
characteristics of their stock or their informal links with welfare 
organisations). Whilst there is still a concern with tenure distinctions 
here, the local authority is likely to take an interest in the types of 
people being mused by the associations, to ensure that assistance is 
being given to people who satisfy some criteria of social need. 
Associations may also be seen as supplementing local authority 
provision. '!his can be achieved by nominating council awlicants, which 
reduces pressure on the waiting list, or by relying upon associations to 
house people in need. This cannot be an anti-nunicipal strategy, for to be 
so the local authority would have to simultaneously reduce its own housing 
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activity, and this would then fall into the category of replacing 
municipal provision. To be genuinely supplementary the local authority 
would have to endeavour to be as active as possible itself whilst 
supporting, and encouraging the Housing Corporation to support, local 
housing associations. 
Finally, housing associations may be seen as having no role. Although 
both Conservative and Labour local councils may adopt this strategy, the 
arguments propounded by Swann (1975) suggest that a Labour authority is 
more likely to be hostile to associations, seeing them as a threat to 
municipal activity. As Swann (1975, p.120) puts it, in order 
"to head off the current challenge by housing associations, 
local authorities will have to respond to some of the demands 
which it is being claimed ••• that the associations could better 
meet: in particular, the demand for more flexible allocation, and 
the demand for tenant control." 
Whilst this may be true of a local authority which wishes to attempt to 
show that its form of provision is superior to association provision 
(which is the ideological task set by Swann), it is not the only case in 
which the local authority may fail to support housing associations. Any 
local authority is quite free to refuse to provide assistance to the 
housing association movement. 
Clearly these categories are ideal-types, and the relationship between 
a local authority and an association may vary over time. Indeed, such 
categories may present a purposive rational model of local government 
which exaggerates the amount of analysis undertaken by local government 
professionals and politicians. In this case elements from rore than one 
strategy may be present. '!be remainder of this chapter considers the 
relationship between local authorities and housing associations in London, 
in order to assess the extent to which local authorities perceive 
associations as an anti-municipal or pro-municipal tool. SUch policy 
rationalisation may not be present at all. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine the variation in municipal policies. As in the earlier discussion 
of housing associations, local var iation, however caused, sits uneasily 
with policies which are intended to be functionalist for central 
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government. 
6.3 Local Authority Expenditure Within the Greater London Area 
Over half of all households renting property from a housing association 
live in London (3] • Within the Greater London area 4% of all households 
rent property from a housing association (4] , whereas nationally only 2% 
rent from an association (5] (see table 6.1). 
~LE 6.1 Percentage of households in each tenure 
(England and Wales). 
Tenure Percent 
Owner Occupied 58.1 
LA/Nl' 28.8 
Housing Association 2.0 
Rented Unfurnished 6.1 
Rented Furnished 2.9 
SOurce: 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 2. 
Because (Nee half of all association households live in London, a focus 
upon housing associations and their relationships with local authorities 
in London is statistically representative of the situation in the whole 
country. In another sense London is not typical. It has particularly severe 
problems with land supply and cost, and this encourages associations to 
undertake rehabilitation ~rk. 'I'able 5.3 (chapter 5) illustrated the 
geographical variation in the ratio of rehabilitation to new wilding 
----------------
(3J GLC, 1981, para.5.4. 
(4] 1981 Census, Greater London County Report Part 1, table 39. 
(5] 1981 Census, Housing and Households, table 2. 
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undertaken by associations, with rehabilitation more prevalent in regions 
with more large towns. 
This is not a major theoretical problem however. The purpose of a case 
study is to illustrate possible contexts for policy formulation and their 
outcomes, not to prove that particular situations will be replicated 
nationally. As Dunleavy (1981, p.199) puts it: 
"the basis for generalization from a real case study is not the 
typicality of the case in any sense, but the logicality of the 
analysis of the case. '!be case demonstrates the operation of 
general principles in a defined context (the real context). 
Problems of choosing a typical case in this awroach disappear, 
and the uniqueness and particularity of each case study is 
explicitly recognised." 
It is sufficient from the theoretical standpoint of this thesis to 
identify examples of the categories listed in the previous section, and to 
demonstrate the extent of local variation. If support of housing 
associations is intended to serve certain functional requirements (e.g. 
the reproduction of specific types of labour power), then one would rot 
expect to see central government encouragement of local authority 
influence if the result of this influence is indeterminant, and likely to 
hinder the achievement of the functional objective. If, on the other hand, 
central government policy is merely intended to promote the concept of 
non-state solutions to housing problems, then the existence of hoUSing 
associations is sufficient, and policy ~lementation becomes less 
significant. 
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~LE 6.2 Percentage households by tenure 
by borough (GLC area) • 
Percentlge 
Housing Local CMner 
Association Authori~ Occu~ied 
Area 
Gr. U>ndon 4.1 30.7 48.6 
Inner 6.7 42.8 27.3 
Outer 2.4 23.2 61.9 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 12.3 14.0 31. 7 
-- -- ----- -- -- -
Hamnersmith 9.9 28.0 30.1 
--. 
Westminster 9.6 29.2 20.7 1--::-- - -----._- . . 
-- - - - --- - - - - - ---Islington 8.3 55.6 17 .0 
._------ -. 
Hackney 7.3 57.5 16.6 
Lambeth 6.7 43.2 26 . 6 
---- - -
-.- - . ---_ .. ---.. -- -- .-
Southwark 6.6 65.0 15.8 
Canrlen 6~2-- 38.9 23.8 
- - ---- -- ._-- -- - - - - - -- -----
Haringey 5.4 28.5 43.6 
Lewisham ' -- .- -:-- -------- ------ .". --5.0 43.6 37.1 
Wandsworth 4.9 35.3 35.5 
- . --Tower Hamlets 4.8 82.0 4.6 
-- -.... - - - -~----- - .. Greenwich 4.3 47.1 38.6 
.... -
- .. ---.- - - - _ . .. -----
Brent 3.9 22.1 53.9 
Privately 
Rented 
15.1 
21.5 
11.2 
38.9 
30.6 
36.1 
--
17.4 
17.8 
22.0 
-- - ---- -.-11.4 
29.1 
21.5 
.-- .- -- ... - --"-
13.3 
22.7 
7.2 
- ------ -----
8.3 
._.-------
19.1 
--
--.--.-
---- - --- - -
--- _._-_ . 
Baling 3.6 20.9 57.3 16.9 
Newham 3.4 39.0 41.6 15.1 
---' Houns1ow 3.4 30.0 53.2 12.1 
---
-_.- .-._--
- ---.------ .--Sutton 3.0 20.1 68.1 7.8 
. _.- .. _. -
---. - . 
_. 
-- -- - -Waltham Forest 2.9 25.0 54.9 16.3 
--- -- t---
·---'- 69: 9 Bromley 2.9 17 .2 8.8 
Cr~don 2.8 18.8 64.7 12.4 
.-
-----.---1------_._- -- -------_. Richmond 2.7 14.7 62.4 18.6 
---
-- -... _--_ .. _-
----. -- --. - ... ----.--
- -
. . -. - - .-
Hi11incE°n .-- --. _ 2.5 26.8 61.4 7.0 
.. 
- ---.. ---- 1- -----Barnet 2.3 19.1 62.2 14.4 1-- --_. -- ---- .-" -- -.- . -._- --.--- - - -- .--- --- --
--- ----Merton 2.2 21.8 61. 7 13.0 
K1ngston 
upon Thames 1.8 14.3 68.9 13.3 
_._---
--- -- ------ -
.--. 
-' 73."0' - _._. -._- -=-Bexley 1.7 19.1 5.5 
- -- .. .. -
- - -- 13:0' --~ -' -.--~ Harrow 1.4 74.7 9.7 
~ - -~. 
- --- - . .._- --Redbr~ _ ___ 1.2 15.2 73.0 9.7 
. - --- -- . -~ --- ---_. --.. .-. ---.-- --- --------:-;:--Havering 1.2 21.0 72.4 4.5 
Enfield 1.2 22.5 66.2 9 • ..9_ 
- -_ .. - ~-
- " City 0.4 69.2 4.9 11.0 
. ~ .,-- r----.--
------Barking and 
Dagenham 0.2 65.3 31.4 2.6 
Source: 1981 Census, Greater London County 
Report Part 1. Derived from table 39. 
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Total 
Households 
2,505,274 
964,217 
1,541,057 
56,068 
61,028 
__ _ 73.L !R.. 
641 299 
68,445 
_____ 95,593 
82.1.892 
70,048 
-
._._ ._ .. 77 , 0J33 
88,300 
981 176 
52 976 
-- ------ ,-.~
_._ 77!~ 
89,262 
._--- --:-
1001 243 
74,176 
7_~1-~?~_ r- -- -
63_.L~5 
- -' 80,643 
109,·074 
._ 114,564 
63 983 
--- ----~-:~
81,590 
- .------:..---:-=-
_ __ J.06,0~5 
63,963 
51,358 
- 77,461 
70,398 
____ . __ 82, ?41_ 
84,422 
~~ ~~lj . 
2,001 
------- -
55,758 
Table 6.2 shows the percentage of households in each of the main 
tenures in all London Boroughs. It is noticeable that the proportion of 
households renting from a housing association is nearly three times higher 
in inner London than in outer London [6) • To some extent this reflects the 
recent emphasis on rehabilitation and the greater need and scope for this 
in inner London. '!be second notable feature of the table is the variation 
in the proportion of housing association tenants in each borough. Barking 
and Dagenham has only 0.15% of its households renting from an association. 
In Kensington and Chelsea one in every eight rent from an association. 
The extent to which such variation is a result of local authority 
policies can be assessed by examining the borough's H.S.I.P~ bids. Table 6.3 
shows the 1981-82 bids for the London Boroughs. '!be inner London Boroughs 
spent a total of £44,023,000 on associations in 1981-82, an average of 
£3.4m. '!be outer London Boroughs spent £19,517,000 in total, an average of 
only £l.Om each. Put another way, in that year each of the inner London 
Boroughs spent roughly three and a half times the lOOney that the outer 
London Boroughs did [7) • 
[6) Inner London comprises the City, Canrlen, Hackney, Hanmersmith and 
Fulham, Haringey, Islington, Kensington and Olelsea, Lambeth, 
Lewisham, Newham, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth and 
Westminster. 
[7) The difference in expenditure between inner London and outer London 
Boroughs is greater for expenditure on associations (inner spending 
2.3 times outer) than for total expenditure (1.9 times). 
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TABLE 6.3 HSIP payments 1981-82 (GLC area) • 
Expenditure Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total 
[1] [2] [3] 
Area 
Greater London 481,347 43,163 74,793 599,303 
Imer London 257,886 18,455 44,023 320,364 
Outer London 126,466 18,855 19,517 164,838 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 7,198 1,082 16,851 25,131 
Hamnersmith 14,011 2,173 4,117 20,301 
westminster 11,867 3,260 4,970 20,097 
---Islington 
-" " 
36,714 1,050 1,097 38,861 
Hackney 18,617 1,392 5,670 25,679 
Lanbeth 34,202 1,261 162 35,625 
" . -- - ~ " 
-SOuthwark 28,906 908 433 30,247 
- -Canrlen 25,621 763 2,815 29,199 
Haring~L . __ 
. ~_L.~50 2,137 2,876 25,563 
- .---- -:-
:--21,752' Lewisham 19,589 756 1,407 
Wandsworth 16,627 2,044 ) .f 263 21,934 
-------- --~ - - - '" Tower Hamlets 8,634 324 140 9,098 
.. ' ... . _--
--Greenwich 16,958 682 19 17,659 
Brent 20,095 1,251 3,706 25,052 
Ea1ing 11,329 1,453 3,370 16,152 
Newham 14,529 1,305 222 16,056 
- --- -----::.-
'-'--'506 ------8;563-Houns1ow 7,252 745 
Sutton 3,273 573 102 3,948 r---:- ._- -. -.-- - -- _. -.--~--'-'- - ---- --- --- ". .. - - -:-
Waltham Forest 7,888 881 . __ . .!, 53~_ 10,307 1-- '-- .. - _ •• - - -
-.. . --.- ----.-
---"------ ----------Bromley 5,118 1,299 1,427 7,844 
Croydon 6,737 1,012 972 8,721 
-
- - i; i64 . - -_ .. . . . -.---- ----Richroond 925 _1,56~ 4,655 
-" '-- ._ --- r-.------Hil1ingdon 10,015 961 599 11,575 
--. _ ... --
- 6,724- -- 508 --- -- ' 454- f--._-- - -.-Barnet 7,686 
r:- :' ---- _.- 5 ~-090 .- 1,32i . - -.. 6,466 Merton 54 
Kingston 
upon Thames 1,913 1,060 5 2,978 
Bexley 
._-
r-- 1,841 f- 68S ~-4,~??~ 6,804 
1-:-:- .----. ' . -.- .- - - . . _- _.- . _-_._------. - _.-_. ' .. . Harrow 3,131 614 9 3,754 
Re<!~~i~!: 2,Q~_(=- f-~ ~, ~I? _' ---- -- -- ~-_ 6 '-O.?~ .. 610 
-. ".- ... -. -~ 
Havering 3,707 244 38 3,989 
Enfield 8,037 974 225 __ J.., ~  
--- _._._- _.-
-----
--_. --_ .. 
City 821 0 0 821 
Barking and 
----
... - "-_ .. _----- --_ ... .. --_ .. _-_.-
---
-42- ----3-;480 Dagenham 3,154 284 
SOurce: GLC (1983). Derived from table on p.41. 
Note: (1) Block 1 covers the ITUnicipal programne; 
(2) Block 2 covers assistance to the private sector; 
[3] Block 3 covers grants to housing associations. 
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Percent 
Block 3/ 
Total 
12.5 
13.7 
11.8 
67.1 
20.3 
24.7 
~---.--'--- .-
2.8 
22.1 
0.5 
._--
1.4 
"----9.6 
11.3 
-- . " " -
6.5 
14.9 
-.• - --
1.5 
0.1 
14.8 
_.-
20.9 
1.4 
- ' .. -- . 6.0 
f .6 
- . --.--- ... --
14.9 
- ... -- -._--
18.2 
11.1 
.-_ .. _--_._ .. -
33.6 
- - -. --_ .. _--
5.2 
- 5:9 
0.8 
0.2 
.- --62 .8 
0.2 
-. - ' -'- -c:-10.1 
1.0 
2.4 
. -
0- ... __ • 
-'-0.0 
1.2 
. 
Since expenditure levels partly reflect policy priorities, the 
variation around the mean expenditure on associations is significant. In 
1981-82 12.5% of H.S.I.P. money was spent on associations on average. In the 
City of London nothing was spent on associations, whilst in Kensington and 
Chelsea 67% was spent on associations. Clearly there is considerable 
variation in the extent to which local authorities are willing to allocate 
their H.S.I.P. money to associations. 
Whilst stock and expenditure patterns provide a good reflection of 
policies, there may be particular problems over which the local authority 
has little control (for example, exceptionally high housing need). In 
order to accurately assess the objectives of a local authority its actual 
performance should be compared with its policy documents. '!he following 
section analyses the policies of the case study boroughs. 
6.4 The Policies of Islington and Westminster Towards Housing Associations 
6.4.1 Introduction 
It is difficult to establish which relationship between a local 
authority and an association is being sought sinply by examining the 'type' 
of association being assisted by a local authority; chapter 5 demonstrated 
that it is difficult to predict the allocational behaviour of a housing 
association. Ideally, the local authority should examine the past activity 
of the association in order to assess the special skills and experience 
that it can usefully apply to meeting the housing needs of its area. Prima 
facie, the lack of such inquiry suggests that support is seeking to 
replace municipal activity. The more a local authority allocates its own 
expenditure to housing associat\ ons, and the less interest it takes in the 
people being housed as a consequence, the roore it is possible to infer that 
the local authority is pursuing a strategy of replacing its own provision 
with association provision; its concern being primarily with tenure rather 
than housing allocation. Although a local authority may assume that 
associations are meeting needs which the authority cannot accomnodate 
itself, without an analysis of the allocational performance of 
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associations, a local author i ty cannot consciously promote associations as 
having a supplementary or complementary role. If the local authority does 
examine the past practices of an association before offering support it 
must be assumed that the authority approves of the association's 
practices. Thus a study of the association may indicate the objectives of 
local authority support. 
Nominations are another key to local authority intent. Interviews with 
housing associations have revealed that the London Borough of cam:len 
sometimes claims 100% nomination rights. That the borough can determine 
the tenant conposition of the entire scheme is oot conclusive evidence of 
intent either; the attitude of the local authority towards the role of its 
own provision will be reflected in the types of households that it chooses 
not to house itself through this process. Failing to take up oomination 
rights is prima facie evidence of an intention to replace nunicipal 
provision; a concern with who does the housing rather than who gets housed. 
If oominations are taken up the types of households benefitting from this 
process must be ascertained if objectives are to be established. Ideally 
this would be done through a direct survey of nominated households to 
avoid the problem that policy statements do oot always accord with 
outcomes in practice. Since there was insufficient time or financial 
resources to do this, it is necessary to rely on policy documents instead. 
'!be local authority's other housing policies will provide a context 
which will better explain the nature of suwort for associations. Again, 
more B.S.I.P. money spent on associations rather than the nunicipal 
programme is evidence of an intention to replace municipal activity [8] • 
B.S.I.P. money that is oot granted to housing associations (expenditure 
head 7) will be divided between local authority provision (heads 1-3), 
municipalisation (head 4) and assistance to the private sector (heads 5 
and 6). '!be way in which an authority allocates expenditure between heads 
1 to 6 will reveal much about its priorities between public and private 
[8] The boroughs were selected in order to mmlJuse population 
differences, in order that expenditure levels can be attr ibuted to 
explicit policies of the local authorities and the associations, 
rather than P'lysical or social 'constraints' upon them (see chapter 
4). 
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sectors, and it would be anticipated that this attitude will be reflected 
in its support for housing associations. 
6.4.2 Housing Need and ExpeOOiture 
Some of the information relating to local housing need can be gleaned 
from the borough's H.S.I.P. forms. Table 6.4 indicates the extent of housing 
need in each of the case study boroughs. Whilst this is useful in providing 
a control for comparing expenditure proposals, it nust be borne in mind 
that since the boroughs compile these figures they are not objective or 
independent measures (i.e. they may themselves reflect policy 
predilictions) • 
TABLE 6.4 Housing need in Islington and 
Westminster (1983). 
Islington 
Total Dwell ings 71,675 
Unfi t Dwell ings 11,905 
Lacking Amenities 2,409 
Needing Renovation 10,972 
Total Need ing Action 25,286 
Percentage of Stock 35.3 
Overcrowded Households 2,923 
Specialised Households 749 
Concealed Households 871 
Sharing Households 4,188 
Homeless Households 932 
Total in Need 9,663 
Source: HSIPs from Boroughs (1984-85). 
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Westminster 
100,738 
3,621 
9,509 
10,714 
23,844 
26.7 
0 
347 
0 
0 
758 
1,105 
The stock figures indicate that Islington has a similar need for 
clearance and improvement, whilst Westminster has a greater need for 
improvement than clearance. 17% of the stock in Islington is unfit, and 18% 
is in need of improvement. Only 3% of the stock in Westminster is unfit, 
whilst 20% is in need of improvement. Current government guidance favours 
association rehabilitation [9] , so it is possible that one should expect 
more Corporation sponsored activity in Westminster [10] Local 
authorities themselves are not obliged to follow this advice, although 
failure to do so may mean that associations assisted may be less likely to 
receive Corporation subsidy. Westminster has a similar number of dwellings 
in need of action as Islington, but less households classified as being in 
need. Overall one would expect similar expenditure levels in the two 
boroughs. 
Table 6.5 shows the details of the H.S.I.P. expenditure for the two 
boroughs for 1983-84. '!be table is subdivided according to the archaic 
system of blocks, since these still accurately describe the division 
between expenditure on the municipal programne, the private sector, and on 
housing associations. 
------------------
[9] See Circular 170/74, which still awlies, and Corporation circular 
24/81, par a.12. 
[10] see table 6.6. This is not, in fact, the case. 
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
~LE 6.5 H.S.I.P. payments for Islington 
and Westminster (1982-83). 
Area Islington 
'lUl'AL (£OOOs) 
Block 1 (public) 56,381 
Block 2 (private) 1,776 
Block 3 (associations) 498 
'lOl'AL 58,655 
Municipa1isation 1,540 
COLUMN % 
Block 1 (public) 96.1 
-
Block 2 (private) 3.0 
Block 3 (associations) 0.9 
'lUrAL 100.0 
Municipalisation 2.6 
RJW % 
Block 1 (pubIc) 83.9 
Block 2 (private) 25.9 
Block 3 (associations) 8.0 
'1OrAL 73.1 
Municipalisation 95.5 
Source: HSIPs from Boroughs (1984-85). 
westminster Total 
10,790 67,171 
5,093 6,869 
5,713 6,211 
21,596 80,251 
73 1,613 
50.0 83.7 
23.6 8.6 
26.5 7.7 
100.0 100.0 
0.3 2.0 
16.1 100.0 
74.1 100.0 
92.0 100.0 
26.9 100.0 
4.5 100.0 
'!he table indicates a considerable difference in total expenditure, 
Islington spending 2.7 times the sum that Westminster spent. Parts (b) and 
(c) clearly indicate that Islington directs roore rooney towards municipal 
provision than Westminster does, both proportionately (96% compared to 
50%) and in absolute terms (£56m compared to £llm). Whilst Islington spent 
5.2 times as ruch on block one in total, this ratio is exceeded in the case 
of nunicipalisation, where it spent 21.1 times as RUch. At national level 
Labour Party support for associations dates from their decision that 
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compulsory acquisition of property was becoming prohibitively expensive, 
and that associations could be used as an alternative means of securing 
the 'public' improvement of older property. In view of the active 
municipalisation programme of Islington it is hardly surprising that it 
spends less on associations than Westminster. 
Despite relatively similar overall assessments of housing need (see 
table 6.4), westminster is spending considerably less than Islington. 
FurtherlOOre, westminster favours the private sector and associations, 
whilst Islington is favouring its or"m ItUlnicipal programme. As table 6.2 
indicates, Islington has a much higher proportion of municipal stock than 
Westminster. '!his is hardly surprising, for awendix 2 reveals that 
Islington consistently allocates IOOre of its H.S.loP. to the nunicipal 
programme. In the years 1981-82 to 1985-86 (estimate), this difference is 
never less than 27%. '!he level of association provision in the two 
boroughs is very similar (8.33% in Islington and 9.56% in westminster). 
Clear ly, whilst the local author i ties are spend ing very different sums of 
lOOney on associations, other factors are intervening to influence the 
level of association activity, and are tending to equalise association 
provision in the two ooroughs. One possible influence is that of the 
Housing COrporation. In 1983/84 the COrporation allocated £13.182m to 
associations in Islington, and only £7.509m to associations in 
Westminster [11] • '!his does help to explain similar overall levels of 
provision in the two ooroughs, for as table 6.6 shows, the total spent in 
the two ooroughs is similar. 
Another factor which may influence the extent of association provision 
in the study ooroughs is the suWOrt that the Greater Lorrlon Council has 
offered associations in these areas. In fact, the GLC has assisted 
associations to a greater extent in Islington, and this also helps to 
explain similar levels of provision, despite the wide variations in their 
Housing Strategy and Investment Programmes. Ranking the London ooroughs in 
order of magnitude of association provision facilitated by GLC finance, 
[11] Data obtained during interview with Chief Developnent Officer of the 
Housing COrporation, 21st December, 1983. 
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Islington is 5th, whilst Westminster is only 19th [12] . 
~LE 6.6 Total expenditure on associations in the 
study boroughs, 1983/84 (excluding GLC expenditure) (£OOOs). 
Borough Islington Westminster 
Source of finance 
Housing Corporation 13,182 
Local Authority 3,145 
Total 16,327 
Source: Interview with Chief Development Officer of 
the Housing Corporation, December 1983, and HSIPs from 
Boroughs. 
Note: Local authority figures are HSIP estimates. 
6.4.3 Housing Policy Docunents 
7,509 
5,850 
13,359 
Another method of assessing the attitudes of a local authority towards 
housing associations is to analyse the local authority's housing policy 
documents. In 1969 [13] the London Borough of Islington (LBI) passed a 
policy of support for small housing associations. Later that year [14] a 
zoning policy [15] was proposed (this proposal does rot oorrespond to 
current zones; see ~ndix. 4). Rules for the reservation of nomination 
rights were proposed. These are the same today. 
[12] Arden (1983, table 4.30). 'Ibere is, in fact, a very poor oorre1ation 
between borough expenditure and expenditure by the Greater London 
Council (see appendix 3). 
[13] 07/10/79, Council Agenda. 
[14] 19/12/69. 
(15] A zoning policy oo~rises two stages. First, areas are defined within 
which associations should restrict their activities. 'Ibis serves to 
prevent duplication of activities. Secondly, specific associations 
are designated within these areas (usually one per zone) which will 
receive favourable assistance from the local authority (to the 
exclusion of all other associations). 
174 
In anticipation of the 1974 Housing Act, and its emphasis on 
rehabilitation, the LBI prepared a twenty-five page report on housing 
associations [16] in 1973. '!his paper sought to identify the role of 
housing associations in terms of their allocation priorities, and the 
extent to which associations could fulfill their own objectives. '!he 
report also considers the relationship between association provision and 
municipal provision. 'Ihree aspects of association activity are 
specifically mentioned. First, associations have a useful role in catering 
for special needs; people who "fall through the council's net" (p.2), thus 
fulfilling a supplementary role. Secoooly (p.3), 
"'!here are ••• particular advantages in Housing Associations 
taking on the task of rehabilitation rather than the council." 
'!he intention here was that associations would protect the integrity of 
municipal slum clearance by preventing the decay of older property 
necessitating further clearance in the future. Evidently anticipating the 
provisions of the 1974 Act, the report suggested that associations 
rehabilitate 4,000 of the borough total of 18,500 properties in a state of 
disrepair. [17] 
The third aspect of association activity discussed is IOOre general 
(p.l) • 
"Associations and Trusts aim to provide cheap, rented 
accomnodation for lower income groups who could rot possibly 
afford to buy a home of their own. They may therefore be seen as 
supplementing the Council's work at a time when the Council's 
wai ting list alone contains over 11,000 names." 
The reference to provision for the poor prevents this statement from 
suggesting that any activity which leads to the provision of rented 
accoomodation is fulfilling a role equivalent to that of the local 
authority. Iooeed, the tenants of cost rent and co-ownership associations 
[16] The Role of Housing Associations and Trusts. 
[17] The discussion of the 1982-83 H.S.I.P. above, which identified some 
12,000 unfit dwellings, indicates that this relationship may not have 
significantly altered. 
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would be unlikely to be amongst the most needy of the Council's waiting 
list awlicants. This perception is reinforced later (p.12). 
"Although the specific aims of each housing association and 
Trust varies it is possible to say in general that their aim is 
to provide satisfactory, cheap rented acconmodation for low 
income people in housing need for whose housing problems there 
is no inmediate solution." 
'!hese aims are awroved of, indeed are said to be "similar to those of 
the local council" (p.12). '!his suggestion of a supplementary role for 
housing associations is confirmed when the findings of the Loooon Housing 
Associations Conmittee are quoted (on p.12): 
"Housing associations are not an alternative, they are an 
additional source of energy and expertise and provide something 
extra, on top of everything the council is doing." 
Subsequently however, the complementary role of associations is 
considered legitimate when it is suggested (p.12) that their allocation 
flexibility reooers them "more than just an extension of the local 
authority". From the balance of argument in the report, it is clear that 
the LBI considers supplementary activity to be the primary task of housing 
associations. 
'!he remainder of the report seeks to demonstrate the extent to which 
associations are meeting these suwlementary and complementary roles. This 
.. 
indicates a desire to monitor association performance in order to justify 
support for them. '!he extent to which associations are free to house 
people that they would like to is analysed. '!he main constraints noted are 
the need for associations to accept council nominations, and the practice 
of acquiring tenanted properties. It is argued that associations are able 
to select very few tenants, because of the constraints imposed on them by 
the types of activities being uI'rlertakeni rehabilitation necessitating 
much decanting. In an attempt to ascertain the outcome of this process 
Circle 33 Housing Trust provided the LBI with data on one sixth of their 
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tenants. Despite the various sources of tenants [18] , the result of the 
process was the housing of needy groups, such as single parent families 
and people claiming supplementary benefit. 
Information was less readily available from other associations, and the 
report concludes uncertainly (p.2l) 
'" 
lilt would seem that the Associations and Trusts together are 
providing for a wider variety of people than the Council and by 
their existence ••• people with little or 00 chance of obtaining 
Council accomnodation have an or::portunity of being housed 
through another housing agency. However, it is not possible to 
substantiate whether this is actually the case." 
Despite the difficulties of obtaining statistical evidence admitted in 
the report, the report represents an attempt to provide the information 
upon which to make logical decisions regarding the nature of support of 
the housing association movement. 
Council oominations came up for review [19] in 1974. '!his followed the 
rejection of some oominated tenants by housing associations. '!he report 
described the constraints on the acceptance of oominations by 
associations. First, charitable rules constrained eligible tenants. 
Secondly, agreements between associations and the council sometimes 
restricted the types of tenants eligible for oomination. Finally, the high 
level of rents on association new building restricted the feasibility of 
nominating certain tenants. '!he report concluded that association 
behaviour was justified and that past practice should continue. 
The increasing scale of municipal oominations led the Research 
Team [20] to suggest the ar::pointment of a full time housing association 
officer in 1975. '!he Research Team disliked the ad hoc nature of the 
systeny and the fact that 
[18] See chapters 7 and 8 for details of the various routes by which 
tenants are housed by associations. 
[19] 17/10/74, Housing Associations-Nominations, The Housing Manager. 
[20] 24/12/75, Housing Associations, Procedures and Statistics, Housing 
Research Team. 
177 
"There is no weans of getting a profile of who is being 
nominated to Housing Association property." [21] 
The Research Team suggested that instead of taking oominations 
directly from the Lettings Department, a special list of available 
property and suitable tenants should be compiled (this is much the way in 
which the system oow works). 'nle intention was to facilitate better 
'. 
matching of tenants to properties. 
By 1976 [22] the target for association rehabilitation had been raised 
to 10,000 in ten years. '!he zoning policy was reaffirmed and its objectives 
were stated to be~ to promote efficient housing management by 
concentrating properties umer one ownership~ to prevent col'I"q?etition 
between housing associations for the acquisition of properties~ and to 
enable effective overall co-ordination of housing policy in the borough. A 
zoning policy confers considerable benefits upon a few specific housing 
associations. 
The above discussion has suggested that a local authority which desires 
that associations supplement their own work should umertake research on 
the associations that it assists. '!he existence of a zoning policy 
increases the need for such research, for the financial and administrative 
benefits of local authority support are 'being concentrated upon a few 
privileged associations. In this case however, the LBI seemed to be more 
concerned with the general administrative objectives listed above, than 
the precise activities of the associations concerned. 
In 1979 [23] the role of housing associations was reviewed again: 
"In some areas, provision by housing associations is seen as an 
alternative to Council housing~ in other areas, including 
Islington, housing associations are seen as complementing 
Council housing." 
[21] Ibid., p.3. 
[22] Housing Policy Review, Document 8, Housing Associations. 
[23] 16/12/79, Housing Associations- Briefing Note for the Leader, p.l. 
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Here 'complementing' simply means that associations are not meant to 
replace municipal activity. Whether association activities were intended 
to be supplementary or complementary was clar ified later, when details 
from the 1980-81 H.S.I.P. bid were referred to [24] 
"As well as providing a valuable crldition to the Council's 
programme for acquisition and improvement of the private sector 
1 associations] provide an invaluable role in providing 
assistance for more specialist provision, often in conjunction 
with voluntary organisations. Islington ~rks closely with 
three zoned associations (Circle 33 Housing Trust, New Islington 
and Hackney Housing Association and Holloway Tenant c0-
operative) and regular meetings are held to discuss policy, 
performance and other issues. Some scope exists for growth in 
the contribution of housing associations in Islington, both in 
terms of their capacity and the outstanding need for 
improvement and conversion and new housing for special needs." 
This is consistent with the borough's earlier statements, and again 
enq;ilasises a supplementary role. In the 1983-84 H.S.I.P. similar comnents 
were made (except that Holloway Tenant co-operative was not specifically 
mentioned and, almost certainly because of an awareness of the financial 
limitations on the borough, the oope for growth in the association 
IOOvement was not expressed). '!he 1984-85 H.S.I.P. (para.49) expresses 
similar sentiments: 
"Housing Associations and Co-operatives provide an important 
addition to the Council's own programme for the purchase and 
improvement of older properties to supply homes to rent. '!hey 
also play an invaluable part in the developnent of more 
specialist accomnodation." 
As regards association allocation, the LBI clearly envisages a 
supplementary role (rehabilitating older property in order to prevent the 
borough's clearance task increasing) and a complementary role (housing 
special needs). Only 50% of association lettings are determined by the 
[24] Ibid., p.2. 
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housing associations, so the nomination practices of the LBI must also be 
examined. 
Discussions with LBI officials in 1983 revealed that an officer is 
specifically-responsible for nominating tenants to housing associations. A 
list is kept of applicants to the waiting list who specifically mention 
housing associations. In addition to selecting tenants from this list, 
certain 'agreed cases' are selected. These may be suggested directly from 
the Lettings Department, or be accepted referrals. AWlicants on the 
association waiting list who would be eligible for prompt housing by the 
council are also regarded as agreed cases. If the association letting is 
in a newly completed dwell ing only an agreed case can be oominated. This 
system permits a matching of tenants with properties. In the case of New 
Islington and Hackney however, a shortlist of suitable nominees is 
forwarded to the association (a 'pool' list). 'Ibis allows the association 
rather roore discretion, and is a system agreed between the borough and the 
specific association following past incidents where the association 
refused some oominations. 
It should be noted that there is 00 policy docl.lnent formalising this 
procedure, and that the oominating officer has complete discretion as to 
whom to select from the association waiting list. '!bere is 00 points 
system for nominations. In defence of this, it is argued by borough 
officials that this system permits flexibility; if this were not the case 
the procedure would offer no advantages over the practices of the Lettings 
Department. An example given was that flexibility allows the council to 
rehouse people facing eviction within a week on occasions. 
Monitoring of nomination practices is weak, and the outcome of LBI 
nominations is oot subject to the same rigour as waiting list allocations. 
Despite the fact that the LBI has given considerable thought to the 
legitimate role of the housing association roovement, and has stated a 
preference for supplementary and oonplementary activity, its practices 
suggest that the implementation of such a policy is problematical. '!be 
1973 report highlighted the difficulties of obtaining statistical 
evidence on housing association activity, and current nomination practice 
is oot closely controlled or rooni tored. '!be borough desires a relationship 
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with associations which is compatible with the pronouncements of past 
Labour Governments, but seems to be devoting insufficient resources to the 
task of ensuring that this occurs. Does the Conservative controlled 
Westminster City Council reflect the aspirations of the Conservative 
Party towards housing associations? 
Westminster City Council (WCC) considered housing associations in 
1976 [25] when zoning arrangements were discussed. The actual allocation 
of zones was uooertaken later in 1976 [26] • Details are contained in 
awendix 4. '!be rost recent major report on the role of housing 
associations in Westminster was prepared in November 1982 [27] • In 
general the report focusses upon questions of efficiency (uooerspend by 
associations, and their speed of conversion). Widespread uooerspending by 
associations is ooted (section 3). It is suggested that part of the 
problem lies with the system of zoning [28] • In ar.pendix 3 of the report 
the analysis of the activity of Brent People's Housing Association 
suggests that spatial constraints tmposed on that association by zoning 
are uoou1y restricting its activity. In section 12.06 of the report it is 
suggested that zoning be abandoned. 'Ibis was implemented in 1983 [29] , and 
will reduce the need for detailed research on specific associations active 
within the borough, for the borough will oot be conferring special 
benefits upon a few selected associations. On the other harxi, decisions of 
support may become ad hoc, and the rore different associations are 
assisted the wider becomes the task of assessing their performance. 
There are few references to the specific tasks that wee wishes to see 
associations perform. '!he reports usually describe types of activity 
rather than the groups of people to be housed. Paragra};Xl 6.03 comnents that 
[25] 
[26] 
[27] 
[28] 
[29] 
05/01/76, Housing Associations, Zoning Arrangements, Joint Report of 
the Chief Executive, Director of Housing, Director of Architecture 
and Planning, and the City Valuer. 
05/04/76, Zoning Arrangements As Afp1ied to Individual Housing 
Associations, Joint Report of the O1ief Executive, Director of 
Housing, Director of Architecture and Planning, and the City Valuer. 
15/11/82, Housing Associations Review Report and Analysis of 
Expenditure 1981/82 and 1982/83, Director of Housing. 
see ~ndix 4 for zones at that date. 
See 1984-85 HSIP, para.S.03. 
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the current decline in association activity might "have a marked effect on 
the achievement of the Council's strategy in respect of sub-standard 
properties". Rehabilitation is therefore an area of activity that ~ 
wishes to see associations perform, and this is reinforced in paragraph 
12.02, when it is suggested that associations should ooncentrate their 
efforts in housing action areas. 
The beneficiaries of this process, both desirable and probable, are 
rarely assessed. Housing the elderly is one area of activity oonsidered 
desirable (para.lO.l), as is housing key workers and the provision of 
special management facilities (para.12.02). Appendix 3 of the report 
contains the main review of the 'performance' of associations operating in 
westminster. 'Ibis assessment focuses exclusively upon questions of 
efficiency (speed and oosts of oonversions). 'Ibe types of people being 
housed are never oonsidered. looeed, the only reference to types of 
activity is to 'new initiative schemes' for extending ownership (which are 
barely mentioned in the main report). 'Ibis is in marked oontrast to the 
LBI, which devoted oons ider able effort to identifying the likely 
beneficiaries of the allocations of associations. 'Ibe 1984-85 H.S.I.P. 
(para.5.02) states that associations should improve "substandard 
accommodation in areas of housing stress" and develop "diversification of 
tenure and the prolOOtion of home ownership". 'Ibis is also in marked 
oontrast to the policy of the LBI (1984-85 H.S.I.P., para.49), which focuses 
exclusively upon association provision for renting. 
Nominations were oonsidered in 1983 [30] • Although there is a general 
waiting list, this list is subservient to a system of priority 
categories [31] • Waiting list applicants are the lowest priority group of 
eight groups. Haneless families are the second highest priority group. 
Nominations are effectively taken from the top of these priority groups. 
Associations offer individual properties to wee and a suitable tenant is 
selected from atOOngst the IOOst needy of the oounc:il applicants. 'lbere is 
no system of keeping a 'pool' of oominated tenants or available properties. 
[30] 17/05/83, Housing Priorities Report 1983/84, Director of Housing. 
[31] Contained in appendix 4 of the report and reproduced in appendix 4 
below. 
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Unlike the LSI, \'l:C has paid relatively little overt attention to the 
types of people that associations are housing. '!be City Council is 
primarily concerned to see another source of provision which is efficient 
and costs the council little (Housing Priorities Report 1983/84, 
para.12.02). Thus research in the City Council focuses upon analysing the 
speed of association conversions, their unit costs and tendency to 
urrler sperrl. 
6.4.4 Cooclusions 
The Lorrlon Borough of Islington itself spends less H.S.I.P. money on 
housing associations than Westminster does, and has taken a greater 
interest in the types of people being housed by associations. 
Superficially, the policies of Westminster resemble the policies of the 
Greater Lorrlon Council when Cutler was housing chairman. Westminster City 
Council spends only one half of its U.S.loP. money on its nunicipal 
progranme (46% going to 'private sector' blocks two and three). '!be City 
Council has also failed to analyse the types of people benefitting from 
association activity. Here the similarities between Westminster and the 
G.L.C. end, for two reasons. First, Westminster City Council does utilise 
its nomination rights [32) • Discussions with officers of the council make 
it clear that they regard this as ensuring that needy groups are housed. 
Given the fact that the level of nominations is currently 50%, and the 
Housing Corporation scrutinises housing association activity, they argue 
that their relative lack of enquiry is not significant. Secorrlly, and 
perhaps more significant from the theoretical perspective of this thesis, 
despite considerable atte~ts to analyse the performance of housing 
associations, the Lorrlon Borough of Islington almost certainly knows no 
more about the activity of associations in its area than Westminster City 
Council does. Its own research team was unable to obtain information on 
more than one association for its 1973 report, and this data is now 
co~letely outdated and unrevised. Whilst there are indeed differences of 
approach between the two boroughs, the difference in actual knowledge of 
association activity is minimal. Irrleed, as chapter 5 pointed out, concern 
[32) Arden (1983, para.12l, p.xxii) notes that G.L.C. take-up of nominations 
was, until 1976, "wholly inadequate". 
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almost always focuses upon cost control at the expense of knowledge about 
policy outcomes. As Arden (1983, para.12.3.46) observes: 
"Individual scrutiny implies prior scrutiny: the emphasis is on 
checking the project at the outset, with a correspondingly 
diminished emphasis on ex post facto scrutiny, or 'performance 
testing'. '!his has long been true in goverrunent itself, of its 
own spending, and was thus the thinking which was applied to the 
task of spending through housing associations. Put shortly, 
performance testing has been no part of government." 
The sole tangible differences between the boroughs lies in their 
H.S.I.P. allocations, and the fact that Islington favours rented provision 
through associations, whilst Wesbninster is willing to support 'new 
tenures'. Given the boroughs lack of evidence upon which to make decisions, 
ideolog ieal attitudes towards tenure distinctions seems to be the only 
feasible explanation for policy decisions. 
6.5 Conclusions 
It is possible for a local authority to respond in many different ways 
to central government policies towards housing associations. 'l.bese 
responses may be analysed in terms of the desired relationship between 
municipal and association provision. Where the pre-eminence of municipal 
provision is to be maintained housing associations are likely to be 
credited with either no specific role, or that of supplementing municipal 
provision. Where the pre-eminence of municipal provision is not considered 
a fundamental requirement, associations may be encouraged to replace 
municipal provision. It has been shown that complementary activity by 
associations can be interpreted in ways which serve either of these 
approaches. 
The Conservative Greater London Council (1967-70) intended to use 
associations in a replacement function, to decrease the part played by 
state institutions in the provision and management of housing (Harloe, 
Issacharoff and Minns, 1974; Young and Kramer, 1978). In Islington and 
Westminster the situation is IOOre corrp1icated. Despite the fact that 
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Westminster itself spends more on associations than Islington does, both 
boroughs utilise nomination rights to ensure that needy tenants are 
housed. Furthermore, neither borough has been able to obtain sufficient 
information to determine the likely outcome of the allocation policies of 
the associations (despite the fact that Islington tried harder to do 
this) • 
Hands and Barrett (1974) have analysed the policies of the London 
Boroughs towards associations as being either 'positive' or 'negative', 
considering the amount of, and conditions upon, assistance offered to 
associations by them. They conclude that 
"'!here ~ars to be neither rhyme nor reason behind the 
policies and attitudes of London's housing authorities towards 
housing associations." (p.56) 
The difficulty of ascertaining details of the types of people housed by 
housing associations must go some way in explaining this confusion. In so 
far as the boroughs can not predict the outcome of association 
allocations, they are pursuing policies the outcome of which are largely 
uncertain. It is debatable whether this tendency of the boroughs to make 
decisions on the basis of insufficient information is ideological or 
pragmatic. Certainly, if the boroughs are merely concerned that 
associations should have the necessary administrative and financial 
support to fulfill a certain role, then the details of their activity may 
not be considered crucial. There are, however, very good financial reasons 
for assisting associations, which are rot affected by uncertainty over 
their activity. In 1983/84 the Housing Corporation allocated f20.7m to 
associations in Islington and Westminster (see table 6.6). 'Ibis source of 
extra finance may be lost if the local authority does rot co-operate with 
associations. 
Whether ideological or pragmatic, the boroughs are clearly capable of 
formulating their own policies towards associations. These policies may 
include the romination of all of the tenants in some schemes. On the other 
hand, the borough may utilise nomination rights over some of the lettings 
of associations and undertake research on association activity in order to 
inform its own policies. 'Ibe extent to which boroughs uroertake such 
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research varies considerably. Westminster does not seem to have raised 
this as a relevant question. Islington has tr ied, largely without success, 
to establish the types of tenants housed by associations. canrlen, for 
example, has gone further, and surveyed a sample of association tenants 
directly [33] • What is significant is that these policies may not reflect 
the allocational aspirations of the boroughs themselves, let alone those 
of central government. It is clear that central government encouragement 
of local authority involvement does render local variation in the activity 
of associations IOOre likely. '!he way in which the policy is implemented 
does seem to be merely designed to encourage housing association provision 
in any way that local authorities decide. '!his can not ensure the 
reproduction of specific types of labour power, or even the use of 
economically efficient associations. 
Arden (1983) indicates that local political control significantly 
affects the extent of housing association activity. Political control in 
the Greater London Council has repeatedly changed, and this provides a 
situation which complements the recent history of Islington and 
Westminster, where political control has been stable for some time (see 
section 4.2, where the significance of local political control is 
discussed). Without pointing out the nature of the changes of political 
control which occurred, Arden (para.46, p.xi-xii) notes that through GLC 
policy between 1967 and 1970 the "way was paved for a wider use of housing 
associations as an al ternati ve to nunicipal ownership". '!he then 
Conservative GLC was thus using associations in a way consistent with 
national Conservative thinking at the time. When Labour gained control of 
the GLC (ibid., para.48, p.xii), the 
"change of administration in 1973 led to a wholly different 
approach. Housing associations in general were less well 
[33] See London Borough of canrlen, Housing Department Comnittee, 07/02/84, 
Untitled (agenda item 28). '!his survey was mainly concerned with 
tenant attitudes towards their landlords. '!be findings for 
association tenants were compared with a smaller sample of council 
tenants. '!he report concludes (p.7) "that satisfaction levels amongst 
Camden tenants in rehabilitated or unconverted homes are lower than 
the average for Housing Association tenants". canrlen has clearly 
raised the nature of association activity as an item for the 
political agenda. 
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favoured, and all GLC disposals (to associations] were hal ted." 
'!he then Labour GLC reflected the attitude of the Labour Party that 
associations should be subordinate to municipal provision. '!he 
Conservatives were re-elected to the GLC in 1977, and their policies 
reflected the return to the private sector favoured within their national 
Party, and which was manifest in legislation three years later with the 
election of a Conservative governrnent~ the 
"fifth administration of the GLC was committed to the return of 
fuoos to housing associations so far as possible. '!here was also 
a return to the policy of the disposal of GLC stock, including 
to associations uOOer new forms of tenure, such as comnunity 
leasehold." (ibid., para.49, p.xii) 
Whilst Arden does rot point out the 'correlation' between political 
control and changing attitudes towards housing associations, the 
implication is clear. '!he nature of political control in the GLC was 
directly reflected in its attitude towards associations. Although the 
policies of Labour Islington and Conservative Westminster do seem to 
imperfectly reflect the attitudes of their national political 
counterparts, this should rot be taken to imply a necessary 
correspoooence. Hands and Barrett (1974, p.56) uncovered evidence which 
suggested that 
"Contrary to a common view that Conservative Councils encourage 
housing associations as a substitute for Council housing, only 
one Conservative-controlled borough had a positive attitude [to 
associations], while the bulk were neutral." 
Pickvance (1978, p.27) is thus correct when he asserts that 
lithe fact that the State has central and local levels, and that 
local authorities are rot simply subordinate agents but are 
'political scenes' in which local class conflicts can be exposed 
••• moves us one step further away from the image of a monolithic 
State producing the appropriate response to some malfunction." 
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In view of the scale of central government financial support of housing 
associations it is unlikely that any local authority will ignore the 
movement. The Housing Corporation is a useful source of additional finance 
for housing investment. The pol icy does therefore seem designed to ensure 
the growth of the housing association movement, but not to ensure the 
achievement of any criteria of performance. The likely beneficiaries of 
the process are largely beyond the sphere of influence of central 
government. This finding is particularly significant, for it is in the 
housing of groups with unusual needs that associations may have a unique 
role. Central government is not taking any steps to ensure that this is the 
case. Once again this suggests that the organisation of the association 
movement is roore significant than the activity which it urrlertakes. The 
following chapter will address the issue of the types of people that 
associations do rouse, and the relationship between association and 
municipal provision that this ~lies. 
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7. ASSOCIATION TENANrS: SECONDARY STATISTICAL SOOOCES 
7.1 Introduction 
The rhetoric of central government policy suggests that housing 
associations should provide accommodation for specific groups of people. 
Perhaps the clearest expression of these allocational objectives is 
contained in the 1971 report of the Central Housing Advisory Committee, 
Housing Associations. Traditional associations (charities with 
philanthropic origins) should be housing would-be council tenants. '!he new 
style associations (originating from the unsubsidised provisions of the 
Conservative 1961 and 1964 Housing Acts) should be setting out to house 
higher wage earners. Following the Labour 1974 Housing Act associations 
have increasingly urrlertaken rehabilitation work in inner cities, thus 
acquiring privately rented sitting tenants. This is in marked contrast to 
the Conservative errphasis of the mid 1960s. Furtherroore, since the 1974 
HOUSing Act both types of association have been able to register with the 
Housing Corporation for the p..1rpose of obtaining financial suwort, 
provided the JOOdel rules of the Corporation are met. '!he organisational 
distinction between 'traditional' and 'new style' has, to a large degree, 
been lost. 
The outcome of central government policies is therefore somewhat less 
clear. Which 'types' of association are performing each of these tasks is 
difficult to determine; indeed, many associations perform both functions. 
Middle income earners can now benefit through shared ownership and other 
forms of equity holding, as well as being able to rent association 
property. The significance of this uncertainty is that the twin functions 
of providing for would be council tenants and for would be owners or 
private renters inply very different relationships between association 
and municipal provision. 
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Much of the ideological rationale for government support for housing 
associations is dependent upon perceptions of the desirable nature of this 
relationship. Whilst previous chapters have considered whether central 
government has established an organisational framework which is likely to 
fulfill its requirements, it is row time to assess the outcome of the 
policy in practice. Central and local government are both in need of 
evidence of the nature of the association movement, am whether its 
activities are supplementing municipal provision, or are oonpeting with 
it. Previous chapters have suggested that neither central or local 
government have sufficient information upon which to make decisions 
intended to promote the fulfillment of specified allocational objectives. 
Statistical research on the activity of housing associations dates 
from at least 1971. If central government policy is purposive-rational one 
would expect that housing Ministers am local authorities have considered 
the findings of these reports. There is little evidence to suggest that 
this is the case, although the 1979 report oonmissioned on behalf of the 
National Federation of Housing Associations (Housing Association Tenants) 
has received government attention [1] Financial assistance to 
associations has steadily increased during the 1970s am early 1980s 
despite the relative lack of rigorous evidence on the outcome of such 
assistance. 'Ibis reflects the fact that ideological attitudes towards 
property ownership am the role of local authorities has largely shaped 
the policy. Irrleed, on the basis of government statements it is 
surprisingly difficult to establish performance criteria by which to 
judge the efficaciousness of government support for housing associations. 
The evidence of previous chapters suggests that the main testable policy 
differences between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party relate to 
the Labour desire for associations to house p:>orer privately rented 
tenants, and the Conservative preoccupation with extending home ownership. 
New style associations urrler the Conservative Government of the mid 
1960s were to house middle income earners. '!be inference is that if 
[1] This report is, for example, referred to at paragraphs 182 and 193, in 
House of Comnons (1979), Parliamentary Paper No.327, Comnittee of 
Public Accounts. 
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association tenants are wealthier than local authority tenants, then 
associations are housing people who may otherwise have become owners or 
private renters. This would suggest that associations are targetting a 
group of people slightly different from local authorities, and are rot 
competing with them for the same tenants. The 1971 C.HAC. report was based 
upon income differences, so this is the first testable performance 
criterion. 
In the debates on the 1982 Housing and Building Control Bill, John 
Stanley M.P. (Conservative Minister for Housing) argued that charitable 
housing associations were rot ensuring that their tenants were poor 
(cols.305-6). No evidence for this statement was provided. '!hese oomnents 
confirm that the main political Parties have definite views on the 
desirable income characteristics of association tenants. '!be views 
expressed in the 1982 debate differ markedly from earlier conservative 
desires that association tenants should be middle income earners [2] • The 
Conservative Party now encourages wealthy association tenants to buy 
their dwellings, so information on the rate of sale of association 
properties should be considered at the same time as income data (certainly 
from the extension of the right to buy to non-charitable association 
tenants in 1980). 
'!he boards of management of associations typically corrprise local 
professionals, politicians and clergy [3] • It is possible, given their 
lack ,of electoral accountability, that such groups may pursue allocation 
po~icies favouring people of similar status. This may lead to a different 
tenan "· profile from local authority housing. This possibility came up for 
discussion during Standing Committee E on the 1963 Housing Bill (col.170). 
Eustace Willis'· "' ,M.P. (Labour) suworted an amenanent prohibiting 
associations from practicing racial discrimination by saying 
"I hope that the Committee will accept the Arrendment. Iooeed, I 
should like it to go further than it does. I do rot want to see 
any kind of class discrimination which, I can q.lite well 
[2] See Sir Keith Joseph (Conservative Minister for Housing), Staooing 
Committee E, 1963 Housing Bill, co1.485. 
[3] See section 5.3.2. 
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appreciate, might also exist in these housing societies." 
Although this clause was defeated, largely on the grouoos that the 
groups of people likely to become members of a board of management would 
not practice such bias, it does serve to illustrate government concern 
with the social class or socio-econami.c group of association tenants. This 
variable therefore provides another relevant method of conparing the role 
of association and nunicipal provision. The 1974 Housing Act greatly 
increased the power of the Housing Corporation to oversee association 
activity, but its krowledge of their allocation practices was still 
limited. '!be National Federation sponsored report Housing Association 
Tenants (1979), amongst others, contains data on the socio-economic 
col'lpOsition of housing association tenants. 
The 1971 C.H.A.C. report also suggested that traditional associations 
should house groups in special need (para.2.4). In 1981 the Labour Party 
(1981, p.38) recognised that local authorities have traditionally failed 
to cater for certain types of tenant. SUggesting reforms for local 
authority practices, the Party recomnended that 
"Probably the biggest change which is needed is to take far more 
seriously the housing needs of single people of working age. For 
too long, housing has been geared almost entirely to the needs 
of nuclear families." 
This proposal raises the issue of the extent to which local authorities 
are capable of fulfilling the tasks assigned to housing associations. To 
the extent that associations cater for groups for which local authorities 
have unsuitable stock or insufficient management experience they are rot 
competing with local authority activity in the short ter~ In the longer 
term however, it makes it less likely that local authorities will 
eventually cater for these groups. It is therefore relevant to assess the 
extent to which local authority and association stock characteristics are 
different (ml1lber or rooms in dwellings, accomnodation designed to meet 
specific needs, and so on). It is also relevant to assess the extent to 
which household conposition is different (single person households, 
elderly households, single parent families). Once again this will reveal 
whether associations are performing a distinctive role, and a role that at 
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present local authorities do not fulfill. 
Several surveys, dating from the early 1970s, provide information on 
the tenant composition of housing associations. 'lhe General Household 
Survey has provided information on housing associations as a separate 
tenure since its first full report in 1972. In 1971 Page undertook a survey 
of co-ownership associations, and in 1977 Thonpson examined the work of 
Merseyside Improved Houses. Bird and Palmer (1979) sampled all types of 
housing association, as did the National Dwelling and Household Survey in 
1978. In 1981 the Census recorded housing associations as a separate 
tenure for the first time. 
Table 7.1 shows the sample sizes used in these secondary sources, 
including the General Household Survey in years which would facilitate a 
comparison of its findings with the results of the other surveys (the 
earliest being 1972, and the other relevant date being 1978). '!be sample 
sizes range from over 3,000 in the National Dwelling and Household Survey, 
to only 52 association households in the 1972 General Household Survey. 
Indeed, both the 1972 and 1978 General Household Surveys rely upon a 
sample of less than one association household in one thousand. '!his is a 
statistically unreliable sample size, and, in so far as they relate to 
housing associations, the findings of the General Household Survey are 
excluded from subsequent analysis. Indeed, since the total population of 
associations presented in the table is derived from N.F.H~ members only, 
it is likely to underestimate the actual total population of association 
households. '!be percentages for association sample sizes are therefore 
likely to be overestimates. 
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TABLE 7.1 Sample size in secondary sources. 
Association [1] Total Association [2] Total 
household association sarrple sarrple 
Date sample JX)pulation percentage percentage 
Page 1970 408 154,867 0.26 -
G.H.S. 1972 52 173,211 0.03 0.07 
Thorrp:;on 1976 300 211,371 0.14 -
Bird and Palmer 1978 1,775 250,000 0.71 -
G.H.S. 1978 97 250,000 0.04 0.08 
N.D.H.S. 1978 3,010 250,000 1.20 
SOurce: [1] ·National Federation of Housing Associations, 
1978a, p.i. 
1.38 
(2J The 1978 N.D.H.S. gives an estimate for the total 
households of England in 1978 as 16,824,000. 'Ibis oolumn shows 
the total sample expressed as a percentage of total households. 
1972 total sample percentage calculated using 1971 Census, 
Household Composition Part 1, table 1. 
Note: SOurce [1] includes only Federation member associations. 
Data for 1978 only. Previous years calculated using data 
in table 3.1. 
Page (1971) focussed upon oo-ownership associations and excluded 
traditional associations. The reasons for this are rot entirely clear in 
the report. The statistics produced are therefore of limited use in 
assessing the relationship between association tenants and local 
authority tenants, for according to the definitions of the Central Housing 
Advisory Coomittee (1971), people expected to be like oouncil tenants have 
been excluded from the survey, and only people expected to be middle 
income earners are included. Thonp;on (1977) studied a different type of 
association activity when he focussed upon Merseyside Inproved Houses 
(The ~le of Housing Associations in Major Urban Areas). Merseyside 
Inproved Houses aimed to house those "least able to c::onpete in today's 
housing market" (p.50). It sought to fulfill tasks closely related to 
housing need rather than ability to pay, and is therefore representative 
of the types of association neglected by the work of Page (1971). The 
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findings of Page and Thompson highlight the range of activity undertaken 
by housing associations, from economic renting to fair renting. Neither 
survey is representative of the association movement as a whole, since 
they focus upon specific types of association, but the differences in 
their activities does serve to illustrate the diversity within the 
association JOOVement described in chapter 5. Bird and Palmer (1979) do 
focus upon all types of housing association, and their findings are 
therefore representative of the movement as a whole. Indeed, this 
conprehensiveness allows them to present their findings for particular 
types of association as well as for all associations. '!heir survey was 
jointly published by the Building Research Establishment and the Housing 
Corporation, and was produced under the guidance of the National 
Federation of Housing Associations. It was based upon a survey of 1,775 
households during a two week period in 1978. '!he 1978 National Dwelling 
and Household Survey relies upon a sanq;>le of over 3,000 association 
households. '!his provided the largest sanq;>le size of any survey of 
association tenants until the results of the 1981 Census were published. 
The latest Census records housing association as a separate tenure, and 
therefore provides a valuable insight into the nature of the allocational 
activity of housing associations. 
Bird and Palmer, the 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey and 
the 1981 Census are all representative of the movement as a whole, and the 
structure of association households revealed in these surveys will be 
compared to the tenant structure of local authorities in order to assess 
the relationships between the two types of provision. 
7.2 Analysis of Income Levels 
Data on the income profile of association tenants was first provided by 
Page (1971, table 30). Page conpared the findings of the 1968 Family 
Expenditure Survey for all tenures with the results of a survey carried 
out on co-ownership housing associations in 1970. Table 7.2 shows the 
findings of the survey. Page concluded (1971, p.79) that, relative to the 
findings of the Family Expenditure Survey for the total population, "the 
lowest income groups ••• were indeed under-represented in housing 
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societies, whereas the middle •.. and upper income groups ••• were over-
represented". Since the survey focussed solely upon unsubsidised 
associations, and excluded subsidised associations, these findings are not 
very surprising. 
TABLE 7.2 Household head income characteristics (1968). 
Percentage 
-
Gross Income of Whole 
Weekly head of household 
Income household incorne 
Housing Family Housing Family 
(£) Society Expenditure Society Expenditure 
Respondents Survey Respoooents Survey 
<10 4.7 20.6 2.0 11.6 
10-15 4.4 11.4 2.7 9.3 
15-20 8.3 16.1 4.2 10.2 
20-25 23.8 20.0 10.3 13.4 
25-30 17.4 13.0 12.5 13.4 
30-40 20.8 11.3 28.4 20.1 
40-50 6.4 3.9 16.2 10.7 
50-60 2.7 1.6 8.8 5.4 
60> 4.2 2.1 8.6 5.9 
No 
Information 7.4 - 6.4 -
Source: Page (1971), table 30. 
Thonpson p.lblished his study of Merseyside Improved Houses in 1977. 
Income data is presented in figure 3 (a) in graIXlical form. Since the 
results are not included in tabular form comparison with other tenures is 
difficult. 'l'honpson does observe that the sample "is remarkable for the 
generally low income level amongst MIH tenants" (p.57), although no 
comparison with other tenures is made. This suggests that the association 
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is fulfilling its expressed aim of housing people on the basis of need 
rather than ability to faY. Merseyside Improved Houses is therefore 
catering for a very different type of tenant than the co-ownership 
associations surveyed by Page. 
Table 3.1 of the report by 'lbompson iooicates that 57% of the tenants of 
Merseyside Improved Houses were acquired tenants; tenants already living 
in accomnodation that was p.lrchased by the association. Whilst the 
properties acquired in this way are likely to be in need of 
rehabilitation, there is no guarantee that the households so acquired will 
comprise relatively poor households [4] 'lbompson therefore 
disaggregated his data between selected and acquired tenants, in order to 
compare their respective situations. In fact, acquired tenants were poorer 
in general than selected tenants. Many acquired households were living 
solely on pensions. 'lbese findings suggest that despite the uncertainty of 
tenant selection caused by the acquisition of tenants through the 
development programne, Merseyside Improved Houses was in general housing 
poor households. It is difficult to make any more general statement than 
this because- it is not possible to compare the findings of 'lbonpson with 
the income profile of the occupants of other tenures. 
Bird and Palmer (1979) present income data on tenants from all types of 
association, and tables 7.3 and 7.4 conpare their findings with the 
findings of the 1976 General Household Survey for all tenures. 
~LE 7.3 Household head income characteristics (1976). 
Tenure All Sitting Selected 
tenants tenants tenants 
Income range (p.a. ) 
o - 1500 4 4 4 
1500 - 3119 50 53 50 
3120 - 4159 29 36 29 
4160+ 17 7 17 
Source: Bird and Palmer (1979), figure C.2.1. 
[4] See section 5.3.2 for a discussion of this (ilenomenon. 
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~LE 7.4 Household head income characteristics (1978). 
Tenure All 
Income range (p.a. ) 
o - 1500 27 
1500 - 3000 23 
3000 - 4000 20 
4000+ 33 
SOurce: 1978 General Household Survey, table 3.12. 
Whilst the income ranges of the t\IIO tables do oot exactly coincide, 
they are very nearly the same, and a direct c:ortq?arison of the results in 
the two tables will oot be misleading. Clearly, the findings of Bird and 
PaLmer (1979) differ markedly from the findings of the General Household 
Survey for the total population. Bird and PaLmer estimate a population of 
association tenants skewed towards middle income levels in conparison 
with the General Household Survey. Their findings conflict with those of 
'l11oap;on (1977), but differ less from those of Page (1971), suggesting that 
there are less association tenants on low incomes than one would expect on 
a proportionate basis. '!be 1981 Census does not provide data on income 
level. 
Available evidence on the income characteristics of association 
tenants is therefore inconclusive [5] • The research surveyed is based in 
different areas, and sometimes examines an unrepresentative sub-sarrple of 
association types. 'Itle only reliable survey, that undertaken by Bird and 
PaLmer, suggests that housing associations have fewer tenants on low and 
high incomes than one would expect on a proportionate basis. Olapter 5 
pointed out the ~rtance the current Conservative Government attatches 
to the incane level of association tenants, yet no research which provides 
reliable data on this variable has been uooertaken. 
(5) Although the National Federation of Housing Associations (1977, 
para.71.vi) has asserted that "housing association tenants have 
incomes 00 higher than Council tenants". 
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7.3 Social Class and Socio-Economic Group 
In addition to assessing income data, Page (1971, table 31) analysed the 
socio-economic group of association tenants, and corrpared the results with 
the 1966 Census (see table 7.5). 
TABLE 7.5 Social class of household head (1970). 
.. 
J?ercentage 
Tenure Housing All tenures 
society respondents England & Wales 
Social class 
I Professional 17.7 4.4 
II Intermediate 35.3 15.5 
III Skilled 31.6 50.2 
IV Partly skilled 4.7 20.8 
V Unskilled 0.5 9.0 
- Students 4.2 -
- Retired 3.9 -
No information 2.0 -
Source: Page (1971), table 31. 
This table clearly shows that association tenants were skewed towards 
higher social classes corrpared to the overall population. 53% of society 
respondents were in the top two social classes, whilst only 20% of the 
total pop.llation was in these classes. In view of the fact that Page 
excludes traditional housing associations from her study, this is not 
surprising. 
Table 7.6 shows the socia-economic data provided by ThOl'lpioo (1977). 
This shows acquired tenants to be drawn from lower socio-eoonomic groups 
than selected tenants, and accords with his finding that acquired tenants 
were poorer than selected tenants. 'l11is table indicates that asociation 
tenants are drawn from lower socio-economic groups than Page suggests, 
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thus confirming the differences in the a11ocational performance of the two 
types of association. 
TABLE 7.6 SOcio-economic group of household head (1976). 
Percentage 
Tenure Selected Acquired All 
S.E.G. 
I and II 10 7 9 
III non manual 20 16 19 
III manual 24 34 28 
IV and V 35 42 37 
Unclassified 11 1 7 
Total 166 88 254 
Source: Thompson (1977), table 3.5. 
Table 7.7 shows the socio-economic group data in the 1978 National 
Dwelling and Household Survey (N.D.H.S.), and similar data from Bird and 
Palmer (1979). Whilst housing associations were urrler represented in the 
highest two socio-economic groups in the N.D.H.S. data, they were over 
represented in the other non-manual category. Local authority tenants were 
roore clearly skewed towards lower socio-economic groups, being urrler 
represented in the top three groups and over represented in the bottom 
three groups. The column indicating the difference between association and 
nunicipal tenants confirms this, by revealing that associations had roore 
tenants in the higher socio-economic groups than local authorities. '!his 
table provides consistent evidence that housing associations were 
accommodating tenants of higher socio-economic status than local 
authorities. Bird's data shows a less definite relationship. 
Another notable feature of the 1978 N.D.H.S. is the fact that 23% of 
association household heads were classified as 'other'. '!his partly 
reflects the fact that nearly 50% of association household heads were 
economically inactive (47.5% according to the N.D.H.S. and 46% according to 
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Bird and Palmer). In the 1978 N.D.H.S. this is the largest proportion of 
economically inactive heads for any tenure except owner occupiers who own 
outright. In the N.D.H.S., if an unemployed or retired person has been 
economically active, the socia-economic group of their previous occupation 
is recorded. '!be category 'other' therefore reflects [6] a high mmber of 
persons in the armed forces, students, the permanently sick or disabled, or 
those never economically active. 
~LE 7.7 Socio-economic group of household head (1978). 
Percentage 
TenurE HA LA All HA - All LA - All HA-LA HA HA-LA 
[1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [2] [1&2] 
S.E.G., 
1. 3.4 0.6 5.1 -1. 7 -4.5 2.8 3 2.4 
2. 8.4 4.3 13.8 -5.4 -9.5 4.1 4 -0.3 
3. 21.4 11.1 17 .8 3.6 -6.7 10.3 35 24.9 
4. 24.6 35.9 30.3 -5.7 5.6 -11.3 30 -5.9 
5. 13.2 19.5 12.9 0.3 6.6 -6.3 22 2.5 
6. 6.0 9.6 5.0 1.0 4.6 -3.6 6 -3.6 
Other 23.1 19.1 15.1 
Total [3] ~,010 i 68,997 1231,532 1,775 
Source: [1] 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 4. 
[2] Bird and Palmer (1979), figure C.2.l. 
[3] Derived using source [1], percentages in table 4, 
and sample si ze in append ix A. 
Notes: 1= professional 
2= employers and managers 
3= other non-manual 
4= skilled manual 
5= semi skilled manual 
6= unskilled manual. 
[6] See 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, p.209. 
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The 1981 Census volume Household and Family Composition was published 
on May 24th, 1984. To date, this is the only published Census volume which 
shows socio-economic data for housing association tenants. A preliminary 
analysis of its findings is contained in appendix 8 [7] • Table 47 of the 
Greater London County Report (Part 2) provides socio-economic group data 
for selected tenures. Despite being listed as a separate tenure in many 
tables, associations are not separately analysed here. '!he following 
chapter therefore contains special tabulations from the 1981 Census which 
provides this data for the study boroughs. 
Whilst housing associations cater for people from lower than average 
socio-economic groups, local authorities house people from lower socio-
economic groups than associations do. '!he income statistics in the 
previous section did not reveal any consistent relationship. In the 
absence of meaningful income statistics, John Stanley M.P. (Conservative 
Minister for Housing) could only have been relying upon socio-economic 
group data when he asserted (Standing Comnittee F, 1982 Housing and 
Building Control Bill, col.305) that "it has become apparent that at least 
sane existing tenants of charitable housing associations are rot in 
necessitous circumstances". section 5.3 (chapter 5) discussed the desire 
of the current Conservative Government to residualise council housing; a 
desire to prolOOte runicipal renting for the poorest only, and to prolOOte 
ownership for the remainder through the right to buy. It was roted that 
Conservative attitudes towards housing associations are becoming very 
similar to this. Any evidence which suggests that association tenants are 
drawn" from higher socio-economic groups than council tenants is likely to 
increase the desire of the Conservative Government to accelerate the 
application of this process to housing associations. '!he repeated 
introduction of new clauses in the 1983 Housing and Building Control Bill 
to extend the application of the right to buy to charitable associations 
is evidence of this (see section 3.2.3, chapter 3). 
[7] This volume was published seven days before the submission date of 
this thesis. Its findings could not be incorporated into the main 
text of the thesis, but are referred to in section 8.3.2, chapter 8. 
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7.4 Analysis of Household and Stock Characteristics 
The 1971 C.H.A.C. report (para.2.4) also suggested that associations 
should house groups with special needs; in other words, households not 
normally catered for by existing tenures. One measurement of this is 
household type, which reveals household size and stage in the family 
cycle [8] • A comparison of the variation across tenures will reveal the 
extent to which associations specialise in housing particular types of 
households, and house types of households not catered for by local 
authorities. 
A comnonly applied analysis of household type uses the following 
categories [9] 
1 Irrlividuals aged urrler 60; households of one 
person aged 16-59 
2 Small adult households; households with two 
persons aged 16-59 
3 Small families; 1 or 2 persons aged 16 or over 
and 1 or 2 persons aged urrler 16 
4 Large families; 1 or more person aged 16 or over and 
3 or more persons aged under 16; or 
3 or more persons aged 16 or over and 
2 persons aged under 16 
5 Large adult household; 3 or IOOre persons aged 16 or 
over with or without 1 person aged urrler 16 
6 Older small households; 2 persons aged 16 or over, one or 
both of whom are aged 60 or over 
7 Individuals aged 60 or over. 
Page (1971) and Thompson (1977, table 3.3) do not use these categories, 
and it is not possible to urrlertake comparisons across tenures with their 
data. Bird and Palmer (1979), the 1978 General Household Survey and the 
1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey all utilise these categories, 
(8) It is only a rudimentary measure, for chapter 5 outlined the variety 
of special needs housed (see section 5.3.2). 
(9) 1972 General Household Survey, page 41. 
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and their results are shown in tables 7.8 and 7.9. 
~LE 7.8 Household type (1978). 
Percentage 
Tenure HA All 
(1] (2] 
Type 
Individuals aged 
under 60 16 7 
Small adult 
households 16 14 
Small families 29 22 
Large families 4 10 
Large adult 
households 6 16 
Other small 
households 9 16 
Households aged 
60 or over 21 15 
Source: [1] Bird and Palmer (1979), figure C.2.1 
(2] 1978 General Household Survey, table 3.7(a) 
Table 7.8 suggests that associations house rore young individuals, 
elderly households [10] and small families than all tenures taken 
together. 
(10] Niner (l979) analysed a sarrple of council tenants in Dudley, and 
conparing the findings to those of Bird and Pamer, concluded that 
.. it seems that it is in provision of housing for the elderly that 
housing associations really complement the local author ity". 
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TABLE 7.9 Household type (1978). 
. 
Percentage 
Tenure HA HA LA All HA - All LA - All HA-LA 
[1] [2] (2] (2] (2] (2] (2] 
Household type 
Individuals aged 
under 60 16 11 5 6 5 -1 6 
Small adult 
households 16 11 11 15 -4 -4 0 
Small famil ies 29 16 18 21 -5 -3 -2 
Large famil ies 4 5 12 9 -4 3 -7 
Large adult 
households 6 9 19 17 -8 2 -10 
Other snall 
households 9 16 18 17 -1 1 -2 
Households aged 
60 or over 21 33 18 14 19 4 15 
SOurce: [1] Bird and Palmer (1979), figure C.2.l 
[2] 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey, table 4 
The N.D.H.S. and the G.H.S. differ from the findings of Bird and Palmer in 
similar ways (see tables 7.8 and 7.9) • Indeed, regard ing the total 
population, the National Dwelling and Household Survey provides results 
very similar to the General Household Survey. 'lhe N.D.H.S. suggests that 
associations cater less for small families and more for elderly households 
than Bird and Palmer suggest (see table 7.9). 
'!he 1981 Census also provides data on the household cx:>np)sition of 
association tenants. Table 7.10 reveals that associations have nearly 
twice as many single person households (45.8%) as is present in the total 
population (23.8%). Associations are uroer represented in all categories 
of household containing two married adults, and all categories of 
household containing three adults, of which two are married. 
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TABLE 7.10 Household type (1981). 
Percentage 
Tenure HA U\ All HA - All U\ - All HA - U\ 
Household Type 
1 AOOLT 
1 male aged 65 or over (0) 4.2 3.5 2.6 1.6 0.9 0.7 
14.2" 1-- ----. 1 female aged 600r over (0") "15.} 11.5 --[ 2.7 3.6 9.1 
- -- -.-- - - -1 adult below pensionable 
age (0) 12.7 7.0 7~ 5.1 -0.6 5.7 1 adult (1) 2.7 1.9 ------ -=--=- 0.9- -- o.tf 1.0 1.7 
mor e) - ---- -- -.-- 2 -.0 - _._- -~ 1--1 adult (2 or 2.2 1.1 0.9 1.1 -0.2 
2 MARRIED AOOLTS 
Both urrler pensionable age (0 8.4 8.7 12.4 -..::-~_Q.. -3.7 _ _ ::O ~ 3 
------1 or both of pensionable 
~~iO) __ 11.1 12.3 12.1 :-1.0 0.2 -1.2 
- --(I) 5.6 5.0 6.7 -1.1 -1. 7 0.6 
(2) -- 6 ~.Q -'IJ 10. 3 - - --3 -- -3,2 ,- --- - --_ __ ":.4_. .:::1 .• 1 (3 or more) 2.6 4.6 4.0 -1.4 0.6 -2.0 
2 01'HER AOOLTS 
Both urrler pensionable 
age (0) 4.7 3.0 3.3 1.4 -0.3 1.7 
-------- --- -1 or both of pensl.onab1e 
age (O) 
. -~- . ------- ---- .- . -~..!.§ --~& ...J~ - -. -0.7 0.5 -1.2 (1 or more)-- 2.4 2.8 1.6 0.8 1.2 -0.4 
3 <R KEE AOOLTS- 2 MARRIED 
(0) 4.9 11.3 11.7 -6.8 -0.4 -6.4 
- -2) (1 or 3.1 6.9 7.1 -4.0 -o. ~_ ---=-~ -----_._--
. '0:5 - --(3 or more) 1.3 1.0 -0.5 0.3 -0.8 
3 OR tomE 01'HER AOOLTS 
(0) 1.8 2.2 1.9 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 
(lor more) 0.7 1.3 0.7 I- -'-- 0.0 ----0-:6 
-0.6 
1 adult 45.8 29.7 23.8 _ _ 2~~ 5.9 16.1 ~- - ---- - - - ----_.. -- 33.7 37..!1 ~~ . ~ - _=-:::'7._& 2 married adults _ -11.8 -4.0 ----- .~- --- -'7 2 other adults 9.7 9.6 8.2 1.5 1.4 0.1 
3 or more adul ts- 2 mairIed - --. JL~~ l-i 9.5- 19.8 ~11.3 -0.3 -11 ~.g.. 
-30 r 'oore- 6ther adul tS-- -- -- - 2.5 3.5 2.6 -0.1 0.9 -1.0 
.----- ---
._ ... - --
--. 
. --- --
-- ---_ .. 
All (0) 74.6 66.9 66.4 
Source: 1981 Census, Houslng and Households. 
Derived from table 17. 
Note: Number in brackets refers to number of 
children urrler sixteen years of age. 
8.2 0.5 7.7 
The tendency for associations to house small households may be caused 
by the size of association d\tiellings. Association stock is ske\1il'ed towards 
smaller units, as table 7.11 shows. Over 50% of association stock has three 
rooms or less, conpared with 25% of local authority stock, and only 14% of 
the total housing stock. 
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TABLE 7.11 Dwelling size (1981). 
Percentage 
Tenure HA LA All HA - All 
No. of rooms 
1 9.7 1.7 1.6 8.1 
2 18.3 8.1 4.1 14.2 
3 22.2 15.5 8.5 13.7 
4 22.2 25.1 21.0 1.2 
5 18.5 33.6 31.1 -12.6 
6 6.9 13.6 21.3 -14.4 
7 1.4 2.0 7.0 -5.6 
8 or JOOre 0.8 0.4 5.4 -4.6 
Source: 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 2. 
LA - All HA-LA 
0.1 8.0 
4.0 10.2 
7.0 6.7 
4.1 -2.9 
2.5 -15.1 
-7.7 -6.7 
-5.0 -0.6 
-5.0 0.4 
A bias towards smaller units is confirmed in the Housing Corporation 
analysis of statistical returns from associations in 1982 (Housing 
Corporation, 1983) where [11] one bedroom units COItPrise the largest 
group, at 32.5%. Two bedroom units corrq;>rise 29.6%, three bedroom units 21.9% 
and four or JOOre bedroom uni ts 2.7%. The table also includes the category 
bedsitter, which preswnably refers to one room dwellings, and COIt'prises 
13.4%. Nearly half (45.9%) of association stock therefore has either 00 
separate bedroom or only one bedroom. 
Associations also have smaller than average households (see table 
7.12), over two fifths of all association households being single person 
households. 
[11] The table has no number nor page number, but is entitled 'Analysis of 
Housing Association's Statistical Returns (England and Wales) '. The 
figures are for 1982, and are contained in part (d) of the table. 
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TABLE 7.12 Household size (1981). 
Percentage 
Tenure HA LA All HA - All 
Persons in 
household 
1 41.1 25.6 21. 7 
2 29.5 29.7 32.2 
3 13.0 16.7 17 .0 
4 10.1 14.9 18.1 
5 4.2 7.8 7.3 
6 1.5 3.4 2.5 
7 0.4 1.1 0.7 
8 0.1 0.4 0.3 
9 0.1 0.1 0.1 
10 or rrore 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Total 361,358 5,101,640 17,706,492 
Source: 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 2. 
19.4 
-2.7 
-4.0 
-8.0 
-3.1 
-1.0 
-0.3 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
LA - All HA-LA 
3.9 15.5 
-2.5 -0.2 
-0.3 -3.7 
-3.2 -4.8 
0.5 -3.6 
0.9 -1.9 
0.4 -0.7 
0.1 -0.2 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 -0.1 
Tables 7.8 to 7.12 clearly demonstrate that association dwellings are 
smaller than runicipal dwellings, and that their households are smaller in 
compar ison to nunicipal accomnodation. 'ltlis is especially ooticeable in 
the case of single elderly households. 'ltlis corrbination of smaller 
households aOO stock size in association property conpared with nunicipal 
property suggests that, in part, associations are coaplementing local 
authority activity because of the different size structure of their stock. 
It also results in very similar densities of occupation in the two tenures 
(see table 7.13). 
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TABLE 7.13 Density of occupation (1981) 
Tenure HA IA AllHA - All IA - All: HA - LA I 
Persons per room 
Over 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Over 1 up to 1.5 3.0 4.9 2.7 
Over 0.75 up to 1 27.7 23.6 18.4 
Over 0.5 up to 0.75 19.6 21.6 22.2 
Up to 0.5 49.0 49.1 56.1 
Source: 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 20. 
0.1 0.1 0.0 
0.3 2.2 -1.9 
9.3 5.2 4.1 
-2.6 -0.6 -2.0 
-7.1 -7.0 -0.1 
Indeed, the differences in household and dwelling size are so parallel 
that the density of occupation in the two tenures is remarkably similar 
(four of the five categories deviating by 2% or less). 
7.5 Conclusions 
Some clear differences exist between the population of housing 
association tenants and local authority tenants, and between the 
population of housing association tenants and the total population. 'Ihe 
most consistent finding is that whilst association tenants are over 
represented in the lower socio-economic groups compared to the total 
population, they are drawn from higher socio-economic groups than 
municipal tenants (tables 7.5 to 7.7). This relationship is not reflected 
in income characteristics however. Some associations seem to cater for 
households with high incomes (Page) (12) , whilst others cater for people 
with low incomes ('lhOO"q?Son). In general, associations cater for people 
with middle income levels. According to Bird and Palmer some 80% of 
(12) In 1978 the National Federation of Housing Associations (l978b, p.14) 
observed that association fair rent levels were on average 130% of 
local authority reasonable rent levels. One might therefore expect 
associations to have catered for higher income groups at that time. 
In 1983 the Federation noted (1983, p.12) however, that association 
fair rents are now comparable to municipal reasonable rents. 
209 
association tenants earned between £1500 and £4000 p.a. (see table 7.3), 
whilst only 43% of the total pop...llation did so (see table 7.4). 
The household composition of HOusing associations also differs 
markedly from the total pop...llation. Single elderly households are over 
represented in housing associations compared to the total pop...llation 
(tables 7.8 to 7.10), and generally have smaller households (tables 7.10 
and 7.12). This is reflected in the finding that associations have smaller 
dwelling units than one would expect on a proportionate basis, compared to 
the total pop...llation, and the stock of local authorities (see table 7.11). 
These results indicate that in some respects the people housed by 
housing associations are different from the people housed in other 
tenures. '!here are two problems with these findings however. '!be first 
relates to the reliability of the data. Even in the survey of Bird and 
Palmer, in which nearly 2,800 tenancies were examined, the sample size 
represents only 0.71% of association households in the country (see table 
7.1). Furtherroore, their sample does oot evenly reflect the variety of 
associations (Bird and Palmer, 1979; see appendix B, paragraItl 8.9). 
Another difficulty with the data is that of analysing causal 
relationships. In order for the influence of local authorities to be 
analysed it is preferable for the data to be spatially disaggregated. 
Chapter 6 outlined the different policies that the London Boroughs of 
Islington and Westminster have toward housing associations. It would be 
interesting to see whether these policies are reflected in the variables 
analysed. 
Since the grant system encourages the construction of small dwelling 
units, one would oot expect stock size (and consequently household size) 
to be significantly affected by local authority practices (13] • Where 
local authority influence may be prooounced is in the social composition 
[13] Total indicative cost limits are calculated taking into 
consideration, inter alia, the number of units provided, and local 
cost factors. In conversion work this encourages associations to 
sutx)ivide houses into as many small flats as is practicable, and is 
not likely to be widely different between the two boroughs. See 
appendix 5 for household composition in the study boroughs. 
210 
of housing association tenants. Local authorities have the power to 
nominate tenants to housing associations, and their conception of the 
legitimate role of associations may lead them to encourage certain types 
of association. 
As regards nominations, westminster City Council mainly nominates 
homeless families to association accommodation [14] , thereby utilising 
units with two or fOOre bedrooms. Table 7.11 indicated that association 
stock comprises smaller units than nunicipal stock, so associations in 
westminster will generally be obliged to offer their own vacancies to 
single people or childless couples as a result of nominations taking their 
larger units. Since this nomination practice is effectively from the top 
of the waiting list (see section 6.4.3, chapter 6), to some extent a 
duplication of roles exists as regards nominations. As regards the 
allocations the association makes, by virtue of the size distribution of 
their remaining stock, a duplication of roles is unlikely. In Islington the 
borough is rather fOOre constrained by the size structure of properties 
offered by the associations for nomination p.lrposes, and nominations tend 
to be single people or childless couples. Since municipal stock comprises 
larger units than association stock, this will generally not be 
duplicating the activity of the local authority itself. If a family unit 
is available the current practice is for the borough to allocate the 
vacancy to families who need to be decanted from borough stock [15] • 
Local authority assistance may also be offered to particular types of 
association. If associations facilitating ownership are assisted, for 
example, one would expect to find a particular socio-economic oorrp:>sition 
of tenants. 'lbese influences will vary spatially as local authority 
policies vary. In view of the unreliability of the secondary sources 
discussed above, and the need for spatially disaggregated data, the 
following chapter provides primary Census data on the tenant composition 
of housing associations in Islington and Westminster. 
[14] Telephone conversation with housing association officer, westminster 
City Council, 120484. 
[15] Telephone conversation with housing association officer in housing 
advisory service, Islington Borough Council, 130484. 
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8. ASSOCIATION TENANrS: PRIMARY STATISTICAL SOOOCES 
8.1 Introduction 
There are two main problems with the secondary sources of data on the 
tenant oomposition of housing associations reviewed in the previous 
chapter. First, the data itself are unreliable; the surveys are all at 
least six years out of date, and the sartq?le sizes are small in terms of the 
total pop..1lation being studied. Secondly, most of the data is national, and 
thus obscures the influence of local factors, including local authorities, 
on the activity of housing associations. In order to circlllTlVent these 
deficiencies primary statistical analysis within the study boroughs will 
be undertaken. Such data will allow variables to be examined across local 
authority areas, and a spatially restricted analysis will facilitate the 
use of a large sartq?le size in relation to the population oonsidered. '!be 
results oould rot be claimed to be typical of the oountry as a whole {I] , 
but would be reasonably typical of the boroughs ooncerned. 
Two methods of oollecting local data have been employed. '!be first 
consists of an examination of the tenant files of some of the largest 
associations operating in the study boroughs. '!be objective of such an 
examination is to assess the extent to which housing associations are 
housing the same types of people that are being housed by other tenures. If 
housing associations do rot cater for a distinctive type of tenant, or 
tenants different to those traditionally housed by other tenures, then it 
becomes difficult to explain state support for the movement in terms of 
the allocational performance of housing associations. Such a finding would 
lend support to the oonclusions of earlier chapters, that more general 
political and ideological factors are influencing government support for 
[1] See appendix 8 for a preliminary analysis of recent Census findings 
on the socio-econornic status of housing association tenants in 
England and Wales. 
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the housing association movement. The inspection of tenant files therefore 
analysed the occupation and income of household heads, and household 
structure, in order to facilitate a comparison of association tenants with 
the occupants of other tenures. The survey will also provide evidence on 
the extent to which associations select their own tenants, or are 
constrained by stock characteristics and developnental factors, or by 
agreements with local authorities. A more general justification for this 
approach is that it facilitates an evaluation of the quality of the record 
keeping of the associations. If data gleaned from these files prove 
inadequate for the p.lrposes of research, then the association itself is 
hardly in a position to evaluate the extent to which its own allocational 
priorities are being achieved. 
The second method of obtaining primary data is based on the fact that, 
for the first time, the 1981 Census lists housing association as a 
separate tenure, rather than including it within the definition of 
privately rented, which previous Censuses have done. Chapter 7 utilised 
some of the results of the 1981 Census in so far as they relate to housing 
associations. '!he Census does not provide income data, but table 47 of the 
Greater London County Report Part 2 provides a breakdown of socio-economic 
group by selected tenures. The standard table does not include the tenure 
housing association, so it was decided to obtain a special tabulation 
providing this for Islington and Westminster [2] • 
[2] Data for Kensington and Chelsea was also requested because it has the 
highest proportion of its pop.llation in association acconmodation 
(12.4%; see table 6.2, chapter 6), and because the local authority 
spends the highest proportion of its B.S.I.P. money 00 housing 
associations (67.1%; see table 6.3, chapter 6). As such it provides an 
example of an 'extreme' case which can be oompared with the findings 
for Islington and Westminster. A significant difference in the 
tenants of associations in Kensington and Chelsea would suggest that 
associations are fulfilling an unusual role there, as well as 
receiving an unusual amount of assistance from the local authority. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the pop.llation structure of 
Conservative Kensington and Chelsea differs oonsiderably from that 
of Labour Islington (see section 4.2, chapter 4). The analysis of data 
for Kensington and Chelsea is largely confined to appendix 7, because 
the characteristics and policies of the borough have not been 
analysed in detail in the text. 
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8.2 Inspection of Tenant Files 
8.2.1 Participating Associations and Methodology 
During interviews with housing association officers in the study 
boroughs permission was sought to urrlertake an inspection of their tenant 
files. Three associations agreed to this request, namely, Comnunity Housing 
Association, Samuel Lewis Housing Trust and World of People Housing Trust. 
In order to establish whether these associations are representative some 
preliminary details on them were ascertained. 
O_ounity Housing Association (CHA) was formed in 1972, arrl was based 
upon the amalgamation of two local associations which had been active for 
some six years [3] • This means that the association was formed during the 
period of Conservative support for cost rent and co-ownership 
associations. The association was registered with the Housing Corporation 
on June 23rd 1975, arrl is row a registered charity. The Directory of 
Registered Housing Associations describes Comnunity as an association 
providing houses for letting and hostels. In 1983 the association had 166 
units in the study boroughs (see appendix 1). 
Samuel Lewis Dousing Trust (SL) was fouooed in 1901, in the will of 
Samuel Lewis, a merchant banker. Sydney (1979, p.3) observes that 
"The will stated that £400,000 should be used by the Trustees to 
establish dwellings for the poor at one or JOOre places in 
England, by the plrchase of land and the erection of suitable 
buildings. These were then to be let to the poor at low rents." 
This clearly places Samuel Lewis in the category of turn of the century 
philanthropic charities. '!he Trust was registered with the Housing 
Corporation on May 13th 1975. '!he Directory of Registered Housing 
Associations describes Samuel Lewis as an association providing housing 
for letting, and houses and hostels for the special needs of the elderly 
---_._---
[3] See Comnunity Housing Association Ltd., Chairman's Annual Report for 
1981-82, inside front cover. 
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handicapped or disabled. The association had 246 units in the study 
boroughs in 1983 (see appendix 1). 
World of People Housing Trust (WPlfi') was founded in 1969 [4] • It was 
registered with the Housing Corporation on July 15th 1975. The Directory 
of Registered Housing Associations describes it as an association 
providing housing for letting, and housing for the special needs of the 
old and blind. Although it was formed whilst the influence of the 1961 and 
1964 Housing Acts was still considerable, it is now a registered charity. 
In 1983 the association had 702 units in the study boroughs (see appendix 
1). 
These associations vary in age, size of stock, and categories of special 
needs catered for. It was therefore concluded that an inspection of their 
tenant files is representative of the types of association active in the 
study boroughs. A preliminary inspection of the tenant files of the 
associations was undertaken in order to ascertain the types of information 
contained therein. On the basis of these visits a standard list of 
information to be recorded was compiled. The list comprised the following 
items: 
Primary variables 
(i) housing need (social, quality of 
previous accommodation) 
(ii) route to accommodation (selected, acquired, etc) 
(iii) if nominated, nominating agency 
(iv) household structure 
(v) occupation 
(vi) income of head of household 
(vii) size of household 
Secondary variables 
(viii) date tenancy granted 
(ix) previous tenure 
(x) rent level 
(4] See Annual Report and Accounts 1981, inside front cover. 
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The rationale for selecting most of the pr imary var iables has been 
discussed at some length in chapter 7. A measure of housing need was sought 
in order to facilitate a comparison of the measures of housing need used 
by associations in practice with those recorded in their policy documents. 
The secondary variables were selected in order to facilitate a 
crosstabulation of the primary variables, if the tenant files provided 
sufficiently comprehensive details on them. It was hoped, in particular, to 
examine the differences in the income level of incoming tenants by the 
year in which they were housed, since government advice on the types of 
people suitable for housing by associations has varied over t~ Such an 
analysis will reveal the extent to which associations have been responding 
to central government advice, or to local authority objectives through 
nominations. 
In view of the relatively small number of tenancies granted by the 
three associations in the study boroughs, it was decided that a 20% sample 
would be feasible (in terms of time available). This produced a total 
sample size of 155 tenancies. Although representing a high sample size for 
each association, because only three associations participated in the 
survey it represents only 1.26% of all association households in the study 
boroughs. This was another reason for proceeding with the special 
tabulation from the 1981 Census, since this table would provide a 10% 
sample. 
The inspection of tenant files was undertaken in August 1983. All 
associations maintained their records in al};tlabetical order of street 
name. Having established which streets were within the study boroughs, one 
file in every five was examined. The type of buildings were checked to 
ensure that one in five would not be unrepresentative (for example, if all 
buildings were five stories in height such a ratio would have selected the 
same floor in each building, and tenants so selected may have been 
untypical). Where appropriate, data obtained from tenant files is 
presented for individual associations and by the borough in which the 
tenancy was located. Any wide discrepancy in the findings between the 
boroughs may reflect a special relationship between the boroughs and the 
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associations surveyed [5] • 
8.2.2 Findings 
The quality of information maintained on tenant files varies 
considerably, both between associations and across variables recorded. 
Table 8.1 shows the percentage of tenant files from which reliable data 
could be obtained. The table exaggerates the comprehensiveness of the data 
on the files. Information on type of employment was unsystematic and often 
absent, and any rigorous interpretation in terms of socio-economic groups 
out of the question. Information on the P'lysical or social need for 
rehousing was seldom recorded on the tenant files. Very few details on the 
P'lysical condition of the property the tenant previously occupied were 
systematically recorded. Information on rent level in previous 
accommodation was also particularly poor, and information on rent level 
upon taking the tenancy was surprisingly poor (rent exclusive of rates 
being on 61.3% of files, inclusive rent on 20.6%). 
[5] The presentation of data in this way is not intended to facilitate a 
JOOre general comparison of the influence of local authority policies, 
for only one association in Islington, and two in Westminster 
participated in the survey. This can hardly be said to be 
representative of association-authority relationships in either 
borough. 
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TABLE 8.1 Percentage of files adequately supplying 
given information. 
Association CHA WPHT SL 
Tenancy date 89.7 97.5 95.7 
Route to accommodation 86.2 93.8 95.7 
Sex of head of household 86.2 98.8 100.0 
Age of head of household 58.6 83.8 93.5 
Size of household 86.2 97.5 97.8 
Employment status 62.1 85.0 97.8 
Previous tenure 65.5 81.3 91.3 
Income of head of household n/r 48.8 19.6 
Source: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
Total 
95.5 
92.6 
96.8 
81.9 
95.5 
84.5 
89.3 
-
Note: n/r indicates too few files with data to be relevant. 
In order to set a context for subsequent analysis it is necessary to 
briefly return to the extent to which associations are free to select 
their own tenants, an issue raised in chapter 5. Table 8.2 shows the ways in 
which surveyed tenants came to be housed by the association. 
TABLE 8.2 Route to accommodation. 
i Percent 
Association CHA WPHT SL Total Percent WMR ISL 
Type of tenant 
Acquired tenant 14 6 0 20 13.9 20.0 0.0 
selected tenant 3 24 17 44 30.6 27.0 38.6 
Nominated tenant 5 27 1 33 22.9 32.0 2.3 
Referred tenant 0 5 0 5 3.5 5.0 0.0 
Decanted tenant 3 12 15 30 20.8 15.0 25.0 
Transferred tenant 0 1 11 12 8.3 11.0 25.0 
-
'IOTAL 25 75 44 144 
Source: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
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This confirms the preliminary findings of chapter 5, that housing 
associations select a minority of their tenants (31%). One fifth of the 
tenants analysed were decanted in order to facilitate improvements. Some 
23% were nominated. These findings can be contrasted with the allocation 
policies of the associations. Table 8.3 compares the rank order of 
allocations in the survey with the priorities of Comnunity Housing 
Association and World of People Housing Trust. Samuel Lewis does not rank 
its priorities in terms of these headings. 
~LE 8.3 Comparison of allocation policies and 
tenant profile of surveyed associations (by rank). 
Association 0iA WPHl' 
policy Survey policy Survey 
Type of tenant rank [1] rank [2] rank [1] rank [2] 
Decant 1 3 1 
Transfer 2 - 2 
Nomination 3 2 3 
Acquired - 1 -
Source: [1] Allocation documents of associations. 
[2] Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
3 
6 
1 
-
Considering that 20% of the tenants of the associations were studied in 
the boroughs of Islington and Westminster, this provides reliable evidence ' 
that the outcome of their allocation practices does not conform to the 
policy statements of the associations. This illustrates the general point 
central to this thesis, that the expression of intent does not always 
match the outcome of action. '!'he difference between the policy and the 
outcome of association allocation practices may result from two factors. 
First, the association may respond to tenant awlications pragmatically, 
adopting a flexible approach which permits general guidelines to be 
ignored. Secondly, the types of people nominated to housing association 
accommodation may be inconsistent with the allocational policies of the 
housing associations themselves. Table 8.4 shows the agencies responsible 
for nominations. 
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~LE 8.4 Nominating agency. 
Percent 
Association OIA WPHT SL Total Percent ~ ISL 
Agency 
Local authority 4 27 1 32 84.2 83.8 100.0 
Resident's association 1 0 0 I 2.6 2.7 0.0 
Area health authority 0 2 0 2 5.3 5.4 0.0 
CEGB 0 2 0 2 5.3 5.4 0.0 
Age Concern 0 1 0 I 2.6 2.7 0.0 
Source: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
As is to be expected, by far the largest category of nominations is 
local authority nominations (84%). Other agencies nominate tenants to 
schemes where, typically, the agency has provided land for developnent 
FUrposes. It should be noted however that at 32, the total murber of local 
authority nominations comprises only 20.6% of all lettings. This is low 
considering that the current practice of local authorities is to claim 50% 
nomination rights. Irrleed, in Islington, only just over 2% of the tenants 
of samuel Lewis were nominated. This may reflect the variation in the 
comnencement dates of tenancies inspected. As tables 8.5 and 8.6 indicate, 
the tenancies analysed for Samuel Lewis in Islington are nuch older than 
for the other associations. It is possible that Samuel Lewis, a well 
established charitable trust, may have received little assistance from 
local authorities in the past, or for other reasons have been subject to 
less pressure from Islington for nominations. '!be variation between the 
polcies of the associations and the outcome of their allocations (table 
8.3) cannot be totally ascribed to the influence of local authority 
nominations. 
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TABLE 8.5 Date tenancy comnenced (by association) • 
. 
Number Percent 
Date rnA WPHT SL All Date rnA WPm' SL All 
--
I---
Pre-1970 0 1 5 6 Pre-1970 0.0 1.3 11.4 4.1 
1970-79 19 9 29 57 1970-79 73.1 U.S 65.9 38.5 
1980 on 7 68 10 85 1980 on 26.9 87.2 22.7 57.4 
Total 26 78 44 148 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
TABLE 8.6 Date tenancy comnenced (by borough). 
Number Percent 
WMR ISL WMR ISL 
Date 
Pre-1970 1 5 1.2 11.4 
1970-79 8 29 9.5 65.9 
1980 on 75 10 89.3 22.7 
Source: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
The inspection of tenant files provided a wide range of information on 
the household composition of housing association tenancies. This permits 
an analysis of the extent to which associations are housing types of 
households similar to those being housed by local authorities, and thus 
facilitated the assessment of the extent to which associations and local 
authorities are performing different allocational tasks. '!be extent to 
which their allocational practices vary will go some way in suggesting 
which of the theoretical relationships between association and municipal 
provision outlined in chapter 6 exists in Islington and Westminster. Table 
8.7 shows that in comparison with the total pofUlation, the associations 
surveyed accomnodate smaller households than one would expect on a 
proportionate basis. The table also shows that association households are 
in general smaller than local authority households, confirming the 
findings of the 1981 Census. 
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TABLE 8.7 Household size (percentage). 
-
England 
and Wales [1] [2] [2] 
Tenure All LA HA HA WMR 
No. of 
persons 
1 21. 7 25.6 41.1 51.4 59.2 
2 32.2 29.7 29.5 28.4 25.2 
3 17 .0 16.7 l3.0 9.5 9.7 
4 18.1 14.9 10.1 4.7 1.0 
5+ 11.0 i 12.9 6.3 6.1 4.9 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 2. 
[2] Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
I 
[2] 
ISL 
33.3 
35.6 
8.9 
8.9 
.~ 
There is very little difference between the age distr ibution of the 
pop.llation of the country and the age profile of all residents at adresses 
surveyed (see table 8.8). This is contrary to the findings of the secoooary 
sources reviewed in chapter 7 (see tables 7.8 to 7.10). 
~LE 8.8 Age distribution (percentage). 
Total Surveyed [2] 
pop.llation [1] pop.l1ation [2] WMR 
Age 
<18 25.6 22.6 16.7 
18-34 24.9 29.2 37.0 
35-44 12.1 l3.2 8.7 
45-59 17 .2 14.0 13.8 
60+ 20.2 21.0 23.9 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Sex Age and Marital Status. 
Derived from table 2 (England and Wales). 
[2] Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
[2] 
ISL 
27.1 
26.0 
14.6 
15.6 
16.7 
An analysis in terms of age of head of household does show a difference 
between the sample and the total pop.llation (see table 8.9). The 
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association tenants surveyed are biased towards the young, but are not 
biased towards the elderly. Compared with the population of local 
authorities, associations cater more for young households (48.8% below 45 
years of age, compared with 31.5% for local authorities). 
TABLE 8.9 Age of household head (percentage). 
Census Survey 
[1] [1] [2] [2] 
Age All LA HA ~ 
16-29 11.9 11.0 24.0 26.9 
30-44 26.7 20.5 24.8 24.4 
45-64 34.0 36.4 25.6 19.2 
65+ 27.3 32.1 25.6 29.5 
SOurce: [1] 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 12. 
[2] Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
[2] 
ISL 
14.3 
28.6 
33.3 
23.8 
'Itle inspection of tenant files permitted an analysis of the sex of 
household heads. Table 8.10 compares the sex of the head of household in 
the sample with that of the total population. This reveals a much higher 
proportion of female heads of households in the sample population (indeed, 
in Islington the majority of household heads surveyed are female). This is 
mainly a result of the fact that the associations house many single person 
households, a large number of which compr ise single women. 
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~LE 8.10 Sex of head of household (percentage). 
All Percent 
tenures Total ISL 
[1] [2] [2] 
Sex 
Male 75.0 50.7 46.1 
Female 25.0 49.3 53.8 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Housing and Households. 
Derived from table 15. 
[2] Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
WMR 
[2] 
60.9 
39.1 
Another guide to the nature of association allocation practices is the 
previous tenure of tenants. Table 8.11 provides this information, 
confirming that the largest category is internal decants. In aggregate, 
this confirms the allocational priorities expressed by associations in 
Islington and Westminster (and presented in table 5.4). Nearly 40% were 
previously privately renting. If the charitable status of the associations 
is being enforced (something which their records did rot permit an 
analysis of), then these tenants would have below average incomes, and 
would otherwise have had to look to the local authority for rehousing. 
Only 7% were previously local authority tenants. 'lbere is thus little 
evidence of a direct exchange of tenants. Rather, people who may have IOOved 
from other tenures to municipal accommodation have IOOVed to association 
accorrmodation instead [6] • Only one person surveyed was previously an 
owner occupier. '!be fact that there were no surveyed tenants in Islington 
that were acquired tenants reflects the history of the Samuel Lewis estate 
in Islington, which was p.lrp::>se built at the turn of the century, and is 
now being rehabilitated. Comnunity Housing Association and World of People 
Housing Trust have acquired many of their properties IOOre recently. 
--------
[6] This is evidently true of nominations, considering the way in which 
the boroughs operate their nomination arrangements (see section 
6.4.3, chapter 6). 
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TABLE 8.11 Previous tenure. 
Percent 
Number Total WMR ISL 
Tenure 
Private rented (acquired) 20 15.9 23.8 0.0 
Private rented (other) 29 23.0 28.6 11.9 
Housing association (decant) 31 24.6 19.0 35.7 
Housing association (other) 16 12.7 0.0 38.1 
Local authority 9 7.1 9.5 2.4 
o.mer occupier 1 0.8 1.2 0.0 
Tied 2 1.6 2.4 0.0 
Sharing (family/friends) 18 14.3 15.5 11.9 
SOurce: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
Although occupation and income level were rot rigorously recorded in 
the tenant files, it was possible to determine the emplo~ent status of 
the head of household in 84.5% of the files. Table 8.12 provides this 
information, and shows that nearly one quarter of the tenants of the 
associations were retired when housed. This says IOOre about the age of the 
tenants than their economic position relative to the occupants of other 
tenures, for life insurance, private pensions and interest on savings can 
alter their income level. 
TABLE 8.12 Employment status. 
Percent 
Status Number Total ~ ISL 
Employed 97 74.1 72.1 77 .8 
Unemployed 3 2.3 3.5 0.0 _._ .. 
Retired 31 23 . 7 24.4 22.2 
SOurce: Inspection of tenant files (1983). 
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The rate of unemployment amongst heads of households is one general 
indicator of relative economic position. As table 8.12 indicates, only 2.3% 
of the association tenants surveyed were unemployed. Whilst being a 
valuable measure of relative economic position, the unemployment rate 
var ies over time, so this information must be cross tabulated by year to 
have any meaning [7] • This presents severe sampling difficulties, for in 
Islington no tenant surveyed was unemployed when housed by the 
association, and in Westminster only three of the surveyed tenants were 
unemployed when housed by the association. A cross tabulation of 
unemployment rate by time will therefore generate cells with few or no 
entries, thus rendering any statistical analysis meaningless. A larger 
sample would have helped to solve this problem, but in general the quality 
of information recorded on income and employment was poor. 
8.2.3 Conclusions 
The inspection of tenant files produced two main sets of conclusions. 
First, data on some household charactersitics were well maintained. This 
showed that associations select few of their tenants, and that household 
sizes are generally small, confirming the findings of earlier chapters. 
The age of household heads living in association accomnodation is biased 
towards the young in comparison with both the total population and the 
population of local authorities. The sex of the head of household renting 
from an association was rruch more evenly distributed than in the 1981 
Census for all tenures. These findings do signify a targetting that is, in 
practice, reasonably distinct from other tenures. Secondly, data on some 
household characteristics was poorly maintained. Income level and type of 
employment being particularly patchy, though employment status was easier 
to establish. No systematic details of the social or IX'lysical reasons for 
housing the tenants was recorded. This made an analysis of the changing 
basis of the allocation priorities of the associations impossible. 
---------
[7) This would also have been necessary for income and rent levels, had 
they been recorded sufficiently well. 
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The survey provides evidence that crucial data on income and employment 
are missing from many files, and the route to accomnodation revealed in 
the sample differed widely from the policy statements of the associations. 
Monitoring of allocational performance seems generally weak [8] 
therefore. This suggests a pragmatic approach to allocations, which may 
aid flexibility, but does little to ensure that the allocational 
priorities of any outside institution are being met. 
8.3 Socio-Economic Group of Association Tenants 
8.3.1 Purpose of the Special Tabulation 
Previous chapters have indicated that government advice on the types of 
tenants suitable for association accomnodation has undergone dramatic 
changes since 1961. Initially, Conservative inspired oost renting was 
intended to be suitable for middle-income earners and young professional 
people. ftk)re recently, Labour legislation has suggested that associations 
should undertake rehabilitation work [9] , a task which will lead to the 
housing of increasingly poor privately rented tenants. In spite of the 
significance of association allocational performance, relatively little 
statistical research has been undertaken on this subject. A special 
tabulation from the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys provides 
data which is unbiased [10] , statistically significant (a sample of 10%), 
and comparable across local author i ty areas. Information on the socio-
economic group of association tenants will throw light on the extent to 
which association practices have been influenced by legislation, and local 
authority policies. 
[8] Although this cannot be generalised to all associations. See Power 
(1979) for example. 
[9] The 1967 Housing Subsidies Act and the 1974 Housing Act. 
[10] A charge levelled against Bird and Palmer (1979) by the Committee of 
Public Accounts (1979, para.193). 
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8.3.2 FiOOings 
Before the results of the special tabulation are presented, it is 
necessary to consider the exact phrasing of the Census question on tenure. 
Question H2 of the Census asked 
"How do you and your household occupy your accomnodation?" 
Seven structured responses were provided. Categories one and two were 
'owner occupier', the former being freehold and the latter leasehold. '!he 
remaining categor ies were 'renting, rent free, or by lease', of which 
category five was 'from a housing association or charitable trust'. 
Crucially, rote (b) to the question transfers some occupants of 
association accornnodation into the owner occupier category. '!he note 
states 
"If a share in the property is being bought under an arrangement 
with a local authority, New TOwn corporation or housing 
association, for example, shared ownership (equity sharing), a 
co-ownership scheme, tick box 1 or 2 as awropriate." 
All association activity defined in the awroved development programme 
as being for 'other tenures' is thus defined in the Census as or,.mer 
occupation [11] • 'l11is definition cannot be criticised on tenurial 
grounds, for chapter 3 demonstrated that such activities have little in 
cornnon with the philanthropic origins of housing associations. What this 
does mean, however, is that the Census definition of housing associations 
is that subset of their activity which does rot result in ownership. There 
is every reason to suppose that tenants who are p..1rchasing their 
properties from an association have higher incomes, or fOOre secure 
employment, than tenants who are rot in the process of acquiring an 
interest in their property. 'l11e findings of the Census will therefore 
umerstate the activity of associations to the extent that such people are 
defined as owner occupiers. 'l11is reinforces the need to examine the rate 
of sale of association properties in order to obtain a fOOre accurate 
[11] The 1978 National Dwelling and Household Survey included co-
ownership and cost rent housing within the tenure 'housing 
association'; see 1978 N.D.H.S., p.183. 
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indication of the total activities of housing associations. 
The special tabulation provided data by socio-economic group. The 
presence of 17 groups means that general patterns are difficult to 
distinguish using these categories. A grouping is necessary in order to 
provide more manageable units for analysis, and to facilitate a comparison 
of the Census findings with the findings of other surveys. Table 8.13 shows 
the grouping convention used, and describes the categories to be folll"rl in 
succeeding tables. Although subsequent tables present the raw data in 
percentage terms, unless otherwise stated, the following analysis uses the 
grouped soico-economic group data presented [12] • 
~LE 8.13 Derivation of grouped socio-economic 
groups. 
Grouped 
socio-
economic Socio-economic 
group Description included 
1 Professional 3,4 
2 Managerial 1,2,13 
3 Intermediate and junior 
non manual 5.1,5.2,6 
4 Skilled manual 8,9,12,14 
----
5 Semi-skilled manual 7,10,15 
6 Unskilled manual 11 
Other Other 16,17 
groups 
Retired Retired Retired (not included 
. 
above) 
. 
Table 8.14 (p.233) shows, by tenure, the socio-economic profile of the 
London Borough of Islington. The last three columns show the difference 
between housing association tenants and the tenants of other tenures. It 
is clear that association tenants are drawn from higher socio-economic 
[12] Another convention used in succeeding tables is the abbreviation of 
tenures as follows: HA indicates housing association, I.A indicates 
local authority or New Town corporation, 00 indicates owner occupied, 
PRO indicates privately rented unfurnished (furnished being absent 
from the Census tables). 
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groups than local author i ty tenants, but lower socio-economic groups than 
owner occupiers. The proportion of housing association tenants and the 
proportion of local authority tenants in the professional and managerial 
groups are smaller than the proportion of owner occupiers in these groups. 
The proportion of association tenants in both of these socio-economic 
groups is closer to the proportion of owner occupiers in these groups than 
it is to the proportion renting from a local authority. The proportion of 
association tenants in the next socio-economic group (intermediate and 
junior non-manual) is similar to the proportion of owner occupiers in this 
group, and JlK)re than the proportion renting from a local authority. In 
socio-economic group 4 (skilled manual) , associations house 
proportionately JlK)re than any other tenure. Of all tenures, local 
authorities house the highest proportion in socio-economic groups 5 and 6 
(semi-skilled and unskilled manual), with owner occupation housing the 
lowest proportion. In general, then, owner occupation accomnodates a 
disproportionately high number of the professional and managerial groups 
(with local authorities housing the least). Housing associations house a 
disproportionately high number of the skilled manual groups. Local 
authorities house a disproportionately high number of the semi-skilled 
and unskilled. In this respect, association tenants are socio-economically 
mid-way between plblic renting and ownership. '!his is confirmed when 
association tenants are compared with privately rented tenants, for here 
the difference is less systematic; associations cater ing for less 
managerial employees, but also less unskilled employees, than the 
privately rented sector. One way of ranking these differences is that of 
'absolute difference'. '!his is the sum of the deviations, expressed as 
though all deviations are positive. Although being a crude measure of 
difference, it is sufficient to form the basis of ranking the scale of the 
differences [13] • Using the grouped categories again, this method reveals 
the following total deviations: 
[13] The measure can be as low as zero, where all socio-economic groups 
accommodate exactly the same proportions. The other extreme is where 
all occupants of one tenure are in one socio-economic group, and all 
occupants in another tenure are in a different socio-economic group. 
'!his would result in a total absolute difference of 200. 
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HA/LA 
HA/OO 
HA/PRO 
29.17 
41.48 
22.78 
This suggests that association tenants differ the least from privately 
rented tenants, as well as differing from them in an unsystematic way. 
Table 8.15 (p.234) shows the socio-economic profile of the London 
Borough of Westminster, by tenure. Once again, housing association tenants 
are generally drawn from higher socio-economic groups than local 
authority tenants, and lower socio-economic groups than owner occupiers. 
Consider ing the socio-economic data in detail, the general pattern in 
Westminster is similar to that found in Islington. CMner occupation 
accomnodates the highest proportion in the professional and managerial 
groups. Housing associations house the highest proportion in the 
intermediate and junior non-manual group. Local authorities house the 
highest proportion in the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual 
groups. Whilst this general pattern is similar to that found in Islington, 
comparing tables 8.14 and 8.15 we see that the scale of the differences 
found in Westminster are lOOre pronounced than those found in Islington. 
For example, the proportion of household heads in owner occupation in 
socio-economic group 2 (manager ial), exceeds the proportion in housing 
association accomnodation in this group by over 20% in Westminster, but by 
only 12% in Islington. The proportion of housing association tenants in 
socio-economic group 3 (intermediate and junior non-manual), is similar to 
the proportion owner occupying in this group in Islington, yet in 
Westminster it exceeds the proportion in owner occupation by nearly 10%. 
Furthermore, the proportion of household heads in association 
accomnodation in socio-economic group 4 (skilled manual), exceeds that 
renting from a local authority in Islington, but in Westminster the 
relationship is the other way around, where local authorities house the 
highest proportion in all three of the lowest socio-economic groups. Thus, 
relative to housing association tenants, owner occupation is lOOre heavily 
biased towards the professional and managerial groups in westminster than 
it is in Islington. Relative to other tenures, housing associations are 
lOOre heavily biased towards the intermediate and junior non-manual group 
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in westminster than they are in Islington. Relative to housing association 
tenants, local authorities are roore heavily biased towards the three 
lowest socio-economic groups in Westminster than they are in Islington. 
Indeed, the proportion of local authority tenants in socio-economic groups 
4 to 6 is 48% in Westminster, exceeding the proportion of housing 
association tenants in these groups by 13 percentage points. In Islington 
however, the proportion of local authority tenants in these groups only 
exceeds the proportion of housing association tenants by 6 percentage 
points. 
Association tenants are drawn from lower socio-economic groups than 
privately rented tenants in Westminster (excluding retired tenants). 
Indeed, the absolute differences between the tenures shows that 
association tenants are roost similar to rrunicipal tenants in this borough: 
HA/IA 
HA!OO 
HA!PRU 
34.54 
68.58 
44.02 
It is worth pointing out that these differences are all large in 
comparison to those found in Islington. To what extent are these 
variations s~ly the result of the overall population differences 
between the two boroughs? 
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TABLE 8.14 socio-economic profile, by tenure, 
1n Isl1ngton (1981). 
Tenure All HA LA 00 PRU HA-LA 
[1] [2] [1] [1] [1] 
Socio- ----
I---
economic 
group 
1 2.59 1.46 1.27 7.46 1.87 0.19 
2 4.89 3.66 2.79 9.89 6.73 0.87 
3 0.61 0.37 0.06 2.71 0.56 0.31 
4 2.81 2.56 0.65 8.58 1.68 1.91 
5.1 7.36 9.32 3.21 14.46 6.54 6.11 
5.2 0.67 0.37 0.68 0.84 0.75 -0.31 
6 12.30 15.72 11.00 10.17 12.90 4.72 
7 4.80 2.38 5.54 3.45 3.36 -3.16 
8 2.06 3.29 2.25 2.15 1.68 1.04 
9 13.54 14.99 16.43 8.40 12.34 -1.44 
10 12.86 13.71 15.19 7.28 12.15 -1.48 
11 7.58 6.76 9.34 3.54 7.29 -2.58 
12 4.70 5.12 3.88 8.40 4.49 1.24 
13 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.06 
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
16 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 LO.OO 0.00 
17 2.58 2.19 2.84 1.68 2.62 -0.65 
I - - - --1---- --
R/A 5.60 5.30 6.36 5.04 I 5.98 -1.06 
R/I 14.98 12.80 18.43 5.88 I 19.07 -5.63 
Total 100 100 100 100 1100 
Grouped I 
socio- I I 
economic I group 
. 4_ ... . _ ._ . 
-------------- -- -------- -- - . - ~ -- ---- - -- ---
1 P 3.42 2.93 0.71 11.29 2.24 2.22 
2 M 7.53 5.12 4.12 17.44 8.60 1.00 
3IJNM 20.33 25.41 14.89 25.47 20.19 10.52 
-
4 SM 20.30 23.40 22.56 18.94 18.50 0.84 
5 SSM 17.68 16.09 20.76 10.73 15.51 -4.61 
6 USM 7.58 6.76 9.34 3.54 7.29 -2.58 
Other 2.60 2.19 2.84 1.68 2.62 -0.65 
Retired 20.58 18.10 24.79 10.91 25.05 -6.69 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
--
HA-OO 
-6.00 
-6.23 
-2.34 
-6.02 
-5.14 
-0.47 
5.55 
-1.07 
1.14 
6.59 
6.43 
3.22 
-3.28 
-0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.51 
0.26 
6.92 
-6.36 
-12.32 
-0.06 
4.46 
5.36 
3.22 
0.51 
1.19 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Greater London County Report, 
Part 2. Derived from table 47. 
[2] 1981 Census, special tabulation from Greater London 
County Report, Part 2 (derivation). 
Note: RIA indicates retired head in household with an 
active member. 
R/I indicates retired head in household with no active 
member. 
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HA-PRU 
-0.41 
-3.07 
-0.19 
0.88 
2.78 
-
-0.38 
2.82 
-0.98 
1.61 
2.65 
1.56 
-0.53 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.43 
-0.68 
-6.27 
0.69 
-3.48 
5.22 
4.90 
0.58 
-0.53 
-0.43 
-6.95 
TABLE 8.15 Socio-economic profile, by tenure, 
1n Westm1nster (1981). 
Tenure All HA LA 00 PRU HA-LA 
[1] [2] [1] [1] [1] 
-- t-. -- -
Socio-
economic 
J group 
1 4.82 2.82 1.89 1 8.78 5.80 0.93 
2 11.81 4.79 3.57 1 21.67 17.53 1.22 
3 1.93 0.28 0.14 5.60 2.69 0.14 
4 3.78 2.25 0.94 8.00 3.39 1.31 
5.1 8.57 10.00 3.57 11.71 10.04 6.43 
5.2 0.63 0.99 0.89 0.13 0.78 0.10 
6 14.66 20.14 13.25 9.82 15.12 6.89 
7 7.62 8.03 9.39 2.47 3.74 -1.36 
8 0.97 0.99 1.74 0.26 0.64 -0.75 
9 5.69 7.46 11.27 1.69 2.97 -3.67 
HA-OO 
-5.96 
-16.88 
-5.32 
-5.75 
-1.71 
0.86 
10.32 
5.56 
0.73 I 5.77 
10 6.34 7.61 10.42
1 
1. 76 3.04 -2.81 5.85 ! 
11 5.38 7.46 11.23 0.65 2.12 -3.77 6.81 
12 3.77 3.52 3.62 I 4.10 5.94 -0.10 -0.58 
13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0. 13 1 0.00 0.00 -0.13 14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
15 0.07 0.14 0. 09 1 0.00 ! 0.00 0.05 0.14 
16 0.59 0.14 0.05 0.33 1 0.21 0.09 -0.19 
17 2.68 2.53 2.58 2.60 1 2.33 -0.05 -0.07 
R/A 4.22 2.54 6.25 4.36 4.17 -3.71 -1.82 
R/I 16.44 18.31 19.30 15.94 19.43 -0.99 2.37 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Grouped 
socio-
economic 
[group 
- --
~-.-. -
-----
1-------
------ - -
I P 5.71 2.54 1.08 13.60 6.08 1.46 -11.06 
2 M 16.66 7.61 5.26 30.58 23.32 2.35 -22.97 
3 IJNM 23.86 31.13 17.71 21.67 25.94 13.42 9.46 
----- - - -4 SM 10.44 11.97 16.63 6.05 9.61 -4.66 5.92 
5 SSM 14.03 15.77 19.90 4.23 6.78 -4.13 11.54 
6 USM 5.38 7.46 11.23 0.65 2.12 -3.n 6.81 
-
Other 3.27 2.68 2.63 2.93 2.54 0.05 -0.25 
Retired 20.66 20.85 25.55 20.30 23.60 ' -4.70 0.55 
--_._---- '-._--
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Greater London County Report, 
Part 2. Derived from table 47. 
[2] 1981 Census, special tabulation from Greater London 
COunty Report, Part 2 (derivation). 
Note: R/A indicates retired head in household with an 
active member. 
R/I indicates retired head in household with 00 active 
member. 
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HA-PRU 
- 2.98 
-12.74 
-2.41 
-1.14 
-0.04 
0.21 
5.02 
4.29 
0.35 
4.49 
4.57 
5.34 
-2.42 
0.00 
-0.07 
0.14 
-0.07 
0.20 
-1.63 
-1.12 
-3.54 
-15.11 
5.19 
2.36 
8.99 
5.34 
0.14 
-2.15 
TABLE 8.16 Comparison of tenants of housing 
assoclatlons, and the total pop.llation of 
Islington and Westminster (1981). 
Area Westminster Islinqton Difference 
Tenure All [lJ HA [2] ~1 [1] HA [2] !All [1] HA [2] 
Socio-
economic 
group 
1 4.82 2.82 2.59 1.46 2.23 1.36 
2 11.81 4.79 4.89 3.66 6.92 1.13 
3 1.93 0.28 0.61 0.37 1.32 -0.09 
4 3.78 2.25 2.81 2.56 0.97 -0.31 
5.1 8.57 10.00 7.36 9.32 1.21 0.68 
5.2 0.63 0.99 0.67 0.37 -0.04 0.62 
6 14.66 20.14 12.30 15.72 2.36 4.42 
7 7.62 8.03 4.80 2.38 2.82 5.65 
8 0.97 0.99 2.06 3.29 -1.09 -2.30 
9 5.69 7.46 13.54 14.99 -7.85 -7.53 
10 6.34 7.61 12.86 13.71 -6.52 -6.10 
11 5.38 7.46 7.58 6.76 -2.20 0.70 
12 3.77 3.52 4.70 5.12 -0.93 -1.60 
13 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
14 0.01· 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
15 0.07 ! 0.14 0.02 0.00 I 0.05 0.14 
16 0. 59 1 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.57 0.14 
17 2.68 2.53 2.58 2.19 0.10 0.34 
R/A 4.22 2.54 5.60 5.30 -1.38 -2.76 
IJ~LI 16.44 18.31 14.98 12.80 I 1.46 5.51 
-
Total 100 100 100 100 
Grouped i I socio- I , I 
economic I I group I 
1 P 5.71 +- 3.42 2. 93 1 2.29 -0.39 2.54 I 
2 M 16.66 7.61 7.53 5.12 I 9.13 2.49 
3 IJNM 23.86 31.13 20.33 25.41 3.53 5.72 
4 SM 10.44 11.97 20.30 23.40 -9.86 -ll.43 
5 SSM 14.03 15.77 17.68 16.09 -3.65 -0.32 
6 USM 5.38 7.46 7.58 6.76 -2.20 0.70 
Other 3.27 2.68 2.60 2.19 0.67 0.49 
Retired 20.66 20.85 20.58 18.10 0.08 2.75 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: [lJ 1981 Census, Greater London County Report, 
Part 2. Der ived from table 47. 
[2] 1981 Census, special tabulation from Greater London 
County Report, Part 2 (derivation). 
Note: R/A indicates retired head in household with an 
active menDer. 
R/I indicates retired head in household with no active 
member. 
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TABLE 8.17 Comparison of socio-economic profile of 
dlfferent tenures in the combined London Boroughs 
of Islington and Westminster (1981). 
Tenure All HA LA 00 PRU HA-LA 
[1] [2] [1] [1] [1] 
Socio-
econanic 
group 
1 3.78 2.23 1.43 8.24 4.72 0.80 
2 8.57 4.30 3.08 16.83 14.56 1.22 
3 1.31 0.32 0.09 4.41 2.10 0.23 
4 3.33 2.39 0.76 8.24 2.92 1.63 
5.1 8.01 9.71 3.34 12.84 9.08 6.37 
5.2 0.65 0.72 0.76 0.42 0.77 -0.04 
6 13.56 18.22 11.84 9.97 14.51 
I 
6.38 
7 6.30 5.57 6.99 2. 87 1 3.64 -1.42 
8 1.48 2.00 2.06 1.03 1 0.92 -0.06 9 9.36 10.74 14.50 4.45 5.54 -3.76 
10 9.39 I 10.26 13.41 4. 02 1 5.54 -3.15 
11 6.41 7.16 10.05 1.84 I 3.54 -2.89 
12 4.21 4.22 3.78 5. 86 1 5.54 0.44 13 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.00 -0.04 
14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 I 0.05 0.00 
15 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 
16 0.32 O.O~I 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.06 17 2.63 2.39 2.75 2.22 2.41 -0.36 
R/A 4.87, 3.74' 6.32 4.64 4.67 -2.58 
R/I 15.76 I 15.91 18.76 11.81 19.33 -2.85 
Total 100 I 100 100 100 100 
Grouped' 
socio-
economic 
group 
1 P 4.63 2.70 0.84 12.65 5.03 1.86 
2 M 12.39 6.52 4.54 25.18 I 19.28 1.98 
3 IJNM 22.21 28.64 15.94 23.23 24.36 12.70 
4 SM 15.06 16.95 20.34 11.35 12.05 -3.39 
5 SSM 15.73 15.91 20.45 6.90 9.18 -4.54 
6 USM 6.41 7.16 10.05 1.84 3.54 -2.89 
f----- 1-------
Other 2.95 2.47 2.76 2.41 2.56 -0.29 
Retired 20.62 19.65 25.07 16.44 24.00 -5.42 
-
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
HA-OO 
-6.01 
-12.53 
-4.09 
-5.85 
-3.13 
0.30 
8.25 
2.70 
0.97 
6.29 
6.24 
5.32 
I 
-1.64 
-0.11 
I 0.00 
; 0.08 I I 
-0.11 
0.17 
-0.90 
4.10 
-9.95 
-18.66 
5.41 
5.60 
9.01 
5.32 
0.06 
3.21 
Source: [1] 1981 Census, Greater London County Report, 
Part 2. Derived from table 47. 
[2] 1981 Census, special tabulation from Greater London 
County Report, Part 2 (derivation). 
Note: R/A indicates retired head in household with an 
active member. 
R/I indicates retired head in household with no active 
member. 
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HA-PRU 
-2.49 
-10.26 
-1.78 
-0.53 
0.63 
-0.05 
3.71 
1.93 
1.08 
5.20 
4.72 
3.62 
, 
-1.32 I 
0.00 I 
-0.05 J 
0.08 I 
-0.07 I 
-0.02 J 
-0.93 
-3.42 
-2.33 
-U.76 
4.28 
4.90 
6.73 
3.62 
-0.09 
-4.35 
Chapter 4 described how the boroughs were selected in order to minimise 
the difference between their household characteristics. The requirement 
that the boroughs should have different local political control 
restricted the extent to which this was possible [14] • Table 8.16 (p.235) 
compares the total population of Islington and Westminster, and the 
tenants of housing associations in these areas. It can be seen that the 
heads of households in Westminster are generally from higher socio-
economic groups than the population of Islington; the proportion in socio-
economic groups 1 to 3 being higher in Westminster, and the proportion in 
socio-economic groups 4 to 6 being higher in Islington. The difference in 
association tenants is somewhat less pronounced than this. Indeed, in only 
two groups is the difference between association tenants greater than 
three percentage points [15] • Furtherroore, the oomparison of tables 8.14 
and 8.15 above showed that, relative to other tenures, local authorities 
accomnodate a disproportionately high number of tenants in the lowest 
three socio-economic groups in Westminster, despite the population of this 
borough being generally from higher socio-economic groups than 
Islington [16] • 'Ibis is oonfirmed in table 8.16, where the proportion of 
housing association tenants in socio-economic groups 4 to 6 is 35% in 
Westminster, but exceeds the proportion in the total population by 5.5%. In 
Islington the proportion of housing association tenants in these groups is 
46%, yet it exceeds the proportion in the total population by only 0.5%. 
This suggests that associations are not merely responding to the 
population profile of their areas; something is causing them to house 
groups of people roore similar across the local authority areas than the 
---_._------
[14] See table 4.6, chapter 4. Although the population of Westminster is 
nearer to that of Islington than is the popluation of Kensington and 
Chelsea, there is still a wide var iation. 
[15] 'Ibis occurs in socio-economic groups 3 and 4. In Westminster, 31% of 
association tenants are in the intermediate and junior non-manual 
group, whilst only 25% are in this group in Islington. Conversely, in 
Islington 23% of association tenants are skilled manual, whilst in 
Westminster only 12% are. 
[16] 'Ibe proportion of local authority tenants in socio-economic groups 4 
to 6 in Islington is indeed higher than in Westminster, but relative 
to other tenures, local authorities seem to specialise in housing 
groups from these groups roore in Westminster. 
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socio-economic profiles of the boroughs alone would suggest [17] • This is 
borne out by considering the absolute differences between the figures: 
All/All 31.41 
HA/HA 24.29 
In particular, associations cater for less professional people than the 
total population would suggest, and more people in the intermediate and 
junior oon-manual and skilled manual groups than the total pop.tlation 
would suggest. 
Tables 8.14 and 8.15 compared the occupants of the various tenures in 
Islington and Westminster. Table 8.17 (p.236) combines this data, and 
permits a comparison of the situation in the individual boroughs with the 
overall position in the two boroughs. Combining the boroughs gives a total 
sample of 1,257 association households (1.22% of all association 
households in Greater London). Once again, associations cater for higher 
socio-economic groups than local authorities, and lower socio-economic 
groups than owner occupation. The tenure with the highest proportion of 
its household heads in the professional and managerial classes is owner 
occupatio~ Housing associations have proportionately the most occupants 
in the intermediate and junior oon-manual class, and local authorities 
have the highest proportion in the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual classes (this relationship between tenures closely resembles the 
position nationally; see appendix 8). In the corrbined boroughs, 
associations cater for lower socio-economic groups than does the 
privately rented sector. The tenants of associations are most similar to 
the tenants local authorities however, despite their very different tenant 
profiles: 
-------
[17] Although it is possible to suggest that association stock size 
characteristics may lead them to house similar types of households, 
irrespective of area, this does little to suggest why the socio-
economic group of their tenants should vary less than variations in 
the local populatio~ It is possible that local authorities may 
nominate similar types of tenants, but chapter 7 showed that this is 
not the case in Islington and Westminster. It could be argued that 
the preponderance of rehabilitation, and the acquisition of sitting 
tenants, is partly responsible for this finding. 
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HAlLA 
HAloo 
HA!PRU 
33.07 
57.22 
39.06 
As stated above, it is necessary to also consider the amount of work 
undertaken by associations which results in home ownership, for this is 
included as owner occupation in the tables above. Although equity creation 
through housing association schemes is unlike the types of activities 
which the {ililanthropic trusts uOOertook in the nineteenth century, any 
analysis of the rationale of state support for housing associations in the 
twentieth century must consider the extent to which associations are being 
encouraged to promote owner occupation. In fact, the definitional 
convention used in the Census is rot likely to switch many tenants of 
housing associations into the owner occupied category. In 1982/83 only 
1.4% of association completions resulted in home ownership [18] 
Furthermore, the 1982/83 Annual Report of the Housing Corporation (p.9) 
reveals that only 947 units were p.lrchased uOOer the 1980 Housing Act 
prior to 31st March 1982, so this is rot a significant factor either. The 
effect of this definitional convention on any future survey which {ilrases 
the tenure q..testion in the same way will be nuch greater; in 1982/83 just 
over 16% of association completions resulted in house p.lrchase, and 2,894 
units were sold uOOer the 1980 Housing Act provisions. In a period when the 
Conservative Government is attempting to extend the right to buy to 
charitable associations, and has accused charitable associations of 
breaking the law by not housing poor people, the importance of the Census 
definition of tenure should rot be uOOerestimated. Purchasers of 
association property are included as owner occupiers, instantly increasing 
the proportion of people who are seen to be adopting non state solutions 
to their housing needs. Those people unable to p.lrchase association 
property will be a relatively poor subset of all people occupying 
association property, representing the activity of housing associations as 
being entirely in accordance with Conservative desires that they should 
only house the residual poor. Using the Census definition of tenure, the 
more associations encourage ownership for middle income tenants, the IOOre 
[18] 1981/82 Annual Report of the Housing Corporation, Appendix I. 
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the Census will suggest that the only activity of housing associations is 
the housing of a residual category of poor households. 
8.3.3 Conclusions 
The evidence suggests that housing associations accommodate people of 
higher socio-economic status than local authorities house. Despite this, 
association tenants are more like municipal tenants than they are the 
occupants of any other tenure. '!his suggests that associations are oot 
duplicating local authority work, and yet are oot performing totally 
dissimilar tasks. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The empirical research described above demonstrates that the tenants 
of housing associations differ from the tenants of local authorities, and 
from privately rented tenants. Households in association accommodation 
tend to be small and young. Association tenants are generally from higher 
socio-economic groups than local authority tenants, and from lower socio-
economic groups than owner occupiers. '!here is 00 similar systematic 
relationship between association tenants and privately rented tenants in 
this respect. Although association tenants are drawn from higher socio-
economic groups than local authority tenants, the tenants of associations 
are more similar to council tenants than they are to the occupants of any 
other tenure in terms of absolute percentage difference. These findings 
suggest that in Islington and Westminster, associations are fulfilling a 
distinctive role, between (public) renting and ownership, but reasonably 
similar to the work of local authorities. This indicates that associations 
are ooop1ementing the wor k of local author i ties. 
These general trends do vary between the study boroughs. In Islington 
association tenants are ITOSt similar to privately rented tenants. In 
Westminster (and Kensington and Chelsea, see a~ndix 7) association 
tenants are ITOst similar to council tenants. Since few ooroughs were 
examined it is difficult to generalise from this, but it does seem that the 
relationship between the tenants of associations and of other tenures may 
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vary considerably between areas (see section 7.5, chapter 7). 
The quality of association record keeping was generally poor, 
preventing any monitoring of allocational performance through the tenant 
files alone. The associations are responsible for selecting a minority of 
their tenants, and their allocational performance does not accurately 
match their policy statements. This suggests that the differences in 
tenant profiles does not result from any preconceived or testable strategy 
on the part of housing associations. It is therefore difficult to imagine 
how central government could be capable of imposing a significant 
influence upon association allocation practices. 
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9. COOCWSIONS 
9.1 The Nature of State Housing Policy Formation 
Whilst chapter 8 concluded that housing associations 'complement' local 
authority activities in Islington and Westminster, it must be stressed 
that this is not a mechanical result of central government preferences. 
The practice of housing association allocational activities is the result 
of the long and complex evolution of the roovement, from its nineteenth 
century Ii1ilanthropic origins to government influence dating from the 
early 1960s. '!his has given the roovement a bewildering variety of 
organisational structures and allocational objectives, and has permitted a 
variety of possible relationships between local authorities and housing 
associations. '!hese factors suggest that the association roovement does not 
lend itself to a roodel of state activity which proposes that central 
government rationally p..lrsues a fixed objective, and implements long term 
strategies intended to secure its achievement. '!here are many influences 
upon state policy formation. Goodwin (1980) argues that economically 
functionalist and relative autonomy explanations of state intervention 
tend to be applied unicausally, whereas both political and economic forces 
shape state housing policy. In order to properly urrlerstand the nature of 
state intervention, therefore, Goodwin (1980, p.2) suggests that 
lithe general theory of state action must be related to national 
hOUSing legislation, and to local implementation of this 
legislation, for it is only through empirical investigation that 
we are able to discover the particular form of state activity. 
One may be able to deduce theoretically that the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism will necessitate state 
intervention, but the form that such intervention assumes can 
only be revealed through detailed histor ical research. II 
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This approach to a study of housing is essential if the links between 
political, economic and ideological influences upon state policies are to 
be explored, and such a perspective has been adopted in this thesis. Whilst 
the nature of central government support for housing associations has 
uooergone dramatic changes since the Conservative Housing Act of 1961, 
central government has little control over the activities of individual 
housing associations, especially compared to the ability of local 
authorities to nominate association tenants. '!hus central government 
cannot guarantee that specific allocational functions will be performed 
by housing associations. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that most of the debate over the proper role of 
housing associations has related to the more general question of the part 
to be played by existing tenures. Swann (1975, p.ll7) recognises that in 
the nineteenth century, "housing associations had the ideological p.1rpose 
of attempting to show that private enterprise could profitably provide 
decent hoUSing for the working classes", similarly cost rent and co-
ownership societies can be seen as an ideological attack upon municipal 
provision. But ideology is not a totally autonomous influence upon state 
policy, for ideological strategies seek to protect certain economic or 
political relationships, and are influenced by factors which threaten to 
change these relationships. Thus, it must be remembered that changes in the 
structure of private provision also influenced government policies 
towards housing associations. '!he decline of private renting in the 
nineteenth century, when p.1blic provision was perceived as an undesirable 
alternative, prorrpted governments to assist hOUSing trusts. Similarly, the 
continued decline of private renting in spite of, or because of, the 1957 
Rent Act, when a Conservative Government considered an enlargement of 
p.1blic provision an undesirable alternative, prompted the government to 
assist new style housing associations. Once legislation is enacted, 
successive governments modify it in the light of their own ideologies 
(Short, 1982, p.36) , and the changing political and economic climate. 
Pickvance (1981) provides an excellent example of this process in his 
study of the developnent of regional policy. According to Pickvance (1981, 
P.247) 
"Regional policy in Britain ••• shows a chameleon-like shift away 
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from a concern with regional unemployment and towards the 
assistance of capital-intensive investment which due to market 
forces is increasingly attracted to Assisted Area locations." 
Thus the implementation of particular policies can be directed towards 
goals very different from those envisaged at their inception. Pickvance 
(1981) suggests that these policy changes may be so subtle that they allow 
the policy to retain a semblance of its original awearance, whilst they 
are implemented to serve very different ends. Of industrial and office 
developnent controls, Pickvance (1981, p.258) suggests 
"both had an 'anti-market', if not anti-capitalist, character at 
their origin, and both have evolved chameleon-like away from 
their original character while retaining their original 'social' 
wrapper." 
'!be developnent of legislation relating to housing associations 
provides some excellent examples of this general awroach to policy 
formation. First, the use of housing associations to promote economic 
renting in the 1960s, when the tradition of the movement had been entirely 
charitable until then, reflects an attempt to legitimate state support for 
what was effectively a new form of private renting by relying upon the 
SOCially acceptable facade of the {ililanthropic movement. '!be confusion of 
roles that this caused within the movement has already been referred to 
(see section 5.3, chapter 5). Secondly, chapter 3 demonstrated oow small 
changes to legislation in 1974, and an increase in capital allocations to 
associations, radically changed the 'image' of oousing association 
activity, from being perceived as quasi-private, to being perceived as a 
part of the p..tblic sector in housing. 
Ball (1983, p.368) suggests that this method of incremental policy 
change is a necessary consequence of "the political effects of ideological 
allegiances to tenures and the consequences of the politics of tenure". 
There are now powerful political groupings ideologically committed to the 
dominant tenure forms, owner occupation and rrunicipal renting, and Ball 
(1983, P.369) suggests that 
"reforms of these two existing tenures must be the main thrust 
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of new policy initiatives rather than replacement of them by new 
tenure forms. Otherwise such ideologically based tenure support 
will act as a barrier to change rather than a means by which it 
can be implemented." 
Kemeny (1981, p.156-7) also suggests that innovations in housing policy 
are likely to replicate dominant tenures: 
.. there is a symbiotic relationship between ideology and the 
power to determine policy. Once a system has been established 
which discr iminates between tenures ••• there is a strong element 
of self-perpetuation involved." 
Consumer preference will be shaped by the existing structure of 
provision, which reflects past as well as present ideological and 
political romnitments to tenures. Is it true, then, that unless housing 
association provision duplicates one of the dominant tenure forms, that it 
is destined to occupy a place in the political background? Kemeny (1978, 
p.48) suggests that this is the case when he points out that 
"The very different development of co-operatives in Australia 
and Sweden suggests that the co-operative movement has 
developed in response to difficulties associated with the 
ability of people to secure accommodation of the type of tenure 
dominant in these societies. In other words, potential owners in 
Australia and potential renters in Sweden have developed ex>-
operative enterprises which are seen as substitutes for owning 
and renting respectively, and this may explain in part at least, 
the very different form that ro-operatives in these countries 
take." 
Are policies towards housing associations unlikely to radically change 
consumption and production patterns because of these constraints? 
Regarding housing consumption, section 3.4.2, chapter 3, discussed Labour 
and Conservative attitudes towards housing co-operatives. In practice, 
very few examples of full tenant self-control can be fouoo. Past debates 
on the role of housing co-operatives usually revolve around the issue of 
the extent to which local authority tenants should be responsible for 
245 
minor repairs, and the financial implications of this. Whether tenants 
should influence the design of houses, or the allocation of tenants to 
them, is rarely an issue. 
Similarly, the nature of housing production is often overlooked in 
analyses of state intervention in housing. Duncan (1981, p.241) for 
example, says of the functionalist approach of Castells, the "production 
of housing, the nature of its circulation and exchange, and the links 
between this and class conflict and state intervention as a whole; all 
this is to be neglected". Further, Harloe (l978, p.599) criticises the 1977 
Consultative Document on Housing Policy on the grounds that 
"Some important concerns are OOlitted altogether. For example, ••• 
the domination of private production for profit in housing lies 
at the heart of any fumarnental analysis of the sector, yet 
questions of production (am landownership) are rot merely 
omitted from the final document but they were explicitly 
excluded from consideration in the review from its start." 
These themes are manifest in the development of government support for 
the association movement. Since government debates on housing policy 
largely exclude discussions of democratic management and public 
development, housing associations were never likely to be encouraged to 
perform tasks radically different from those undertaken by local 
authorities. '!be stock characteristics of housing provided through 
associations has led them to house small, and therefore young and old 
households, but this is rot the result of an explicit policy requirement. 
It is the result of the financing system which has encouraged the 
provision of small units. Imeed, the outcome of housing association 
activity is a response to broadly defined central objectives relating to 
tenure form rather than detailed performance criteria. 
It is difficult to imagine any direct economic function for such a 
policy. Whilst housing association provision has rot altered the private 
basis of housebuilding, neither had municipal provision before it, and 
this failure to change market relationships can hardly be used to explain 
such a substantial policy initiative. Furthermore, although associations 
are being encouraged to enforce their charitable status, and concentrate 
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upon housing the poor, a similar approach is also being applied to local 
authorities. If the intention of this is that the economically 
urx'lerprivileged should be discouraged from political IOObilisation, 
something which Kirby (1981) is rightly sceptical about, why encourage 
local authorities and housing associations to do this? 
An alternative approach to such fuoctionalist explanations is to 
suggest that the policies resulted from political pressure. The quality of 
public housing built during the 1960s has received widespread criticisay 
and it can be suggested that housing associations were proIOOted as a 
response to public protest over the nature of the public housing 
programne. '!bere is little evidence to support this view, for public 
protest over the nature of municipal buliding programnes has been notably 
ineffective in this country (see Dunleavy, 1977). Iooeed, an analysis of 
government debates in the 1960s suggests that early cost rent and co-
ownership schemes were very much the idea, as well as the creation, of 
central government. 
The IOOSt plausible explanation of the policy initiative is that it 
corresponds to the ideological aspects of a relative autonomy view of the 
state outlined in chapter 2. The alternatives to a declining privately 
rented sector were viewed largely in terms of existing tenures, as an 
expansion of owner occupation or public renting. In order to prevent 
further expansion of the municipal sector, which is produced to meet need 
rather than the market criteria of ability to pay, the Conservative 
Government of 1961 established a quasi-private alternative tenure. 'Ibis 
sought to attract middle-income tenants away from public housing 
authorities. '!be ideological basis of early Conservative support for the 
movement was thus to contain political pressure for an expansion of 
municipalisation of privately rented stock, and to demonstrate that the 
private sector was still capable of new investment in private (rented) 
housing. From the time this pol icy was implemented however, successi ve 
governments have adapted the legislation to meet their changing 
conceptions of the desirable form of state intervention in housing. It is 
because the policy has evolved in piecemeal fashion that it contains such 
contradictory elements. The Labour Party has used the IOOvement to 
demonstrate that public intervention can be sensitive (rehabilitation), 
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whilst the Conservative Party has used the movement to demonstrate the 
potential of private initiative and private financing. Indeed, it is 
because private finance has not been forthcoming that the Conservate Party 
is now attempting to privatise the houses produced by associations. 
Clearly, an historical perspective is essential if we are to understand 
the nature of political support for the movement, for the nature of this 
support has changed dramatically over the last two decades. 
Such an approach to pol icy formation necessar ily ignores radical 
innovations in housing production and consLUnPtion. What is needed is a 
theoretical approach which stops housing legislation coq>rising ad hoc 
responses to perceived problems, and adopts a policy approach to housing 
consLUnPtion and production integrated across tenures. What roves are 
possible in order to reform the consLUnPtion and production of hoUSing? 
Saunders (1982) suggests that the benefits of occupying different tenures 
should be equalised. This can be done by preventing personal capital gains 
through owner occupation, and by increaSing tenant control in rented 
property. As Forrest (1984, p.5-6) ~ts it 
nit is important to rove beyond tenure divisions to demystify 
notions of 'public' and 'private' and to develop housing policies 
which transcend the existing tenure structure." 
Several proposals have been made to achieve this "gradual blurring of 
the distinction between ownership and renting" (Ball, 1983, p.390), a rove 
which may begin to break down ideological comnitments to existing dominant 
tenure forms. 
9.2 ~~nure Neutral Housing Policy 
In 1981 the Labour Party ~blished A Future for Public Housing, which 
suggested five reforms to the consLUnPtion of housing intended to break 
down the basis of traditional attatctunents to tenures. '!he first consisted 
of rore autonomy for local authority tenants through a form of "leasehold 
ownership" in the ~blic sector (p.28). This policy consisted of 
(i) the granting of life tenancies, with rent arrears being the 
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only grounds for repossesion, and 
(ii) tenants being responsible for repairs and free to urxiertake 
improvements. 
According to the Labour Party (1981, p.28) such a scheme "offers a way 
for public housing to meet the widespread aspirations for dweller control 
which have fuelled the support for council house sales, while 
simultaneously preserving the advantages of public ownership". It has been 
pointed out that the tenants of housing associations do not generally 
enjoy more rights of self control than the tenants of local authorities, 
so the argument could equally have been applied to housing association 
tenancies. 
The second reform suggested by the Labour Party (1981, p.38) was to 
widen the scope of municipal provision to include the provision of 
(i) furnished accommodation, 
(ii) shared accommodation, 
(iii) housing with social support, 
(i v) unconventional housing, for example, for the needs of 
people who must work at home, and 
(v) cheap or short life housing for people choosing to pay 
little or nothing for their housing. 
Much of the support for housing association provision relies on the 
argument that it provides rented accommodation for types of people not 
traditionally housed by local authorities. Tenure neutral policy must 
therefore encourage diversity within municipal and association provision. 
'!he third proposal was to extend nOOility between tenures (p.63). 
Preference for renting or owning may vary with stage in the family life-
cycle, from marriage and the raising of children to retirement. '1tle Labour 
Party considers it desirable that people should be able to switch tenures, 
and "broad conparability between the tenures ••• can lay the basis for such 
flexibility" (p.64), including rendering owner occupiers eligible for 
council housing; for example, on retirement. Mobility between municipal and 
association accommodation already exists, with nominations and voluntary 
agreements. Housing associations only occasionally house poor owner 
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occupiers, and whilst the Labour Party stresses the need for more links 
between owner occupation and municipal provision, the policy could 
logically be extended to relationships between owner occupation and 
housing association provision. 
'l'he fourth proposal was to devise a method whereby council tenants can 
benefit from the appreciation in the value of the dwelling that they 
occupy. This policy is in marked contrast to recent attitudes towards 
rented provision by associations. Unless an association tenant is 
purchasing the property occupied, tenant equity is tightly controlled, 
especially in the case of housing co-operatives. An alternative approach 
is to restrict wealth creation through owner occupation, as suggested by 
Ball (1983), for this raises less problems over the conparability between 
municipal and association provision. 
The fifth proposal was that of the "comprehensive housing service" 
(p.62), where the local authority assumes responsibiltiy for all types of 
housing proviSion within its area. It is here that the primacy of 
municipal provision over association provision, implicit in the previous 
proposals, comes closest to the surface. Irrleed, the set of pol icies 
contained in A Future for Publ ic Housing seem deSigned to ensure a 
dominant role for council housing, by making a council tenancy a IOOre 
desirable experience. Nothing is suggested about the sources of finance 
for housing or the nature of housing production. Referring to proposals 
for a National Construction Corporation, Crosland (1971, p.6-7) sums up the 
attitude of the Labour Party to hOUSing production by suggesting that such 
proposals 
"are directed not to the housing problem as such, but to the 
structure of the industry and the conditions of the workers in 
it." 
Whilst the exper ience of a council tenancy would be greatly improved by 
the policies suggested, crucial issues of finance and production are 
ignored. Without considering all of these factors it will be difficult to 
confer upon public renting, from a local authority or a housing 
association, benefits comparable to those offered by owner occupation. 
Only if this is done will public renting attract broad based political 
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support equivalent to that existing for owner occupation. 
The Social Democratic Party considered the significance of housing 
finance in its Green Paper A Strategy for Housing (1983). 'Ibe Party 
proposed attracting private institutional investment into a National 
Housing Bank, which would be used to promote housing association provision 
at rents between fair rents and economic rents (see section 3.4.3, chapter 
3). This is reminiscent of the basis of cost renting and co-ownership, and 
recognising that it would be unlikely to succeed in corIq?etition with 
existing subsidies to owner occupation, the Party suggests that mortgage 
tax relief "should be reformed in order to direct assistance to those who 
most need it; introduce greater fairness as between owners and between 
owners and those who rent, and to establish a ceiling for Exchequer 
support" (p.27). Iooeed, one reason for the failure of cost renting was 
that the relative attractiveness of ordinary owner occupation proved to be 
too great, especially as interest rates began to rise. '!he policy of the 
Social Democratic Party is to promote tenure neutrality through 
competition between suwliers. 'Ibis is a perspective shared by Kemeny 
(1981, p.153-4), who suggests that Conservative stigmatisation of council 
housing requires amove away from municipal provision: 
"Although there is no reason why local governments should not be 
able to run a non-stigmatized cost-rental sector, it is probably 
desirable that cost-renting not be defined as a kind of 
community service if it is to gain status comparable to home-
ownership. In addition, it is more conducive to corIq?etition and 
occupier control if some of the larger local housing 
authorities lost their virtual monopoly status." 
Both Ball (1983) and Kemeny recognise the importance of "ideological 
images of organizational forms" (Ball, 1983, p.371), despite arriving at 
different conclusions. Although Kemeny moves beyooo a study of housing 
consumption to discuss forms of provision, it is to the work of Ball (1983) 
that we must look for a radical view of housing production. Ball (p.391) 
suggests that "only through land and building industry nationalization 
can the preconditions exist for the progressive transformation of housing 
provision". Nationalisation alters the structure of housing provision in 
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all tenures simultaneously, and Ball (p.382) suggests that financial 
accounting criteria should be replaced by a 'social audit', an "amalgam of 
physical and financial goals". Removing council housing from the 
constraints of capitalist relations of production will allow local 
authorities to devote their efforts to meeting the aspirations of tenants 
for better design, and production more responsive to expressed needs. 
'!be focus upon the social implications of housing tenure, rather than 
the ideological image of tenures, is relatively new. Writing in Marxism 
Today in May of this year, Griffiths and Holmes (1984) still stress the 
need for a newawroach to the formation of radical housing policies which 
seek to "disentangle housing tenures from their implications for social 
status, ideology and access to wealth" (p.ll), and break with traditional 
landlord-tenant relationships in state housing. 
9.3 The Future for Housing Associations 
During the 1980s, largely in response to Conservative polcies which 
assert natural preferences for owner occupation, obstacles to access to 
council housing and the lack of self-control implicit in a council tenancy 
have become the subject of political debate. Groups with an ideological 
comnitment to council housing have suggested reforms in local authority 
practice, whilst groups owosed to a municipal IOOnopoly of rented 
accomnodation have suggested alternative forms of rented provision. 
In previous decades the debate was less innovative, with the 1977 
Consultative Document on Housing Policy focussing upon minor 
modifications to existing tenures. It is hardly surprising that the debate 
on the role of housing associations should have been umertaken in terms 
of whether provision by them should be IOOre like council housing or O'tImer 
occupation, and that radical innovations such as tenant autonomy, design 
for specific clients or new methods of financing or production should have 
been absent. Housing association provision seems to 'complement' local 
authority provision, but we should not be surprised that two decades of 
POlicies towards housing associations should have resulted in them 
hOUSing groups socio-economically mid-way between ownership and FOblic 
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renting. What is symptomatic of the nature of British housing policy 
formation is the fact that nobody has bothered to seriously raise the 
issue of association allocations before. '!he ad hoc nature of housing 
policy formation has not permitted an analysis of the nature of 
association production and consumption, and an explicit statement of the 
role of associations in relation to existing tenures. Should associations 
rely upon alternative sources of finance, for example, from institutional 
investors? Should associations pioneer new systems of developnent, or 
relationships between developers and tenants which aim at more sensitive 
design, or a quicker response to expressed needs? Should the movement 
accommodate specific types of people, and pioneer types of management not 
found in previously existing tenures? Can local authority housing 
departments and private developers also perform some of these tasks? Until 
these questions are answered, association provision will vacillate between 
the known IOOdels of local authority provision and owner occupation. If 
such a definition is undertaken, and the social objectives of associations 
mapped out in detail, then the extent of local variation in the activities 
of housing associations may reduce. Until this is done the movement will 
fulfill a role between council housing and owner occpuation, in search of 
an identity which can survive the ideological swings of successive 
governments. 
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Awendix 1: Housing Associations in the Study Boroughs 
Housing Associations in Islington. 
Stock Category Special Needs 
Association [1] [2] [3 ] 
Ada Lewis Womens 
Hostels 0 H 
Afsil 0 
Anchor 23 L E 
Church Army 0 HL E 
Circle 33 1,173 L E,D 
City Roads 0 
Crown 0 HL Civil servants and F 
Family 11 HL D and F 
Guinness 82 HL Y,E,D 
Habinteg 19 HL D 
Highbury Corner 
Housing Co-operative 20 LC SPF,SW 
Holloway Tenant 
Co-operative 500 C 
Islington and 
Shored itch 184 L E 
John Grooms 12 L D 
London and Quadrant 3 HL E,D 
Mace 14 
Metropolitan 5 L 
New Islington and 
Hackney 1,033 HL SPF 
New Swift 6 LC WP 
Newlon 2 L 
Peabody 1,584 L 
Peter Bedford 0 HL U,R 
Samuel Lewis 246 HL E,D 
Shaftesbury SOciety 0 L E 
Sutton 186 HL 
Utopian 97 L S,sPF,E,D 
Victoria Park 5 L 
~ 0 L W 
Housing Associations in Westminster. 
Stock Category Special Needs 
Association [1] [2] [3] 
Auriol 18 HL S 
Brent People's 444 L H 
Central London for 
the Aged 480 L E 
Church Army 397 HL E 
Conmunity 166 HL 
Family 234 HL D and F 
Holland Co-ownership 12 
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Stock Category Spec ial Needs 
Association [1] [21 [3] 
Irish Centre Hostels 132 H S 
JBG Housing Society 27 HL E 
Leinster Square 30 C 
Look Ahead 297 HL S 
Octavia Hill and Rowe 71 HL E 
Over Forty Association 
for Women 32 L W 
Paddington Churches 1,990 HL E,D 
Paddington Old Peoples 23 L E 
Peabody 2,416 L 
Servite Houses 65 HL E,H 
Seymour 50 C S 
Single Persons 35 L S 
Soho 168 HL 
St. Marylebone 1,462 HL E 
Tennant 583 HL 
Unicorn 48 L E 
Westminster Homes 36 L E 
WOOlenS Pioneer 34 L WOrking W 
WPlfl' 702 L E, Blind. 
~ 397 L W 
Notes: [1] Stock data provided as follows; Islington data provided by 
Borough, as at 310382. Westminster data provided by Borough, as at 010483. 
Figures exclude ron-self contained acconmodation. [2] Categories derived 
from Housing Corporation (1982). C= co-ownership or co-operative, L= 
housing for letting, H= hostels. [3] Special needs categories in Housing 
Corporation (1982). Letters signify the following: 
y= young persons 
E= elderly 
D= disabled 
F= families of 
S= single persons 
SW= single working persons 
SPF= single parent families 
WP= working parents 
U= unemployed 
R= rootless persons 
W= women 
H= handicapped. 
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AF{>endix 2: Analysis of H.S.I.P. Documents 
Is Lmgton 
Year 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
(a) ro. ~ (£0005) 
(b) 
(a) 
(b) 
Block 1 (public) 36,714 56,381 38,203 61,918 
Block 2 (private) 1,050 1,77~ .lL147 6,115 
Block 3 (associations) 11 097 498 3.145 4.773 
'lUrAL 38,861 58,655 44,759 72,806 
Mun1c1pa11sat10n 1,224 1,540 2,038 1,750 
<X>WMN % 
Block 1 (public) 94.48 96.12 85.28 85.05 
Block 2 (pnvate) 2.70 3.03 7.70 8.40 
Block 3 (associations) 2.82 0.85 7.02 6.56 
'Trfl'A 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Mun1c1pal1Sat10n 3.15 2.63 4.55 2.40 
WE!sbninster 
Year 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
'lUrAL (£OOOs) 
Block 1 (public) 11,867 10,790 14,681 21,034 
Block 2 (private) 3,260 5,093 6,652 7,743 
Block 3 (assoc1at10ns) 4,970 5,713 5,850 7,852 
'lUrAL 20,097 21 ,596 27,183 36,629 
I Mun1C1pa11sat10n 4 73 100 100 
<X>WMN % 
Block 1 (Pllblic) 59.05 49.96 54.01 57.42 
Block 2 (private) 16.22 23.58 24.47 21.14 
Block 3 (associations) 24.73 26.45 21.52 21.44 
'lUI'AL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 .. 00 
Municipa1isation 0.02 0.34 0.37 0.27 
Source: HSIP documents from boroughs (1982 and 1983). 
Note: 1981-82 and 1982-83 figures are actual 
expenditure, other figures are estimates. 
85-86 
60,273 
5,834 
5.748 
71.864 
374 
83.87 
8.13 
8.00 
100.00 
0.52 
85-86 
16,468 
8,000 
8,250 
32,718 
130 
50.33 
24.45 
25.22 
100.00 
0.40 
These time series figures suggest that Islington is intending a slight 
shift away from the nunicipal programne. In 1981-82 blocks two and three 
comprised only 5.52% of its total expenditure. By 1985-86 this will have 
trebled to 16.13%. 'Ibis is still far less than Westminster allocates to 
blocks two and three; 40.95% in 1982-83, rising to 49.97% in 1985-86. The 
general tendency for Islington to favour the rrunicipa1 programne IOOre than 
Westminster does is thus confirmed. '!be figures for municipa1isation 
indicate that both authorities will be spending very little in this 
direction (Islington reducing this expenditure to 0.52% and Westminster 
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increasing it to 0.40%). The planned reduction in expenditure on 
municipalisation may explain why Islington is intending to increase its 
allocation to housing associations. 
It should be pointed out however, that reliance upon future estimates 
is a dubious practice. The 1982 H.S.I.P.s of the boroughs inaccurately 
estimated 1982 expenditure when compared to actual payments as recorded in 
their 1983 H.S.I.P.s. In the case of expenditure on housing associations, 
Westminster spent 1.5% below its estimate (£5.7lm compared to an estimate 
of £5.80m), and Islington spent 75.6% less (£0.49m compared to an estimate 
of £2.04m). Such differences may well not be the result of 'technical' 
factors. Local authorities may deliberately over- or umer-estimate future 
expenditure in order to influence the future allocation of central 
government subsidies, or to influence the electorate. Such financial 
'promises' do not have to be adhered to. 
257 
Appendix 3: Association Units Provided Through GLC Funding 
No. Percent 
Borough 
[1] [1] 
Southwark 2,498 11.82 
Lewisham 1,670 7.90 
Hackney 1,662 7.86 
LaItDeth 1,440 6.81 
Islington 1,439 6.81 
Wandsworth 1,175 5.56 
Brent 1,169 5.53 
Greenwich 1,168 5.52 
Hammersmith & Fu1harn 1,113 5.26 
Tower Hamlets 837 3.96 
Houns1ow 837 3.96 
Ea1ing 791 3.74 
Croydon 645 3.05 
Bromley 561 2.65 
Wa1 tham Forest 535 2.53 
cam:1en 487 2.30 
Newham 473 2.23 
Barnet 362 1.71 
Westminster 297 1.40 
Merton 294 1.39 
Kens~ngton & Chelsea 278 1.31 
Haringey 250 1.18 
Havering 233 1.10 
Harrow 181 0.85 
Redbridge 145 0.68 
Enf~e1d 98 0.46 
Rictunond upon Thames 95 0.44 
Kingston upon Thames 48 0.22 
Hi11ingdon 39 0.18 
Bexley 27 0.12 
Sutton 21 0.09 
Barking & Dagenham 8 0.03 
Source: [1] Arden (1983, table 4.30); 
[2] 1981 Census, Greater London County 
Report Part 1. Der i ved from table 39; 
[3] GLC (1983). Derived from table on p.41. 
Note: Rank One ranks the boroughs according 
Rank 
One 
[1] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
to the amount of association provision assisted 
by the GLC; Rank Two ranks the boroughs 
according to the proportion of HSIP 
allocations spent on associations 
by the boroughs; Rank Three ranks the boroughs 
according to the amount of association stock 
in each borough. 
Rank Rank 
Two Three 
[2] [3] 
22 7 
16 10 
5 5 
29 6 
20 4 
9 11 
11 14 
30 13 
7 2 
21 12 
17 17 
6 15 
13 21 
8 20 
9 19 
15 8 
22 16 
18 24 
4 3 
26 25 
1 1 
12 9 
25 30 
28 28 
14 29 
20 31 
3 22 
28 26 
19 23 
2 27 
18 18 
24 33 
It is interesting to speculate whether GLC expenditure is intended to 
co~nsate for low levels of borough expenditure on associations in 
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certain areas. The table above ranks the boroughs in the order of 
association stock, borough and GLC expenditure on associations. This type 
of data is suitable for analysis using the Spearman rank order correlation 
coefficient. The following correlations are obtained: 
Rank l/Rank 2 
Rank l/Rank 3 
Rank 2/Rank 3 
0.0326 
0.6844 
0.3259 
This shows that GLC expenditure correlates reasonably well with 
existing stock distributions, but shows neither a positive nor negative 
relationship to borough expenditure. In practice, therefore, GLC 
expenditure bears no relationship to borough expenditure. The number of 
units provided through GLC finance is small compared to the total stock of 
associations, so it awears that the GLC is merely reinforcing already 
existing trends. 
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Appendix 4: Policy Documents of Study Boroughs 
Proposals for zoning in Islington (1969). 
The suggested zones were as follows: 
Association 
Islington and Shoreditch 
New Islington 
Circle 33 
Barnsbury 
Isledon 
Ward 
St.Mary, Canonbury and St.Peter 
Quadrant and Mildmay 
Holloway and Highbury 
Thornhill and Barnsbury 
St.George's and Hillmarton 
Zones in Westminster (1976). 
The zones were as follows: 
Number Association 
Zone 1 St.Marylebone HA (Brent Peoples HA reserve) 
Zone 2 Paddington Churches HA and Circle 33 Housing Trust 
Zone 3 Paddington Churches HA (Octavia Hill and Rowe HA reserve) 
Zone 4 Unallocated 
Zone 5 Unallocated 
Zone 6 St.Marylebone HA (Circle 33 Housing Trust reserve) 
Zone 7 Community HA 
Zone 8 Soho HA 
Zone 9 Peabody Trust 
Zone 10 Tennant Housing Trust (Family HA reserve) 
Note: HA= housing association. 
Zones in Westminster (1982). 
The zones were as follows: 
Number Association 
Zone 1 Brent People's HA and St.Marylebone HA 
Zone 2 Paddington Churches HA 
Zone 3 Paddington Churches HA 
Zone 4 Unallocated 
Zone 5 Unallocated 
Zone 6 Circle 33 Housing Trust 
Zone 7 Community HA 
Zone 8 Community HA and Soho HA 
Zone 9 Unallocated 
Zone 10 Family HA and Tennant Housing Trust 
Note: HA= housing association. 
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Housing Allocation Priority Groups in Westminster (1983). 
Number Type of household 
Category 1 Households decanted from council property as part 
of the rehabilitation programme. 
Category 2 Persons affected by closing orders, and 
homeless persons. 
Category 3 category 'A' medical cases, and social 
services nominations. 
Category 4 caretaking staff and staff of other departments. 
Category 5 Possession order cases. 
Category 6 Assistance to private landlords and housing associations 
to facilitate Unprovements to the housing stock. 
category 7 Special quotas approved by the committee. 
category 8 Waiting list applicants under the points scheme. 
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Awendix 5: Household Composition in Study Boroughs 
Household .1'YPe 
1 Adult 
Pensionable age (0) 
Under pens I age (0) 
(lor lOOre) 
2 Adults (married) 
(0) 
(lor lOOre) 
3 or roore Adul ts-
2 married 
(0) 
(lor lOOre) 
Other Adul ts-
2 or lOOre 
(0) 
(lor roore) 
1 AOOLT 
2 AOOLTS 
3 AOOLTS 
Ol'HER AOOLTS 
Household Type 
1 Adult 
Pensionable age (0) 
Under pens I age (0) 
(lor roore) 
2 Adults (married) 
(0) 
(lor lOOre) 
3 or lOOre Adul ts-
2 married 
(0) 
(lor lOOre) 
Other Adul ts-
2 or lOOre 
(0) 
(lor roore) 
1 AOOLT 
2 AOOLTS 
3 AOOLTS 
Ol'HER AOOLTS 
HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE BY TENURE 
Greater London 
Percentage 
HA LA All HA - All 
22.6 18.6 14.4 8.2 
16.1 8.5 11.6 4.5 
5.5 5.5 2.7 2.8 
16.7 19.6 21.5 -4.8 
15.2 14.3 16.2 -1.0 
5.3 10.6 11.2 -5.9 
3.8 7.3 7.6 -3.8 
11.4 10.9 12.1 -0.7 
3.5 4.7 2.7 0.8 
44.2 32.6 28.7 15.5 
31.9 33.9 37.7 -5.8 
9.1 17 .8 18.8 -9.7 
14.9 15.6 14.8 0.1 
Islington 
Percentage 
---
HA ~- All ~_ - All 
14.7 19.4 15.8 -1.1 
20.4 11.6 17.5 2.9 
6.0 5.2 3.9 2.1 
15.1 17.8 17.0 -1.9 
14.9 12.9 12.1 2.8 
6.4 9.5 8.9 -2.5 
4.5 6.4 6.4 -1.9 
13.8 12.6 14.9 -1.1 
4.2 4.6 3.5 0.7 
41.1 36.2 37.2 3.9 
30.1 30.7 29.1 1.0 
10.9 15.9 15.2 -4.3 
18.0 17.2 18.5 -0.5 
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LA - All 
4.2 
-3.1 
2.8 
-1.9 
-1.9 
-0.6 
-0.3 
-1.2 
2.0 
3.9 
-3.8 
-1.0 
0.8 
LA - All 
3.6 
-5.9 
1.3 
0.8 
0.8 
0.6 
0.0 
-2.3 
0.9 
-1.0 
1.6 
0.7 
-1.3 
-. 
HA-LA 
4.0 
7.6 
0.0 
-2.9 
0.9 
-5.3 
-3.5 
0.5 
-1.2 
11.6 
-2.0 
-8.7 
-0.7 
HA-LA 
-4.7 
8.8 
0.8 
-2.7 
2.0 
-3.1 
-1.9 
1.2 
-0.4 
4.9 
-0.6 
-5.0 
0.8 
Westminster 
Percentage 
HA IA All HA - All IA - All 
" 
Household Type 
1 Adult 
Pensionable age (0) 29.0 24.5 19.2 9.8 5.3 
Under pens' age (0) 22.9 12.1 23.9 -1.0 -11.8 
(lor rore) 3.9 4.5 2.4 1.5 2.1 
-
2 Adults (married) 
(0) 13.6 16.9 16.6 -3.0 0.3 
(lor rore) 8.2 10.5 8.2 0.0 2.3 
--
.. 
3 or rore adults-
2 married 
(0) 4.7 9.3 6.9 -2.2 2.4 
(lor rore) 2.3 6.0 4.2 -1.9 1.8 
Other Adul ts-
2 or rore 
(0) 13.1 12.5 16.4 -3.3 -3.9 
(lor rore) 2.3 3.6 2.1 0.2 1.5 
1 AOOLT 55.8 41.2 45.5 10.3 -4.3 
2 AOOLTS 21.8 27.5 24.8 -3.0 2.7 
3 AOOLTS 7.1 15.2 11.1 -4.0 4.1 
ornER AOOLTS 15.4 16.2 18.6 -3.2 -2.4 
Source: 1981 Census, Greater London County Report Part 1. 
Derived from table 39. 
Note: number in brackets refers to number of children 
under 16 years of age. 
HA-LA 
4.5 
10.8 
-0.6 
-3.3 
-2.3 
-4.6 
-3.7 
0.6 
-1.3 
14.6 
-5.7 
-8.1 
-D.81 
In Greater Loooon housing associations cater for rore small households 
than local authorities do, and than are present in the total population. 
Iooeed, the relationship bears a striking similarity with that 
demonstrated in England and Wales (see table 7.10). Westminster displays a 
similar relationship, but in Islington this difference is rather less 
pronounced. 
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Awendix 6: Results of Inspection of Tenant Files 
20% Sample; N=155 
1. Date Tenancy COIllUenced 
, .. Assoclatlon CllA WPHl' SL Total 
Date 
Pre 1965 0 0 1 1 
1965 0 0 0 0 
1966 0 0 1 1 
1967 0 0 0 0 
1968 0 1 0 1 
1969 0 0 3 3 
1970 0 0 3 3 
1971 0 0 2 2 
1972 0 0 5 5 
1973 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 5 5 
1975 0 0 4 4 
1976 0 0 2 2 
1977 0 0 4 4 
1978 17 1 1 19 
1979 2 8 3 13 
1980 3 15 3 21 
1981 2 22 2 26 
1982 1 19 2 22 
1983 1 12 3 16 
'IDrAL 26 78 44 148 
2. Route to Accomnodation 
Association CHA WPHl' SL Total Percent . 
Type of Tenant 
ACQUired tenant 14 6 0 20 13.89 
Selected tenant 3 24 17 44 -.l0~~ 
Nominated tenant 5 27 1 33 22.92 
Referred tenant 0 5 0 5 3.47 
Decanted tenant 3 12 15 30 20.83 
-Transferred tenant 0 1 11 12 8.33 
-
'IDrAL 25 75 44 144 
3. Naninating Agency 
Association CHA WPHl' SL Total Percent 
Aqencv 
Local authority 4 27 1 32 84.21 
Resldent's association .--~- --'-0 ' r--~- 1 2.63 0 
Area health author i ty 0 2 0 2 5.26 
-CEGB 0 2 0 2 5.26 
Age Concern 0 1 0 1 2.63 
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4. Sex of Head of Household 
. 
Association CllA WPHT SL Total Percent 
- -. -... - .----- --.--
Sex 
---
_ .... _-.. -
- -- - . 
Male 11 37 28 76 50.67 
... - --- -----
--_._-
-------Female 14 42 18 74 49.33 
'IDrAL 25 79 46 150 
5. Age of Head of Household 
---
. 
Association CllA WPHT SL Total Percent 
--
Age 
18-34 4 2_5 __ 8 :-. 37 29.13 
----- 16 54 35-44 1 10 10 21 
45-59 
._---- ------
1 13 11 25 19.69 f--- - ---.. .. -.-60+ 11 19 14 44 34.65 
'IDrAL 17 67 43 127 
6. Size of Household 
Association CllA WPHT SL Total Percent 
No. of persons 
1 19 42 15 76 51.35 
2 5 21 16 42 28.38 
3 0 10 4 14 9.46 
-4 1 0 6 7 4.73 
5+ 0 5 4 9 6.08 
'IDrAL 25 78 45 148 
7. Employment Status 
Association 
_<;HA WPHT SL Total Percent 
-- -
Status 
. 
. Employed 
--
10 52 35 97 74.05 
--.---Unemployed 2 1 0 3 2.29 7 -- ------ '-------
- - 31 Retued 14 10 23.66 
'IDrAL 18 68 45 131 
8. Previous Tenure 
Association CllA WPHT SL Total Percent 
----
1------ - _ .. -
Tenure 
- --
~--1----
--Private rented (acquired) 14 6 0 20 15.87 
Private rented (other) ------ -· · 23 5 29 23.02 1 
Houslng association (decant) -_.- ---Yr- . 3 15 31 24.60 
Housinq association (other~ 0 0 16 16 12.70 
---Local authority 0 8 1 9 7.14 
Owner occupler 1 0 0 1 0.79 
Tled 0 2 0 2 1.59 
Sharing (family/friends) 0 13 5 18 14.29 
-_.-
'IDrAL 19 65 42 126 
.. .... _--.. - -- -
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9. Number of Rooms in Current Accommodation 
Association 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4+ 
'IOl'AL 
10. Income of Tenants 
CtmDlJnity Housing Association 
Insufficient information 
WOrld of People Dousing Trust 
Year 1983 1982 
Income (p,rnet) 
<£50 1 2 
£50-£99.99 2 5 
£100-£149.99 0 3 
£150-£199.99 0 2 
£200+ 1 0 
'IOl'AL 4 12 
Salllle1 Lewis Housing Trust 
Year 1983 1982 
Income (p,rnet) 
<£50 0 1 
£50-£99.99 1 0 
£100-£149.99 0 0 
£150-£199.99 0 0 
£200+ 0 0 
'IOl'AL 1 1 
Total 
Year ~983 :1982 
Income (p,rnet) 
<£50 1 3 
£50-£99.99 3 5 
£100-£149.99 0 3 
£150-£199.99 0 2 
£200+ 1 0 
'IOl'AL 5 13 
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rnA WPHT 
---------
0 0 
11 19 
4 11 
. 
2 7 
17 37 
. 
1981 1980 1979 
3 2 1 
8 5 1 
2 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
13 8 2 
1981 1980 1979 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 1 1 
1981 1980~T979 
--
r------ ---
4 3 2 
9 5 1 
2 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
15 9 3 
SL Total Percent 
0 0 0.00 
17 AI AaA5. 
16 31 31.96 
10 19 19.59 
43 97 
1978 1977 1976 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1978 1977 1976 
0 1 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 1 
1978 1977 1976 
0 1 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 1 
11. Rent Level on Departing Previous Accommodation 
COOlTllJnity Housing Association 
Insufficient information 
WOrld of People Housing Trust 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
Rent (pw) 
(exc/inc) 
<£10 0/0 0/0 2/3 0/2 1/1 
£10-£19.99 0/0 1/1 1/4 2/0 0/0 
£20-£29.99 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 0/1 1/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 
£35-£39.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£40-£49.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£50+ 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
'!UrAL 1/2 3/1 4/7 3/3 1/1 
Sallllel Lewis Housing Trust 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
Rent (pw) 
(exc/inc) 
<£10 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/0 
£10-£19.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 
£20-£29.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£35-£39.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 I £40-£49. 99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 £50+ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
'lOrAL 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 3/0 
(Six entries pre-1976 not coded) 
Total 
1978 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
1978 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 
Rent (pw) 
(exc/inc) 
<£10 1/0 0/0 2/3 0/2 4/1 0/0 
£10-£19.99 0/0 1/1 1/4 2/1 0/0 0/0 
£20-£29.99 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 0/1 1/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 
£35-£39.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£40-£49.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£50+ 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
'lOrAL 2/2 3/1 4/7 3/4 4/1 0/0 
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1977 1976 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 QLO 
1977 1976 
3/0 2/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
aLa QLO 
3/0 ~O 
1977 1976 
3/0 2/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 
3/0 2/0 
12. Rent on Becoming Housing Association Tenant 
CagDlJnity Housing Association 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
Rent (pw) 
(exc/inc) 
<£10 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£10-£19.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£20-£29.99 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£35-£39.99 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 
£40-£49.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£50+ 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/2 0/2 
'101.'AL 0/1 1/0 1/2 0/2 0/2 
World of People Housing Trust 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
Rent (pw) 
(exc/inc) 
<£10 0/5 0/0 1/0 2/0 0/0 
£10-£19.99 1/2 7/0 19/0 11/0 8/1 
£20-£29.99 1/0 12/0 3/0 1/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 3/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£35-£39.99 
_. 
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£40-£49.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£50+ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
'101.'AL 5/7 19/0 23/0 14/0 .~/1 
SaIIIlel. Lewis Housing Trust 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
Rent (pw) 
(exc/inc) 
- -
<£10 1/0 1/0 1/1 2/0 3/0 
£10-£19.99 1/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£20-£29.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£35-£39.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£40-£49.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
£50+ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
'101.'AL 2/2 1/0 1/1 2/0 3/0 
(Ten entries pre-1976 not coded) 
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1978 1977 1976 
1/0 0/0 0/0 
1/3 0/0 0/0 
2/3 0/0 0/0 
5/4 0/0 0/0 
1/2 0/0 0/0 
1/2 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
11/14 0/0 0/0 
1978 1977 1976 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
. 
1978 1977 1976 
1/0 2/0 1/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
1/0 2/0 1/0 
Total 
Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 
Rent (p,l) 
(exc/inc) 
<£10 1/5 1/0 2/1 4/0 3/0 2/0 2/0 1/0 
£10-£19.99 2/4 7/0 19/0 11/0 8/1 1/3 0/0 0/0 
£20-£29.99 1/0 13/0 3/0 1/0 0/0 2/3 0/0 0/0 
£30-£34.99 3/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 5/4 0/0 0/0 
£35-£39.99 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/2 0/0 0/0 
£40-£49.99 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/2 0/0 0/0 
£50+ 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/2 0/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 
'IDl'AL 7/10 21/0 25/3 16/2 11/3 12/14 2/0 1/0 
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Tenure 
Socio-
econanic 
group 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5.1 
5.2 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
R/A 
R/I 
Total 
Grouped 
socio-
economic 
group 
1 P 
2 M 
3 IJNM 
4 SM 
5 SSM 
6USM 
Other 
Retired 
Total 
Appendix 7: Socio-economic profile, by tenure, 
in Kensington and Chelsea (1981). 
f ' 
All HA LA 00 PRU HA-LA HA-OO 
[1] [2j [1] [1 ] [1] 
5.90 1.57 0.76 10.51 4.36 0.81 -8.94 
11.98 3.70 4.58 18.97 13.64 -0.88 -15.72 
2.58 0.14 0.13 6.19 1.80 0.01 -6.05 
4.60 1.28 0.64 7.61 2.96 0.64 -6.33 
10.75 7.26 5.34 14.03 10.94 1.92 -6.77 
0.70 1.14 0.76 0.34 1.16 0.38 0.80 
15.38 14.67 12.60 11.64 16.60 2.07 3.03 
6.47 6.41 10.56 1.76 4.25 -4.15 4.65 
0.96 2.56 1.40 0.28 0.51 1.16 2.28 
4.88 11.40 11.96 1.14 3.86 -0.56 10.26 
5.33 10.26 11.07 1.08 3.86 -0.81 9.18 
3.39 6.84 9.80 0.23 1.29 -2.96 6.61 
3.67 3.56 3.44 3.69 4.89 0.12 -0.13 
0.05 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.00 -0.11 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.04 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.08 
0.36 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.39 0.00 -0.62 
3.44 4.56 2.93 3.07 3.60 1.63 1.49 
4.58 5.13 7.89 4.52 6.18 -2.76 0.61 
14.69 19.37 16.16 14.14 19.56 3.21 5.23 
1100 100 100 100 100 
7.18 1.42 0.77 13.80 4.76 0.65 -U.38 
17.93 5.27 5.34 29.59 18.15 -0.07 -24.32 
26.83 23.08 18.70 26.01 28.70 4.38 -2.93 
9.51 17.52 16.80 5.11 9.27 0.72 U.41. 
11.84 16.81 21.63 2.90 8.11 -4.82 13.91 
3.39 6.84 9.80 0.23 1.29 -2.96 6.6l 
3.80 4.56 2.93 3.69 3.99 1.63 0.87 
19.54 24.50 24.05 18.68 25.74 0.45 5.82 
~OO 100 100 100 100 
Source: [1) 1981 Census, Greater London County Report, 
Part 2. Derived from table 47. 
(2) 1981 Census, special tabulation from Greater London 
County Report, Part 2 (derivation). 
Note: R/A indicates retired head in household with an 
active member. 
R/I indicates retired head in household with no active 
member. 
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HA-PRU 
-2.79 
-9.94 
-1.66 
-1.68 
-3.68 
-0.02 
-1.93 
2.16 
2.05 
7.54 
6.40 
5.55 
-1.33 
-0 .13 
0.00 
0.14 
-0.39 
0.96 
-1.05 
-0.19 
-3.34 
-U.88 
-5.62 
8.25 
8.70 
5.55 
0.57 
-1.24 
This table shows that association tenants are drawn from higher socio-
economic groups than local authority tenants. This relationship is not as 
pronounced as in Islington and Westminster; indeed, in this borough local 
authorities house more managerial tenants than housing associations house. 
Housing association tenants are drawn from lower socio-economic groups 
than owner occupiers, and higher socio-economic groups than privately 
rented tenants. 'lbe absolute differences between the tenures is 
significant: 
HAlLA 
HAlOO 
HA/PRU 
15.68 
79.25 
46.15 
At just umer 16%, associations tenants are more like municipal tenants 
in Kensington and Chelsea than in either of the study boroughs. 
Furtherroore, at 79%, associations tenants are more unlike owner occupiers 
than in either of the study boroughs. It is evident that in this borough 
associations are nearer to 'duplicating', or 'supplementing' the work of 
local authorities, than they are to 'complementing' their work. 
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Tenure 
Grouped 
socio-
economic 
group 
1 P 
2 M 
3 IJNM 
4 SM 
5 SSM 
6 USM 
Other 
Total 
Appendix 8: Grouped socio-economic profile, by tenure, 
in England and Wales (1981). 
All HA LA 00 PRU HA-LA HA-OO 
5.04 2.28 0.67 7.18 2.14 1.61 -4.90 
15.73 8.18 4.45 21.16 11.32 3.73 -12.98 
19.76 23.64 11.28 23.02 18.94 12.36 0.62 
30.81 27.09 36.51 29.78 29.19 -9.42 -2.69 
15.92 19.16 25.36 11.04 18.60 -6.20 8.12 
5.14 6.57 10.88 2.64 6.27 -4.31 3.93 
7.61 13.09 10.86 5.18 13.53 2.23 7.91 
100 1100 100 100 100 
Source: 1981 Census, Household and Family Composition. 
Derived from table 16. 
HA-PRU 
0.14 
-3.14 
4.70 
-2.10 
0.56 
0.30 
-0.44 
The relationships between tenures revealed in this table corresponds 
closely with the relationship between tenures in Islington and 
Westminster (see table 8.17, chapter 8). Association tenants are skewed 
towards higher socio-economic groups in comparison to municipal tenants, 
and lower socio-economic groups in comparison to owner occupiers. There is 
no clear relationship between association tenants and privately rented 
tenants in this respect. The tendency for owner occupation to accomnodate 
high socio-economic groups and local author i ties to accomnodate low 
socio-economic groups is clearly demonstrated. Owner occupation has the 
highest proportion of household heads in the professional and managerial 
groups. Associations have the highest proportion in the intermediate and 
junior non-manual group (although almost as many owner occupiers are in 
this group). Local authorities have the highest proportion of household 
heads in the lowest three groups. Indeed, nearly three quarters of local 
authority household heads are in the lowest three socio-economic groups, 
whilst only 53% of association tenants are, and a mere 43% of owner 
occupiers are. 
The absolute differences reveal that, in England and Wales as a whole, 
association tenants are most like privately rented tenants, and least like 
owner occupiers: 
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39.86 
41.15 
11.38 
This is different from the situation in Islington and Westminster (see 
table 8.17), where the distribution of association household heads 
differed least from the distribution of local authority household heads. 
The fact that table 8.17 contains a grouped category for the retired does 
not alter the relationship between the absolute differences in that table, 
although it does make comparison of the actual figures in table 8.17 with 
those in this appendix difficul~ 
273 
BIBLIOORAPHY 
Internal policy documents prepared by the boroughs studied in this thesis 
are not included in the bibliography. References to these are contained as 
footnotes in the text. 
274 
Allaun, F (1974) Are Housing Associations the Answer?, Voluntary 
Housing, Vol.6 No.4, 14. 
Allen, J & McDowell, L (1982) The Impact of Shortholds, Housing 
Review, Vol.31 No.6, 194-197. 
Althusser, L (1971) Lenin and Philosophy, New Left Books, London. 
Ambrose, S (1979) The Role of Housing Associations in Inner London, BA 
in Urban and Regional Planning, Lanchester Polytechnic. 
Architects Journal (1979) The Third Arm, Architects Journal, Vol.170 
No.29, 118-119. 
Arden, A (1983) Report on Housing Associations to the Greater London 
Council, Greater London Council, London. 
Ash, J (1982a) Tenant Participation, Part One, Housing Review, Vol.31 
No.2, 55-57. 
Ash, J (1982b) Tenant Participation, Part Two, Housing Review, Vol.31 
No.4, 138-140. 
Ash, J (1982c) Tenant Participation, Part Three, Housing Review, 
Vol.31 No.5, 177-180. 
Ash, J (1984) Housing Co-operatives, Housing Review, Vol.33 No.1, 
14-17. 
AShby, G (1981) New Homes From Older Houses, Daily Telegraph, 
September ~th, 13a. 
Back, G (1983) Association Football, Roof, Vol.S No.3, 26-27. 
Back, G (19~4) Hard Times Arrive for the Typically British Movement, 
!own and Country Planning, Vol.53 No.5, 148-150. 
Bagot~ P (1971) A Comparative Study of Three Forms of Housing Tenure, 
Unlversity of Edinburgh, Architecture Research Unit, Edinburgh. 
Baker, C V (1976) Housing Associations, Estates Gazette, London. 
Balchin, P N (1981) Housing Improvement and Social Inequality, Gower, 
Aldershot. 
B 1 
a 1, M (1981) The Development of Capitalism in Housing Provision, 
. Lnternational Journal of Urban and Regional Research, VOl.5 No.2, 
145-177. 
Ball Cl M (1982) Housing Provision and the Economic Crisis, Capital and 
_ass, Vol.17, 60-77. 
275 
Ball, M (1983) Housing Policy and Economic Power, Methuen, London. 
Ball, M & Harloe, M (1974) Housing Policy in a Socialist Country: ~he 
Case of Poland, Centre for Environmental Studies (Research Paper 
No.8), London. 
Ball, M & Harloe, M (1981) Housing in Poland, in Cochrane, A, Hamnett, 
C & McDowell, L (Ed), City, Economy and Society: A Comparative 
Reader, Harper and Row, London. 
Bancroft, R (1979) Out of the Public Eye, Architect's Journal, Vol.169 
No.lO, 471-487. 
Barclay, I (1976) People Need Roots: The Story of St. Pancras Housing 
Association, Bedford Square Press, London. 
Barnett, M J (1969) The Politics of Legislation: The Rent Act 1957, 
Widenfeld and Nicholson, London. 
Barwick, N (1978) Misunderstandings About Housing Associations, Local 
Government Chronicle, Vol.5823, 1258-1260. 
Bassett, K & Short, J R (1980) Housing and Residential Structure, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Best, R (1979) Housing Associations and Housing Investment Programmes, 
Housing and Planning Review, Vol.35 No.1, 8-10. 
Best, R (1981) It's Housing By Halves, The Guardian, July 22nd, 18c. 
Bird, B & Palmer, J (Ed) (1979) Housing Association ~enants, The 
Housing Corporation and the Building Research Establishment, 
London. 
Birmingham University (1980) Housing Association Activity in Dudley, 
University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies 
(Working Paper No.74), Birmingham. 
BOddy, M & Fudge, C (Ed) (1981) The Local State: Theory and Practice, 
University of Bristol School for Advanced Urban Studies (Working 
Paper No.20), Bristol. 
BOWley, M (1945) Housing and the State, George Allen and Unwin, 
London. 
Branson, N (1979) Poplar ism, 1919- 1925, Lawrence and Wishart, London. 
Br' l~~'.M ' , Legg, C (1977) Should Training for Housing Association 
H af~ Dlffer from Training for Housing Department Staff?, Vol untary 
_OUslnS, VOl.9 No.2, 32-33. 
Bristol . 
ReI ~nlve~sity (1979) Implementation and the Central Local 
st a~lonshle, University of Bristol, School for Advanced Urban 
Udles, Bristol. 
276 
Brown, C (1983) Rebels Block Sale of Charity Homes, The Guardian, 
April 27th, Ig. 
Brown, C (1984) House of Lords Poses a Defeating Paradox for Labour, 
The Guardian, March 19th, 2a. 
Burke, G (1981) Housing and Social Justice, Longman, London. 
Burns, I (1980) Rehabilitated Housing in Liverpool, Housing Review, 
Vol.29 No.5, 145-147. 
Byrne, D (1982) Class and the Local State, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, Vol.6 No.1, 61-82. 
Byrne, D & Darner, S (1980) The State, The Balance of Class Forces, and 
Early Working-Class Housing Legislation, in Political Economy of 
Housing Workshop, Housing, Construction and the State, Political 
Economy of Housing Workshop (Conference or-Socialist Economists), 
London. 
Carpenter, R T (1980) Housing Associations and the State, Diploma in 
Town Planning, Leeds Polytechnic. 
Carvel, J (1982) Homes to Rent or For Sale?, The Guardian, September 
24th, 22c. 
Carvel, J (1983) The Home Truths, The Guardian, June 3rd, 4a. 
Carvel, J (1983) Homes Row Councillors Told to Consider Quitting, ~he 
Guardian, June 29th, 2a. 
Carvel, J (1983) Housing Association Building Cut Back, The Guardian, 
November 25th, 6g. 
Carvel, J (1984) Scheme Raises Rent Arrears By £6m, The Guardian, 
January 20th, 2d. 
Carvel, J (1984) Ministers Irritated by Right-to-Buy Reverses, The 
Guardian, March 1st, 4h. 
Castles, F (1978) The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routledge 
and Regan Paul, London. 
Chapman, S D & Bartlett, J N (1971) The Contribution of Building Clubs 
~nd Freehold Land Societies to Working Class Housing in Birmingham, 
ln Chapman, S D (Ed), The History of Working Class Housing, David 
and Charles, Newton Abbott. --
Chr~stians~n, S P (1983) Tenant Participation and Housing Improvement 
Y HOuslng Associations, Housing Review, Vol.32 No.1, 16-21. 
277 
Christoforou, C (1976) The Housing Problem- Its Epitome in the London 
Crisis: With Special Reference to Housing Associations, M.Phil 
Thesis, Edinburgh University. 
Clark, G (1980) Abolition of 436 Quangos by 1983 to Save £23m, The 
Guardian, December 4th, 2a. 
Clarke, J, Connell, I & McDonough, R (1977) Misrecognising Ideology: 
Ideology in Political Power and Social Classes, in Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology, Hutchinson, London. 
Clarke, S (1977) Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas' Theory of the 
State, Capital and Class, Vol.2, 1-31. 
Clay, T (1978) The Liverpool Co-ops, Architect's Journal, Vol.168 
No.27, 37-38. 
Cockburn, C (1977) The Local State, Pluto, London. 
Cowan, R (1981) When Tenants Take Over, Town and Country Planning, 
Vol.50 No.7/8, 196-197. 
Crine, A & Wintour, J (1980) HIPs: The Vital Statistics, Roof, Vol.5 
No.2, 52-54. 
Crosland, A (1971) Towards a Labour Housing Policy, Fabian Society 
(Tract No.4l0), London. 
CUllin~worth, J B (1979) Essays on Housing Policy, George Allen and 
Unw~n, London. 
Damer, S & Madigan, R (1974) The Housing Investigator, New Society, 
VOl.29 No.616, 226-227. ---
Denim, S (1984) A Goldmine of Information for Those With Patience, 
B22i, Vol.9 No.1, 8. 
Dennis, N (1970) People and Planning, Faber and Faber, London. 
Depart~ent of the Environment (1971) Report of the Central Housing 
Adv~sory Committee: Housing Associations, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1971) White Paper: Fair Deal For 
HOusing, Cmnd. No.4728, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1973) White Paper: Better Homes: The 
~ext Priorities, Cmnd. No.5339, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1973) White Paper: Widening the Choice: 
!he ~ Steps in Housing, Cmnd. No.5280, HMSO, London. 
278 
Department of the Environment (1974) Circular 160/74: The Housing Act 
19'74, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1974) Circular 170/74: The Housing Act 
1974: Housing Corporation and Housing -Associations, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1975) Circular 13/75: Renewal 
Strategies, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1975) Final Report of the Working Party 
on Housing Co-operatives, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1976) Circular 8/76: Housing 
Co-operatives, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1976) Report of the Working Group on 
New Forms of Social Owner ship and '!'enure, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1977) Circular IB/77: Housing Capital 
Expenditure: Arrangements for the Financial Year 1977-1978, HMSO, 
London. 
Department of the Environment (1977) Circular 63/77: Housing Strategy 
~ Investment Programmes: Arrangements for 1978-79, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1977) Green Paper: Housing Policy: A 
Consultative Document, Cmnd. No.6851, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1978) Circular 38/78: HSIPs for Local 
Authorities in England: Arrangements for 1979-1980, HMSO, London. 
Department of the Environment (1980) Circular 21/80: Housing Acts 1974 
~ 1980, HMSO, London. 
Dickens, P (1978) Social Change, Housing and the State; Some Aspects 
of Class Fragmentation and Incorporation 1915-1946, in Harloe, M 
(Ed), Urban Change and Conflict, Centre for Environmental Studies, 
London. ---
DOig, A (1979) The Machinery of Government and the Growth of 
Governmental Bodies, Public Administration, Vol.57, 309-331. 
DOnnison, D & Ungerson, C (1982) Housing Policy, Penguin, 
liarmondsworth. 
Duclaud Williams, R H (1978) The Politics of Housing in Britain and 
~rance, Heinemann, London. 
Duncan, J & Ley, D (1982) Structural Marxism and Human Geography: A 
Critical Assessment, Annals of the Association of American 
&eographers, Vol.72 No.1, 30-59-.--
279 
Duncan, S S (1978) Housing Reform, the Capitalist State and Social 
Democracy, University of Sussex (Working Papers in Urban and 
Regional Studies No.9), Falmer. 
Duncan, S S (1~78) Housing Provision in Advanced Ca~italism: Sweden in 
the 1970s, University of Sussex (working Papers 1n Urban and 
Regional Studies No.lO), Falmer. 
Duncan, S S (1981) Housing policy, the Methodology of Levels, and 
Urban Research: the Case of Castells, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, Vol.5 No.2, 231-254. --
Duncan, S S & Goodwin, M (1982a) The Local State and Restructuring 
Social Relations, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, Vol.6 No.2, 157-185. 
Duncan, S S & Goodwin, M. (1982b) The Local State, Political Geography 
Quarterly, Vol.l No.1, 77-96. 
Dunleavy, P (1977) Protest and Quiescence in Urban Politics, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.l No.2, 
193-218. 
Dunleavy, P (1980) Urban Political Analysis, Macmillan, London. 
Dunleavy, P (1981) The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-1975, 
Clarendon, Oxford. 
Edel, M (1982) Home Ownership and Working Class Unity, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.6 No.2, 205-222. 
Edmonds, R (1982) The ~enantls Charter- the Need for Information, 
Advice and Consultation, Housing Review, Vol.31 No.1, 26-29. 
EngliSh, J (l982a) Must Council Housing Become Welfare Housing? Part 
One: Council Housing at the Crossroads, Housing Review, Vol.31 
NO.5, 154-156. 
English, J (1982b) The Choice for Council Housing, in English, J (Ed), 
~ Future of Council Housing, Croom Helm, London. 
Filkin, G & McMorran, J (1979) Improved Houses for Sale: A New Role 
for Inner City Housing Associations?, Housing Review, Vol.2H No.1, 
24-20. 
FlYnn, R (1978) State and Planning: A Review and Critique of Some 
Recent Marxist Writings, Public Administration Bulletin, Vol.2H, 
4-16. 
FlYnn, R (1981) Managing Consensus: Strategies and Rationales in 
pOliCY-Making, in Harloe, M (Ed), New Perspectives in Urban Change 
~~ Conflict, Heinemann, London. 
280 
Flynn, T (1981) Local Politics and Local Government, Capital and 
Class, Vol.13, 114-127. 
Forrest, R (1984) Marginalisation and Subsidised Individualism: The 
Sale of Council Houses in the Restructuring of the Welfare State, 
Conference on the Changing Public Sector, University of Glasgow. 
Foster, J (1979) How Imperial London Preserved Its Slums, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.3, 
93-114. 
Francis, P (1978) Boom Days for Housing's 'Third Arm', The Observer, 
April 30th, 20c. 
Franey, R (1981) Co-ownerships; ••• But the Poor Lose Out, Roof, Vol.6 
No.5, 7-8. 
Gallagher, P (1982) Ideology and Housing Management, in English, J 
(Ed), The Future of Council Housing, Croom Helm, London. 
Gauldie, E (1974) Cruel Habitations: A History of Working-Class 
Housing 1780-1918, George Allen and Unwin, London. 
Ginsburg, N (1979) Class, Capital and Social Policy, Macmillan, 
London. 
GOld, D, Lo, C & Wright, E (1975a) Recent Developments in Marxist 
Theories of the Capitalist State, Monthly Review, Vol.27 No.5, 
29-43. 
GOld, 0, Lo, C & Wright, E (1975b) Recent Developments in Marxist 
Theories of the Capitalist State, Part Two, Monthly Review, Vol.27 
NO.6, 36-51. 
GOOdwin, M (1980) State Housing Policy, The Limits of Central and 
Local Implementation, London School of Economics (Discussion Paper 
NO.79), London. 
Gough, I (1975) State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism, New Left 
!eview, Vol.92, 53-92. 
Gough, I (1979) The Political Economy of the Welfare State, Macmillan, 
London. 
Gray, F (1976a) Selection and Allocation in Council Housing, 
~ransactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. l No.1, 
34-46. - --
Gray, F (1976b) The Management of Local Authority Housing, in 
PO~itical Economy of Housing works~op, Housing and Class in 
~ltain, Political Economy of Houslng Workshop (Conference of 
SOcialist Economists), London. 
281 
Gray, F (1979) Consumption: Council House Management, in Merrett, S, 
State Housing in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Greater London Council (1981) Housing Strategy and Investment 
Programmes 1982-83, GLC, London. 
Greater London Council (1983) Analysis of 1982 London Borough and GLC 
Submissions, GLC, London. 
Greve, J (1971) Voluntary Housing in Scandinavia, University of 
Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies -(Occasional Paper 
No.21), Birmingham. 
Griffith, JAG (1966) Central Departments and Local Authorities, 
George Allen and Unwin, London. 
Griffiths, D & Holmes, C (1984) To Buy or Not to Buy ••• Is That the 
Question?, Marxism Today, Vol.28 No.5, 8-13. 
Groves, R & Niner, P (1983) A Register of Housing Research in England 
and Wales Since 1980, University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban 
and Regional Studies (Research Memorandum No.95), Birmingham. 
GUardian, The (1982) Housing Group's Role, The Guardian, January ~Oth, 
2f. 
Guardian, The (1983) Charity Homes Sale Measure Attacked, The 
Guardian, April 12th, 5a. 
GUardian, The (1983) Housing Sell-Off 'Illegal', The Guardian, April 
14th, 18a. 
Hadley, R & Hatch, S (1981) Social Welfare and the Failure of the 
State, George Allen and Unwin, London. 
Hall, P (1983) Ebenezer Howard: Has His Time Come at Last?, Town and 
Country Planning, Vol.52 No.2, 42-47. 
Hall, S, Lumley, B & McLennan, G (1977) Politics and Ideology: 
Gramsci, in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, On 
Ideology, Hutchinson, London. --
Hallett, G (1977) Housing and Land Policies in West Germany and 
~ritain, MacMillan, London. 
Hamnett, C & Randolph, B (1981) Flat Break-Up and Decline of the 
Privately Rented Sector, Estates Gazettei Vo1.2bO No.6054, 31-JS. 
Hands, J (1978) The Co-operative Housing Agency: 18 Months On, Housing 
~view, Vol.27 No.6, 148-15U. 
282 
Hands, J & Barrett, B (1974) London Boroughs and Housing Associations, 
Student Co-operative Dwellings (Research Report No.2), Lonaon. 
Harloe, M (1978) Housing and the State: Recent British Developments, 
International Social Science Journal, Vol.XXX No.3, 591-603. 
Harloe, M (1981) 'l'he Recommodification of Housing, in Harloe, M & 
Lebas, E, City, Class and Capital, Edward Arnold, London. 
Harloe, M, Issacharoff, R & Minns, R (1974) The Organisation of 
Housing, Heinemann, London. 
Hatch, S & Mocroft, I (1979) The Relative Costs of Services Provided 
by Voluntary and Statutory Organizations, Public Administration, 
Vol.S7, 397-405. 
~eadey, B (1978) Housing Policy in the Developed Economy, Croom Helm, 
London. 
Hencke, 0 (1980) Home Groan, The Guardian, November 4th, 15a. 
Heseltine, M (1979) Why We Must Curb the Bureaucrats, The Sunday 
Times, December 19th, 16b. 
Hesselbach, W (1976) Public, Trade Union and Co-operative Enterprise 
in Germany, Frank Cass, London. 
Hillman, J (1980) 'l'he Shrinking Pool of Private-Rented Housing, New 
Society, Vol.S3 No.920, 17-18. 
HOle, V (1979) Social Research into Housing- A Review of Progress in 
Britain Since World War II, Local Government Studies, Vol.S No.6, 
23-40. 
HOlland, P & Fallon, M (1978) The Quango Explosion, Conservative 
Political Centre, London. 
HOlloway, J & Picciotto, S (1977) Capital, Crisis and the State, 
Capital and Class, Vol.2, 76-101. 
HOlloway, J & Picciotto, S (1978) Towards a Materialist Theory of the 
State, in Holloway, J & Picciotto, S (~d), State and Capital: A 
Marxist Debate, Edward Arnold, London. 
Hooper, A (1978) The Political Economy of Housing in Britain, 
£nternational Journal of Urban and Regional Research, VOl.2 No.1, 
175-187. 
Hooper, A (1982) Neo-Weberian Political Sociology: The Politics of 
COllective Consumption, Political Geography Quarterly, vol.l NO.1, 
97-107. 
283 
House of Commons (1961) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1961 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1961) Hansard: Session 1960/1961, Standing Committee 
~ 1961 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1963) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1963 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1963) Hansard: Session 1963/1964, Standing Committee 
~ 1963 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1971) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1971 Housing Finance Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1971) Hansard: Session 1971/1972, Standing Commitee 
~ 1971 Housing Finance Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1974) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1974 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1974) Hansard: Session 1973/1974, Standing Committee 
B, 1974 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1979) Parliamentary Paper No.327: Committee of 
Public Accounts, 5th Report of Session 1978/1979; Housing 
associations and the Housing Corporation, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1980) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1980 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1980) Hansard: Session 1979/1980, Standing Committee 
F, 1980 Housing Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1982) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1982 Housing and Building Control Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Commons (1982) Hansard: Session 1982/1983, Standing Committee 
fL 1982 Housing and Building Control Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Lords (1983) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
Debate on the 1982 Housing and Building Control Bill, HMSO, London. 
House of Lords (1984) Hansard: Official Report of the Second Reading 
~ebate on the 1983 Housing and Building Control Bill, HMSO, London. 
HOUSing Corporation (1975) Circular 1/75: The Selection of Tenants ~ 
~Ousing Associations for Subsidised Schemes, Housing Corporation, 
London. ---
HOUSing Corporation (1978) Circular 3/78: In The Public Eye, Housing 
Corporation, London. 
284 
Housing Corporation (1981) Circular 24/81: The Approved Development 
Programme, Housing Corporation, London. 
Housing Corporation (1982a) Directory of Registered Housing 
Associations, Housing Corporation, London. 
Housing Corporation (1982b) Housing Corporation News Special: Funds 
for Associations in 1982/83 in England, Housing Corporation, 
London. 
Housing Corporation (1982c) Housing Corporation News Special: 1983/84 
Programme for England Announced, Housing Corporation, London. 
Housing Corporation (1983a) Analysis of the 1982 Statistical Returns 
from Registered Housing Associations in England and Wales, Housing 
Corporation, London. 
Housing Corporation (1983b) Housing Corporation N~ws Special: The 
Development Programme in England in 1984/85, Housing Corporation, 
London. 
Housing Corporation (1983c) Circular 5/83: Cost Criteria for Housing 
Association Schemes 1983/84: Newbuild and Rehabilitation for Rent, 
Housing Corporation, London. --- --- ----
Housing Corporation (1983d) Circular 19/83: Cost Criteria for Housing 
Associations; Newbuild and Rehabilitation for Rent, Housing 
Corporation, London. --- ----
Housing Review (1971) Housing Associations: Reference Sheet No.4, 
Housing Review, Voi.20 No.3. 
Jessop, B (1977) Recent Theories of the Capitalist State, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, Vol.i, 353-375. 
Jessop, B (1982) The Capitalist State, Martin Robertson, Oxford. 
JOhnson, N (1979) Quangos and the Structure of British Government, 
Public Administration, Vol.57, 379-395. 
Jones, P (1980a) Improving Liverpool's Housing, Town and Country 
flanning, Vol.49 No.2, 46-48. 
Jones, P (1980b) Housing Associations in Housing Action Areas, Housing 
~n~ Planning Review, Vol.36 No.2, 5-9. 
Jones, P (1981) Housing Associations and House Improvement, Town and 
~ountry Planning, Vol.50 No.4, 113-114. ---- ---
Jones, P (1983) Improvement for Sale by Housing Associations, Housing 
~eview, Vol.32 No.2, 54-55. 
285 
Karn, v (1977) '£he Newe st Profession, Roof, Vol.2 No.6, 177-179. 
Karn, V (1979) How Can We Liberate Council Tenants?, New Society, 
Vol.47 No.860, 738-740. 
Kemeny, J (1978) Forms of Tenure and Social Structure: A Comparison of 
Owning and Renting in Australia and Sweden, British Journal of 
Sociology, Vol.29 No.1, 41-56. 
Kemeny, J (1981) The Myth of Home Ownership, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. 
King, N (1982) Association Tendering Grinds to a Halt, Roof, Vol.7 
No.6, 9. 
King, N (1984) Housing Association Cuts will Mean Fewer Homes, Roof, 
Vol.9 No.1, 9. 
Kinghan, M (1981) Create Your Own Housing, The Planner, Vol.67 No.3, 
68-69. 
Kinsey, G (1978) Reflections on Housing Association Activity, Public 
Finance and Accountancy, Vo1.S No.8, 408-409. 
Kirby, A (1981) The Housing Corporation 1974-1979: An Example of State 
Housing Policy in Britain, Environment and Planning ill, Vol.13 
No.10, 1295-1303. 
Kirkpatrick, B (1982) Association Staffing, Roof, Vol.7 No.4, 5. 
Kirkpatrick, B (1983) Criticism of Housing Association Committee 
Structure, Housing Review, Vol.32 No.1, 4-5. 
Labour Party, The (1981) A Future for Public Housing, Labour Party, 
London. 
Laclau, E (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left 
Books, London. 
Lambert, J, Paris, C & Blackaby, B (1978) Housing Policy and the 
State, MacMillan, London. 
Leather, P (1984) Housing Allocations and the GNI, Housing Review, 
Vol.33 No.1, 9-1J. 
LeWi~, A (1981) Housing Co-operatives in Developing Countries, John 
W~ley and Sons, Chichester. 
Lewis, N (1976) Council House Allocation: Problems of Discretion and 
COntrol, Public Administration, Vol. 54, 147-160. 
286 
Lukes, S (1977) Essays in Social Theory, MacMillan, London. 
Lundqvist, L (1984) Housing Policy and Alternative Housing Tenures: 
Some Scandinavian Examples, Policy and Politics, Vol.12 No.1, 1-12. 
Macey, J (1979) Rents for Council Housing and Housing Associations, 
Voluntary Housing, Vol.ll No.1, 6-7. 
Marcuse, P (1978) Housing policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, 
Social Policy, Vol.8 No.4, 21-26. 
Marcuse, P (1982) Building Housing Theory: Notes on Some Recent Work, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.6 No.1, 
115-121. 
Mason, T (1980) Can Housing Associations be Large and Sensitive to 
Local Needs?, Housing Review, Vol.29 No.5, 147-148. 
Matthews, R (1981) Cuts Escape, Roof, Vol.6 No.2, 7. 
MCDougall, G (1979) The State, Capital and Land: The History of Town 
Planning Revisited, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, Vol.3, 361-380. --
MCDowell, L & Allen, J (1982) The Impact of Municipal Rehousing on the 
Private Rented Sector, Housing Review, Vol.31 No.5, 156-158. 
MCKay, D & Cox, A (1979) The Politics of Urban Change, Croom Helm, 
London. 
Melling, J (Ed) (1980) Housing, Social Policy and the State, Croom 
Helm, London. 
Mellor, H (1983) Democracy and Accountability in Housing Associations, 
HOusing Review, Vol.32 No.3, 84-85. 
Merrett, S (1979) State Housing in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. 
Miles, M (1983) Housing Associations: Grant Redemption Fund and Future 
Rental Surpluses, Housing Review, Vol.32 No.1, 13-10. 
Miller, M (1979) Garden City Influence on the Evolution of Housing 
POlicy, Local Government Studies, Vol.5 No.6, 5-22. 
M' lller, M (1980) In Search of the £150 Cottage, Town and Country 
~lanning, Vol.49 No.2, 48-50. ---- ---
Miller, S (1978) The Recapitalization of Capitalism, International 
~Ournal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.2 No.2, 202-212. 
287 
Mills, M (1984) Housing Associations: Recent ~rends, Present Aims, 
Future Prospects, Housing Review, Vol.33 No.1, 18-20. 
Milton Wilkinson, C & Thurman, I (1981) Land and Housing Associations, 
Bournville Village Trust, Birmingham. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1954) Circular 58/54: 
Housing Repair and Rents Act 1954: Section 33, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1961) White Paper: Housing 
in England and Wales, Cmnd. No.1290, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1962) Circular 12/62: 
Housing Associations in England and Wales, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1963) Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Cmnd. No.2338, HMSO, 
London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1963) White Paper: Housing, 
Cmnd. No.2050, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1964) Circular 41/64: The 
Housing Act 1964, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1965) Report of the 
Committee on Housing in Greater London, Cmnd. No.2605, HMSO, 
London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1965) White Paper: The 
Housing Programme 1965 to 1970, Cmnd. No.2838, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1967) Circular 73/67: 
Subsidies for Housing Associations, HMSO, London. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1969) Ninth Report of the 
Housing Management Sub-Committee of the Central Housing Advisory 
Committee: Council Housing, Purposes, Procedures and Priorities, 
HMSO, London. 
M'Kenzie-Hall, J (1971) Low Cost Homes to Rent or Buy, Robert Hale, 
London. 
Moreton, J (1975) Tenants into Owners, New Society, Vol.33 No.670, 
295-296. 
Moreton, J (1980) Housing Associations Face the Double Edged Axe, 
!oof, Vol.5 No.6, 167-168. 
MOUffe, C (1979) Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, in Mouffe, C (Ed), 
~amsci and Marxist ~heory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
288 
Murie, A (1982) A New Era For Council Housing?, in English, J (Ed), 
The Future of Council Housing, Croom Helm, London. 
Murie, A & Forrest, R (1980) Wealth, Inheritance and Housing Policy, 
Policy and Politics, Vol.8 No.1, 1-19. 
National Building Agency, (1974) Housing Associations: A Review of 
Recent Trends, N.B.A., London. 
National Federation of Housing Associations, (1977) The Response of 
the National Federation of Housing Associations Council to the 
GOVernment's Consultative-Document on Housing Policy, N.F:H.A., 
London. 
National Federation of Housing Associations, (1978a) Housing 
Associations: Some Information From the National Federation of 
Housing AssociatIOns, N.F.H.A., London. 
National Federation of Housing Associations, (1978b) Housing 
Associat~ons: Their Part in Britain's Housing, N.F.H.A., London. 
National Federation of Housing Associations, (1979) Housing 
Association Tenants, N.F.H.A., London. 
National Federation of Housing Associations, (1983) Housing 
Associations: Their Contribution and Potential, N.F.H.A., London. 
Nevitt, A A (1966) Housing Taxation and Subsidies, Nelson, London. 
Niner, P (1975) Local Authority Housing Policy and Practice, 
University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 
Birmingham. 
Niner, P (1979) Associations Match Council Selection, Roof, Vol.4 
NO.4, 125-126. 
Noble, D (1979) Policing Voluntary Housing, Roof, Vol.4 No.4, 122-124. 
NOyes, H (1981) Heseltine to Force Homes Sale, The Times, December 
4th, 4d. 
Page, D & Ramsay, E (1~84) Association Arrears Hit New Peak, Roof, ' 
Vo1.9 No.2, 3-4. 
Page! D. (Ed) (1971) Housing Associations: Three Surveys, University of 
B~rm~ngham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Birmingham. 
Paris, C (1977) Policy Change: Ideological Consensus and Conflict, in 
Hsarl~e, M (Ed), Urban Change and Conflict, Centre for Environmental tUd~es, London. 
289 
Pickvance, C (1978) Explaining State Intervention: Some ~heoretical 
and Empirical Considerations, in Harloe, M (Ed), Urban Change and 
Conflict Conference, Centre for Environmental Studies, London. 
Pickvance, C (1980) The Role of Housing in the Reproduction of Labour 
Power, and the Analysis of State Intervention in Housing, in 
Political Economy of Housing Workshop, Housing, Construction and 
the State, Political Economy of Housing Workshop (Conference ~ 
Socialist Economists), London. 
Pickvance, C (1981) Policies as Chameleons: An Interpretation of 
Regional Policy and Office Policy in Britain, in Dear, M & Scott, A 
J (Ed), Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society, 
Methuen, London. 
Piper, S (1976) More Space and Gardens: A Survey of Housing 
Association Tenants, Housing Review, Vol.25 No.2, 46. 
Plumridge, R (1970) SNAP- A Pacemaker in Liverpool, Voluntary Housing, 
Vol.2 No.3, 30-3J. 
Poulantzas, N (1967) Marxist Political Theory in Great Britain, New 
~ Review, Vol.43, 57-74. 
POulantzas, N (1973) Political Power and Social Classes, New Left 
Books, London. 
Poulantzas, N (1974) Fascism and Dictatorship, New Left Books, London. 
Power, A (1979) Facts and Figures About Holloway Tenant Co-operative, 
H.T.C./North Islington Housing Rights Project, London. 
Raynsford, N (1980) The Role of Voluntary Organisations in Housing, 
Housing and Planning Review, Vol.36 No.1, 13-15. 
Roberts, T (1983) Extending the Tenant's Right to Buy, ~he Guardian, 
April 16th, 20a. 
RObson,.A (1974) The Provision of Low Cost Rented Housing: With 
~~clal Reference to the Voluntary Housing Movement, M. Phil 'I'hesis, 
Unlversity of London.---
Rose, 0, Saunders, P, Newby, H & Bell, C (1976) Ideologies of 
Property: A Case Study, Sociological Review, Vol.24 No.4, 699-731. 
Saunders P . . J ' (1978) Domestlc Property and Soclal Class, International 
_ournal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.2 No.2, 233-251. 
Saunders, P (1979) Urban Politics, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
290 
Saunders, P (1981) Social Theory and the Urban Question, Hutchinson, 
London. 
Saunders, P (1982a) Why Study Central-Local Relations?, Local 
Government Studies, Vol.8 No.2, 54-66. 
Saunders, P (1982b) Beyond Housing Classes: The Sociological 
Significance of Private Property Rights in Means of Consumption, 
University of Sussex (Working Papers in Urban and Regional Studies 
No.33), Falmer. 
Saunders, P (1983) On the Shoulders of Which Giant? The Case for 
Weberian Political Analysis, in Williams, P (Ed), Social Process 
~ the City, George Allen and Unwin, London. 
Savill, D (1982) Tenant Participation in Housing Management in Sweden, 
Housing Review, Vol.3l No.6, 209-212. 
Sayer, A (1979) Theory and Empirical Research in Urban and Regional 
Political Economy: A Sympathetic Critique, University of Sussex 
(Working Papers in Urban and Regional Studies No.14), Falmer. 
Sayer, A (1982) Explanation in Economic Geography: Abstraction Versus 
Generalization, Progress in Human Geography, Vol.6 No.1, 68-88. 
Schifferes, S & Matthews, R (1980) Shelter's 1980 HIP Survey, Shelter, 
London. 
Short, J (1981) Decline of the British Landlord, Geographical 
Magazine, Vol.LIII No.2, 787-792. 
Short, J (1982) Housing in Britain: The Post War Experience, Methuen, 
London. -- --
Skellington, R (1981) Bow Blacks Lose Out in Council Housing, New 
SOciety, Vol.55 No.950, 187-189. 
Sk' l~ner, D & Langdon, J (1974) The Story of Clay Cross, Spokesman 
Books, Nottingham. 
Smi~h, R (1982) Improvement For Sale: A Role For Housing Associations 
~ ~ome Ownership?, University of Sheffield, Department of Town and 
ReglOnal Planning (Occasional Paper No.36), Sheffield. 
Social Democratic Party, (1983) A Strategy for Housing, Social 
Democratic Party, London. 
soc~a~ D~mocratic Party/Liberal Alliance, (1983) Working Together for 
_rltaln, S.D.P./Liberal Party, London. 
Spencer, L & Dale A (1979) Integration and Regulation in 
Organizations:'A Contextual Approach, Sociological Review, Vol.27 
NO.4, 679-702. 
291 
Spring, M (1980) Community Work, Building, Vol.239 No.71S7, 47. 
btack, U (196&) The Development of a Housing Association, University 
of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Research (Occasional 
Paper No.1), Birmingham. 
Stanton, C (1979) Growth of the Co-ops, Building Design, Vol.433, 18. 
Stanworth, P & Giddens, A (Ed) (1974) Elites and Power in British 
Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Stedman Jones, G (1976) Outcast London, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
Sudjic, D (1979) Freeing Tenants Inside Their Homes, New Society, 
Vol.46 No.839, 263-264. 
SUmmers, 0 (1981) The Road to ~Jelfare Housing, 'l'own and Country 
Planning, Vol.SO No.7/8, 185-187. 
Swann, J (1975) Housing Associations: A Socialist Critique, in 
Political Economy of Housing Workshop, Political Economy and the 
Housing Question, Political Economy of Housing Workshop (Conference 
of Socialist Economists), London. 
Swenarton, M (1981) Homes Fit For Heroes, Heinemann, London. 
SYdney, A (1979) A History of the Samuel Lewis Housing Trust: 
1901-1974, S.L.H.T., London. 
Tarn, J N (1966) The Peabody Donation Fund: The Role of a Housing 
Society in the Nineteenth Century, Victorian Studies, Vol.10 NO.1, 
7-::S8. 
'l'arn, J N (1968) The Housing Problem a Century Ago, Urban Studies, 
Vol.S No.3, 290-jOO. 
Tarn, J N (1971) Working-Class Housing in 19th-Century Britain, Lund 
Humphries, London. 
Tarn, J N (1973) Five Per Cent Philanthropy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge:----
'l'h 
omas, A D (1979) Area Based House Improvement: The Role of Local 
~~thorities in England, Local Government Studies, Vol.S No.6, 
!lJ-68. 
Tho~a~, D C (1981) The Implications of Differential Rates of Capital 
~aln,From Owner Occupation for the Formation and Development of 
ROUslng Classes, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
_esearch, Vol.S No.2, 205-217. 
292 
Thompson, A (1977a) The Role of Housing Associations in Major Urban 
Areas, University of Birmingham (Centre for Urban and Regional 
Studies), Birmingham. 
Thompson, A (1977b) What Role for Housing Associations- and Who 
Benefits?, Voluntary Housing, Vol.9 No.3, 28-32. 
Times, The (1984) Noble Tripwires, The Times, March 6th, 15a. 
Treasury (19Bl) White Paper: The Government's Expenditure Plans 
1981-82 to 1983-84, Cmnd. No.8175, HMSO, London. 
Treasury (1982) White Paper: The Government's Expenditure Plans 
1982-83 to 1984-85, Cmnd. No.B494, HMSO, London. 
Treasury (1983) White Paper: The Government's Expenditure Plans 
1983-84 to 1985-86, Cmnd. No.8789, HMSO, London. 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1975) 
Non-Profit Housing Associations, United Nations, New York. 
Waddilove, L (1962) Housing Associations, Planning, Vol.XXVIII No.462, 
113-152. 
Walker, D (1981a) Heseltine's Right to Speed House Sales Challenged, 
The Times, December 5th, 2a. 
Walker, D (1981b) Norwich Loses Homes Sale Fight, The Times, December 
19th, If. 
Walker, D (1982) Norwich Loses Appeal on Sale of Houses, The Times, 
February 10th, 4a. 
Walker, R (1984) Extending the Right To Buy, Roof, Vol.9 No.2, 7. 
Watson, S (1983) Housing, Homelessness and the Single woman, PhD 
Thesis, The Open University. 
Webster, P (1981) Heseltine Faces Challenge on Norwich House Sales, 
~ 'l' imes, November 6th, 4f. 
White, J (1978) Simpler to Buy Them?, New Society, Vol.44 No.811, 
132-133. 
Williams, P (Ed) (1983) Social Process and the City, George Allen and 
Unwin, London. 
Williams, R (1973) Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory, 
~ ~ Review, Vol.82, 3-16. 
Wilson, M (1983) Black Housing Associations, Voluntary Action, Vol.lS, 
20-21. 
293 
Wohl, A S (1971) The Housing of the Working Classes in London 
1815-1914, in Chapman, S D (Ed), The History of Working Class 
Housing, David and Charles, Newton Abbot. 
Woh1, A S (1977) The Eternal Slum, Edward Arnold, London. 
Wolmar, C (1979) Whose Share in the Future?, Roof, Vo1.4 No.5, 
146-148. 
Wolmar, C (1981) Co-ownerships: Most Make Money, Roof, Vol.6 No.5, 7. 
WOlmar, C (1982) Corporation Critics, Roof, Vol.7 No.5, 12-14. 
Wolmar, C (1984) Buying Off Charity Tenants, New Statesman, Vo1.107 
No.2761, 4. 
Yelling, J (1982) L.C.C. Slum Clearance Policies, 1889-1907, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol.7 No.3, 
292-303. 
Young, K & Kramer, J (1978) Strategy and Conflict in Metropolitan 
Housing, Heinemann, London. 
294 
